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Is peacekeeping intervention? This is the central theme which runs 
throughout this thesis. Since its conception in the mid-1950s, peacekeeping 
has significantly evolved from traditional, passive, monitoring and 
observing operations to robust, multi-dimensional stabilisation operations. 
This raises questions as to whether this is simply a natural evolution of 
peacekeeping or whether it marks an expansion of the concept of 
peacekeeping beyond its boundaries, pushing it into the realm of peace 
enforcement or intervention. Put simply, has peacekeeping evolved too far? 
Focusing on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), this thesis seeks 
to understand the relationship between United Nations peacekeeping and 
the principle of non-intervention. It therefore explores the boundaries 
between the two, by examining peacekeeping’s legal and normative 
frameworks, questioning whether, at times, peacekeeping becomes a form 
of intervention. Uniquely applying a Third World Approaches to International 
Law (TWAIL) lens, it provides new insights into intervention and 
peacekeeping, contributing to recent trends that seek to reimagine or 
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Is peacekeeping intervention? This is the central theme which runs 
throughout this thesis. Since its conception in the mid-1950s, peacekeeping 
has significantly evolved from traditional, passive, monitoring and 
observing operations to robust, multi-dimensional stabilisation operations, 
with seemingly endless lists of mandated tasks. In recent years, despite the 
continued existence of some traditional models of peacekeeping 
operations,1 the UN has increasingly deployed multi-faceted operations to 
‘stabilise’ complex, fragile settings and enable state institutions to flourish, 
reflecting a state-centric, stabilisation approach to peacekeeping.2 This 
noticeable drift from the traditional understanding of peacekeeping raises 
questions as to whether this is simply a natural evolution of peacekeeping 
or whether it marks an expansion of the concept of peacekeeping beyond 
                                   
1 For example: UNFICYP, UNSC Res 2561 (29 January 2021) UN Doc S/RES/2561.  
2 AC Day and CT Hunt, ‘UN Stabilisation Operations and the Problem of Non-Linear Change: A Relational Approach 
to Intervening in Governance Ecosystems’ (2020) 9(1) Stability 1-23, 1.  
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its boundaries, pushing it into the realm of peace enforcement or 
intervention. Put simply, has peacekeeping evolved too far? 
Focusing on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the beating heart 
of Africa, this thesis seeks to understand the relationship between United 
Nations (UN) peacekeeping and the principle of non-intervention. That is, it 
explores the boundaries between peacekeeping and intervention, 
questioning whether, at times, peacekeeping becomes a form of coercive 
action designed to influence change in the host state and, therefore, 
intervention. In order to do this, the thesis begins by examining the history 
of intervention and the development of the principle of non-intervention, 
before outlining the evolution of peacekeeping, clarifying its legal and 
normative frameworks which, together, form a complex red boundary line 
around peacekeeping, separating it from intervention and thus preventing 
it from violating the principle of non-intervention. This analysis is then taken 
further, through an exploration of the interpretation and application of 
peacekeeping’s norms and legal principles in the Congo – the largest arena 
within which UN peacekeeping has evolved. The aim of the thesis is to 
attempt to provide an overview of the contemporary peacekeeping 
frameworks and to understand how the fluidity of these frameworks has 
allowed peacekeeping to be used (and abused) by dominant powers in the 
furtherance of their interests and agendas, resulting in peacekeeping being 
used to legitimate intervention. As such, it will be questioned whether there 
needs to be a redrawing of peacekeeping’s boundary lines, in order to 
reaffirm the distinction between peacekeeping and intervention. The 
 3 
purpose of this research, then, is to provide clarification on these issues, 
with the aim of contributing to recent trends that seek to reimagine or 
reinvigorate UN peacekeeping.3 
2. Methodology  
Both the principle of non-intervention and the concept of peacekeeping are 
ill-defined, with no formal, legal basis rooted in a definitive Charter, Act or 
body of law. Instead, the principle of non-intervention has developed, 
predominantly, from UN General Assembly Resolutions and Declarations4 
and interpretations by the International Court of Justice (ICJ)5 and regional 
organisations.6 Similarly, peacekeeping was conceived through 
interpretations of the UN Charter, the implied powers of the Security 
Council,7 General Assembly,8 and Secretary-General,9 decisions from the 
ICJ10 and is based upon the three fundamental principles of consent, 
impartiality and non-use of force.11 The thesis will therefore consult and 
interpret primary sources such as Security Council and General Assembly 
Resolutions; Secretary-General Reports and Bulletins and case law of the 
ICJ. It will aim to ‘seek out, discover, construct or reconstruct rules and 
principles’12 relating to intervention and peacekeeping, in an attempt to 
                                   
3 Such as the UN Secretary-General’s ‘Action for Peacekeeping’ initiative: UN Peacekeeping, ‘A4P+ Priorities for 
2021-2023’ <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/a4p_background_paper.pdf>  
4 For example: Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation 
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, UN Doc A/Res/2625 (XXV) (24 October 
1970). 
5 For example: Corfu Channel Case (UK v Albania) (Merits) [1949] ICJ Rep 4, 132-169. 
6 Such as the Organisation of African Unity and African Unity. 
7 See: Articles 24(1), 36(1), 40 UN Charter. 
8 See: Articles 10, 11(2), 12, 14 UN Charter. 
9 See: Articles 97-99 UN Charter. 
10 Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 2 of the Charter) (Advisory Opinion) [1962] ICJ 
Rep 151. 
11 UNGA, ‘Summary Study’ A/3943 (9 October 1958) UN Doc A/3943. 
12 R Banakar and M Travers, ‘Law, Sociology and Method’ in R Banakar and M Travers (eds) Theory and Method 
in Socio-Legal Research (Hart 2005) 7. 
 4 
clarify the current legal and normative frameworks and to set the basis for 
further theoretical analysis. 
When identifying the legal rules and principles governing intervention and 
peacekeeping, the thesis will take this doctrinal approach further by 
adopting a socio-legal approach. In doing so, it will consider the wider, 
historical and social structures which have influenced the concepts of non-
intervention and peacekeeping, rather than just assuming or accepting the 
legal rules and legal doctrine as autonomous or internally constructed.13 
Indeed, within Chapters 2 and 3, in particular, as the development of the 
principle of non-intervention and the concept of peacekeeping are explored, 
respectively, broader social and historical events which influenced their 
development are considered. The thesis will therefore examine both the 
‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’ history of intervention and UN peacekeeping.14 That 
is, it will explore the development of these two concepts within international 
law (resolutions, declarations, case law) and, simultaneously, the ‘extrinsic’ 
history of their relationship to general history and other social phenomena. 
Allott argues that by examining the history of international law itself 
(‘intrinsic’ history) it will ‘re-form our consciousness of the identity, the 
functioning, and the potentiality of international law as law’.15 Whilst writing 
the ‘extrinsic’ history ‘will re-form our consciousness of the role of 
international law in the forming, re-forming, and re-making of international 
                                   
13 CM Campbell and P Wiles, ‘The Study of Law in Society in Britain’ (1976) 10 L&SR 547-578, 553. 
14 P Allott, ‘International Law and the Idea of History’ (1999) 1 JHistIntLaw 1-22. 
15 ibid 20.  
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society’.16 Mapping the historical development of the principle of non-
intervention and UN peacekeeping will therefore offer a better 
understanding of how the principle and peacekeeping operate today. 
2.1 Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) 
The law of international organisation ‘is still somewhat immature’, in that 
there is no convincing theoretical framework governing the area.17 In 
particular, as Klabbers notes, ‘international legal doctrine has a hard time 
coming to terms with the relationship between an international organisation 
and the very states which are its members’.18 Indeed, this is a central issue 
within this thesis – the relationship between the United Nations, its member 
states and the state host to a peacekeeping operation. In order to address 
this matter, this thesis will invoke critical legal theory in order to illuminate 
this tension within UN peacekeeping. The decision to apply critical legal 
theory, or to think critically about the law in this area, was inspired by 
Foucault’s insistence that most claims which were presented as ‘truth’ can 
be viewed simply as expressions of power by the actor making the claim, 
who is attempting to shape the knowledge and undermine competing 
claims.19 Indeed, it is argued that the UN Charter is a ‘living instrument’ 
which is ‘like every constitutional instrument, continuously interpreted, 
moulded and adapted to meet the interests of parties’.20 It therefore follows 
that as UN peacekeeping stems from interpretations of the Charter, 
                                   
16 ibid. 
17 J Klabbers, An Introduction to International Institutional Law (CUP 2009) 3.  
18 ibid 3-4.  
19 See: M Foucault, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth: Essential Works of Michel Foucault 1954-1984. Volume I 
(Penguin 2000).  
20 O Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice (Martinus Nijhoff 1991) 118-119. 
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particularly Chapters VI and VII, peacekeeping can, arguably, also be 
interpreted, moulded and adapted to meet the needs of the relevant parties, 
who, as this thesis will demonstrate, are typically the dominant Global North 
states or the permanent five members of the Security Council. The thesis 
thus seeks to challenge the dominant Western narrative of international 
law, opening it up to different interpretations in order to ascertain a true 
understanding of intervention and UN peacekeeping. As Kennedy notes, it 
is only after ‘pushing past international law’s classic self-conception’ as the 
‘highest experience of universal values, the best map of the world’s political 
actors and their powers, and toolkit of policy solutions’ that international 
lawyers will be able to use international legal materials to illuminate global 
processes.21 
In adopting this critical lens, the thesis will apply the philosophy of Third 
World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL). This has been chosen, in 
part, given that the focus of the thesis – the DRC - is a Global South or 
Third World state and partly because TWAIL is a scholarly movement 
committed to challenging the existing international order.22 Whilst there is 
no coherent and distinctive ‘Third World approach’ to international law, 
there are common features or characteristics which may be seen as an 
overarching ‘Third World approach’.23 Indeed, all TWAIL scholars or ‘TWAIL-
ers’ are united in their opposition to the ‘unjust global order’ and the 
                                   
21 D Kennedy, ‘Law and Political Economy of the World’ (2013) 26(1) LJIL 7-48, 37. 
22 See: OC Okafor, ‘Newness, Imperialism, and International Legal Reform in Our Time: A TWAIL Perspective’ 
(2005) 43(1/2) OHLJ 171-191, 176-177. 
23 K Mickelson, ‘Rhetoric and Rage: Third World Voices in International Legal Discourse’ (2011) 16(2) WisIntlLJ 
353-419, 353. 
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furtherance of their common goal of eradicating international laws’ 
subordination of the Third World and its peoples.24 As Mickelson notes, such 
a movement is best imagined as a ‘chorus of voices that blend, though not 
always harmoniously’ to make a shared collection of concerns heard.25 
TWAIL scholars therefore have a ‘shared ethical commitment’ to expose and 
reform features of international law which maintain an unequal order.26 In 
seeking to expose the ‘unjust relationship between the Third World and 
International Law’,27 TWAIL also illuminates the perspective of those who 
are often unheard – in this instance, the peoples of the Third World. As with 
other critical theorists, TWAIL scholars therefore strive to give a voice to 
‘the poor, the disadvantaged, the voiceless, the unrepresented, [and] the 
powerless’.28 
The origins of TWAIL, for some, can be traced to the decolonisation period, 
in particular, the Bandung Conference of 1955.29 Generally, a distinction 
can be made between TWAIL I scholarship produced by this first generation 
of post-colonial international lawyers, such as Georges Abi-Saab and Taslim 
Elias,30 and post-1996 TWAIL II scholarship.31 Regardless of this distinction, 
                                   
24 M Mutua, ‘What is TWAIL?’ (2000) 32 ASILProc 31-38, 36-37. 
25 Mickelson (n23) 360. 
26 Okafor (n22) 177. 
27 MA Attar and R Thompson, ‘How the Multi-Level Democratisation of International Law-Making Can Effect Popular 
Aspirations Towards Self-Determination’ (2011) 3(1) TradeL&Dev 65-102, 67. 
28 E Said, Representation of the Intellectual (Vintage 1994) 84. 
29 Whilst Mutua argues that ‘Bandung was the symbolic birthplace of TWAIL’, others such as Gathii consider it to 
be a more recent phenomenon, tracing its origins to around 1996 at Harvard Law School. See: Mutua (n24) and 
JT Gathii, ‘TWAIL: A Brief History of its Origins, its Decentralised Network, and a Tentative Bibliography’ (2011) 
3(1) TradeL&Dev 26-64. 
30 TO Elias, New Horizons in International Law (Springer, 2nd edn, 1992) and G Abi-Saab, The Development of 
International Law: An Introduction by the United Nations in F Snyder & S Sathirathai (eds) Third World Attitudes 
to International Law: An Introduction (Martinus Nijhoff 1987).  
31 A group of Harvard Law School graduate students initiated a series of meetings. The group consisted of 
Celestine Nyamu, Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Hani Sayed, Vasuki Nesiah, Elchi Nowrojee, Bhupinder Chimni and 
James Thuo Gathii.  
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for all TWAIL scholars, ‘international law makes sense only in the context 
of the lived history of the peoples of the Third World’.32 Two key 
characteristics of TWAIL thinking then stem from this. Firstly, that 
colonialism and neo-colonialism have made Third World peoples ‘acutely 
sensitive to power relations among states’ and to how international rules 
and institutions ‘will actually affect the distribution of power between states 
and peoples’.33 And, secondly, the ‘interpretive prism through which these 
rules of international law are to be evaluated’ is the ‘actualised experience’ 
of Third World peoples and ‘not merely that of states’.34 TWAIL therefore 
examines international law and the distribution of power from the 
perspective of the Third World and its peoples. Taking this TWAIL approach, 
this thesis will seek to question: if international law is ‘the principal 
language in which domination is coming to be expressed in the era of 
globalisation’, can this domination be found within intervention and UN 
peacekeeping?35 In particular, is peacekeeping used, at times, to legitimate 
intervention in order to further the interests and agendas of the dominant 
powers?      
In answering these questions, the thesis will apply some important tenets 
of both TWAIL I and TWAIL II scholarship. Firstly, TWAIL I, inter alia, 
stressed the importance of the principles of sovereignty and non-
intervention and focused on colonial international law legitimising the 
                                   
32 A Anghie and BS Chimni, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law and Individual Responsibility in 
International Conflicts’ (2003) 2(1) ChinJIL 77-103, 78. 
33 ibid.  
34 ibid.  
35 BS Chimni, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto’ (2006) 8 ICLR 3-7, 3.  
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subjugation and oppression of the Third World.36 The thesis will therefore 
generally highlight both the importance of the principle of non-intervention 
and the use of international law by dominant states to oppress the Third 
World. Secondly, this thesis will focus on a main proposition of TWAIL II 
scholarship: that colonialism is not external or incidental to international 
law but, rather, that it is central to the formation of international law.37 In 
doing so, the thesis will draw heavily on Antony Anghie’s work on 
imperialism, sovereignty and the making of international law as his 
combination of theory, history and colonialism, when examining both 
international law and sovereignty, could arguably be applied to the principle 
of non-intervention, given that it is a corollary of sovereignty.38 Anghie 
broadly argues that colonialism was central to the formation of international 
law, with many of the basic doctrines of international law (in particular, the 
doctrine of sovereignty) being forged out of the colonial confrontation and 
the attempt to create a legal system which could manage relations between 
European and non-European worlds.39 This thesis will therefore take this 
hypothesis and apply it to the principle of non-intervention and UN 
peacekeeping to ascertain the extent to which, if at all, colonialism has 
animated the principle and the concept of peacekeeping. 
In adopting this TWAIL approach, the thesis does not seek to deliberate the 
merits of TWAIL scholarship. That is, it will not engage in discussions about 
                                   
36 See: RP Anand, International Law and the Developing Countries (Banyan Publications 1987).  
37 Anghie and Chimni (n32); See also: A Riles, ‘Aspiration and Control: International Legal Rhetoric and the 
Essentialization of Culture’ (1993) 106(3) HarvLRev 723-740; A Anghie, ‘Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty 
and Colonialism in Nineteenth Century International Law’ (1999) 40(1) HarvIntlLJ 1-71.  
38 A Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (CUP 2007). 
39 ibid, 3.  
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the risk of TWAIL ‘simply rehashing, not reimagining old debates’40 or its 
potentially paradoxical argumentative logic that is said to ultimately rely 
upon the very underlying assumptions of the conservative system which it 
seeks to transcend.41 Instead, the thesis will uniquely apply a TWAIL lens 
to intervention and peacekeeping to provide an alternative view to the 
prevailing Western-centric narratives. Similarly, it must also be noted that 
whilst the TWAIL story is one of the frustrations, disappointments and 
exploitation of the Third World by international law and international 
institutions, ‘it is also a story of hope in the moments of resistance’.42 
Therefore, the purpose of this thesis’ application of the philosophy of TWAIL 
to UN peacekeeping is not to present a totalising, destructive critique of 
peacekeeping but, rather, to provide new insights and constructive 
criticisms in the hope that it will offer a more pluralistic interpretation, 
contributing to the reimagining and reinvigoration of peacekeeping.  
2.2 The Congo 
The Democratic Republic of the Congo has been chosen as the focus of this 
thesis as both peacekeeping and the Congo are arguably inextricably linked. 
That is, the UN has been deployed within the Congo, intermittently, since 
1960 - two weeks after the country gained its independence and a few years 
into the birth of peacekeeping. As peacekeeping has shaped the Congo, 
then, so too has the Congo shaped peacekeeping. Indeed, the DRC has 
                                   
40 AG Kiyani, ‘Third World Approaches to International Criminal Law’ (2016) 109 AJILUnbound 255-259, 257 
41 JD Haskell, ‘TRAIL-ing TWAIL: Arguments and Blind Spots in Third World Approaches to International Law’ 
(2014) 27(2) CJLJ 383-414, 386. 
42 M Fakhri, ‘Law as the Interplay of Ideas, Institutions, and Interests: Using Polyani (and Foucault) to Ask TWAIL 
Questions’ (2008) 10 ICLR 455-465. 
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been used as a test-bed for UN peacekeeping with three operations 
deployed – ONUC (1960-1964) shortly after the Congo gained 
independence; MONUC (1999-2010) after the First Congo War and the 
signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and MONUSCO (2010-present 
day) which was an evolution of MONUC into a stabilisation peacekeeping 
operation. These operations have been some of the largest and most 
expensive peacekeeping operations in UN history, with MONUSCO, in 
particular, continually reinventing itself43 in an attempt to adapt to changing 
conflict dynamics and demands from the Security Council, Congolese 
government and regional actors. 
Throughout its turbulent history, the Democratic Republic of the Congo has 
also been known by various names from its independence in 1960 to 
present day. During colonisation, it was named the Congo Free State and, 
later, the Belgian Congo; after gaining independence, initially, it was known 
as the Republic of Congo and then the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
until 1971 when the then President, Mobutu, changed its name to the 
Republic of Zaire under his ‘Africanisation’ programme.44 The country 
remained as Zaire until Mobutu’s dictatorship ended in 1997, when it was 
again renamed as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as it is still known 
today. Throughout this thesis, the country will be referred to as ‘Congo’ or 
‘DRC’ interchangeably. This is not to be confused with the Republic of Congo 
(or Congo-Brazzaville) which lies across the Congo River from the DRC’s 
                                   
43 Such as deploying the Force Intervention Brigade and engaging in protection of civilian tasks. 
44 See: M Wrong, In the Footsteps of Mr Kurtz (Harper Collins 2000). 
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capital city, Kinshasa. It must also be noted that the use of ‘the’ may also 
be invoked (‘the Congo’) and whilst this does form part of Congo’s official 
name, it must be recognised that some find it to be problematic, as it 
denotes colonial remnants.45 The usage of ‘the Congo’ or ‘the DRC’ within 
this work, is therefore to be understood not in support of a colonial legacy 
but simply for grammatical purposes.  
Similarly, throughout the thesis whilst the term ‘Global South’ is 
predominantly used, it may, at times be interchanged with ‘Third World’, 
particularly within Chapter 2 when the historical development of the 
principle of non-intervention is explored. In the post-Cold War era, many 
academics were sceptical of the term ‘Third World’, and proclaimed that it 
had ceased to exist as a category.46 However, as Chimni argues, a critique 
of the term is an ‘old divide and rule strategy’ used by hegemonic states to 
‘misrepresent and undermine the unity of the Other’ in order to exercise 
their own dominance.47 Other commentators have also stressed the 
importance of understanding the term as a direct attack on Western 
hegemony in the world order.48 Therefore, the category of ‘Third World’ 
remains crucial, provided that it is not fixed to a geographical space, and 
peoples continue to self-identify with the term.49 
                                   
45 See, for example, S Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo (CUP 2010) 36. 
46 See: D Otto, ‘Subalternity and International Law: The Problems of Global Community and the 
Incommensurability of Difference’ (1996) 5(3) SocLegStud 337-364, 353. 
47 Chimni (n35) 6.  
48 Mutua (n24) 36. 
49 Okafor (n22) 175. 
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2.3 Empirical Research 
The doctrinal, socio-legal, theoretical and jurisprudential research within 
this thesis is also supported by qualitative empirical research, in the form 
of semi-structured interviews, which is interwoven throughout the thesis.50 
That is, rather than containing a separate chapter of research findings, data 
from the interviews is dispersed throughout the thesis, informing how the 
law is applied in practice and providing an external perspective which will 
be compared and contrasted with the author’s analysis of intervention, 
peacekeeping and the frameworks which govern the two concepts. The 
purpose of this empirical research is to provide an additional layer of 
analysis, potentially fill any gaps left by the theoretical and doctrinal parts 
of the thesis and to, ultimately, provide a more nuanced appreciation of the 
UN decision making process for peacekeeping both in general and 
specifically within the DRC. 
Participants for this research consisted of United Nations personnel from 
various departments and organs of the UN within the organisation’s 
headquarters in Geneva and New York, including: the Department of Peace 
Operations, the Office of Legal Affairs, UN Development Programme, Office 
of the High Commissioner of Human Rights and Office of the Special 
Representative on Conflict Related Sexual Violence. Furthermore, beyond 
the UN headquarters, numerous current and former MONUSCO personnel 
were also interviewed, including personnel within the Office of the Special 
                                   
50 See: JM Smits, The Mind and Method of the Legal Academic (Edward Elgar 2013); FL Leeuw & H Schmeets, 
Empirical Legal Research: A Guidance Book for Lawyers, Legislators and Regulators (Edward Elgar 2017). 
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Representative of the Secretary-General to MONUSCO, former Deputy and 
Force Commanders, current and former senior military personnel within 
MONUSCO’s Force component, and numerous civilian personnel, such as: 
gender and child protection advisers and political affairs and human rights 
officers. Outside of the UN, interviews were also conducted with personnel 
from International Organisations, such as the International Committee of 
the Red Cross, non-governmental organisations and independent experts, 
including Congolese actors.  
This combination of UN and non-UN actors was chosen as a data sample as 
it this ecology of ‘First UN’ (member states), ‘Second UN’ (staff members of 
international secretariats) and ‘Third UN’ (supportive non-state actors such 
as NGOs and consultants) which, together, formulate and refine ideas and 
decision making on UN policies, including peacekeeping matters.51 Focusing 
on a mixture of these actors therefore provides a greater understanding of 
the politics of knowledge and norm production which shape UN directives 
on peacekeeping and the ideas and narratives which drive or underpin 
them.52 
Whilst a number of interviewees were selected for their knowledge or work 
in fields relating to intervention and UN peacekeeping in the DRC, ‘snowball 
sampling’ or the ‘chain-referral sampling’ method was also undertaken.53 
The exponential non-discriminative snowball sampling method was used to 
                                   
51 TG Weiss, T Carayannis and R Jolly, ‘The “Third” United Nations’ (2009) 15(1) GG 123-142. 
52 T Carayannis and TG Weiss, The “Third” United Nations: How a Knowledge Ecology Helps the UN Think (OUP 
2021) 1-2. 
53 SC Parker and A Geddes, ‘Snowball Sampling’ in P Atkinson, S Delamont, A Cernat, JW Sakshaug and RA 
Williams (eds) SAGE Research Methods Foundations (SAGE 2019) 3-13. 
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allow for multiple referrals, providing greater access to networks within the 
UN system. This method was also chosen as, in-line with this thesis’ aim of 
understanding knowledge, norm and policy production in the UN, 
snowballing sampling can generate a unique type of social knowledge, 
which is ‘emergent, political and interactional’.54 That is, it can provide a 
deeper understanding of the intricacies of UN decision making on 
peacekeeping matters as interviewees identify and refer others within their 
network whom they deem to be key or influential actors within 
peacekeeping. This then creates a patchwork of differing interpretations, 
views and understandings on how and why peacekeeping’s norms and 
principles are interpreted and applied.  
Thus, the aim of these interviews and the broader purpose of the thesis is 
to seek to ascertain the ‘what’, ‘why’ and ‘how’s’ of peacekeeping – what 
constitutes the peacekeeping frameworks, why are they peacekeeping’s 
boundaries and how are they interpreted and applied in practice? Whilst the 
author offers an interpretation of these questions, the interviews with 
personnel who engage in these frameworks at the institutional and field 
level provides further views on both their interpretations of these 
frameworks and their understanding of the UN’s interpretations. 
Furthermore, fieldwork for this thesis has focused on interviews with actors 
at the institutional level, rather than at the field level, as it these actors who 
set the legal and normative frameworks which govern intervention and 
                                   
54 C Noy, ‘Sampling Knowledge: The Hermeneutics of Snowball Sampling in Qualitative Research’ (2008) 11(4) 
JSRM 327-344, 327. 
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peacekeeping and which this thesis seeks to clarify. Interview questions 
therefore focused on ascertaining what frameworks the individuals 
perceived themselves to be operating within, what they believed to be the 
high and low points or strengths and weaknesses of the UN’s current 
operation in the Congo (MONUSCO) and whether they believed that there 
are any lessons which could be learnt from the UN’s experiences in the 
Congo.55 
All interviews were conducted in a private location, either face-to-face 
(predominantly at the UN headquarters in New York) or via online 
technologies such as Skype and Zoom.56 The latter was used in order to 
overcome any temporal, financial or geographical constraints, thereby 
permitting access to key informants and increasing participation.57 
Interviews were then recorded using a digital voice recorder, accessed only 
by the researcher. All participants consented to their data potentially being 
used in the thesis and any future presentations, projects or publications 
authored by the researcher. Interviewees have also all been anonymised 
(except one participant who requested to be named) and are simply 
identified as either ‘interviewee’ or by some nondescript reference to their 
occupation, such as ‘senior UN personnel’ or ‘former military personnel’. 
Data from the interview, including participants’ personal information and 
transcripts of the interview, have been stored on an encrypted USB and in 
                                   
55 See: I Seidman, Interviewing as Qualitative Research: A Guide for Researchers in Education and the Social 
Sciences (3rd edn, Teachers’ College Press 2006). 
56 NG Fielding, RM Lee and G Blank, The SAGE Handbook of Online Research Methods (2nd edn, SAGE Publishing 
2016). 
57 R Janghorban, R Roudsari and A Taghipour, ‘Skype Interviewing: The New Generation of Online Synchronous 
Interview in Qualitative Research’ (2014) 9(1) IJQSHW 24152. 
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password protected files accessible only to the researcher. From this, the 
data has been condensed into a 70-page, thematic dataset which has been 
published in the University of Nottingham Research Data Management 
Repository in order for the findings to be discoverable, visible and citable.58 
3. Structure of the Thesis 
The structure of this thesis can be likened to a three-tiered pyramid with 
intervention or the principle of non-intervention forming the top of the 
pyramid, whilst UN peacekeeping forms the second layer, with 
peacekeeping in the Congo constituting the third and final layer. Chapter 2 
will therefore begin by providing a definition of intervention and an 
examination of the historical development of the principle of non-
intervention. It will highlight how the concept and practice of intervention 
has been somewhat cyclical, with a constant fluctuation in intervention and 
non-intervention rhetoric, often coupled with a disparity between rhetoric 
and practice. That is, whilst the principle of non-intervention may have been 
emphatically supported, in practice interventions have often occurred. The 
Chapter therefore argues that these cycles of interventionist practice have 
had the impact of either supporting or undermining the principle of non-
intervention. When exploring contemporary interventions, the Chapter 
noted that UN peacekeeping, as a form of collective security intervention is 
the most prevalent form of intervention today. 
                                   
58 J Giblin, ‘United Nations Peacekeeping Raw Interview Data’ (University of Nottingham Research Data 
Management Repository, June 2021) DOI: <http://doi.org/10.17639/nott.7119>. 
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As such, Chapter 3 moves on to explore the second layer of the pyramid – 
UN peacekeeping – finding that, despite the lack of an explicit framework, 
there exist legal principles and norms which, together, form a complex 
peacekeeping framework. It identifies the ‘holy trinity’ of consent, 
impartiality and non-use of force as the three legal principles which 
formulate peacekeeping’s legal framework, whilst arguing that the newer, 
more controversial norms of democracy promotion, protection of civilians 
(PoC) and the prohibition of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) form part 
of peacekeeping’s normative framework. The Chapter argues that the legal 
framework sits at the core of peacekeeping and is surrounded by the much 
broader normative framework. However, Chapter 3 notes that these 
frameworks do not exist in total isolation but, rather, overlap at certain 
points, particularly when the norms invoke elements of international 
humanitarian, criminal and human rights law, thereby providing a 
secondary contribution to peacekeeping’s legal framework. Furthermore, 
the Chapter argues that these principles and norms do not exist 
harmoniously and instead ‘exist in a competitive arena’ with the normative 
composition of a peacekeeping operation being ‘rebalanced each time’.59 As 
such, an interpretation and application of one norm or principle may have 
an impact on another. Indeed, Chapter 3 highlights how the six principles 
and norms are continually re-interpreted and re-shaped which results in 
peacekeeping’s frameworks being repeatedly contracted and expanded. 
                                   
59 J Karlsrud, ‘Special Representatives of the Secretary-General as Norm Arbitrators? Understanding Bottom-up 
Authority in UN Peacekeeping’ (2013) 19(4) GG 525-544, 527. 
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That is, where the principles and norms are interpreted narrowly, generally, 
this results in a constriction of the peacekeeping frameworks, thereby 
firming the boundary between peacekeeping and intervention and 
consequently reinforcing the principle of non-intervention. However, when 
the principles and norms are interpreted more broadly, as is frequently the 
case with contemporary, multi-dimensional stabilisation operations, this 
expands peacekeeping’s frameworks, blurring the line between 
peacekeeping and intervention and therefore undermining or, at times, 
potentially contravening the principle of non-intervention.  
Following this, Chapters 4 and 5 take this analysis further by examining 
peacekeeping in practice, through an exploration of the UN’s operations in 
the Congo. Whilst Chapter 4 focuses on the interpretation and application 
of peacekeeping’s legal frameworks in the DRC, Chapter 5 examines the 
normative frameworks. Both chapters again demonstrate how these 
frameworks are constantly re-interpreted, re-imagined and contorted, 
resulting in a continual fluctuation of peacekeeping’s boundaries and the 
dividing line between peacekeeping and intervention. It is argued that, at 
times, ONUC, MONUC and MONUSCO have expanded peacekeeping’s 
frameworks to their very limits and beyond, resulting in peacekeeping 
becoming intervention. As such, the thesis argues that there may need to 
be a narrowing or retraction of some of peacekeeping’s principles and 
norms, and therefore the peacekeeping frameworks, in order to shrink the 
invisible red boundary line surrounding peacekeeping and to re-affirm the 
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1. Introduction  
In the broadest sense of the term, everything that anyone does which has 
an effect or influence on another is an intervention. Indeed, intervention is 
a ‘continuum, ranging from criticism to coercion’1 and is both a legal and 
political concept.2 Within international law, intervention is a contentious 
concept, directly linked to the principles of sovereignty, self-determination 
and non-use of force, and is a ‘corollary of every state’s right to sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and political independence’.3 The purpose of this Chapter 
is to critically analyse the development of the principle of non-intervention 
and to ascertain its current status within international law. In subsequent 
Chapters this concept of intervention will then be applied to UN 
peacekeeping in order to understand the relationship between 
peacekeeping and intervention. That is, when exploring the development of 
peacekeeping and its principles, this thesis will question to what extent 
these principles may support or breach the principle of non-intervention, 
resulting in peacekeeping potentially becoming a form of unlawful 
intervention.  
Defining Intervention 
Within international law, there is no singular, authoritative definition of 
intervention. It is an ambiguous, ‘blurred, controversial and disputed’ legal 
term,4 and, as a concept, is described as ‘one of the vaguest branches of 
                                   
1 MNS Sellers, ‘Intervention under International Law’ (2014) 29(1) Maryland JIL, 6.  
2 For a discussion on the legal and political aspects of intervention, see: H Bull (ed) Intervention in World Politics 
(Clarendon 1984).  
3 RY Jennings and AD Watts, Oppenheim’s International Law (9th edn, OUP 2008) 428. 
4 G Hafner, ‘Sub-group on Intervention by Invitation, Preliminary Report, 26 July 2007’ (2007) Yearbook of the 
Institute of International Law, Sanitago Session 226, 236. 
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international law’.5 As Argentinian jurist Carlos Calvo wrote in 1870, on the 
matter of intervention ‘there are almost as many opinions as there are 
authors’.6 This remains true today. The definition is also further complicated 
by states’ frequent use of the term in political rhetoric, condemning the acts 
of other states as intervention in their internal affairs.7  
Within the United Nations system, a practical, working definition of 
intervention is adopted, with intervention defined as any ‘action along a 
wide continuum from the most pacific to the most coercive’ by one state 
against another.8 However, for the purposes of this Chapter, as the thesis 
is examining the legal norms or principles within UN peacekeeping, a 
normative definition will be taken instead. ‘Intervention’ will therefore be 
defined as any situation where coercive action is taken by a state, state 
actor, or international organisation to try to enforce a change in the internal 
affairs of another state. This definition follows the general definition stated 
by Oppenheim, that ‘intervention is dictatorial interference by a State in the 
affairs of another State’.9 It is also in-keeping with the International Court 
of Justice’s (ICJ) understanding of the principle of non-intervention, which 
it stated in Nicaragua ‘involves the right of every sovereign State to conduct 
                                   
5 PH Winfield, ‘The History of Intervention in International Law’ (1922-3) 3 BYIL 130. 
6 Translation quoted in: A Heraclides and A Dialla, Humanitarian Intervention in the Long Nineteenth Century: 
Setting the Precedent (MUP 2015) 14. 
7 Such as the Trump administration’s foreign policy dialogue. See: S Siddiqui, ‘Donald Trump Praises Syria Strikes 
and Declares: ‘Missions Accomplished’’ (The Guardian, 14 April 2018) <https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2018/apr/14/donald-trump-syria-strikes-mission-accomplished>  Accessed 15 April 2018; M Zenko, 
‘Donald Trump is a Magical (Foreign Policy) Realist’ (Foreign Policy, 7 June 2016) 
<foreignpolicy.com/2016/06/07/donald-trump-is-a-magical-foreign-policy-realist/> Accessed 1 March 2018. 
8 UN Press Release, ‘Secretary-General Presents his Annual Report to General Assembly’ (SG/SM/7136, 
GA/9596). 
9 IL Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise (Longmans, Green and Co 1905) 221.  
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its affairs without outside interference’.10 The Court also went on to note 
that the principle ‘forbids’ intervention either ‘directly or indirectly in 
internal or external affairs of other States’, which includes political, 
economic, social, cultural and foreign policy matters, and confirmed that 
intervention is ‘wrongful when it uses methods of coercion’.11  
For the remainder of this thesis, then, when examining both the principle 
of non-intervention and, later, UN peacekeeping, ‘intervention’ will be any 
action taken by a state, state actor or international organisation such as the 
UN, that may be deemed coercive, in order to force change within the host 
state. In particular, there will be a focus on action taken by the UN, 
predominantly through peacekeeping, to coercively influence change within 
the DRC. Coercive action will be further understood as activities which 
override the element of voluntariness. That is, pressure on the host state, 
(either directly or indirectly) to change or demand a change to their 
behaviour, without the state being able to reject the change or to decide 
whether or not to comply. Coercion is therefore distinguishable from 
persuasion, criticism, public diplomacy and propaganda as they are aimed 
at a voluntary change, unlike coercion which removes this element of 
voluntarism. For example, a peacekeeping operation which instructs a host 
state to remove certain personnel from its armed forces or it will withdraw 
its support could amount to direct coercive action as the ultimatum removes 
the element of voluntarism from the UN’s request. Similarly, indirect 
                                   
10 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of 
America) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, para 202.  
11 ibid 205. 
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coercive action may occur through the development of sub-economies 
around peacekeeping bases as these create host state dependency or 
reliance on the peacekeeping operation which, in turn, may result in 
subsequent UN ultimatums becoming coercive. Indeed, it is this concept – 
UN peacekeeping as intervention – which will run as the red thread 
throughout this thesis. That is, when examining the development of UN 
peacekeeping and then, more specifically, UN peacekeeping in the DRC, this 
thesis will highlight instances in which it appears that peacekeeping has 
crossed the threshold into intervention. More profoundly, it will explore how 
the functions of contemporary stabilisation peacekeeping operations may 
amount to intervention.  
Furthermore, as outlined in the introduction, this Chapter, like the whole of 
the thesis, will also be informed by Third World Approaches to International 
Law (TWAIL). As previously explored,12 for TWAIL scholars, ‘international 
law makes sense only in the context of the lived history of the peoples of 
the Third World’.13 Applying TWAIL, the Chapter will focus on the 
importance of the principle of non-intervention and the use of international 
law by dominant states to oppress the Third World or Global South. It will 
also focus on the role colonialism has played in shaping the principle of non-
intervention.14 In particular, it will draw upon Anghie’s work on imperialism, 
sovereignty and the making of international law to ascertain the extent to 
                                   
12 Chapter 1, Section 2.1. 
13 A Anghie and BS Chimni, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law and Individual Responsibility in 
International Conflicts’ (2003) 2(1) Chinese JIL 77-103, 78. 
14 ibid; See also: A Riles, Aspiration and Control: International Legal Rhetoric and the Essentialization of Culture 
(1993) 106 HarvLRev 723; A Anghie, ‘Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth Century 
International Law’ (1999) 40(1) HarvIntlLJ 1.  
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which, if at all, colonialism has animated the principle of non-intervention.15 
More specifically, this Chapter will highlight the power relations embedded 
both within the principle and within its application, focusing on the concept 
of ‘othering’16 – distinguishing between ‘us’ and ‘them’/‘others’, with the 
latter group viewed as lesser, thereby justifying domination by the 
enlightened ‘us’.17 Anghie argues that ‘over the centuries’ international 
lawyers have maintained a basic dichotomy between ‘the civilised and the 
uncivilised’ and have ‘continually developed techniques’ to civilise the 
uncivilised.18 As other scholars have noted, the civilising mission or the 
‘standard of civilisation’ identified ‘those that belong to [a] particular society 
from those that do not’ and those nations that did not measure up were 
excluded ‘as ‘not civilised’ or possibly ‘uncivilised’’.19 Throughout the early 
development of international law, this  division resulted in those deemed to 
be ‘uncivilised’ as falling ‘outside the bounds of international society and 
thus lacking equal recognition in international law’.20 These ‘uncivilised’ 
societies were either rejected from the remit of international law or given a 
quasi-legal status – partially subjected to international law but afforded only 
minimal protection. The classical standard of civilisation was therefore ‘well 
and truly entrenched in the annals of international law’.21 This endless 
process of creating a gap between two cultures (‘demarcating one as 
                                   
15 A Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (CUP 2007). 
16 See: E Said, Orientalism (Penguin Books 2003). 
17 See: E Said, Culture and Imperialism (Vintage 1994) (For contemporary discussion in international law, see: A 
Orford (ed) International Law and its Others (CUP 2006). 
18 Anghie (n15) 4. 
19 GW Gong, The Standard of ‘Civilization’ in International Society (Clarendon Press 1984) 3. 
20 B Bowden, ‘The Colonial Origins of International Law. European Expansion and the Classical Standard of 
Civilization’ (2005) 7 JHIL 1-23, 20. 
21 ibid.  
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‘universal’ and civilised and the other as ‘particular’ and ‘uncivilised’) and 
then seeking to close this gap by normalising the ‘aberrant society’ is what 
Anghie refers to as the ‘dynamic of difference’.22 He argues that this 
dynamic animated the development of core doctrines of international law, 
in particular, sovereignty doctrine and continues to operate within 
international law today. Anghie further argues that this characterisation of 
‘non-European societies as backward and primitive legitimised European 
conquest of these societies’ and justified intervention.23 It is this concept 
that this Chapter, and the remainder of the thesis, will therefore build upon. 
Indeed, this Chapter will highlight how the principle of non-intervention, 
like sovereignty, also acquired its character through colonialism and was 
shaped, and continues to be shaped, by the ‘dynamic of difference’. It will 
note examples of when this dynamic has been created and then used to 
justify intervention, primarily on the basis of needing to bridge the gap 
between the civilised and uncivilised or, more recently, the developed and 
developing. The Chapter will therefore employ Anghie’s theory and a 
broader TWAIL lens to highlight the contradictions and inherent power 
biases throughout the evolution of the principle of non-intervention (the 
North-South divide), its uneven application (both past and present) and the 
potential for it to be used as a tool by dominant powers (including the UN 
as an autonomous actor) to extend their self-interests.  
                                   
22 Anghie (n15) 4. 
23 ibid.  
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Taking this theoretical approach and the previously discussed definition, 
this Chapter will examine the legal development and application of the 
principle of non-intervention. The aim of the Chapter will be to analyse this 
development and application with reference to the broader global issues 
and its impact on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), where 
relevant. The Chapter will begin by examining the historical development of 
non-intervention and, then, its advancement through international 
organisations, conventions, charters and case law, before examining the 
principle in the modern era. It will identify key tipping points or periods 
throughout this evolution, such as colonialism, the Bandung conference, 
decolonisation and, more recently, the War on Terror. The Chapter will 
examine various forms and justifications for intervention, such as collective 
security intervention, and will identify examples of Anghie’s dynamic of 
difference throughout the development and operation of non-intervention. 
It will conclude by summarising the principle of non-intervention today 
before the thesis moves on to explore UN peacekeeping as a specific form 
of intervention. Throughout this exploration, it must be noted that whilst a 
critical lens is applied, this is not a totalising critique aimed at dismantling 
the principle of non-intervention. As noted in the introduction to this thesis, 
the adoption of a critical lens is a constructive critique, designed to clarify 
the legal and normative boundaries of the principle – the red elastic band 
which surrounds the principle- and to explore the justifications or 
legitimisations which puncture this red line, thereby challenging or 
undermining the principle of non-intervention. This Chapter therefore 
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provides a greater understanding of the principle of non-intervention which 
will be taken further in subsequent Chapters when examining the concept 
of peacekeeping. 
2. Historical Development 
During the ‘Age of Discovery’ in the fifteenth century intervention occurred 
on a grand scale in the form of conquest and discovery. Led by Portuguese 
and Spanish explorers, the ‘discovery’ of the ‘New World’ facilitated 
European expansion and laid the foundations for the subsequent colonial 
project.24 It was during this period that the DRC was subject to external 
intervention for the first time. In 1482 Portuguese explorer, Diogo Cão 
‘discovered’ the Congo, claiming the land on behalf of King Jão II of 
Portugal, despite the pre-existing Kingdom of Kongo which is thought to 
have been established at least 100 years prior to European intervention.25 
Although the Portuguese were said to have ‘grudgingly recognised in the 
Kingdom a sophisticated and well-developed state’,26 it was disregarded on 
the basis of the Europeans’ belief in their superior ontological status and 
divine or natural right to hegemonic power – a mentality which has 
seemingly endured throughout history, as this Chapter will highlight. 
Indeed, it could be argued that within this exploration of the principle of 
non-intervention, this is the first example of Anghie’s dynamic of difference. 
That is, the first occasion, in relation to intervention, in which the ‘other’ is 
                                   
24 See: E Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire: 1875-1914 (Abacus 1989). 
25 See:  SH Broadhead, ‘Beyond Decline: The Kingdom of the Kongo in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries’ 
(1979) 12(4) IJAHS 615-650; J Vos, Kongo in the Age of Empire, 1860-1913: The Breakdown of a Moral Order 
(University of Wisconsin Press 2015). 
26 A Hochschild, King Leopold’s Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror and Heroism in Colonial Africa (Pan Books) 9. 
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created and a distinction is drawn between the hegemonic Western powers 
and the newly ‘discovered’ Congolese state. 
Prior to the nineteenth century intervention was therefore a common 
method for dealing with foreign affairs and, in particular, enforcing impartial 
and papal rules in the Middle Ages.27 As European exploration intensified, 
questions arose as to how the ‘New World’, ‘which was not part of the 
‘respublica Christiana’, but also not classed as the ‘enemy’, should be 
perceived.28 Again, the issue of how to deal with the ‘other’ and address the 
dynamic of difference was problematic.  
2.1 Peace of Westphalia 
This changed in 1648 with the Peace of Westphalia – a trinity of treaties 
which ended the Thirty Years War in Europe and marked a turning point in 
international relations and the law of nations. It is generally argued that the 
Peace established the concept of sovereignty and a ‘Westphalian system’ of 
equal, sovereign states who refrained from intervening in each other’s 
domestic affairs.29 Westphalia is therefore crucial for the principle of non-
intervention as it established the concept of sovereignty within international 
law and, by corollary, non-intervention. However, as Milton argues, by 
including France and Sweden’s ‘foreign crowns’ in the treaties, ‘a right to 
intervene for the protection of constitutional and religious rights within 
                                   
27 See: W Preiser, ‘History of International Law, Ancient Times to 1648’ (Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law, 2008) <http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-
9780199231690-e716> Accessed 20 June 2017.  
28 G Baars, ‘From the Dutch East India Company to the Corporate Bill of Rights: Corporations and International 
Law’ in U Mattei and J Haskell (eds) Research Handbook on Political Economy and Law (Edward Elgar 2015) 263. 
29See: D Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations (PUP 2001) 4, 
30, 85; cf D Croxton, ‘The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty’ (1999) 21(3) Int Hist Rev 
569; S Beaulac, ‘The Westphalian Legal Orthodoxy – Myth or Reality?’ (2000) 2 JHIL 148-177.  
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another state was enshrined in positive treaty law’.30 The Westphalian 
treaties therefore legalised intervention in a foreign state in order to protect 
the legal rights of subjects. Similarly, the concept of sovereignty and 
therefore this tentative principle of non-intervention, was only applicable to 
the European powers, as such, intervention in non-European territories was 
perceived as more permissible. This is epitomised in the sixteenth century 
when Francisco de Vitoria discussed the legitimacy of intervention in the 
form of European colonisation in the ‘New World’.31 In On the Indians Lately 
Discovered,32 Vitoria denied the natives or ‘Indians’ sovereignty, on the 
basis that this was a right reserved only for Christians.33 This purported lack 
of sovereignty, combined with European claims to free trade and the 
absence of any Western legal systems denoted a lack of civilisation in the 
‘New World’ and justified European intervention and conquest. The 
Europeans believed that these ‘uncivilized’ or ‘primitive’ societies required 
the expansion of European (international) law;34 again, providing another 
justification for extensive intervention. For Anghie, this exemplifies the 
formulation and operation of the dynamic of difference ‘at the very 
beginning of the discipline of international law’ as the Indian’s are firstly 
characterised as the primitive other and then a series of legal principles are 
                                   
30 P Milton, ‘Guarantee and Intervention: The Assessment of the Peace of Westphalia in International Law and 
Politics by Authors of Natural Law and of Public Law c. 1650-1806’ in S Zurbuchen (ed) The Law of Nations and 
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outlined to justify intervention on the basis of the need to ‘civilise’ the other 
and close the gap between the two cultures.35 
Similarly, whilst European lines of hegemony were being demarcated across 
the globe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, trading companies 
became increasingly important interventionist actors in aiding states’ 
attempts to colonise any unclaimed land.36 Corporations such as the Dutch 
and British East India Companies became key components of the colonial 
expansion as their ‘indistinct legal status’ made them ‘perfect agents to 
police’ the ‘transitional’ colonialism.37 In the Congo, its position in the centre 
of the central African trade network allowed for expansive trade in ivory and 
other natural resources, particularly with Portuguese merchants who often 
traded directly with provincial nobles.38 Corporations were therefore 
significant interveners, with their interventionist activities moulding the 
earliest formations of international law. As Grewe notes, whilst states used 
these actors, who were considered more or less independent, to annex 
conquered territories, they consequently constructed a ‘particularly elastic 
system of colonial international law’.39 At the same time as corporations 
and states were exploring and expanding, the Trans-Atlantic slave trade – 
the most illustrative and interventionist form of colonial violence – was 
spreading across Africa. For the Congo, the slave trade began in the 
Kingdom of Kongo as early as the fifteenth century as relations between 
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the Portuguese explorers and Kongo rulers increased.40 Whilst the Kingdom 
initially only enslaved and deported foreign-born captives, with natives of 
the Kongo largely protected from enslavement, this distinction soon eroded 
and all peoples became subject to enslavement.41 This expansion of the 
slave trade contributed to the weakening of the Kingdom and allowed for 
European colonies to take root.42  
The slave trade also perfectly exemplifies Anghie’s dynamic of difference. 
The trade solidified  the dichotomy of ‘civilised’ and ‘uncivilised’ and 
crystallised the concept of the ‘other’.43 Western intervention in the ‘New 
World’ was then justified on the basis of ‘civilising’ the ‘barbarians’ or 
‘savages’ thereby seeking to close the gap in Anghie’s so-called dynamic of 
difference.44 The slave trade was therefore animated by the European 
belief, in particular, in African’s ‘inferiority’ and ‘backwardness’, resulting in 
a lasting effect on how Europeans viewed and treated Africans.45 This 
narrative also perpetuated the concept of the ‘White Man’s burden’46 within 
international relations. That is, the belief that powerful, predominantly 
Western states are tasked with the ‘burden’ of ‘civilising’ the ‘barbarous’ 
Third World and therefore intervention in these states is a necessary and 
legitimate task. This rhetoric of enlightened civiliser and uncivilised natives 
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was also furthered during the Age of Discovery by Christian missionaries 
who sought to convert natives to Christianity. Within the Congo, Christian 
missionaries were particularly prevalent, providing the ‘vanguard of 
European colonisation in the Congo’.47 During this period, intervention 
therefore occurred extensively and was predominantly based or justified on 
a sense of moral righteousness –the European belief in their duty to 
enlighten the inferior ‘new world’- a theme which has arguably permeated 
the principle of non-intervention and remains embodied within it today. It 
is within this context that international law and the principle of non-
intervention emerged. 
2.2 Formulating a Principle of Non-Intervention 
In the seventeenth-century, scholars such as Hugo Grotius, began to 
support the notion of intervention (within European states) to protect 
individuals within another state from violations of natural law, on the basis 
that they were unable to defend themselves from their sovereign.48 
However, others such as Wolff believed that intervention within the concept 
of natural law was impermissible, arguing that to interfere in another state 
‘is opposed to the natural liberty of nations’.49 Post-Westphalia, the principle 
was therefore still subject to much debate. Indeed, overall, whilst the Peace 
of Westphalia established a system of sovereign states and, by extension, 
an unofficial agreement of non-interventionism, rather than curtailing 
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internal interventions, Westphalia ‘strengthened them by increasing the 
scope of the basis upon which interventions could take place’.50 The 
Westphalian system therefore seemingly established a system which 
favoured non-intervention, on the basis of sovereignty, but permitted 
intervention if a legal basis existed. This formulation of a general prohibition 
of intervention but with specific legal justifications or exceptions has 
persisted throughout the development of the principle of non-intervention.   
During this period, it is Emer de Vattel, a founding father of modern 
international law,51 who is often credited with being the first to formulate 
the principle of non-intervention in 1758 in his work Le droit des gens.52 
Within this, Vattel ‘inaugurated the terms in which we continue to carry on 
debates about intervention’; that is, a system of ‘legally equal and 
independent sovereign states that warrant protection from outside 
intervention in order to develop autonomously’.53 However, despite some 
codification of the principle,54 in the midst of the French Revolution, France, 
for example, failed to limit its own interference in the internal affairs of 
other states, with the French government claiming a right to intervene in 
all cases where interference was necessary to assist people’s struggle for 
liberty.55 Even during its early conception, then, the paradox within the 
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intervention principle is evident. This contradiction between intervention in 
theory and intervention in practice or, more specifically, the dominant 
powers’ manipulation of a caveated principle of non-intervention, has 
persisted throughout the evolution of the principle. That is, states arguably 
purport to be non-interventionist yet intervene extensively under various 
auspices. Indeed, the French justification for intervention – the protection 
of nationals and individual liberties-56 has arguably persisted throughout 
the development of the principle of non-intervention and can be seen in 
contemporary justifications such as humanitarian intervention and the 
responsibility to protect. All of which seek to protect the rights of individuals 
and invoke a similar sense of moral righteousness, as espoused during the 
Age of Discovery, albeit in a different context. For TWAIL scholars, the 
creation of international law during this period was based on European and 
Christian values, with ‘Europe as the centre, Christianity as the basis for 
civilisation, capitalism as innate in humans and imperialism as a 
necessity’.57 The selective use of intervention by the dominant European 
powers therefore exemplifies these European and Christian origins of 
international law. 
Whilst the concept of a non-intervention principle was discussed again by 
scholars such as Kant in the late 18th Century,58 states continued to 
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intervene extensively in other nations. In Europe, the Holy Alliance59 
claimed the right to intervene in situations involving European revolutionary 
governments, on the basis of protecting the legal establishment60 - a 
justification arguably similar to today’s Rule of Law. Beyond Europe, the 
right of intervention was also established in multilateral treaties such as the 
Treaty of Berlin 1878, which permitted European powers to interfere in the 
internal affairs of Turkey and Africa, primarily based on a form of 
‘humanitarian’ intervention, to guarantee a minimum of rights of the 
inhabitants.61 In international legal scholarship, Oppenheim’s classic 
commentary on international law also addressed the issue of intervention.62 
Following Lauterpacht’s approach, Oppenheim noted that intervention was 
‘as a rule, forbidden by the Law of Nations’ but only if it was ‘forcible or 
dictatorial interference’.63 Interference ‘pure and simple’ was not enough to 
be considered as illegal intervention.64 Oppenheim also noted that, in 
addition to forceful or dictatorial interference, intervention could be justified 
on the basis of protecting a state’s nationals, humanitarian reasons or 
collective intervention in the general interest.65 It is this concept of 
intervention which has generally prevailed.  
                                   
59 See: WP Cresson, The Holy Alliance: The European Background of the Monroe Doctrine (OUP 1922); A Brisku, 
‘The Holy Alliance as ‘An Order of Things Conformable to the Interests of Europe and to the Laws of Religion and 
Humanity’ in T Hippler and M Vec (eds) Paradoxes of Peace in Nineteenth Century Europe (OUP 2015).  
60 Austrian intervention was justified in the Troppau Proposal of 19 November 1821. See: P.W. Schroeder, The 
Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848 (OUP 1994) 610-612. 
61 Treaty between Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Russia and Turkey for the Settlement 
of Affairs in the East (13 July 1878). 
62 Oppenheim (n9). 
63 ibid s134, 221. 
64 Jennings and Watts (n3) 428. 
65 ibid.  
18 
 
The principle of non-intervention eventually began to gain significant 
support from states, with the introduction of numerous doctrines in the late 
nineteenth century.66 This change in approach to intervention was a direct 
reaction to the excess and abuse of intervention which occurred with the 
emergence of new nation states. In particular, the Latin American Wars of 
Independence forced a shift in the colonial global power order and marked 
the first wave of decolonisation, with most Latin American states gaining 
their independence by 1825.67 During this time policies such as the Monroe 
Doctrine were proclaimed, in this instance, as a United States’ policy against 
opposing European colonialism in the Americas, appearing to declare a 
strong non-interventionist stance.68 However, in practice the doctrine was 
used by the United States to exert American hegemony over Latin America 
and justify intervention.69 The Monroe Doctrine could be viewed, then, as 
an agreement between dominant states in the Global North to mutually 
respect each other’s sovereignty and, in particular, to refrain from 
intervening in each other’s spheres of influence – namely, the Global South. 
It therefore was a selective form of the principle of non-intervention, 
supporting the notion that both non-intervention and sovereignty were only 
applicable to select states, thereby marginalising and excluding the ‘other’ 
states who were not granted the protection of the principles and, again, re-
creating Anghie’s dynamic of difference. Indeed, the United States’ 
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application of the Monroe Doctrine has been referred to as ‘imperial 
anticolonialism’;70 that is, whilst the Doctrine rejected European 
colonialism, it simultaneously permitted American imperialism. Again, the 
development and application of the Monroe Doctrine supports Anghie’s 
argument that doctrines of international law grew out of and were shaped 
by the colonial encounter, with the endless dynamic of difference creating 
gaps between states.71 The Treaty of Berlin and the Monroe Doctrine are 
therefore two examples of a legal instrument and a political instrument 
having a legal effect which both contributed to the development of the 
principle of non-intervention and simultaneously permitted intervention, 
primarily within the context of colonialism. 
2.3 Colonialism  
The contradictory development of the principle of non-intervention is 
exemplified by the fact that during the mid-late nineteenth century, whilst 
Latin America was gaining its independence and the United States was 
emerging as a great power, throughout the African continent, colonialism 
was at its height with the ‘Scramble for Africa’, culminating in the Berlin 
Conference of 1884-1885.72 Therefore, whilst the Global North states 
enjoyed the full protection and benefits of the principles of sovereignty and 
non-intervention (including the protection of their nationals when in the 
Global South), Latin American states seemingly gained a quasi-form, whilst 
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colonised states fell outside the remit of the principles and were instead 
subject to extensive intervention. This reflected the hierarchy of states (and 
states’ rights) which was prevalent at that time; that is, the distinction 
between civilised, semi-civilised and uncivilised states with each of these, 
respectively, enjoying either full, limited or no international legal 
personality.73 The principle of non-intervention at this point could therefore 
arguably be compared to an exclusive club which was still in its infancy, 
with the terms of its membership, including who qualifies for admittance, 
still undecided.   
The colonial era marks the height of Western intervention, with states 
occupying and exploiting vast amounts of territory in the non-Western world 
in order to expand their Empires or boost their state’s economy. During this 
period, international law arguably permitted, legitimated and legalised 
extensive intervention through, for example, legal instruments or 
institutions such as treaties or trade agreements and, more profoundly, the 
Berlin Conference of 1884-1885.74 Colonial conquest therefore represented 
‘the first pertinent global model of intervention’ which was a ‘manipulated 
and purposeful penetration of foreign peoples and their cultures’.75 Through 
explorers or private chartered companies,76 treaties between native tribal 
leaders and Western States were established and used exploitatively to 
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allow Western States to formally obtain land. In the Congo, Henry Morton 
Stanley explored the local area and negotiated with local tribe leaders for 
the sale of their land to the International Association of the Congo (IAC).77 
The IAC was, ostensibly, a charitable association founded by King Leopold 
of Belgium, yet through this, Stanley acquired vast amounts of land in the 
name of the IAC for the benefit of King Leopold.78 These unequal treaties 
were a common use of the law to ensure Leopold was granted 
‘everything’;79 they were also used during the Berlin Conference as a basis 
for Leopold’s claim to the Congo. These treaties, again, highlight a striking 
paradox within the law. Whilst Europeans acknowledged that the natives 
were capable of entering into legal obligations to grant Western powers 
sovereignty over their territory, within international law the natives were 
also characterised as lacking any form of legal status.80 Indeed, Anghie 
notes how the natives were granted a ‘quasi-sovereignty for the purposes 
of enabling them to transfer rights, property and sovereignty’ to the 
Western imperial powers.81 The law was therefore used by the hegemonic 
powers to transfer partial rights to natives, whilst simultaneously limiting 
their rights and affording them little protection. For the principle of non-
intervention, natives were evidently capable of falling within the ambit of 
international law in order to transfer their property or sovereignty but did 
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not qualify to obtain the protection of the principle as they were subject to 
extensive intervention from the West. It is within this arguably two-tiered 
level of international law, with its uneven evolution and application of 
sovereignty, that the principle of non-intervention developed. 
At the Berlin Conference this power differential between the Western 
colonisers and the native peoples was exacerbated further, with 
international law again permitting and legitimising such actions. The 
conference determined the future of Africa, dividing the continent into 
artificial countries which could be more easily controlled by European states, 
with not one African involved in the process. Indeed, ‘the most irrelevant 
factor in deciding the fate of the continent was the Africans themselves’.82 
As occurred with the early European explorers, the Western States showed 
complete disregard for any pre-existing Kingdoms, systems of governance, 
or ethnic, tribal or national interests. The arbitrary boundary lines, pencilled 
on a map by Leopold and Stanley,83 divided Kingdoms and ethnic groups 
and contrived an ‘unnatural division of Africa’.84 In the Congo, people who 
lived 750 miles apart instantly became compatriots, with an alien identity 
forced upon them.85 These colonial borders still have a profound influence 
on contemporary African politics, as is particularly evident with the ethnic 
tensions in the Great Lakes region.86 It could therefore be argued that 
intervention, in this instance, has had a significant, long-term impact, again 
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based on the superiority of Western standards and interests which were 
forced upon the non-Western world, with international law providing a 
veneer of legitimacy to these interventionist activities.  
In particular, the process of intervening and dividing the African continent 
was addressed through the rhetoric of free trade and ‘civilising’ which were 
enshrined in the subsequent ‘General Act of the Berlin Conference 
Respecting the Congo’.87 The Act focused on ensuring the provision of free 
trade for the European states operating in the area and pledged to ‘civilize’ 
the native population, making them ‘understand and appreciate the 
advantages of civilization’.88 Again, Anghie’s dynamic of difference is 
presented here through the ‘civilising mission’, with the Europeans 
presented as the ‘civilisers’ or ‘saviours’ in contrast to the ‘barbaric’ or 
‘uncivilised’ non-Europeans.89 Grewe notes that the term ‘civilisation’ 
‘embodied an attempt to place the global political supremacy and colonial 
mission of the white man on a new basis of legitimacy’ which corresponded 
with the changing conditions of the nineteenth century.90 Indeed, the 
General Act, and other international treaties at that time, ‘included a 
pathetic invocation of the European powers’ mission to promote 
civilization’.91 This rhetoric of free trade and civilising simply allowed 
Western states, leaders and corporations to ‘pursue contradictory and 
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inconsistent goals’.92 In particular, within the Congo, the General Act and 
the IAC opposed the slave trade and promoted the ‘civilising mission’, yet 
in practice Leopold enslaved the native population by imposing rubber 
collection quotas on communities.93 In order to exploit Congo’s natural 
resources, particularly rubber and ivory, Leopold forced the local population 
to collect resources using the native army, the Force Publique, as a ‘tool of 
colonial coercion’.94 This resulted in the mutilation or killing of civilians who 
failed to meet the quotas with estimates of up to ten million people killed 
during the time of the Congo Free State.95 
Within the Congo, for Leopold, who recognised that ‘a colonial push would 
require a humanitarian veneer’,96 the civilisation project therefore offered 
the perfect cover to allow him to pursue his colonial interventions. Through 
the IAC, which was likened to the Red Cross,97 Leopold astutely created the 
appearance that he was morally superior to imperialist states who were 
vying for control of Africa.98 The professed aim of the IAC was to ‘establish 
a powerful Negro state’99 by ‘suppressing slave trade and introducing 
legitimate commerce into the Congo Basin, while strongly supporting the 
principles of free trade.’100 Leopold was therefore praised for his purported 
humanitarian goals and received significant support even after he had 
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gained control of the Congo and had imposed a brutal regime. In particular, 
the Catholic missionaries, who had arrived with the first explorers in the 
fifteenth century, ‘were the most steadfast champions of the king’.101 These 
missionaries did much to further the ‘civilising mission’ and ‘were inclined 
to turn a blind eye to Leopold’s excesses’ as they believed they were 
‘bringing the blessings of true Christianity to the heart of Africa.’102 
Evidently, intervention during this period was again based on a sense of 
moral righteousness and the colonial or imperialistic narrative of the 
‘civilised self’ against the ‘savage’, ‘barbaric’ other which TWAIL scholars 
seek to challenge.103 This polarisation was then arguably glossed over by 
international law, with instruments such as the General Act of the Berlin 
Conference legitimating these justifications for intervention and thereby 
perpetuating the civilised-barbaric narrative. 
The Congo was therefore host to a multitude of interventions – economic 
intervention from Leopold; ‘humanitarian’ intervention from both state and 
non-state actors; and a religious or moral based intervention from 
missionaries. This latter intervention, in particular, whilst a soft form of 
intervention (in comparison to the hard forms of economic and 
humanitarian intervention) has proved to be particularly penetrative and 
enduring. Within the Congo today, the Catholic Church, who were 
significantly involved in the early stages of Leopold’s colonial projects,104 
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are one of the most influential non-state actors,105 particularly through the 
National Conference of Congolese Catholic Bishops (CENCO).106 Over half 
of the Congolese population are Roman Catholic and the Church has a vast 
infrastructure of schools, hospitals and private businesses,107 the roots of 
which can be traced back to the colonial era and Catholic missionaries such 
as the ‘White Fathers’ who supported Belgian civilising missions.108   
As with the arbitrary colonial boundaries drawn at the Berlin Conference, 
the effects of colonial interventions in the Congo have therefore had long-
term impacts; thus, highlighting that historical interventions and colonial 
activities still animate present-day practices.  
Furthermore, when examining the history of international law, in this 
instance the principle of non-intervention, the discipline’s inextricable ties 
with colonialism and imperialism are evident. Indeed, for TWAIL scholars, 
imperialism is said to be ‘ingrained in international law as we know it 
today’.109 In particular, Anghie’s dynamic of difference – the clash between 
two cultures- is both animated and justified by international law.110 
Understanding both this relationship between international law and 
colonialism and the use of international law to subjugate and oppress Third 
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World peoples is a central objective of TWAIL.111 Mutua notes how European 
states justified the colonisation of independent, non-European lands, 
whether by military conquest, fraud or intimidation, through international 
law.112 As colonisation was viewed as ‘part of the manifest destiny of 
Europeans and ‘good’ for non-Europeans’, ‘any method deployed in its 
pursuit was morally and legally just’.113 In an age of ‘frenetic’ expansion, 
international law therefore provided ‘an ethical rationalisation’ of the 
European will for global power.114 Fisch notes that although ‘the colonial 
acquisition of Africa needed no justification’, as the right of conquest was 
‘widely accepted both in theory and state practice’, it was understood that 
there should be proper justification115 – hence the conference and 
subsequent General Act. Koskenniemi also argues that the Berlin 
Conference marked a shift in the European approach to intervention. He 
contends that the Conference was a result of a ‘new imperialism’ whereby 
European powers ‘suddenly took active steps for the creation of formal 
empires’.116  
The colonial period was therefore a crucial time for both the delimitation of 
the principle of non-intervention and the development of international law 
more broadly. In particular, it established the principle of non-intervention 
between European states but not between European states and non-
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European territories, once again reflecting the balance (or imbalance) of 
power during that period. As the remainder of this Chapter will 
demonstrate, the influence of colonialism on shaping international law and 
the colonial dichotomy of civilised and uncivilised have remained firmly 
entrenched within international law, particularly the principle of non-
intervention.  
2.4 Into the 20th Century  
During the start of the twentieth century, a wealth of international 
conventions were produced after the First World War which endorsed the 
principle of non-intervention. After many years of battling with the concept, 
firm commitments were made to recognise the importance of non-
intervention and respect for sovereign equality of states. Regional and 
international treaties were created, alongside international institutions, 
which further solidified the status of the principle within international law. 
It is during this period that the principle of non-intervention began to firmly 
take shape and states which had previously been excluded from the 
principle’s ambit now fell within the protection of the law as they gained 
sovereign status.  
The first affirmative condemnation of intervention came in 1933 with Article 
8 of the Montevideo Convention which proclaimed that ‘no State has the 
right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another’.117 The 
subsequent Additional Protocol Relative to Non-Intervention also affirmed 
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the principle.118 Parties to the Protocol declared inadmissible ‘the 
intervention of any one of them, directly or indirectly, and for whatever 
reason, in the internal of external affairs of any other of the Parties’.119 In 
the Americas, the Good Neighbour Policy, which favoured anti-imperialism, 
economic internationalism and political non-interventionism,120 appeared to 
reaffirm sovereignty for Latin American States.121 However, similar to the 
application of the Monroe Doctrine, non-intervention was only restricted 
within the boundaries set by the political elites in the United States. This 
later became evident with the United States’ numerous Cold War 
interventions, despite Latin American states’ attempts to challenge US 
intervention through coordinated diplomatic manoeuvring.122 The principle 
of non-intervention was therefore tentatively but unevenly developing. In 
particular, there remained a significant gap between the West and ‘the rest’, 
with the latter, non-Western states typically falling outside of the remit of 
the principle, thereby remaining subject to intervention and perpetuating 
Anghie’s dynamic of difference.  
In addition to this distinction, there was also a difference in approaches to 
intervention amongst Western states, with the language or justifications put 
forward for intervention varying between Europe and the USA. Whilst 
European countries favoured the ‘monopolistic protectionism’ of colonies as 
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exclusive sources of raw material, the USA advocated for freedom of 
commerce unfettered by territorial or sovereign claims of control.123 This 
distinction was exemplified in the Congo where Belgium colonised the 
territory, extracting its numerous natural resources (e.g. rubber)124 and the 
USA engaged in ‘unrestricted free trade’ and freedom of navigation on the 
Congo which implied that the river was ‘free from the claims of jurisdiction 
by the participating countries’.125 As TWAIL scholar Gathii notes, whilst the 
USA’s approach implied they were an ‘enlightening power’ and in opposition 
to European territorial expansion and intervention, it ‘effectively legitimised 
the very colonial occupation it regarded as illiberal’ – as occurred in the 
Congo.126 Indeed, this approach to intervention in the Congo arguably 
persisted post-independence, when the USA significantly supported 
Mobutu’s 30 year dictatorship through financial aid in exchange for Cold 
War alliances and access to resources.127 
Again, to use the analogy of the principle of non-intervention as a club – 
the club’s handbook had begun to be drafted (by the hegemonic powers) 
but, as colonialism still existed, membership was still limited and reserved 
for the most dominant states. It is only with the formation of the United 
Nations and the body of law which it and the International Court of Justice 
produced, that the principle of non-intervention began to solidify and be 
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more uniformly applied. At the end of the Second World War, an increase 
in state cooperation and the rise of internationalism led to the further 
development of the principle. Non-intervention was defined as prohibiting 
intervention through use of force but also interference through economic, 
political and diplomatic means,128 thereby laying the foundations of the 
principle which is prevalent today. This broader understanding of 
intervention also reflected the political climate at that time. As co-operation 
between states increased, interference was possible in a more subtle and 
effective manner without the need for the use of force.  
2.4.1  The United Nations 
Perhaps one of the most illustrious examples of increased co-operation 
between states, post-Second World War, was the creation of the United 
Nations, which also marked a turning point for the principle of non-
intervention. Whilst the International Law Commission was the first 
institution to stipulate non-intervention as a duty of states,129 the 
establishment of the United Nations in 1945 set the stage for what would 
later become a pivotal institution for the principle of non-intervention. 
Whilst non-intervention is ‘not, as such, spelt out in the Charter’ of the 
United Nations, it is a ‘corollary of the principle of the sovereign equality of 
States’ contained in Article 2(1) of the UN Charter.130 It is therefore 
generally implied that if a state has sovereign powers, by extension, it is 
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granted the protection of the principles of non-use of force and non-
intervention.131 Conversely, without the prohibition on intervention, the 
principle of sovereignty, with its ‘two complementary and mutually 
dependent dimensions’ of ‘internal sovereignty’ (the power to make 
decisions on domestic matters) and ‘external’ sovereignty (that ‘a sovereign 
power obeys no other authority’)132 cannot be realised. Within the UN 
Charter, the principle of non-intervention can therefore be viewed as being 
enshrined in Article 2(1), as a corollary of sovereignty, and is also read into 
Articles 2(4) and 2(7) of the Charter. Thus, the introduction of the UN and 
its founding Charter encapsulated the principle of non-intervention into a 
legal document on a much broader scale than ever before. Indeed, it went 
further than its predecessor, the League of Nations, whose Covenant 
contained weaker provisions that indirectly supported the early conception 
of non-intervention by abolishing the ‘right of conquest’ for members of the 
league,133 protecting members from ‘external aggression’ and preserving 
their ‘domestic jurisdiction’.134 Therefore, whereas non-intervention had 
previously only been found in ad hoc conventions and policies, 
predominantly at a regional level,135 now, it had gained a global and 
somewhat ‘universal’ recognition through the UN.   
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Whilst the prohibition on the use of force, contained within Article 2(4), can 
be seen within the principle of non-intervention in the prohibition on the 
use of armed or military intervention (including military occupation of a 
territory, naval blockades, seizure of assets and embargos),136 the only 
direct reference to intervention within the Charter is found in Article 2(7). 
This states that the Charter does not authorise the UN to ‘intervene in 
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state’, 
excluding enforcement measures under Chapter VII.137 Although this could 
be viewed as a notable development for the principle of non-intervention, 
as it enshrined the concept within the Charter of an international institution, 
for some, no other Article within the Charter ‘has caused more trouble than 
this one’ as ‘its relatively simple terms contain a dual danger’.138 That is, 
the UN is prohibited from intervening but only in ‘domestic’ matters and 
neither ‘intervention’ nor ‘domestic jurisdiction’ have been sufficiently 
defined as to clarify what forms of intervention this encompasses. This has 
then lead to different constructions of the Article which makes its ‘content 
elusive’ and results in contradictions or self-negating outcomes.139 For 
some, the Charter’s focus on the ‘limits instead of the forms of intervention’ 
avoid ‘the intractable problem of distinguishing intervention from the 
legitimate and necessary efforts of states to influence the behaviour of other 
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states’.140 There has also been debate as to whether this provision is 
applicable only to the UN or whether it also applies a fortiori to member 
states.141 Therefore, what initially appears to be a development in the 
strengthening of the principle of non-intervention is, arguably, not as 
significant as first appears. 
The contribution of Article 2(7) to the development of the principle of non-
intervention is further weakened by the inclusion of the caveat that it does 
not preclude enforcement measures under Chapter VII. As such, Article 2(7) 
is effectively placed into the hands of the UN’s executive body – the Security 
Council – as it is the Council who determines the exercise of Chapter VII 
measures. This is problematic when the composition of the Security Council, 
in particular, the permanent five members’ veto power is considered.142 
Gifted to the most dominant states at the time of the UN’s creation,143 the 
veto power of the five permanent members (P5) has been referred to as 
‘the mother of all powers of the UN’ as it provides the P5 with a right to 
veto proposed resolutions or decisions.144 A disproportionate amount of 
power therefore lies with these dominant five states who are able to act in 
their own self-interests, using the veto power to protect their agendas, 
often at the detriment of smaller states, thus maintaining a level of 
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inequality amongst member states of the UN.145 The veto power, then, is 
arguably a permanent reminder of the North-South divide and the 
domination of hegemonic powers, which TWAIL opposes.  Indeed, ‘TWAIL 
regards the structure of the UN, and in particular its Security Council, as 
‘completely indefensible’, with scholars such as Mutua arguing that the UN 
legitimises Western global hegemony through ‘the cloak of universality’.146 
The veto power could also be viewed as a perpetual example of Anghie’s 
dynamic of difference both in its fundamental composition (the five 
dominant states advantage against the remaining members) and in its 
operation – in this instance, in its potential to be implemented in relation to 
Article 2(7). Indeed, this was an issue which was considered during the 
drafting of this provision, in particular, in relation to the interpretation of 
‘domestic jurisdiction’. As international lawyer and TWAIL scholar, Abi-
Saab, has noted, when drafting the provision, smaller states attempted to 
widen the scope of ‘domestic jurisdiction’ both to safeguard their own 
independence and ‘as a bar and a limitation to the extensive powers that 
could be exercised by the directorate’ of the permanent five members.147 
The creation of the UN and the inclusion of the principle of non-intervention 
within the UN Charter therefore assisted with the development of the 
principle of non-intervention but this was limited by the inherent power 
imbalances within the UN system. It is only with decolonisation and the 
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inclusion of more Global South states that the UN became a greater tool or 
instrument for the development of the principle of non-intervention, albeit 
with the enduring and ever-looming hegemony of the Security Council.  
3. Decolonisation and the Rise of the Global South 
Decolonisation marked a significant shift in the history of intervention and 
the formation of the principle of non-intervention. It is during this period 
that the principle expanded from essentially a European/Western principle 
to an international doctrine, starting with the Bandung Conference, and 
then primarily through the United Nations and the body of law which it 
produced predominantly from 1960 until 1985. The creation of the UN, 
combined with the decolonisation period resulted in an expansion of 
sovereign states and consequently an increase in states who were subject 
to the principle of non-intervention. This led to an expansion of the 
geographical scope of the principle and also required a re-balancing within 
the ‘international community’ as the Northern or Western states domination 
within global politics and international law was now challenged by the newly 
sovereign Third World states.148 As Grewe has argued, this period became 
‘an oscillation between international community and the hegemony of a 
single superpower’.149 That is, both international law and the international 
community150 were adjusting to the new world order – learning how to 
balance the newly independent states of the Third World, the reduction in 
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Western hegemonic power, and the body of UN and ICJ law on the principle 
of non-intervention.   
As has been a recurring theme throughout the development of the principle, 
during this period there was a paradox between non-intervention rhetoric 
and interventionist activities. Whilst colonial intervention ended and the 
principle was emphatically supported, intervention still occurred but in a 
less obvious, more subtle form.151 States moved from overt, unilateral 
military intervention to multilateral intervention or proxy interventions 
through insurgents, armed groups, mercenaries and private military and 
security companies (PMSCs).152 Similarly, within the Congo, intervention 
was once again used to counter intervention, with a UN peacekeeping 
operation deployed in 1960 to remove Belgian forces within the country.153 
Reverting back to the analogy of the principle of non-intervention as a club 
– membership had expanded to include almost all states but sub-groups 
had begun to grow resulting in a fracturing of the forms of intervention, 
with seemingly just as many interventionist activities albeit in a less 
invasive form.  
3.1 Bandung and Decolonisation  
In 1955, against the ‘backdrop of crumbling European colonies’, 
representatives from twenty-nine Asian and African states gathered in 
Bandung (Indonesia) and sought to use new norms of non-intervention to 
                                   
151 For example, Belgium granted the Congo independence but retained significant control within the mineral-rich 
province of Katanga. See: Reybrouck (n83). 
152 See for example: PW Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Private Military Industry (Cornell University 
Press 2003). 
153 UNSC Res 143 (14 July 1960) UN Doc S/RES/143. 
38 
 
regain their sovereignty.154 The conference represented approximately two-
thirds of the world’s population and became viewed as an ‘event’155 or, more 
abstractly, a ‘spirit’156 which has influenced numerous contemporary 
movements and institutions. Indeed, within international law scholarship, it 
is considered to be the ‘symbolic birthplace’ of TWAIL.157 More broadly, it 
sparked the ‘Afro-Asian movement’, leading, in the early 1960s, to ‘the 
Non-Aligned Movement’ before the birth of the ‘Group of 77’ (G-77).158 The 
latter of these saw the Latin American states joining the Asian and African 
states who shared the same economic and political predicaments. The 
Bandung Conference was therefore a key catalyst for mobilising non-
Western states to oppose the agenda of the dominant hegemonic powers. 
More specifically, in relation to the principle of non-intervention, those 
states at the conference, who had already gained independence, sought to 
challenge history’s most illustrious form of intervention – colonialism. 
Noting the ‘evils arising from the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, 
domination and exploitation’, these newly-independent states declared that 
‘colonialism in all its manifestations is an evil which should speedily be 
brought to an end’.159 This demand was then later reiterated in the General 
Assembly in its 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence.160 Thus, 
these Global South states were challenging the long-standing practice of 
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Western domination and simultaneously expanding the scope of the 
principle of non-intervention to now include the Global South. 
For TWAIL scholars, this decolonisation period, beginning with the Bandung 
Conference, marked ‘the emergence of a new voice and the quest for a new 
paradigm’.161 Third World states were therefore contesting ‘the universality 
and legitimacy of the international legal system’ which had been developed 
without their participation and used to justify their subjugation.162 This did 
not, however, mean that the ‘new’ Asian-African states rejected the whole 
body of international law; rather, ‘the occasional outbursts’ and ‘demand 
for its adaptation’ reflected only protests against the inequities within the 
system.163 Again, this reflected the broader TWAIL initiative of opposing the 
global hegemony of the West and advocating for the full representation of 
all voices, particularly those who constitute the ‘Third World’.164 These ‘new’ 
states therefore wished to actively participate in international law and assist 
in its transformation into a more equitable body of law. Indeed, Anand 
argues that the newly independent states believed international law to be a 
protection for them as ‘weaker members of international society’, despite 
recognising that the system was developed by ‘Western Christian 
civilisation’ in accordance with their cultures and philosophies.165 No more 
so is this tension arguably evident than with the development of the 
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principle of non-intervention, which, during this period, was transformed 
from a ‘European into a universal rule of international law’.166 That is, as 
Global South states gained independence they entered the international 
arena as sovereign states, falling within the ambit of international law. 
Thus, they ostensibly gained the same status as their former colonial rulers 
and also obtained the benefits of this status, including the protection of the 
principle of non-intervention. 
Decolonisation therefore marked a tipping point for the concept of non-
intervention and it was ‘professed equally emphatically in the East, West 
and Third World’.167 Where the principle had previously only been applicable 
to the West, it was now also applicable to the Global South, thereby 
representing ‘the utilisation of existing international law to craft a more 
pluralistic, tolerant international system’.168 In this instance, international 
law was effectively used by Third World states to reject colonial intervention 
and protect their own legal, political and cultural interests. However, whilst 
the principle of non-intervention was now applicable to both the North and 
South, this did not necessarily translate into an equal application. Indeed, 
the dichotomy of the colonial relationship did not instantly vanish when 
colonised states gained their independence and became sovereign entities. 
For some, the decolonisation period was viewed as a ‘Revolt against the 
West’169- a term loaded ‘with a sense of dismay and disapproval at anti-
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colonialism, decolonisation and the emergence of a demanding, unsettled 
and unruly ‘Third World’’.170 Whilst decolonisation eliminated military 
occupation and sovereign control over African territories by European 
powers, it has been argued that ‘political influence, economic 
preponderance, and cultural conditioning’ remained.171 Whilst states 
granted their former colonies their independence,  in reality they simply 
fostered a transition from formal control to informal control through less 
conspicuous means of intervention.172 This was particularly the case in the 
Congo where Belgium, after granting the Congo its independence, retained 
a significant amount of influence in the country, particularly within the 
mineral-rich province of Katanga which proclaimed its secession shortly 
after Congo’s independence day.173 Although Katanga was never formally 
recognised by a single state, it received significant support from Belgium 
who bankrolled white mercenaries, funded the local regime and manned the 
military, administrative and economic infrastructures.174 All the while, 
Belgium maintained its grasp on the mining industries and protected their 
economic interests. As Reybrouck notes, colonialism did not cease in 
Katanga as it formally did in the rest of the country, with colonial practices 
and rituals – such as segregation and ruling Belgian elite- remaining in place 
throughout the province.175 Similar to how Leopold used international law 
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to obtain land from the native leaders, Belgium also entered into ‘Treaties 
of Friendship’ with the Congo, which permitted Belgian troops to continue 
to be stationed at two bases (Kitona and Kamina) until agreements were 
made to have them taken over by Congolese authorities.176 These Treaties 
of Friendship’ therefore marked a move towards, arguably, a consensual 
intervention or intervention by invitation, which appeared to be more 
acceptable but could still be used to disguise coercion – such as the 
continued Belgian presence in Katanga. Once again, law was therefore used 
to legitimate extensive intervention, supporting the TWAIL assertion that 
international law provides powerful states with a legal pretext to exercise 
its domination over the weak. More specifically, it could also be viewed as 
a recreation of Anghie’s dynamic of difference, this time between the newly 
independent state and the former coloniser, rather than the colonial 
dichotomy of ‘uncivilised’ and ‘civilised’. That is, the former colonial power 
creates the narrative of a gap between themselves and the newly 
independent ‘other’ states, thereby justifying intervention as a means to 
close this gap and alter the ‘other’ to align with the hegemonic agenda. Put 
differently, whilst the Global South had gained the same rights and 
protections as the Global North, the playing field was not levelled, with the 
North-South divide maintained even as the South entered the international 
law arena.   
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3.2 Non-Intervention through the UN   
This battle or readjustment between the North and South states also 
unfolded within the UN system as almost a third of the world’s population 
(750 million people) and more than 80 former colonies gained their 
independence through decolonisation.177 This subsequently led to a 
significant increase in UN membership, with the original 51 members 
growing to 127 by 1970 with 44 states admitted during the high point of 
decolonisation.178 Membership to the UN provided newly independent states 
with a seat in the General Assembly, thereby also providing them with 
voting powers and a platform to promote their interests. For some TWAIL 
scholars and Third World states, the UN was therefore viewed as a ‘shield 
for the protection of the small Powers’.179 These newly independent states 
were also said to have adopted a ‘very liberal and functional interpretation 
of the Charter’180 and powers of the UN organs to ‘change the status quo’ 
and strive to ‘restructure their societies and the international society to 
reach a more equitable situation’.181 As such, the UN system offered Third 
World states a tool to challenge the dynamic of difference and attempt to 
reduce the gap between themselves and the Global North through their 
engagement in the development of international law. From a TWAIL 
perspective, membership in the UN could therefore have been viewed as an 
opportunity for the newly independent Global South states to contest the 
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dominant states’ monopoly and to influence international law-making 
‘through participation in debates, decisions and cooperate activities’ 
undertaken in the UN.182 This influx of Global South states thus challenged 
the domination of the Global North, particularly within the General Assembly 
as, for the first time, Global South states held the voting majority.  
For the principle of non-intervention, this growing presence of the Global 
South meant these states could engage in the development and formation 
of the principle, promoting their interests and therefore making the principle 
ostensibly more universal, rather than a European or Western creation. In 
particular, as the Cold War ‘precluded the potential directorate’ of the five 
permanent members of the Security Council, the General Assembly (GA) 
became ‘the stronghold of the small Powers’ as they enjoyed ‘absolute 
equality’ with the big Powers and ‘numerical superiority’.183 Therefore, when 
the inherently biased hegemonic organ of the Security Council was 
paralysed, the playing field was levelled somewhat, with the Global South 
able to promote their agendas without having to compete with the P5 and 
their all-pervading veto power. This was epitomised in the adoption of the 
UN’s pivotal 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples which declared the need to bring colonialism to a 
‘speedy and unconditional end’.184 It expressly stated many of the concerns 
identified during the Bandung conference and reflected the informal alliance 
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between these states, the non-aligned Bloc and the Group of 77, thus 
signalling a shift in the majority within the UN General Assembly. Whilst the 
General Assembly’s ‘Essentials of Peace’ could be viewed as the UN’s first 
postulation of non-intervention,185 it is the Assembly’s 1960 Declaration on 
Independence which was the first UN document to significantly contribute 
to the principle of non-intervention by explicitly and vehemently rejecting 
the most prevalent form of intervention at that time – colonialism – ‘in all 
its forms and manifestations’.186 This then established a platform which 
allowed the broader UN system to more coherently develop the principle of 
non-intervention through Declarations and Special Committees, which 
remain active today.187 
Building upon the 1960 Declaration on Independence, the UN’s main 
contribution to the principle of non-intervention came with the 1965 
Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention, which provided a more 
authoritative elaboration of the norm of non-intervention.188 This declared 
that ‘no State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason 
whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State’.189 During 
General Assembly debates, the Declaration was viewed as ‘one of great 
importance, particularly for the smaller countries, which did not feel safe 
from intervention by more powerful countries’, in spite of the Charter 
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provisions on self-determination and ‘categorical assurances and virtuous 
professions’.190 The Declaration could therefore be viewed as an important 
development within international law not only for the principle of non-
intervention but also for the promotion of the Third World voice as it built 
upon Bandung and the 1960 Declaration by including recommendations 
from the former colonised states. This again demonstrated how, through 
General Assembly debates, newly independent states, who had struggled 
against colonial intervention, were able to voice their concerns and 
interests.191 Ghana, for example, noted that the emergence of new states 
from colonisation ‘revealed other more subtle forms of intervention in the 
internal affairs of those States’.192 This included economic dependence 
resulting in political pressure and foreign military bases which enabled 
external states ‘to run the affairs of other States from the sidelines in their 
own interests’.193 As such, it was recognised that the Declaration needed to 
include these forms of intervention as prohibited acts. Again, from a TWAIL 
perspective, these resolutions were ‘momentous’ as they concerned 
matters ‘of utmost interest to the Third World’ and, as they were developed 
within the UN General Assembly, newly independent states could play a 
significant role in ‘renegotiating the rules’ and developing international 
law.194  
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Within the UN system, the development of the principle of non-intervention 
was also supported by the General Assembly’s establishment of the Special 
Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations 
and Cooperation among States in 1963.195 This committee was concerned 
with ‘the principles of peaceful coexistence’ – non-use of force, the settling 
of disputes by peaceful means, ‘the duty not to intervene in matters within 
the domestic jurisdiction of any State’ and the principle of sovereign 
equality.196 This culminated in the Friendly Relations Declaration of 1970, 
which expressly stated that the principles of the UN Charter, which were 
embodied in the Declaration, including non-intervention, ‘constitute basic 
principles of international law’.197 Within the preamble, it also developed 
the principle of non-intervention further by linking non-intervention and 
international peace and security, noting that a ‘strict observance by States’ 
not to ‘intervene in the affairs of any other State’ is an essential condition 
for nations to live in peace.198 It also re-emphasised the overlap between 
the principles of non-intervention and non-use of force by stating that 
forceful or ‘armed’ intervention and ‘all other forms of interference or 
attempted threats’ against the personality of the state violate international 
law.199 The Declaration then went on to maintain a somewhat broader 
interpretation of non-intervention by stating that ‘No State may use or 
encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of measures to 
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coerce another State’ in order to ‘obtain from it the subordination’ of any of 
its sovereign rights and secure advantages.200 Therefore, the Declaration 
clarified that intervention amounted to more than merely forceful or military 
intervention, simultaneously reinforcing the notion that coercion is the 
essence of intervention.  
In addition to these notable legal contributions to the development of the 
principle, the Declaration again highlighted the Global South states 
newfound ability to contribute to the development of international law. As 
with the 1960 Declaration, during committee meetings on the core 
principles of the Friendly Relations Declaration, statements on self-
determination were included, largely at the insistence of newly independent 
African and Asian states.201 The Declaration, like the earlier GA resolutions 
and declarations, therefore demonstrated both the development of the 
principle of non-intervention and the reconfiguration of the relationship 
between the North and South, with an increased involvement of the Global 
South. However, as has been identified as a common pattern within the 
development of the principle, all is not as first appears with discourse not 
matching practice. Whilst the principle was being legally and normatively 
strengthened, in practice the UN was intervening extensively in the Congo 
with its largest and most forceful peacekeeping operation to date;202 thus, 
again highlighting the recurring contradiction between the principle of non-
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intervention in theory and in practice. Furthermore, whilst there had been 
an increase in states entering the international system, and thereby a 
greater possibility of them contributing to the development of the principle, 
this did not necessarily translate into a counterhegemonic narrative to 
juxtapose that of the dominant states. This was highlighted in 1981, ten 
years after the Friendly Relations Declaration when a General Assembly 
Resolution containing a Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in 
the Domestic Affairs of States was issued.203 Whilst this resolution provided 
a much more comprehensive definition of intervention than previous 
resolutions, it was opposed by most Western states.204 Again, reflecting the 
lingering dynamic of difference between the West and the rest and, 
arguably, a reluctance by the dominant states to place limitations on their 
powers and close the dynamic gap.  
This then leads us to the broader and inescapable issue of the intrinsic 
power relations embedded within the UN system. As noted earlier, the 
Security Council holds a disproportionate amount of power within the UN 
and for TWAIL scholars ‘the primacy of the Security Council’ over the 
General Assembly makes ‘a mockery of the notion of sovereign equality 
among states’.205 It is further argued within TWAIL scholarship that the UN 
was used as a front by the big powers and ‘simply changed the form of 
European hegemony, not its substance’.206 Indeed, Mazower goes as far as 
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to argue that the UN was created both to promote liberal internationalism 
and to preserve the interests of Empire.207 He argues that at the founding 
of the UN, many believed the organisation was deeply hypocritical, viewing 
its ‘universalising rhetoric of freedom and rights as all too partial’.208 
Mazower proposes, therefore, that the UN may not have begun as an 
instrument to end colonialism but, rather, ‘at least in the minds’ of some of 
the drafters, as a means to preserve it.209 Arguably, this is reflected in the 
development of the principle of non-intervention with, for example, the 
Western opposition to the most comprehensive proposed definition of 
intervention and the continual, uneven application of the principle between 
North and South states. Further, as the remainder of this thesis will 
highlight, UN peacekeeping is a prime example of both this tension and the 
use of selective intervention, based on the dominant states’ agenda. That 
is, if the UN can be viewed as being taken ‘hostage by powerful states and 
exploited for their geo-political and economic interests’,210 with the Security 
Council holding a disproportionate power, then, as it is the Security Council 
who sets the peacekeeping agenda, by extension it could be argued that 
peacekeeping, as a form of intervention, is driven by a Western dominant 
agenda. Building upon the TWAIL perspective that interventions are staged 
on a tableau of Western justifications (such as human rights), yet espoused 
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to be part of a ‘universal progress narrative’,211 the subsequent Chapters 
will therefore explore how peacekeeping, as a form of intervention, has 
developed in this same vein. Put simply, is peacekeeping another example 
of Western-led intervention in the Global South, based on the interests of 
the dominant powers?   
3.3 Evolution in the International System 
Whilst the UN is the main institution within the international system to have 
contributed to the development of the principle of non-intervention, other 
entities such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and regional 
organisations have also contributed to the development. The creation of 
regional entities such as the Organisation of American States (OAS), 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)212 and Organisation of 
African Unity (OAU)213 reinforced the interests of the Global South and 
further developed the principle of non-intervention through their 
constitutive acts and charters. This essentially provided the principle with 
greater legal and normative support and created a more nuanced 
understanding of its composition. In particular, it also explored the 
application of the principle to the Global South, which began to highlight a 
somewhat new form of intervention – intervention by the Global South 
within the Global South- which started to become more prevalent in the late 
Cold War and Post-Cold War era.214    
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3.3.1  International Court of Justice 
Within the ICJ, Articles 62 and 63 of the Court’s Statute envisage the 
possibility of third state intervention in specific circumstances. That is, when 
a ‘legal interest’ may affect the intervening party215 or for the purposes of 
interpreting a multilateral treaty to which the intervening state is a party.216 
The Statute could therefore be deemed to take a relatively strong non-
interventionist stance, rendering intervention permissible only within these 
limited circumstances. Indeed, within its judgments in cases pertaining to 
intervention, the Court’s refusal to permit intervention in Corfu Channel and 
the Continental Shelf Cases reflects a non-interventionist stance,217 thereby 
buttressing the principle of non-intervention. Similarly, the Court also 
reiterated the understanding of intervention outlined in the Friendly 
Relations Declaration, namely that there must be an element of coercion 
and the intervention must bear on matters which each state is freely 
permitted to decide, including political, economic, social, cultural systems 
and ‘the formulation of foreign policy’.218 The decisions by the Court 
solidified the understanding of non-intervention, with its discussions on the 
use of force and self-defence in Nicaragua crystallising the law in this area 
and remaining valid today in regards to humanitarian and collective security 
intervention.219 In defence of the principle and its boundaries, the ICJ also 
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noted it would ‘certainly lose its effectiveness as a principle of law if 
intervention were to be justified by a mere request for assistance made by 
an opposition group in another State’.220 More specifically, it argued that it 
would ‘be difficult to see what would remain of the principle of non-
intervention in international law’ if intervention, which is already allowable 
at the request of the host state government, were also to be allowed at the 
request of the opposition.221 It was believed that this would ‘permit any 
State to intervene at any moment in the internal affairs of another State’, 
either at the request of the government or the opposition.222 The ICJ 
therefore clarified and reaffirmed the boundaries of the principle of non-
intervention, highlighting its importance within international law. 
Furthermore, as the subsequent Chapter will explore, this assertion of state 
sovereignty and state consent for intervention is also replicated within UN 
peacekeeping, whereby the host state must consent to the presence of a 
peacekeeping operation. Therefore, this notion of state sovereignty and 
consent within the principle of non-intervention is carried through into 
collective security intervention. More specifically, as will be explored in 
Chapter 4, this interpretation has been upheld when, for example, in the 
DRC consent for the presence of peacekeepers is only requested from the 
host state and not from the prevalent non-state actors or armed groups, 
who have significant territorial control.  
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Once again, the ICJ reasserted the boundaries of the principle of non-
intervention and applied the principle to support the Global South states, 
thereby cultivating its universal application and demonstrating how the 
international arena had expanded in the post-Second World War era. 
Furthermore, the court’s decision in Nicaragua could also be viewed, 
applying a TWAIL perspective, as a defence of the Global South (Nicaragua) 
against a hegemonic power (USA). As Richardson argues, Nicaragua was 
important not only for reaffirming the principle of non-intervention but also 
for condemning the ‘hegemonic subordination of small, regional ‘other’ 
states and peoples’.223 Returning to the analogy of non-intervention as a 
club – whereas the Global South had gained membership through 
decolonisation and the UN system, there was still disparity between its 
members (the North and South) and the application of the principle to these 
members. However, this changed slightly through the decisions of the ICJ 
which applied the principle of non-intervention to all members of the club, 
including the Global South, and elaborated on the conditions of their 
membership. 
Indeed, the ICJ developed the application of non-intervention in the Global 
South further in Democratic Republic of Congo v Uganda,224 where it 
reaffirmed the principle of non-intervention after the DRC accused Uganda 
of performing acts of armed aggression in violation of both the UN Charter 
and the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity. In its judgment, the 
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Court found that Uganda’s use of force in the DRC was not self-defence but 
instead constituted an ‘unlawful military intervention’ in ‘grave violation’ of 
the Article 2(4) prohibition on use of force found in the UN Charter.225 It 
also found that ‘by actively extending military, logistic, economic and 
financial support to irregular forces’ in the DRC, Uganda had violated both 
the principle of non-use of force and the principle of non-intervention.226 By 
determining that Uganda had violated the norm of non-intervention, the 
Court again contributed to the understanding of what constitutes direct or 
indirect intervention within customary international law. Furthermore, for 
the principle of non-intervention, the case is unique as it is one of the first 
examples of the international system engaging in a debate on intervention 
within the Global South by the Global South, instead of the typical pattern 
of Northern intervention in the South. This therefore, again, reflects the 
broadening of the application of the principle of non-intervention and the 
increased engagement of the Global South in the international system. More 
specifically, for the DRC, the decision could be viewed as a recognition that 
the extensive involvement of its neighbours in its internal affairs amounted 
to intervention, thereby condemning the actions of Congo’s neighbours and 
reaffirming Congo’s sovereignty. As the subsequent Chapters will explore, 
the involvement of Congo’s neighbours in its internal affairs, particularly 
after the Second Congo War, has been an ongoing, major concern and, 
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alongside the presence of UN peacekeeping operations, is one of the most 
significant examples of contemporary intervention in the DRC.  
3.4 Diversifying Forms: From Theory to Practice 
Despite the significant development of the principle of non-intervention 
through the UN system and the ICJ, the instability and conflicts during the 
decolonisation period created an opening for a diverse range of Cold War 
interventions.227 These interventions differed from the typical, direct 
military interventions and instead took the form of proxy wars (often 
involving private military contractors), economic interventions, and a small 
number of UN peacekeeping operations. It could therefore be argued that, 
during this period, as the composition of the international community had 
shifted with the inclusion of the Global South, the rules of the game began 
to change. That is, whilst the principle of non-intervention had been firmly 
established and the most illustrious form of intervention had ceased, in 
practice, intervention continued to occur but in more subtle forms. 
Arguably, a splintering occurred whereby intervention, instead of taking the 
form of direct, military action, began to occur in less overt but numerous 
different forms which, in turn, continued to perpetuate the long-standing 
power imbalances and dynamics of difference. Again, as has been 
highlighted throughout this Chapter, within the development of the principle 
of non-intervention a gap between theory and practice remained. Thus, 
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whilst the principle had gained strong legal underpinnings and there was a 
significant non-intervention rhetoric, this did not translate in its application.  
3.4.1  Peacekeeping as Collective Security Intervention  
Perhaps the most notable of these ‘new’ forms of intervention is collective 
security intervention through UN peacekeeping which, amongst other 
things, highlights the dichotomy between intervention in theory and 
intervention in practice. As was discussed in the previous section, the UN 
has been a key actor in developing and strengthening the principle of non-
intervention through its organs, particularly the General Assembly. 
However, in somewhat of a contradiction to this, whilst espousing non-
intervention and producing resolutions and declarations, it simultaneously 
began to develop peacekeeping as a tool for maintaining international peace 
and security. The UN was therefore creating a new form of intervention 
whilst also supporting the creation of the principle of non-intervention. This 
was done through the concept of collective security intervention – 
something which was ‘not unique to the twentieth century’ but has since 
become synonymous with the UN.228 
Indeed, when the Cold War geo-political tensions paralysed the UN Security 
Council, peacekeeping was invented as a mechanism to ensure that the UN 
could fulfil its role of maintaining international peace and security.229 Thus, 
a ‘new’ form of intervention was introduced based upon multilateral action 
through an international organisation, ostensibly on the basis of the 
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collective interests of the international community. Traditionally, 
peacekeeping began as simple observation and monitoring operations, 
designed to oversee ceasefire agreements as part of the UN’s ‘preventive 
diplomacy’ to avoid local conflicts escalating into global confrontations.230 
Whilst the UN deployed personnel to the Balkans, Middle East, Kashmir and 
Korea, mostly to monitor adherence to armistice agreements or ceasefires, 
it is UNEF I that is generally considered to be the first UN peacekeeping 
operation.231 UNEF, deployed in the Sinai to help diffuse the Suez Crisis of 
1956, established the traditional model of UN peacekeeping operations, 
contributing to the establishment of the core peacekeeping principles of 
host state consent, impartiality and non-use of force.232 As the following 
Chapter will explore in detail, this ‘new’ form of intervention seemingly 
adopted a tentative, non-interventionist stance as the three fundamental 
principles placed a limit on the extent of peacekeeping as an intervention 
in the host state. That is, the principles, together, created a red boundary 
line around peacekeeping, similar to that which had developed around the 
principle of non-intervention. In particular, the need to obtain host state 
consent for a peacekeeping’s presence mirrored the emphasis on state 
sovereignty which had been evident throughout the development of the 
principle of non-intervention. As such, the initial peacekeeping operations 
could be characterised as a passive, non-threatening, disinterested form of 
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intervention which did not penetrate, interfere or seek to impose any 
changes within the host state. Instead, they simply played a supportive 
role, aiding the host state in the implementation of ceasefire agreements 
and thereby contributing to the maintenance of international peace and 
security. For the principle of non-intervention, the creation of peacekeeping, 
justified under the umbrella of collective security intervention, could 
perhaps have been viewed, at this point, as an acceptable exception to or 
justifiable expansion of the principle of non-intervention.  
However, the exception to this was the UN’s peacekeeping operation in the 
Congo – ONUC – which was deployed in 1960, during the height of 
decolonisation, a mere two weeks after the country gained independence. 
Unlike the UNEF-style peacekeeping operation, ONUC was a larger, highly 
robust, more complex and multifaceted operation composed, at its peak, of 
almost 20,000 troops, alongside civilian components.233 Although initially 
deployed as a traditional peacekeeping operation, it rapidly evolved into a 
more robust, forceful peace enforcement-style operation in an attempt to 
fulfil its mandate and address the disintegrating security situation in the 
Congo.234 In doing so, ONUC used high levels of force, essentially engaged 
in armed conflict,235 and became embroiled in the country’s internal affairs, 
including the claims to legitimate government and the Katangan 
secession.236 ONUC was therefore highly interventionist, broadly 
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interpreting the fundamental principles that acted as a boundary around 
peacekeeping and consequently expanding the interventionist nature of 
peacekeeping – a recurring theme within peacekeeping which will be 
explored in the subsequent three Chapters. In addition, this expansion of 
peacekeeping also had the consequential effect of constricting or narrowing 
the principle of non-intervention by creating a broader exception to the 
principle, which was at odds with the non-intervention narrative that the 
UN was espousing during that period. Furthermore, it also created 
significant tensions within the UN, particularly between the two Cold War 
superpowers, with the Soviet Union arguing that ONUC was a proxy for the 
US, rather than an agent of the Security Council.237 This, again, highlights 
the problematic unfair representation within the Security Council, as noted 
earlier, and the risk that the concentration of power within the Council may 
result in the UN being used for the benefit of the dominant powers. In 
particular, it supports the TWAIL view that the UN legitimises Western 
hegemony through the ‘cloak of universality’238 and TWAIL scholars’ 
assertions that dissemination functions of international institutions are 
‘steered by the dominant coalition of social forces and States to legitimise 
their vision of world order’.239 
Indeed, Simpson argues that the UN (like the Concert of Europe and League 
of Nations which came before it) is predicated on a ‘legalised hierarchy’, 
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whereby the international community conferred special rights and 
responsibilities upon the great powers and enshrined them in law – such as 
through the UN Charter.240 The purpose of this legalised hierarchy within 
the UN, then, was to ‘preserve substantial sovereign equality’.241 It is then 
further posited that the dominant powers have a special responsibility to 
maintain international peace and security.242 Again, this is enshrined within 
the organ of the Security Council and, more specifically, the five permanent 
members who hold the veto power. As discussed earlier, it is this rationale 
and power imbalance which TWAIL seeks to challenge. As international 
institutions, such as the UN, are ‘ideologically charged to validate and 
legitimate world order norms’,243 they are able to include Global South 
leaders and absorb counter-hegemonic initiatives.244  International 
institutions can therefore play a crucial role in levelling the playing field and 
developing international law. Whilst the inclusion of the Global South within 
the UN system during decolonisation seemed to offer a counter to Western 
domination, as was previously noted, this did not necessarily translate into 
practice during the development of the principle of non-intervention. The 
same could also be said for the creation and early development of 
peacekeeping, highlighted by ONUC and the Congo crisis.   
The inherent power dynamics and North-South divide which animated the 
principle of non-intervention and the creation and expansion of the UN 
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during decolonisation can also be said to have filtered down into the concept 
of peacekeeping. This is, again, based upon the inherent power dynamics 
and unequal distribution of power within the Security Council. That is, as 
peacekeeping was created as a means for maintaining international peace 
and security, it was, ostensibly, a legitimate form of intervention at the 
disposal of the dominant powers to fulfil this role. As it is the Security 
Council who, under the UN Charter, is charged with ensuring international 
peace and security, by extension, it is primarily responsible for determining 
when and where a peacekeeping operation is deployed, which has 
predominantly been in the Global South. Put simply, it is the Global North 
(in particular the veto-wielding P5) who set the peacekeeping agenda, 
deploying peacekeeping operations (and therefore interventions) in the 
Global South. Thus, the North-South divide is maintained within 
peacekeeping, as is Anghie’s dynamic of difference. Indeed, it could be 
argued that the dominant powers recognise a gap between the dominant 
(North) and weaker (South) states, creating a division of ‘us’ (UN 
peacekeeping) and ‘them’ (the host state), with the former sent to the latter 
in an attempt to bridge the gap by normalising or transforming the ‘other’ 
to meet the dominant powers agenda. This is then further exacerbated by 
the fact that these operations predominantly consist of troops from the 
Global South, whilst the Global North primarily fund and dictate 
peacekeeping activities. In contemporary peacekeeping this division is stark 
with Global South states providing approximately 92 percent of all military 
and police personnel for operations, contributing only 15 percent to the 
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peacekeeping budget.245 For some, this results in the inclusion of these 
Global South armed forces into the global military systems of the imperial 
powers, constituting a sort of ‘dependent militarisation’.246 Whilst there may 
be many explanations for this disparity, including Global South states’ 
desire to advance their public image, gain recognition and prestige, benefit 
financially or support regional cooperation,247 there are some who perceive 
it as ‘racism in peacekeeping’.248 Indeed, this North-South divide or ‘colour 
line’ within peacekeeping, results in the Global South troops predominantly 
taking the risks, whilst the Global North adopt senior or management 
positions – a case of ‘you lead, we bleed’.249 
As UN peacekeeping is driven by the P5 or hegemonic agenda, its 
deployment within a host state could therefore be viewed as an attempt to 
alter or force change within the host state, in order to meet hegemonic 
interests. Whilst the nuances of this argument will be explored in more 
detail in the subsequent Chapters, for the development of the principle of 
non-intervention, the birth of peacekeeping created a further justification 
for intervention which was legitimated by international law and, arguably, 
had the consequence of narrowing the principle of non-intervention. 
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3.4.2  Cold War Interventions and Regional Organisations  
The introduction of peacekeeping as a new form of intervention, under the 
umbrella of collective security, therefore permitted the UN to continue to 
fulfil its role in maintaining international peace and security during the Cold 
War. In a similar vein, as the Cold War superpowers refrained from 
engaging in direct conflict other forms of intervention evolved. During this 
period, intervention began to take the form of proxy wars, with external, 
allied powers supporting internal actors, such as Cuba’s involvement in 
Angola and Ethiopia,250 and its attempted intervention in the Congo (then 
called Zaire) in support of Congolese independence.251 The Cold War and 
decolonisation period also brought about a revival of mercenaries252 who 
found ‘opportunities in the power vacuums created by colonial 
transitions’.253 Within the DRC, mercenaries were particularly prominent in 
Katanga during its attempted secession, with many mercenaries recruited, 
trained and deployed by Belgian officers, to ensure the foreign states’ 
interests in the region.254 Thus, again, highlighting how the colonial 
dynamics did not instantly vanish when colonial rule formally ended. It also 
marked another form of military intervention but one which differed from 
the usual direct state intervention and therefore fell into a grey area within 
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international law255 - raising questions as to how the principle of non-
intervention could or should apply in these instances. 
Indeed, the principle of non-intervention, was arguably challenged by these 
changing forms of intervention throughout the Cold War. From a TWAIL 
perspective, it could also be viewed as a loss of some of the gains that had 
previously been made – a classic example of one step forward and two steps 
back. That is, it could be argued that just as the principle of non-
intervention had been substantially developed in the UN and ICJ and Global 
South states had managed to gain independence from the most illustrious 
form of intervention, the rules of the game changed again. Therefore, the 
Third World’s challenge of the North’s dominance and shaping of 
international law and its principles (including non-intervention) was 
arguably stalled. Despite the Global South states ostensibly gaining the 
same rights and protections as Northern states, the Global North, 
particularly the two Cold War superpowers, continued to intervene to 
maintain their dominance, this time fighting to gain spheres of influence in 
the South.256 Intervention thus offered a ‘potentially attractive means to 
pursue relative gains’, particularly in the ‘‘grey zones’ of the Third World’.257 
The United States, in particular, viewed Africa ‘through the prism of white-
minority rights and the Cold War and considered radical nationalist 
                                   
255 See: PW Singer, ‘War Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military Firms and International Law’ (2003-
2004) 42 ColumJTransnatlL 521-550; C Lehnardt, ‘Private Military Companies and State Responsibility’ (2007) in 
Chesterman and Lehnardt (n253) 155. 
256 See: D Richterova and N Telepneva, ‘An Introduction: The Secret Struggle for the Global South – Espionage, 
Military Assistance and State Security in the Cold War’ (2021) 43(1) IntHistRev 1-11. 
257 SN MacFarlane, ‘Intervention During the Cold War’ (2002) 42(350) AdelphiPapers 33-45. 
66 
 
movements to be Soviet proxies’.258 This narrative was therefore used to 
justify extensive intervention in order to protect hegemonic interests and 
maintain benefits gained through the colonial encounter – in essence 
maintaining significant elements of colonialism. Indeed, it is noted that 
‘some of these interventions resembled past imperial practices with more 
powerful nations attempting to exploit Africa and its riches for their own 
ends.’259 This was particularly evident within the Congo when Belgium 
sought to maintain its interests in the Eastern province of Katanga and the 
USA provided significant financial donations and aid in exchange for 
allegiance.260 Similarly, the assassination of the Congo’s first democratically 
elected President, Patrice Lumumba, seven months after his appointment, 
was allegedly carried out by Congolese forces with the support of a Belgian 
execution squad and following plans devised by American and Belgian 
governments.261 Applying a TWAIL lens, the West’s involvement, in 
particular, in the removal of Lumumba, an individual who openly challenged 
Western dominance and championed state sovereignty, national unity, 
economic independence and pan-African solidarity,262 could be interpreted 
as a deliberate attempt to maintain the North-South power divide and 
hegemonic interests, all through the use of intervention. More specifically, 
it could be viewed as an example of what TWAIL scholar Chimni refers to 
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as a ‘Northern subversive strategy’ designed to undo regimes which were 
not favourable to Western hegemonic states.263 This, consequently, 
prevents an ‘effective Third World coalition from emerging as a 
counterweight to the unity of the First World’.264 Therefore, for the principle 
of non-intervention, this arguably has the knock-on effect of limiting the 
ability of the Global South to both meaningfully contribute to its 
development and seek its protection when faced with the prospect of an 
intervention from the Global North. These hegemonic interventions during 
the Cold War can, arguably, also be viewed as another example of Anghie’s 
every-changing dynamic of difference – on this occasion, the hegemonic 
powers identified the Global South states as siding with the Cold War 
opposition, thereby justifying intervention in order to close the gap and alter 
the ‘other’ to prevent them from joining the adversary. In other words, 
again using the Congo as an example, the USA demarcated themselves and 
the Congo as two separate cultures, with the former as the ‘civilised’ 
Western state and the latter as the ‘other’ ‘uncivilised’ state, at risk of siding 
with the Soviet Union, thereby once again requiring the Global North to 
alter, influence or normalise the aberrant Global South.   
South-South Intervention 
These Cold War interventions also led to further interventions in the form 
of regional and neighbouring interventions;265 that is, intervention in the 
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Global South by the Global South. The influx of weapons and money within 
the newly independent states throughout the Cold War and its proxy 
wars,266 ‘entrenched power differentials and rendered local conflicts far 
more lethal’.267 At the end of the Cold War, unstable, post-colonial states 
were therefore left with a wealth of weapons ‘that fuelled new competition 
for riches and power’.268 This then resulted in intervention between these 
states; thus, intervention by the Global South within the Global South. 
Within the Congo, for example, President Mobutu’s 32-year dictatorship, 
which had been supported by the USA during the Cold War, was ended in 
1997 by a rebel insurgency led by Laurent Kabila and supported by 
Rwanda.269 This escalated into the ‘First Congo War’270 which marked the 
beginning of an extensive period of intervention within Africa’s Great Lakes 
region, particularly, within the Congo. Indeed, shortly after Kabila took 
power, the Congo faced numerous interventions from its neighbours. Whilst 
Angola, Namibia, Chad and Zimbabwe supported the Kabila government, 
Uganda and Rwanda supported the opposing rebels, with Tutsi’s occupying 
Katanga in the East and attempting to remove Kabila in a bid for control of 
the DRC. These interventions escalated into a brutal armed conflict in what 
became known as ‘Africa’s World War’ or the ‘Second Congo War’, one of 
the deadliest conflicts since the Second World War, with five million deaths 
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from 1998 to 2003.271 Rwanda and Uganda, in particular, had a significant 
presence in the conflict and intervened extensively in the DRC’s internal 
affairs – intervention which still persists today.272 Indeed, the Rwandan 
Tutsi Government initially entered the Congo on the basis of searching for 
Hutu genocidaires, who had fled to Eastern DRC after the 1994 Rwandan 
genocide.273 However, even after this justification ceased to be relevant, 
Rwanda, along with Congo’s other neighbours continued to intervene in the 
DRC, resulting in continual cycles of violence within the East, exacerbated 
by the looting of Congo’s natural resources, with the DRC’s neighbours 
supporting or opposing various armed rebel groups, partaking in numerous 
proxy wars.274 In addition to military intervention, Rwanda and Uganda’s 
support of rebel armed groups and political leaders275 and disputes over the 
porous border (with formal crossings often sporadically closed based on 
diplomatic disputes, security concerns, health precautions or economic 
considerations)276 could all be perceived as subversive277 or diplomatic278 
forms of intervention. Indeed, the Congo’s neighbours have frequently 
engaged in these forms of intervention, as opposed to direct military or 
forceful interventions, in order to influence change in the DRC and freely 
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exploit the DRC’s natural resources through illegal exploitation networks.279 
In particular, Rwanda’s support of M23, has included establishing alliances 
to facilitate targeted assassinations of opposition rebel movements and 
supporting post-electoral mutinies within the Congolese armed forces.280 As 
will be explored in subsequent Chapters, this external neighbouring 
intervention has persisted to such an extent that the DRC’s current 
President, Tshisekedi, has contemplated inviting Burundi, Rwanda and 
Uganda to conduct joint military operations with DRC troops against rebel 
groups.281  
This Congolese example therefore highlights the ‘new’ form of neighbouring 
or inter-African intervention which emerged at the end of the Cold War. In 
particular, it was during this period that the notion of ‘African solutions to 
African problems’ began to occur, legitimising the practice of inter-African 
interventions.282 That is, the notion that ‘long-term-solutions could only 
come from Africans themselves’; thus, internal, African solutions were 
preferable over imported, dictated or external foreign solutions and 
interventions.283 This therefore juxtaposed the typical patterns of Northern 
intervention in the South that had significantly shaped the principle of non-
intervention up until this point.  
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This initiative and the practice of Global South intervention was then given 
further weight with the development of regional organisations, such as the 
African Union (AU). Officially launched in 2002 as a successor to the OAU, 
the AU developed an ‘elaborate institutional framework to implement the 
right to intervene’.284 Whereas the AU’s predecessor, the OAU, had no legal 
power to intervene in internal conflicts within the continent, Article 4(h) of 
the AU’s Constitutive Act gave the AU the right to intervene unilaterally and 
forcefully if one of its member states is subject to war crimes, genocide, 
and crimes against humanity.285 It also permits the AU to intervene when a 
member state requests intervention to restore peace and security.286 The 
AU’s approach to intervention thereby significantly contributed to the 
development of the principle of non-intervention, being realistic of the 
needs of its member states. The AU was also the first regional institution to 
propose a comprehensive collective security and intervention regime which 
was normatively more advanced than any other regional organisation, 
including NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization).287 Furthermore, this 
could therefore be viewed, not only as a development for the principle of 
non-intervention and its regional application, but also an example of the 
Global South making a notable contribution to the international system and 
the shaping of international law. Indeed, the AU’s development of the 
principle of non-intervention could be viewed as an example of what TWAIL 
                                   
284 International Refugee Rights Initiative, ‘From Non-Interference to Non-Indifference: The African Union and 
the Responsibility to Protect’ (September 2017) 4 
<https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/AU%20R2P%20-%20final.pdf> accessed 7 May 2020. 
285 Constitutive Act of the African Union (11 July 2000).   
286 ibid. 
287 O Emeka, ‘Analyzing Humanitarian Intervention From an African Point of View’ (2012) 1 Vestnik RUDN IR 22-
26, 24.  
72 
 
scholar, Abi-Saab, referred to as the Third World states ‘renegotiating the 
rules’.288 That is, the Global South states, who had entered an international 
legal system which had been formed without their input,289 were now 
attempting to redress the balance and re-define principles and norms to 
meet their interests.290   
Furthermore, AU intervention again supports the concept of ‘African 
solutions to African problems’, promoting intervention by the Global South 
over intervention by the Global North.291 The OAU, in particular, was said 
to have ‘guarded’ Article 33 of the UN Charter,292 strongly advocating that 
African solutions should be sought first, before conflicts were referred to 
the UN Security Council.293 This became known as ‘try Africa first’294– the 
origins of the norm of African solutions to African problems – which was 
legitimised through the notion of ‘continental jurisdiction’, with the concept 
of Pax Africana asserting that ‘the peace of Africa is to be assured by the 
exertions of Africans themselves’.295 A distinction was therefore drawn 
between illegitimate foreign intervention and inter-African intervention 
which, through Mazuri’s understanding of ‘racial sovereignty’ was a more 
legitimate form of intervention.296 Whilst these forms of intervention 
therefore further developed the principle of non-intervention, by creating a 
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more nuanced understanding of intervention in the Global South, it also 
raises concerns about the applicability of the principle and how to reconcile 
this form of intervention with the TWAIL narrative that intervention is 
predominantly exercised by the Global North. Indeed, as Adebajo notes, 
these interventions were simply an ‘African ‘Monroe Doctrine’;297 that is, it 
prohibited intervention from external actors (essentially those from outside 
the continent) whilst simultaneously permitting intervention by internal 
actors (neighbours or those within the continent). Consequently, it 
perpetuated as great a level of intervention as Western or foreign 
interveners, which arguably risked contravening the principle of non-
intervention, as was seen in the ICJ’s case of the DRC v Uganda.298 The 
concept of ‘African solutions to African problems’ and its usage to justify or 
legitimate interventions, is therefore as ‘problematic and riddled with 
hidden agendas as traditional interventions’.299 Thus, the TWAIL narrative 
which has ran throughout this exploration of the development of the 
principle of non-intervention is seemingly challenged. However, it could be 
argued that if these interventions are considered more broadly, they could 
be reconciled with a TWAIL perspective if viewed as a consequence of 
Western intervention. That is, it could be argued that the Cold War proxy 
wars in the Global South, which were initiated, supported and influenced by 
the dominant hegemonic powers, as previously noted, led to an influx of 
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weapons, heightening local conflicts.300 These Cold War, Global North-led 
interventions could therefore be viewed as forming the basis for these 
neighbouring interventions. Put differently, interventions during the Cold 
War, which were driven by the hegemonic powers’ interests and agendas, 
arguably formed the foundations or evolved into these Global South 
interventions. Thus, whilst these South-South interventions appear to stray 
from the typical pattern of North-South interventions, it could be argued 
that they were not necessarily a new form of intervention but, rather, an 
altered or hybrid form of Global North interventions. The influence of the 
hegemonic powers therefore seemingly prevailed, maintaining the North-
South divide and the narrative of the dominant North driving interventions. 
For the principle of non-intervention, then, these interventions developed 
further nuances within the principle but still within the overall power 
structure of a hegemonic North.   
Similarly, taking this argument further, it could be argued that some 
neighbouring interventions have been a consequence of or have been 
shaped by colonialism – a form of Global North intervention – again 
attributing some neighbouring interventions to earlier Western 
interventions. For example, within the Great Lakes Region, colonialism is 
charged with racialising the ethnic identities of Tutsi and Hutu and 
embedding the dynamic within institutional structures, reproducing 
institutional privilege.301 By extension, it could be argued that the Tutsi-
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Hutu division which resulted in the Rwandan genocide and the subsequent 
overspill into the DRC (including Rwandan interventions in the Congo) can 
be linked back to this colonial dynamic and thus Western intervention. 
Again, for the principle of non-intervention this supports the notion that the 
North-South divide and power dynamics are maintained within these South-
South interventions. That is not to say, of course, that colonialism or the 
Global North is solely to blame for all South-South, neighbouring 
interventions, such as the ongoing conflicts in Congo. Rather, as Anghie 
argues that colonialism has animated international law, in particular 
sovereignty, so too could it be said to have influenced the principle of non-
intervention, in this instance, inter-African intervention. This is also 
compounded by the fact that these interventions have led to further 
Western intervention as a remedy to the problematic neighbouring 
intervention – as occurred with the deployment of a UN peacekeeping 
operation in the Congo during the Second Congolese conflict. Thus, it could 
be argued that there had been a cyclical evolution within intervention in the 
post-decolonisation period. That is, as decolonisation began, intervention 
was predominantly undertaken by the North, this was then followed by a 
rise in the Global South’s voice and a shift to interventions by the South, 
within the South, which, in turn, led back to Global North-directed 
interventions, this time, predominantly, in the form of multilateral 
interventions such as UN peacekeeping. For the principle of non-
intervention, then, the decolonisation period was a tipping point in its 
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development with the inclusion of the Global South rapidly developing the 
principle into a much more nuanced, universally applicable norm. 
4. The Empire Strikes Back 
Decolonisation and the Cold War were therefore pivotal periods in the 
development of the principle of non-intervention. Similarly, as the Cold War 
ended, the nature of intervention once again altered, albeit within the 
framework or boundaries of the principle which had been set predominantly 
within the UN system during decolonisation. Intervention in the post-Cold 
War era, then, undertook another oscillation period, this time as 
interventions shifted from predominantly unilateral interventions to 
multilateral interventions. The collapse of the Soviet Union and Western 
‘victory’ changed the Cold War consensus which had sanctioned 
intervention302 and led to increased optimism about the potential for the UN 
and the international community to ensure peace.303 Intervention therefore 
became reliant on a ‘coalition of partners, shared costs and UN-led 
multilateral forces’,304 as opposed to direct and unilateral intervention. As 
Falk notes, ‘the renunciation of [unilateral] intervention’ did ‘not substitute 
a policy of non-intervention’; rather, it involved the development of some 
form of collective intervention.305 Indeed, towards the end of the Cold War, 
there was a revival of UN peacekeeping, with more operations undertaken 
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between 1988 and 1993 than in the previous forty years.306 In the 
subsequent decades, peacekeeping rapidly developed from traditional 
peacekeeping to ‘robust’ peacekeeping operations and, more recently, 
multidimensional or ‘stabilisation’ operations.307 Arguably, these 
developments of peacekeeping, in turn, created further nuances within the 
principle of non-intervention by permitting broader, more ambiguous forms 
of intervention, legitimised under the auspices of UN peacekeeping. 
Furthermore, as collective security intervention (which typically takes the 
form of UN peacekeeping) has now replaced unilateral intervention as the 
main method of intervention in the modern era, then an understanding of 
the legal and normative boundaries of peacekeeping is essential in order to 
understand the boundaries or composition of intervention today. Indeed, it 
is this very issue which the subsequent Chapters will explore – how the 
legal principles and norms, which constitute a peacekeeping framework, 
may support or contravene the principle of non-intervention.  
In a similar vein, alongside this shift in military or forceful intervention, 
there was also a further diversification of the forms which intervention took, 
namely economic intervention. During the 1990s, as globalisation brought 
states closer together, foreign intervention into African economies became 
‘the critical backdrop to the crises of the 1980s and 1990s, which stimulated 
a new wave of external political and military intervention in the 
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continent’.308 Intervention therefore took the form of humanitarian aid, 
market expansion investments such as Chinese investment in the Congo’s 
electricity Grand Inga Dam project,309 and the extraction of natural 
resources through mining companies,310 which has, again, been prolific 
within the Congo.311 The latter of these interventions, in particular, has 
proved to be extremely controversial with numerous fatalities as a result of 
poor conditions, resulting in lawsuits against large, international 
companies.312 For the principle of non-intervention, whilst these 
interventions may appear to have marked a shift from the typical patterns 
of intervention which had been prevalent up until this point, they were 
arguably not a new form of intervention. That is, the practice of intervening 
to exploit natural resources for the intervening states benefit was a historic 
practice which had been a key feature of colonial intervention (such as King 
Leopold of Belgium’s exploitation of the Congo’s rubber)313 and this had 
been recognised and included within the concept of intervention as it 
developed in the UN system. Indeed, as noted earlier, as the principle of 
non-intervention evolved through UN General Assembly Resolutions and 
Declarations, the definition of intervention was expanded, often at the 
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insistence of the Global South states, to include these subtler forms of 
intervention. It could therefore be argued that the main framework for the 
principle of non-intervention had been set during the decolonisation period. 
More contemporary interventions then simply added further nuances to the 
understanding of the principle in practice, rather than adding any 
significant, new developments to its boundaries. Returning, once again, to 
the analogy of the principle as a club – membership to the club was now 
open to all, with a well-established handbook or manual to guide 
proceedings. However, in order to keep up-to-date with changing practices, 
interpretations of the handbook and additional appendices were possible. 
Whilst some of these amendments remained within the club’s boundaries, 
others contravened the club rules, falling outside the boundaries and 
thereby undermining the values of the club.   
4.1 Consensual Intervention: A Humanitarian Veneer 
Whilst the principle of non-intervention significantly developed during the 
decolonisation and Cold War period, with a relatively strong rhetoric of non-
intervention, this began to soften at the end of the twentieth century and 
beginning of the twenty-first century. As the Cold War ended and the 
concept of an ‘international community’ took root, intervention again 
became more acceptable but within the framework or justification of 
collective security action, such as UN peacekeeping. From a TWAIL 
perspective, this changing attitude towards intervention was reflected in the 
shift in power dynamics within the UN system. That is, as the Security 
Council’s Cold War paralysis dissolved, the General Assembly, which had 
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allowed the newly independent Third World states to play a significant role 
during decolonisation, ‘lost its own as legal oracle of the international 
community’.314 Therefore, whilst the Global South had been able to play a 
greater role in the development, interpretation and application of 
international law, including the principle of non-intervention, thus 
challenging the dominance of the Global North, the latter began to re-take 
some of their dominance, effectively silencing the Third World again. 
Indeed, prominent TWAIL scholar, Georges Abi-Saab, refers to this 
immediate post-Cold War period as ‘the empire strikes back’ – the second 
act in the three-part ‘psychodrama’ of the North-South confrontation.315 
4.1.1  A Return of the Civilising Mission? 
This re-balancing of the global order was highlighted in the 1990s as the 
international community received criticism for failing to intervene in 
atrocities such as the Rwandan genocide and the Srebrenica massacre.316 
Therefore, whilst Global North intervention in the Global South had been 
strongly condemned during decolonisation, there was now a general 
consensus that dominant states should be intervening in weaker states, on 
the basis of humanitarian needs. This was then legitimised within 
international law in the form of the ‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine317- 
the notion of ‘coercive action against a state to protect people within its 
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borders from suffering grave harm’.318 Thus, the intervention rhetoric 
shifted from one which supported the independence of the Global South 
against hegemonic interventions, to one which now welcomed intervention 
in the South, based on a perceived duty of the dominant states to protect 
vulnerable citizens of the world, through collective intervention.319 The 
principle of non-intervention, then, was constricted or eroded during this 
period as these potentially broad humanitarian-based justifications chipped 
away at the red boundary line that had demarcated the principle and limited 
intervention. Indeed, it was similarly recognised that these interventions 
had eroded state sovereignty, particularly within African states, who were 
forced to ‘dilute notions of absolute sovereignty to allow military 
interventions for humanitarian purposes’.320 
From a TWAIL perspective, these forms of intervention arguably also raise 
numerous issues. Firstly, it could be argued that the basis or criteria for a 
humanitarian-based intervention is essentially based on European or 
Western standards and ideals. That is, determining what constitutes a gross 
human rights violation, and an affront on civilised standards (thus justifying 
intervention) involves the imposition of a standard of ‘civilised’ behaviour 
which ‘to some degree is likely to reflect culturally specific values’.321 As 
collective intervention is primarily carried out by the UN, it follows that 
decisions on when and where to intervene are determined by the UN and 
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thus, ultimately, the veto-wielding members of the Security Council. 
Decisions on humanitarian-based interventions are therefore ultimately 
determined by the dominant Global North states and, as such, are based 
upon Western rather than universal values. This, in turn, leads to criticisms 
about the selectivity of these interventions, with the ‘international 
community’ accused of determining targets selectively, ‘ignoring human 
rights violations of equal or even greater magnitude elsewhere’.322 Again, 
applying a TWAIL lens, humanitarian intervention and R2P can be critiqued 
as a form of European/Western standard setting which is presented as 
‘supposedly universal values’ but is used ‘to conquer and colonise parts of 
the Third World’.323 Indeed, both concepts have been identified as tools 
which could be ‘indirectly used as an intervention instrument’324 or a 
‘weapon of imperial intervention at will’.325 Thus, international law has once 
again provided a veneer of legitimacy to hegemonic intervention in the 
Global South, simultaneously legitimising ‘the intrusion of international law 
in the internal affairs of a state’.326 Put simply, humanitarian-based 
interventions permit Global North intervention in the Global South on the 
basis of standards set by the dominant states.  
This then leads to the similar, second notable issue with these types of 
intervention, from a TWAIL perspective. It could be argued that these forms 
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of intervention are comparable to the colonial civilising mission as both are 
based on the notion of ‘the White Man’s burden’,327 with an enlightened 
dominant state civilising or altering a weaker state to match the standards 
of the former. For some, this points to the broader evolution and purpose 
of international law in the modern era. As Koskenniemi notes international 
law instead of ‘being dressed as a project for civilisation’ now ‘appears as a 
modernising project, a state-building project, a project for economic and 
technological development, for human rights protection, for conserving 
natural resources and seeing to global security’.328 Thus, the same themes 
and power structures are arguably present but are simply re-packaged into 
a more palatable form. Furthermore, humanitarian-based interventions 
could also be viewed as a replication of Anghie’s dynamic of difference as it 
is, once again, an example of the hegemonic powers identifying a gap with 
the ‘other’ and then using that gap as a justification for intervention in order 
to alter the ‘other’. As Anghie argues, as the international system changes, 
so too does the dynamic of difference, which continuously acquires a new 
form.329 In the modern era, then, ‘the familiar pattern of the colonial 
encounter, the division between civilised and uncivilised’ is replicated as the 
developed and the developing or the Global North and the Global South.330 
In this instance, the dynamic is replicated within these humanitarian-based 
interventions. This, in turn, also has the effect of maintaining the North-
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South divide and hierarchical power structures which have been prevalent 
throughout the development of the principle of non-intervention. As a 
result, despite the increased involvement of the Global South in the 
development and application of the principle, the power dichotomy remains.   
4.2 From Military to ‘Security’, through Peacekeeping? 
Alongside these humanitarian-based interventions, further nuances have 
developed within the principle of non-intervention through a revival of UN 
peacekeeping331 and a shift towards a ‘security’ culture following the 9/11 
terrorist attacks and the subsequent ‘war on terror’.332 At the turn of the 
century, the ‘war on terror’ led to an increase in Global North interventions, 
such as the United States-led war in Iraq which, for some, changed the ‘way 
the world viewed international military action’.333 Therefore, as noted within 
the previous discussion of humanitarian interventions, whereas the 
decolonisation period could be characterised as having a strong non-
interventionist rhetoric, this softened within the post-Cold War era, 
particularly after the 9/11 attacks, when numerous justifications for 
intervention began to arise. Whilst decolonisation was a tipping point for 
the principle of non-intervention, it could also be argued that the 9/11 
attacks and the subsequent ‘war on terror’ were a further tipping point for 
the principle. However, whilst decolonisation promoted non-intervention 
and the Global South voice, the war on terror promoted intervention and 
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the dominance of the Global North. Thus, through a TWAIL lens, the war on 
terror era, offers a further example of the empire striking back, with the 
North seeking to regain and retain its prominence in the international arena. 
It is within this backdrop, as intervention became more permissible again, 
that the reinvigorated UN peacekeeping operations were increasingly 
expanded and used as a primary tool for engaging in collective security 
intervention in the twenty-first century. As the strategic context for 
peacekeeping operations shifted, peacekeeping adapted, with significant 
internal assessments on its limits and potential undertaken at the turn of 
the century to strengthen its capacity to create peace and stability in 
complex environments.334 Put simply, peacekeeping evolved in-line with 
interventionist trends (such as humanitarian intervention and security 
interventions) which were, again, dictated by the dominant powers. 
4.2.1  Multi-Dimensional Peacekeeping 
The move towards a security culture was therefore reflected in the 
development of peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era, which 
simultaneously further exemplified the underlying Western dominance and 
North-South divide within both the concept of peacekeeping and the 
principle of non-intervention. As the deployment of peacekeepers became 
more frequent at the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping operations also 
began to evolve from the traditional, passive model to multi-faceted 
operations which engaged in numerous activities that typically fell within 
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the host state’s jurisdiction, thereby resulting in a greater or deeper level 
of intervention in the host state. These multidimensional operations were 
mandated to not only maintain peace and security but also to facilitate 
peace processes, protect civilians, assist in disarmament, demobilisation 
and reintegration of former combatants, promote human rights and support 
democratisation.335 In addition to the expansion of peacekeeping to include 
these tasks, the concept of ‘robust peacekeeping’ was also introduced 
during this period.336 This permitted peacekeeping to use force to defend 
both the mission’s components and the operation’s mandate, including the 
ever-growing list of operational tasks.337 Within the UN’s operation in the 
Congo, for example, the protection of civilians was introduced within 
MONUC’s mandate, resulting in the operation using extensive levels of force 
to fulfil the task, consequently expanding the interventionist nature of the 
peacekeeping operation.338 Whilst the subsequent Chapters (in particular 
Chapter 5) will explore the interventionist nature of some of these tasks, 
more generally, as the following Chapter highlights, this evolution began to 
raise concerns as it became a ‘mix of peacekeeping, peacebuilding and 
peace enforcement’,339 thereby blurring the boundaries between 
peacekeeping and intervention. More specifically, it expanded the possibility 
of intervention (coercive action to influence change in a state), 
simultaneously contracting the principle of non-intervention. Indeed, this 
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development of robust peacekeeping and the introduction of protection of 
civilians as an operational task fit within the broader intervention rhetoric 
at the time as it came after the UN was criticised for failing to intervene in 
the numerous atrocities of the 1990s.340 The discourse of humanitarian-
based interventions, which was previously discussed, had therefore 
permeated the concept of peacekeeping, primarily through concepts such 
as robust peacekeeping and the protection of civilians. Again, this, in turn, 
expanded the remit of peacekeeping, consequently expanding the concept 
of collective security intervention and thereby constricting the principle of 
non-intervention.  
Put differently, if there is an invisible red boundary line which surrounds the 
principle of non-intervention, collective intervention could be viewed as a 
main gateway which permits an opening of this boundary. Peacekeeping 
could then be viewed as a central vessel which runs from this, creating 
space for further intervention, with the varying tasks contained within a 
peacekeeping mandate seen as additional interventionist threads. If 
collective intervention is the overarching exception to non-intervention, 
then peacekeeping and its complex mandates with its numerous tasks are 
the arteries, veins and capillaries which extend UN intervention into the 
host state even further. This is compounded by the fact that, often, UN 
peacekeeping operations are deployed simultaneously with the imposition 
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of UN sanctions – a form of economic intervention.341 Under Article 41 of 
the UN Charter, the Security Council is authorised to impose sanctions to 
maintain or restore international peace and security. This may include 
economic and trade sanctions or more targeted measures such as arms 
embargoes, travel bans and asset freezes, as have been imposed on groups 
and individuals within the DRC since 2004 in an attempt to force these 
actors towards peace.342 An additional layer of intervention is therefore 
imposed upon the host state, in an attempt to coerce change within the 
host state, simultaneously buttressing military, collective security 
intervention which also attempts to alter the state. For the principle of non-
intervention, whilst this may appear to be another form of contemporary 
intervention, it is arguably best viewed as simply a replication of pre-
existing interventionist practices. That is, the sanctions can be categorised 
as simply another form of economic intervention, alongside the extraction 
of natural resources, investments or trading which, as previously discussed, 
have also typically occurred together with military or forceful intervention. 
However, what makes the UN sanctions a more significant form of 
intervention is that they stem from the UN, thereby carrying with it the 
weight of the organisation, and are often imposed alongside the deployment 
of a peacekeeping operation, as is the case in the Congo. The sanctions 
therefore add additional pressure to coerce the host state into altering as 
the UN sees fit; thus, amounting to an additional layer of intervention 
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designed to force a change in behaviour which is, ultimately, based on the 
agenda of the UN Security Council. 
Both the expansion of peacekeeping into multi-dimensional operations and 
the use of sanctions therefore lead back, once again, to the TWAIL narrative 
of a regime of domination and subordination. As discussed in previous 
sections, the inescapable, disproportionate hierarchy of power which 
underpins the UN results in the veto-wielding P5 states ultimately 
determining both the deployment and general composition of a 
peacekeeping operation and the imposition of UN sanctions. Therefore, as 
with the humanitarian-based interventions, two further issues arise with 
these multi-dimensional operations; firstly, the list of mandated tasks and, 
secondly, the selectivity of deployment. For the former, it could be argued 
that, like humanitarian interventions, the prioritisation of certain tasks 
within a peacekeeping mandate, including the advancement of human 
rights343 and democratisation,344 are based upon Western values and 
standards. As TWAIL scholars such as Mutua have argued, human rights 
and democracy are ‘the universalised version of the other’, both of which 
are projects that are devoid of the input of Third World states and are 
‘essentially infinite, open-ended, and highly experimental in nature’.345 
Thus, the inclusion of these within peacekeeping tasks arguably creates not 
only an ambiguous and potentially open-ended justification for intervention, 
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but also a potentially limitless justification for the Global North’s dominance 
over the Global South. Similarly, the decision on where and when to deploy 
a peacekeeping operation is, as with humanitarian-based interventions, 
premised on the interests, values and motivations of the hegemonic powers 
within the Security Council. Once again, reinforcing the power dynamics 
and North-South divide and offering another example of Anghie’s dynamic 
of difference – the dominant actor identifies a gap in the subordinate other 
and subsequently sets about closing the gap, in this instance, by deploying 
a peacekeeping operation. Indeed, this is strongly evidenced within UN 
peacekeeping with the predominance of operations in Africa and the 
frequent clashes between members of the P5 over the deployment of 
peacekeepers to countries such as Syria – a crisis which has invoked the 
use of the veto by Russia and China on numerous occasions, thereby also 
highlighting the differing views on intervention within the P5 of the Security 
Council.346 
For the principle of non-intervention, then, these multi-dimensional 
peacekeeping operations represent both a broadening and deepening of 
intervention which contracts the boundaries of the principle but which, in 
turn, is limited by the selectivity of the deployment of peacekeeping 
operations. That is, the expansion of peacekeeping to multi-dimensional 
operations undoubtedly increases peacekeeping’s interventionist 
possibilities, thereby widening or broadening the gateway that opens the 
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non-intervention boundary line. However, this opening is narrowed again 
by the fact that the operations are predominantly only deployed within one 
geographical location. The shift to multi-dimensional peacekeeping could 
therefore be best described as a deepening, rather than a broadening, of 
intervention as it permits greater levels of intervention but within a 
narrower geographical scope. This therefore creates a further nuance or 
dimension within the development of the principle of non-intervention but 
one which, ultimately, continues to support the TWAIL narrative of a system 
predicated on subordination and domination.  
4.2.2  Stabilisation Peacekeeping: Intervention by Invitation?  
These multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations were given a further 
interventionist veneer in 2010 when some were re-packaged into 
‘stabilisation’ peacekeeping operations– now one of the most prevalent 
forms of intervention in contemporary peacekeeping. Peacekeeping 
therefore evolved again, with operations now able to take numerous forms 
- traditional, multi-dimensional, robust or stabilisation. Since 2010, the 
Security Council’s new generation of ‘stabilisation’ peacekeeping operations 
have been mandated to support the host government, protect civilians and 
combat armed groups, often in joint operations with the host state forces, 
such as MONUSCO’s Force Intervention Brigade, which Chapter 4 explores 
in great detail.347 Despite the increased use of the term ‘stabilisation’ and 
its inclusion in the title of peacekeeping operations in the DRC, Mali and the 
                                   
347 UNSC Res 2098 (28 March 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2098 and UNSC Res 2502 (19 December 2019) UN Doc 
S/RES/2502, para 29(i)(e); S Sheeran and S Case, ‘The Intervention Brigade: Legal Issues for the UN in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo’ (IPI 2014). 
92 
 
Central African Republic (CAR), it is undefined within the UN,348 creating a 
flexibility that opens a window for a broad range of interventionist activities 
to be undertaken, as the subsequent Chapters will explore. Generally, four 
main elements have been identified as forming part of these operations – 
‘robustness’, counter-terrorism, cooperation with the host state, extending 
state authority and control, and entrenching the rule of law and ending 
impunity.349 Again, as with multi-dimensional operations, the same TWAIL 
lens could be applied, with arguments made about how these tasks or 
components stem from a Western-dominated agenda, with only the 
element of cooperation with the host state seemingly invoking the input of 
the Global South.  
Indeed, this apparent cooperation with the host state raises further 
questions for peacekeeping’s legal basis or framework. Whilst stabilisation 
operations could be viewed as an evolution or extension of UN peacekeeping 
from its traditional or robust models, some have argued that these types of 
operations ‘should be understood as a qualitatively distinct form of UN-
mandated intervention by invitation’.350 That is, whilst peacekeeping’s legal 
basis is generally found under Chapter VI (consensual peacekeeping) or 
Chapter VII (non-consensual enforcement) of the UN Charter, Labuda 
argues that the legal basis for stabilisation operations could be tied to host 
state consent rather than Chapter VII.351 This is based on the fact that the 
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Security Council cannot order the host state to provide troops, use force or 
conduct joint operations with a peacekeeping operation in its territory, 
regardless of how broadly its powers are interpreted.352 Therefore, when 
peacekeepers are ‘authorised’ to conduct joint operations with the host 
government forces, it implies that the Security Council is permitting or 
mandating host troops to use force alongside peacekeepers, which is a 
power that the Council does not possess.353 As such, Labuda argues that 
where a host state plans and conducts joint operations with a stabilisation 
operation, as has occurred within MONUSCO in the DRC, this should instead 
be viewed as ‘a function of the host state’s consent’ for UN intervention;354 
thus, the government’s support for external intervention or an invitation to 
intervention. This, in turn, raises numerous issues pertaining to the use of 
force, the invocation of rules of international humanitarian law, and the 
traditional peacekeeping principles of impartiality and consent – all of which 
will be discussed in further detail in the subsequent Chapters. For the 
principle of non-intervention, it also creates a further nuance within the 
concept and creates a complex paradox of extensive, consensual 
intervention, which renders the boundaries of the principle of non-
intervention unclear, thereby leaving room for extensive, potentially 
unlawful, intervention. The evolution of peacekeeping to these stabilisation 
operations therefore, again, highlights a key theme of this thesis – whether 
contemporary peacekeeping operations, such as MONUSCO in the DRC, are, 
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at times, intervention, and thereby contravene or, at the very least, 
constrict the boundaries of the principle of non-intervention. Indeed, it 
could be argued that as peacekeeping has created a justified or legitimate 
gap in the invisible red boundary line around the principle of non-
intervention, every evolution of peacekeeping expands this gap further. It 
arguably follows, then, that there must reach a point where this gap cannot 
be expanded anymore without snapping the red elastic band boundary, 
resulting in a violation of the principle of non-intervention and eroding its 
validity. As such, it is essential to establish the framework or boundaries 
surrounding peacekeeping in order to assess how today’s most prevalent 
form of intervention impacts the principle of non-intervention in the modern 
era. 
5. Intervention as Peacekeeping  
An exploration of the development of the principle of non-intervention 
highlights how intervention is best characterised as a concept or practice 
which has been cyclical in nature. That is, whilst intervention was overt and 
extensive during colonialism, the decolonisation period saw a decline in 
intervention, only for it to increase again in the post-Cold War/’War on 
Terror’ era. There has been a constant fluctuation, then, in intervention and 
non-intervention rhetoric, with, at times, rhetoric failing to match practice. 
During decolonisation, for example, when the concept of non-intervention 
was supported emphatically, intervention was still occurring in the form of 
UN peacekeeping operations and economic or political interventions by 
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colonial powers in their former colonies – as occurred in the Congo. All the 
while, as these patterns of intervention have occurred, the principle of non-
intervention has been developed, primarily through international 
institutions such as the UN and ICJ. Indeed, it is during the decolonisation 
period, when the Cold War paralysed the hegemonic powers and 
intervention was at a low point (except within the superpowers’ spheres of 
influence), that the newly independent Global South states gained a seat at 
the table, thereby being able to contribute to the development of the 
principle. This period was therefore a significant tipping point for the 
principle of non-intervention, firmly establishing its legal framework and 
importance as a principle of international law. It could be argued, then, that 
this creation of the red boundary line around the principle of non-
intervention has remained in place ever since, even when interventions 
began to increase again. That is, once established as a principle of 
international law during this period, subsequent interventionist practices 
have provided a more nuanced understanding of the concept of non-
intervention and its application, which has arguably had the duplicitous 
effect of both supporting and undermining the principle but, ultimately, not 
eradicating it as an established principle of international law. Therefore, 
regional organisations, humanitarian-based interventions and UN 
peacekeeping have all contributed to the development of the principle of 
non-intervention, not through adding anything substantially new to the 
principle but, rather, by providing a greater understanding of the pre-
existing elements of the principle. 
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This then leads to further noticeable dynamics which have arisen 
throughout the development of the principle. From a TWAIL perspective, 
the unequal global order, the lack of a Third World voice within the 
international system and the use of international law to maintain these 
hierarchies, in particular, the North-South divide are all present within the 
principle of non-intervention and interventionist practices.355 Indeed, TWAIL 
scholars such as Tzouvala argue that international law is simultaneously ‘a 
locus of oppression’ and a ‘constant promise for liberation’.356 No more so 
is this dichotomy evident than within the principle of non-intervention 
whereby the principle has both protected the Global South from 
intervention, whilst simultaneously permitting intervention by the Global 
North within the Global South, primarily through the justification of 
collective security intervention. Furthermore, as Anghie argues, 
international law is animated by colonialism with the colonial dichotomy of 
civilised and uncivilised continually replicated in what Anghie refers to as a 
‘dynamic of difference’.357 Again, both the influence of colonialism and the 
replication of the dynamic of difference can be found within the 
development of the principle of non-intervention and contemporary 
interventions, as this Chapter has demonstrated. In particular, it is arguable 
that some elements of colonialism or, rather, practices which occurred 
during colonialism, remain within the concept of intervention today, in 
particular, through UN peacekeeping. Thus, comparisons may be drawn 
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between the two forms of intervention. Indeed, just as colonialism was the 
most illustrious form of intervention in the nineteenth and twentieth 
century, so too is peacekeeping the most illustrious form of intervention in 
the twenty-first century. Both invoke elements of domination and 
subordination, both highlight the North-South divide, both are largely 
motivated or led by the interests and will of the hegemonic powers (the 
Global North), both invoke justifications based on notions of values or 
standards which are predominantly Western-centric and both have gained 
varying degrees of legitimacy through international law. This comparison, 
however, is not to condemn peacekeeping and its purported well-
intentioned efforts. Rather, it is to join the TWAIL movement in exposing or 
acknowledging the ‘imperial character’ of international law and the 
remnants of colonial practice which linger within the international 
system,358 in order to then promote or increase the Global South’s 
participation, creating a truly universal international law. 
Having tracked the development of the principle of non-intervention, then, 
the following Chapter will take this analysis a level deeper by examining 
today’s most prevalent from of intervention (and therefore the greatest 
contemporary challenge to the principle) – UN Peacekeeping. It will explore 
how interpretations of peacekeeping’s legal principles and norms either 
expand or contract the boundaries of peacekeeping and thus undermine or 
support the principle of non-intervention. That is, if peacekeeping is a form 
                                   




of intervention, thereby constituting an exception to the principle of non-
intervention, the form which peacekeeping takes arguably has a direct 
impact on the boundaries of the principle of non-intervention. As this 
Chapter has demonstrated, whilst the traditional concept of peacekeeping 
did not pose a significant challenge to the principle, the same cannot be 
said for contemporary, multi-dimensional operations, particularly the 
stabilisation operations which some consider to be intervention by 
invitation.359 The following Chapter will therefore outline the evolution of 
peacekeeping, identifying its legal and normative frameworks. Chapters 4 
and 5 will then go on to examine these principles and norms in practice in 
the DRC, with the purpose of providing specific examples of how 
peacekeeping in reality may impact the principle of non-intervention, 
possibly, at times, even contravening it and, thus, amounting to 
intervention. 
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As the most prevalent form of intervention in the modern era, UN 
peacekeepers are now one of the largest military forces deployed abroad, 
second only to the United States’ military.1 Following on from the previous 
Chapter’s exploration of the principle of non-intervention, this Chapter will 
therefore examine the evolution of peacekeeping as a form of collective 
security intervention.2 The purpose of this analysis is to clarify the legal and 
normative boundaries which constitute peacekeeping’s framework, in order 
to then establish its impact on the principle of non-intervention. It will 
identify peacekeeping’s ‘legal’ framework (the fundamental legal 
principles), that sit within what could be viewed as a wider ‘normative’ 
framework composed of norms which may have commonalities with 
principles of law but are, ultimately, not underpinned by law and therefore 
do not amount to legal principles.3 Whilst identifying these laws and norms, 
the Chapter will continually explore how they intersect with the principle of 
non-intervention noting where, at times, a broader interpretation or 
application of these may result in peacekeeping becoming intervention, 
thereby contravening the principle of non-intervention. Put differently, if 
collective security is the main gateway opening the red boundary line 
around intervention, then peacekeeping is an extension of this, an 
                                   
1 There are over 78,000 military personnel and 25,000 civilians in 14 countries, see: UN Peacekeeping Website: 
<https://peacekeeping.un.org/en> Accessed 1 June 2021. See also: S Autesserre, ‘The Crisis of Peacekeeping’ 
(2019) ForeignAffairs 101-116. 
2 See: N Tsagourias and ND White, Collective Security Theory, Law and Practice (CUP 2013). 
3 On legal normativity, see generally: JL Coleman, KE Himma and SJ Shapiro, The Oxford Handbook of 




additional gateway that permits intervention. Its principles and norms then 
act as veins, arteries and capillaries that further expand a peacekeeping 
operation’s interventionist potential; thus, simultaneously undermining or 
contravening the principle of non-intervention. 
1.1 Searching for a Peacekeeping Framework 
As the UN Charter makes no reference to peacekeeping, there is no pre-
determined constitutional, institutional or normative framework or 
guidelines governing peacekeeping. Instead, it has developed from 
interpretations of the Charter, the implied powers of the Security Council,4 
General Assembly,5 and Secretary-General,6 decisions from the 
International Court of Justice7 and is based upon the three fundamental 
principles of consent, impartiality and non-use of force.8 Therefore, as with 
the principle of non-intervention, peacekeeping has evolved through 
international organs which have established a piecemeal red boundary line 
around the concept that separates peacekeeping from intervention. That is, 
it creates a line between, on the one hand, peacekeeping, as a form of 
collective security intervention and thus a justified exception to the principle 
of non-intervention, and, on the other hand, intervention in the form of 
coercive action designed to influence change within a state, which violates 
the principle of non-intervention. It is therefore important to clarify what 
                                   
4 See: Articles 24(1), 36(1), 40 Charter of the United Nations (24 October 1945) (“UN Charter”). 
5 See: Articles 10, 11(2), 12, 14 UN Charter. 
6 See: Articles 97-99 UN Charter. 
7 Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 2 of the Charter) (Advisory Opinion) [1962] ICJ 
Rep 151. 




the legal and normative frameworks surrounding peacekeeping are in order 
to ascertain the interventionist nature of peacekeeping and the extent to 
which peacekeeping’s principles and norms may reinforce or undermine the 
principle of non-intervention. Continuing the approach taken in the previous 
Chapter’s exploration of non-intervention, this Chapter will identify 
instances in which peacekeeping’s red boundary line has been expanded, 
contorted and, at times, stretched to its limits. It will then note how this, in 
turn, has a direct impact on the principle of non-intervention as, if 
peacekeeping breaches its limits, it risks crossing the intervention line, 
becoming a form of coercive action and thereby violating the principle of 
non-intervention.  
Furthermore, identifying the legal and normative frameworks is also 
important for both the operation and function of peacekeeping. In 
particular, clarifying peacekeeping’s legal framework is important as ‘in 
general, third party activity is much less likely to raise objection if it rests 
on legal authority and is brought within the framework’ of the UN Charter.9 
Similarly, it is argued that a peacekeeper may find invoking legal obligations 
and prescriptions persuasive when facilitating negotiations or undertaking 
tasks,10 with a ‘legal foundation for the necessary activities’ proving to be 
‘essential to effective performance’.11 Peacekeeping’s legal framework is 
therefore essential both for relations with the host state, the legitimacy and 
                                   
9 O Schachter, ‘The Uses of Law in International Peacekeeping’ (1964) 50(6) VLR 1096-1114, 1098. 
10 O Schachter, ‘Dag Hammarskjold and the Relation of Law to Politics’ (1962) 56(1) AJIL 1-8, 5-6.  




legality of the operation and for regulating and guiding the peacekeepers 
during the deployment of an operation.  
1.2 Peacekeeping’s Legal Basis 
Generally, peacekeeping finds its constitutional basis within Chapters IV, VI 
and VII of the UN Charter, although it has been argued that the more fitting 
categorisation is ‘Chapter VI and a half operations’.12 Similarly, as seen in 
Chapter 2, some have suggested that the legal basis for contemporary 
stabilisation operations could be tied to host state consent, thereby a form 
of intervention by invitation.13 Whilst Chapter IV deals with the powers of 
the General Assembly, it is only on very rare occasions that the Assembly 
has mandated peacekeeping operations.14 Instead, the GA undertakes a 
key role in the financing of operations and monitoring peacekeeping 
performance through its Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 
with the Security Council tasked with establishing peacekeeping 
operations.15 Within Chapter VI, the Security Council is authorised to deal 
with the ‘pacific settlement of disputes’ that may endanger international 
peace and security, including recommending ‘appropriate measures or 
methods of adjustment’.16 Peacekeeping operations authorised under this 
Chapter therefore follow the traditional, passive, consensual model, such as 
                                   
12 See: JF Hillen III, ‘UN Collective Security: Chapter Six and a Half’ (1994) 24(1) Parameters 27-37. 
13 See: Chapter 2, Section 4 and PI Labuda, ‘United Nations Peacekeeping as Intervention by Invitation: Host 
State Consent and the Use of Force in Security Council-Mandated Stabilisation Operations’ (2020) JUFIL 1-37, 
3.  
14 UNEF: UNGA Res 377 (V) (3 November 1950); ONUC: UNGA Res 1474 (ES-IV) (20 September 1960). 
15 See: UN Peacekeeping, ‘Role of the General Assembly’ <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/role-of-general-
assembly> Accessed 5 March 2020. 




UNEF and UNFICYP,17 and thus reinforce the principle of non-intervention. 
Through Chapter VII, the Council is given broad powers to determine 
breaches or threats to peace and then to take military, coercive action to 
combat these in order to ‘maintain or restore international peace and 
security’.18 Operations mandated by the Council under Chapter VII are thus, 
typically, non-consensual enforcement operations,19 such as ONUC, MONUC 
and MONUSCO, which, at times, blur the boundaries between peacekeeping 
and peace enforcement and thus undermine the principle of non-
intervention by pushing peacekeeping closer to the interventionist boundary 
line.20  
Despite this general distinction, in reality, the constitutional basis of 
peacekeeping operations is not as clear-cut, with recurrent, inconclusive 
debates about the Charter basis of peacekeeping,21 leading to an 
uncertainty about the coercive or interventionist nature of peacekeeping. 
For some, peacekeeping operations may be initiated on the basis of 
recommendations made by the Security Council on ‘procedures or methods 
of adjustments’ under Article 36(1); thus, Chapter VI may provide a legal 
                                   
17 UNGA Res 998 (ES-I) (4 November 1956); UNSC Res 186 (4 March 1964) UN Doc S/RES/186. 
18 Articles 39-42 UN Charter.  
19 Articles 39 and 40 envisage recommendations and provisional measures as well as decisions and therefore a 
Chapter VII operation is not automatically non-consensual. On the legality and enforceability of Security Council 
powers, see, for example: D Whittle, ‘The Limits of Legality and the United Nations Security Council: Applying 
the Extra-Legal Measures Model to Chapter VII Action’ (2015) 26(3) EJIL 671-698 and E De Wet, The Chapter 
VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council (Hart Publishing 2004). 
20 UNSC Res 143 (14 July 1960) UN Doc S/RES/143; UNSC Res 1279 (30 November 1999) UN Doc 
S/RES/1279; UNSC Res 1925 (28 May 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1925.  
21 See, for example: ND White, ‘The UN Charter and Peacekeeping Forces: Constitutional Issues’, (1996) 3(4) 
IntPeacekeep 43-63; A Orakhelashvili, ‘The Legal Basis of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations’ (2003) 
43 VaJIL 485-524; D Ciobanu, ‘The Power of the Security Council to Organize Peacekeeping Operations’ in A 




basis for the establishment of a peacekeeping operation.22 However, for 
others, it is impossible for peacekeeping’s constitutional foundations to lie 
in Chapter VI as the potential use of force by peacekeepers is not an 
element of the pacific settlement of disputes contained within the Chapter.23 
Instead, it is argued that peacekeeping’s basis lies in Chapter VII, in 
particular, Article 39 which permits the Security Council to ‘take coercive 
measures or make recommendations’.24 Further, although the International 
Court of Justice stressed that peacekeeping operations are not enforcement 
actions, and, as such, cannot find their legal basis in Articles 41 and 42,25 
there remain debates as to whether measures can be taken by 
peacekeeping operations pursuant to these two Articles.26 
To further complicate matters, within contemporary peacekeeping, the 
multi-dimensional, stabilisation or ‘third generation’ operations are 
frequently deployed with a Chapter VII mandate in complex, intra-state 
conflicts.27 However, the explicit reference to the Charter often comes in 
the form of a singular phrase - ‘Acting under Chapter VII’- which is invoked 
in the introductory clause or chapeau of the resolution.28 This then creates 
the misleading impression that peacekeeping and peace enforcement have 
become one (with some even referring to these stabilisation operations as 
                                   
22 H Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of its Fundamental Problems (Frederick A Praeger 
1964) 401; Orakhelashvili (nError! Bookmark not defined.). 
23 Ciobanu (nError! Bookmark not defined.). 
24 Orakhelashvili (n21). 
25 Certain Expenses (n7) 166, 171. Ciobanu (n21) 18. 
26 Orakhelashvili (n21) 492-493. 
27 MW Doyle and N Sambanis, ‘Peacekeeping Operations’ in TG Weiss and S Daws (eds) The Oxford Handbook 
on the United Nations (OUP 2007) 325. 




‘Chapter VII and a half’ operations) when, instead, the invocation of Chapter 
VII is to authorise the use of force for specific tasks, such as the protection 
of civilians.29 
Today’s operations are therefore a complex infusion of Chapter VI and VII 
elements, exploiting the space between the two Chapters.30 This Chapter 
will not, however, engage in these well-trodden debates over 
peacekeeping’s Charter basis.31 Instead, it will focus on the legal principles 
and norms of peacekeeping as it is these norms or principles which arguably 
determine the interventionist nature of peacekeeping as they form 
peacekeeping’s frameworks and thus peacekeeping’s boundary line. The 
Chapter will therefore explore the evolution and inter-connected nature of, 
firstly, the fundamental principles of peacekeeping, often referred to as the 
‘Holy Trinity’, and, secondly, three new, controversial norms: democracy 
promotion, protection of civilians (PoC) and the prohibition of sexual abuse 
and exploitation (SEA). These latter three norms have been identified as 
they encompass numerous elements within peacekeeping operations and 
are three norms which have been most prevalent in the UN’s operations in 
the DRC – as the subsequent two Chapters will examine. They also reflect 
some of the main justifications or motivations for contemporary 
                                   
29 ibid. On Chapter VII and a half: J Karlsrud, ‘United Nations Stabilization Operations: Chapter VII and a Half’ 
(2019) 18(5) Ethnopolitics 494-508. 
30 ND White, ‘Peacekeeping Doctrine: An Autonomous Legal Order?’ (2019) 88(1) NJIL 86-110, 94. 
31 See, for example: ND White, ‘The UN Charter and Peacekeeping Forces: Constitutional Issues’, (1996) 3(4) 
IntPeacekeep 43-63; A Orakhelashvili, ‘The Legal Basis of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations’ (2003) 
43 VaJIL 485-524; D Ciobanu, ‘The Power of the Security Council to Organize Peacekeeping Operations’ in A 




interventions, which Chapter 2 explored; namely, humanitarian or security-
based interventions. 
Indeed, whilst examining this relationship between peacekeeping and non-
intervention, a TWAIL lens will also continue to be applied. As with the 
previous Chapter, examples of Anghie’s dynamic of difference,32 the North-
South divide and the use of international law to maintain hierarchies will all 
be identified within the evolution of peacekeeping. Furthermore, this 
analysis of the evolution of peacekeeping and establishment of its 
frameworks, rather than relaying a textbook history of peacekeeping, will 
be done through the lens of the UN Secretary-General (SG), as it is the SG 
who has been a key ‘norm entrepreneur’ helping to shape peacekeeping 
and its principles.33 That is, it will focus on the influence of the SG to create, 
institutionalise or interpret norms in, what Johnstone refers to as a three-
stage ‘diffuse process’.34 These three, non-sequential stages include, firstly, 
the SG helping to create norms, by influencing interactions between state 
and non-state actors in the UN; secondly, institutionalising these norms 
within the UN and its organisational structure; and, thirdly, interpreting 
norms, whether implicitly or explicitly, helping to ‘render existing norms 
operational’.35 Taking Johnstone’s application of organisational sociology 
and constructivist international relations theory to the role of the Secretary-
General as norm entrepreneur, the Chapter will examine this within the 
                                   
32 See: A Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (CUP 2007). 
33 I Johnstone, ‘The Secretary-General as Norm Entrepreneur’ in S Chesterman, Secretary or General? The UN 
Secretary-General in World Politics (CUP 2007) 123-138. 
34 ibid, 124, 131.  




context of peacekeeping. However, whereas Johnstone’s article focused on 
the individual, in particular, Kofi Annan, this Chapter will focus on the office 
of the Secretary-General (and by extension the Special Representative of 
the Secretary-General (SRSG)) as an institutional position within the UN 
system. In doing so, it will be purposefully selective, focusing on 
Secretaries-General and issues which have had greater impact on the 
normative and legal development of peacekeeping, particularly if occurring 
within the DRC. Peacekeeping will therefore be examined through a unique 
blend of TWAIL and Johnstone’s theory of norm entrepreneurship. In 
marrying these two theories together, it will challenge the typical, state-
centric, Western narratives of peacekeeping and will allow for a more 
realistic understanding of the internal structures of the UN and 
peacekeeping. 
The Chapter will therefore begin by applying this Secretary-General lens to 
explore a brief history of the development of peacekeeping, before turning 
to focus on the six legal or normative principles. It will consider how these, 
whether taken individually or combined, may restrict or permit 
peacekeeping as intervention, depending on how they are interpreted, 
thereby reinforcing or undermining the principle of non-intervention. That 
is, if the three fundamental principles are interpreted narrowly, the 
peacekeeping operation is arguably non-interventionist, thereby supporting 
the principle of non-intervention. However, as the next two Chapters will 




interpreted broadly, they permit a greater level of intervention and thus 
undermine or threaten to contravene the principle of non-intervention. 
Similarly, the three new norms, found within contemporary, multi-
dimensional operations, even if interpreted narrowly, are arguably much 
more interventionist than the ‘Holy Trinity’ and, again, as these are 
interpreted more broadly, the red line around peacekeeping, which limits 
its interventionist nature, is also expanded. An examination of these norms 
will then be taken further in Chapters 4 and 5 which will examine each 
within the context of the UN’s peacekeeping operations in the DRC; thereby 
providing a much more nuanced understanding of peacekeeping – the most 
dominant form of contemporary intervention- and its relationship with the 
principle of non-intervention.  
2 Peacekeeping’s Norm Entrepreneur  
Whilst it is well-established that peacekeeping operates (or should operate) 
according to the three fundamental principles and other important norms, 
these are rarely found to coexist harmoniously and consistently. Rather, 
these norms are said to ‘exist in a competitive arena’ and, within the context 
of a peacekeeping operation, ‘the normative composition is re-balanced 
each time’.36 For each peacekeeping operation, these norms are re-
interpreted, re-defined or re-actualised in order to meet the realities on the 
ground, the demands of the Security Council mandate and the resources 
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provided for the operation. Indeed, there is an ongoing battle about what 
peacekeeping ought to be and do37 and, as such, practices and normative 
reasonings which back these are significant when tracing how the norms of 
peacekeeping operations ‘wax and wane’.38 Comparisons could therefore be 
drawn here with the development of the principle of non-intervention. That 
is, as the previous Chapter outlined, interventionist rhetoric waxed and 
waned throughout the principle’s development, often in direct correlation 
with the dominance of the hegemonic powers and their agenda. From a 
TWAIL perspective, then, similar arguments can be made about how the re-
balancing of norms and this battle between what peacekeeping is or ought 
to be, is, like the principle of non-intervention, set within the dynamics of 
the North-South divide. Just as Chapter 2 identified how elements of the 
principle of non-intervention (such as contemporary justifications for 
intervention) are based on Western values and standards, the same 
arguments could be made about the norms of peacekeeping, as this Chapter 
will explore. In particular, Chapter 2 identified the inherent power 
imbalances within the UN Security Council and how this could influence the 
shaping of laws, norms and practices, such as the principle of non-
intervention.39 As the Security Council plays a key role in peacekeeping, 
again, the same arguments made about the principle of non-intervention - 
the powers of the veto-wielding P5 and the prevalence of Western 
hegemony - could be extended and applied to peacekeeping.   
                                   
37 AJ Bellamy and P Williams, Understanding Peacekeeping (2nd edn, Polity Press 2010). 
38 Karlsrud (n36) 527.  




Indeed, within the UN system, there is a complex interaction between the 
Security Council (composed of member states who are tasked with 
maintaining international peace and security and therefore set the 
peacekeeping agenda) and the Secretariat (the body of international staff 
who carry out the substantive and administrative work of the UN).40 Head 
of the Secretariat is the Secretary-General, the ‘chief administrative officer 
of the Organisation’, who, ‘more than anyone else’, ‘stands for the United 
Nations as a whole.’41 They are a ‘living symbol and embodiment’ of the 
UN,42 a manager, an investigator and a chief mediator diplomat.43 Within 
this multifaceted role, the Secretary-General is also ‘commander in chief’ of 
UN peacekeeping and, as Johnstone argues, a ‘norm entrepreneur’44 who 
plays a significant part in developing and shaping peacekeeping. This 
Chapter, then, will examine the evolution of peacekeeping through the SG 
lens in order to offer a greater understanding not just of what UN 
peacekeeping is or does but, rather, how UN peacekeeping works or has 
worked over the past seventy-two years. Therefore, examining the 
development of peacekeeping through the SG lens offers an even deeper 
analysis to assist with the overall aim of understanding peacekeeping’s 
relationship with the principle of non-intervention. 
                                   
40 Article 97, UN Charter.  
41 Report of the United Nations Preparatory Commission, December 23, 1945 (HM Stationary Office, London, 
1946). 
42 KJ Kille, ‘Moral Authority and the UN Secretary-General’s Ethical Framework’ in KJ Kille (ed) The UN 
Secretary General and Moral Authority: Ethics and Religion in International Leadership (GUP 2007) 11. 
43 EJ Ravndal, ‘“A Force for Peace”: Expanding the Role of the UN Secretary-General Under Trygve Lie, 1946-
1953’ 23(3) (2017) GG 443-459, 445. 




2.1 Creating Norms 
For Johnstone, the Secretary-General is not only an administrative or 
political actor within the Secretariat, but also a central figure in the creation, 
institutionalisation and interpretation of norms within peacekeeping.45 
Johnstone notes that the language in the UN Charter, ‘opens space for the 
Secretary-General to play the role of norm entrepreneur’.46 Indeed, Article 
99, in particular, authorises the Secretary-General to notify the Security 
Council of ‘any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance 
of international peace and security’47 – a power which is rarely used but 
was invoked most notably in 1960 during the Congo crisis.48 Whilst this 
does not provide the SG with the power to launch an observer mission or 
peacekeeping operation on his own, it does not preclude them from playing 
a key role in the internal structures of peacekeeping operations.49 This 
includes coordinating the establishment of a force, reporting to the Security 
Council on its progress50 and exercising command and control over the 
operation.51 Within the field, the office of the Secretary-General is embodied 
in the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) who is head 
of each peacekeeping operation. Operating under the authority of the 
Security Council mandate and the SG, the SRSGs have significant discretion 
                                   
45 ibid.  
46 ibid, 124. 
47 Article 99, UN Charter.  
48 UNSC Record, Annual Report from 16 July 1958 to 15 July 1959 (13 July 1960) UN Doc S/4381; UNSC 
Verbatim Record (13/14 July 1960) UN Doc S/PV.873. 
49 B Simma et al, The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (2nd edn, OUP 2002) 686.  
50 The first Secretary General, Trygve Lie, set a precedent by using the report as an opportunity to outline his 
reactions to events and to record the successes and failures of the Organisation; thus, creating the space for 
the SG to act as a norm entrepreneur, highlight specific issues or promote their agendas. See: T Lie, In the 
Cause of Peace: Seven Years with the United Nations (Macmillan Co 1954). 




on the trajectory of the operation and the implementation of the mandate.52 
Indeed, the priorities and success of a peacekeeping operation can differ 
greatly, depending on the background or orientation of the SRSG as ‘each 
SRSG has a different vision of what the mission would be like’.53  
For the UN’s operation in the Congo, the managerial role of the SRSG and 
their relationship with the Force Commander, who is delegated military 
command and control, has proved pivotal in shaping the operation. For 
example, during MONUSCO’s most robust phase, when the Force 
Intervention Brigade was introduced, it was led by the then SRSG, Martin 
Kobler, who ‘was largely using a stabilisation doctrine’, concerned with 
‘clearing whole [scores] of armed groups’.54 Kobler, in his position as SRSG, 
therefore took a more military, forceful interpretation of the mandate, which 
was viewed by many as ‘very problematic’ and one that ‘has been largely 
debunked by the scholarship’.55 In contrast, whilst Kobler was therefore 
much more forceful, he was also said to have had ‘poor political leverage 
and entry points’, unlike his successor, Maman Sidikou who had ‘much 
better political entry points but very little leverage because he wasn’t really 
using the rest of the mission’.56 Thus demonstrating how the SG’s norm 
entrepreneurship is, as with other powers, delegated to the SRSGs, allowing 
them to create, interpret and institutionalise norms and practice within their 
                                   
52 See: C de Coning, ‘Mediation and Peacebuilding: SRSGs and DSRSGs in Integrated Missions’ (2010) 16(2) GG 
281-299. 
53 Interview with Independent Expert and Former UN Political Adviser (‘Interviewee 8’) (New York, 26 
November 2019) DOI: <http://doi.org/10.17639/nott.7119> pg 13. 
54 ibid.  
55 ibid. See also: T Mueller, ‘MONUSCO: Kobler’s Likely Departure Signals Post-FIB Era for Peacekeeping in 
Congo’ (African Arguments, 25 February 2015) <https://africanarguments.org/2015/02/monusco-kobblers-





peacekeeping operation. Indeed, the role of the SRSG and senior leadership 
within the operation, or ‘adaptive leadership’, has begun to be explored 
within academic and policy research.57 This examination of ‘adaptive peace 
operations’ is a new normative and functional approach to peacekeeping 
designed to ‘cope with complexity and uncertainty’ and to balance ‘the 
dynamics that drive international interventions to contain violence and 
stimulate peace’ with ‘the space and time needed for resilient local 
capacities to sustain peace to emerge’.58 The norm entrepreneurship of the 
office of the SG, then, in somewhat of a bottom-up approach, adds a further 
nuance to the normative peacekeeping frameworks and, by extension, 
magnifies the interventionist potential of peacekeeping, as it arguably 
creates a space for further justifications for intervention to be put forward. 
Put differently, the ability of the SG and their office to mould peacekeeping, 
consequently means that they are, indirectly, able to shape the principle of 
non-intervention, depending on how they choose to interpret mandates and 
conduct peacekeeping operations.  
Furthermore, from a TWAIL perspective, the ability of the SG and SRSG to 
potentially shape peacekeeping also presents an opportunity to increase the 
Third World voice and challenge the hegemonic states within the Security 
Council. That is, if the Global North dominates decision making on the 
peacekeeping agenda (predominantly within the P5 of the Security Council) 
                                   
57 See C de Coning, ‘Adaptive Peacebuilding’ (2018) 94(2) IntAff 301-317; L Howard, Power in Peacekeeping 
(CUP 2019). 
58 C de Coning, ‘Adaptive Peace Operations: Navigating the Complexity of Influencing Societal Change Without 




and Global South states struggle to challenge this through the organs of the 
Council and Assembly, then the Office of the Secretary-General may provide 
an alternative avenue. As the SRSG, in particular, has the power and 
influence to ‘muster and align’ the resources of agencies, donors and 
countries to support peacebuilding efforts,59 then it follows that through the 
SRSG, Global South states may lobby or petition their interests and agendas 
within a given context. Therefore, if they are able to contribute to the 
relevant peacekeeping operation this, in turn, could influence broader 
peacekeeping practices, such as PoC activities or practices for the 
prohibition of sexual exploitation and abuse. If the purpose of TWAIL 
‘rhetoric’ is to open the mind to possibilities and widen the focus ‘beyond a 
narrow consideration of technical and legalistic issues’,60 then the role of 
the SG and SRSG in adapting peacekeeping could present an opportunity 
to take a different approach to peacekeeping and one which increases the 
Global South voice. In particular, if the SRSG is both an individual from the 
Global South (as is the current SRSG in Congo, Bintou Keita) and the office 
of SG/SRSG adopts an adaptive leadership approach, which includes 
steering the operation towards supporting grassroots or local initiatives in 
order to create peace, then this, arguably, expands the Global South voice 
within peacekeeping. For TWAIL, this then offers a counter to the 
dominance of the Global North, particularly the Security Council, in 
peacekeeping decision making. More broadly, it also begins to move 
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peacekeeping towards a more bottom-up approach as opposed to a top-
down, outsider led approach which, for some, is the key to creating 
sustainable peace.61 
It is the Secretary-General’s ‘embeddedness’, then, which Johnstone argues 
is a source of influence as they hold a privileged, central position within the 
UN system, in part because they are able to communicate with a multitude 
of actors.62 This does not mean, however, that the SG is a ‘normative free 
agent’ who is able to strike out in ‘entirely new normative directions’ but, 
rather, that they are most effective when they use the UN ‘to crystallise 
emerging understandings’ amongst state and non-state actors.63 This norm 
entrepreneurship can occur in three, non-sequential phases – helping to 
create norms, institutionalising them and then interpreting them. When 
norms are created, Johnstone argues that they do not ‘find their genesis in 
the mind of some individual’ but are shared through interactions between 
states and other actors, with the UN acting as a platform for this and the 
SG as a central figure in mediating this creation.64 No more so is this form 
of entrepreneurship evident than with the creation of peacekeeping as a 
form of collective security intervention and a tool for maintaining 
international peace and security. Whilst the second Secretary-General Dag 
Hammarskjöld, alongside Canadian minister Lester Pearson, are credited 
with establishing peacekeeping, the idea ‘did not just spring from the brain 
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of Hammarskjöld’.65 Instead, in a classic example of norm creation, 
peacekeeping emerged following the work of Hammarskjöld’s predecessor, 
Trygve Lie, alongside a growing support for the concept amongst member 
states. In the early 1950s, Lie presented his vision for peace in his Twenty 
Year Program for Achieving Peace Through the United Nations.66 Lie, in 
arguably the first example of a Secretary-General acting as norm 
entrepreneur, produced a ten point memorandum on his programme in 
which he proposed, inter alia, the establishment of a UN force, which could 
be deployed to prevent the outbreak of localised violence.67 It was his belief 
that such a force ‘would greatly enhance the ability of the Security Council 
to bring about peaceful settlements’ and he set out to convince member 
states of this benefit.68 This proposal was based upon his earlier experience 
during the Palestine crisis where he noted that the UN ‘set a first precedent 
for armed international police action in the field’69 when he orchestrated the 
commission of a police unit to be deployed in Jerusalem in 1948. Whilst this 
was not the formal peacekeeping operation that we know of today, Lie’s 
proposal for a UN force arguably pathed the way for his successor, 
Hammarskjöld, to oversee the creation and institutionalisation of the norm.   
Similarly, it is also through the Korean War that Lie began to shape peace 
enforcement, by supporting and assisting in the establishment of an 
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international military force in Korea. The ‘Unified Command’ (USG),70 
authorised under Security Council Resolution 84,71 was organised by the 
Government of the United States of America, with the discretionary use of 
the United Nations flag ‘in the course of operations’ and required to produce 
regular reports to the Security Council.72 Arguably, through shaping peace 
enforcement, Lie inadvertently helped to mould peacekeeping by offering 
its diametric opposite. The requirement of annual reports to the Security 
Council, and the use of the UN flag, are also subtle norms which Lie 
established and which remain in place within peacekeeping practice today. 
His insistence that the SG should be ‘a force for peace’73 also set the climate 
for the establishment of UN peacekeeping as a permanent tool for securing 
international peace and security. Lie’s tenure as Secretary-General 
therefore highlights the ability of the officeholder to act as a norm 
entrepreneur and, simultaneously, undermine the principle of non-
intervention which, at that time, was also beginning to develop in the UN 
system. That is, by setting the foundations for UN peacekeeping, Lie created 
an opening or the start of a thread, under the umbrella of collective security 
intervention, which broadened both the potential interventionist activities 
of the UN and the collective security sphere.  
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In addition, linking Johnstone’s theory of norm entrepreneurship with 
Anghie’s dynamic of difference, it could be argued that the SG’s norm 
entrepreneur role fits or exists within the dynamic. As previously discussed, 
if the act of deploying a peacekeeping operation to a purposefully selected 
state is viewed as an example of Anghie’s dynamic of difference (a Global 
North state identifying a gap with the ‘other’ state and seeking to close it),74 
then it follows that the SG’s norm entrepreneur role is exercised within this 
gap. Therefore, whilst Anghie’s dynamic exists at the macro-level, in the 
form of a peacekeeping operation sent to the host state to bridge the gap 
between the dominant North and weaker Global South states, Johnstone’s 
norm entrepreneur SG is engaged at the meso-level, inside this identified 
gap. Through the level of autonomy, embeddedness and norm 
entrepreneurship that they possess, the Office of the SG can then influence 
the closing, broadening or maintenance of this gap. Put simply, as the SG 
or SRSG manage a peacekeeping operation, they are able to shape or 
control the very tool which has been sent by the dominant states in order 
to normalise or transform the ‘other’ and close the gap. Therefore, the SG, 
through their norm entrepreneurship role, is able to engage in and influence 
the dynamic of difference. 
2.2 The Birth of the ‘Holy Trinity’  
Building upon the foundations laid by Lie, Hammarskjöld exercised his role 
as norm entrepreneur, becoming central to the formation and 
                                   




institutionalisation of peacekeeping. The first UN peacekeeping operation, 
UNEF, was a lightly armed, several thousand-strong monitoring and 
observing operation deployed to the Sinai in 1956 to oversee the Suez 
peace agreement and act as a buffer between the four formerly hostile 
states.75 Following UNEF, Hammarskjöld set out the ‘basic principles and 
rules which would provide an adaptable framework’ for peacekeeping 
operations in his Summary Study report.76 Within this, Hammarskjöld, 
again in an act of norm creation, set out the three fundamental principles 
of peacekeeping, the ‘Holy Trinity’ of consent, impartiality and non-use of 
force. Initially, these principles were narrowly interpreted and therefore, 
cumulatively, suggested a non-interventionist approach which echoed the 
UN’s agenda at that time and epitomised Hammarskjöld’s own personal, 
philosophical beliefs.77 Indeed, this formulation of peacekeeping was 
occurring during the height of the decolonisation period which, as explored 
in the previous Chapter,78 was also a pivotal time for the development of 
the principle of non-intervention, with a general non-interventionist rhetoric 
dominating the international system. The principles, then, created a red 
boundary line around the concept of peacekeeping, similar to that 
surrounding the principle of non-intervention.  Peacekeeping operations 
which maintain this narrow interpretation of the principles, such as UNEF, 
are therefore classified as traditional models of peacekeeping and are 
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typically consensual, non-interventionist and non-coercive. However, as the 
remainder of this Chapter will explore, these principles have been 
significantly expanded over the years, thereby widening both the 
boundaries and the interventionist nature of peacekeeping. Indeed, this 
expansion or interpretation of the principles began even during 
Hammarskjöld’s tenure with the deployment of ONUC in the DRC in 1960. 
Whilst ONUC initially began as a traditional model of peacekeeping, 
following a narrow reading of the fundamental principles which 
Hammarskjöld had only recently laid out, escalating conflict, demands from 
the host state and pressure from UN members forced Hammarskjöld to 
interpret his principles more broadly. As later sections will explore, 
Hammarskjöld, in his position as SG, struggled to balance the maintenance 
of his original understanding of the fundamental norms with the 
complexities of the Congo crisis, leading to a somewhat inevitable 
expansion and re-interpretation of the norms, again in an act of norm 
entrepreneurship. This broadening of the peacekeeping norms also, 
simultaneously, stretched the thin red boundary line surrounding 
peacekeeping, expanding the sphere of collective security intervention, and 
thereby undermining or perhaps contravening the principle of non-
intervention. 
Furthermore, throughout UNEF and ONUC’s deployment, the Secretary-
General also acted as norm entrepreneur through their creation and 
interpretation of other norms and practices within peacekeeping operations, 




independence’.79 Therefore, as the previous Chapter noted how the Cold 
War paralysis of the Security Council allowed the General Assembly to play 
a greater role within the UN,80 particularly in the shaping of the principle of 
non-intervention, it similarly created the space for the SG to undertake a 
larger role within peacekeeping. For example, at the conception of UNEF, 
key logistical and operational decisions, such as how and where the force 
was to be set up and when or how it would withdraw, were all made by the 
Secretary-General81 - all of which could also be viewed as examples of the 
SG engaging in or influencing the dynamic of difference. Similarly, when 
ONUC was deployed, Hammarskjöld had only one permanent special 
peacekeeping advisor and no permanent management team, leaving the 
interpretation of the mandate, and therefore the principles, almost solely to 
the Secretary-General.82 This independence and broad power was heavily 
criticised by some states, most notably by the Soviet Union who claimed 
that Hammarskjöld had ‘always been prejudiced in his attitude towards the 
socialist countries’, which they believed was epitomised in his ‘deplorable 
role’ in the Congo.83 These difficulties were said to have had a ‘notable 
impact on the formulation of subsequent mandates for peacekeeping 
forces’.84 These critiques highlight how the politicised nature of intervention 
and the inherent power dynamics within the UN, which were explored in 
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Chapter 2,85 seep through into the office of the Secretary-General. Whilst 
the SG is an independent civil servant, they are evidently not spared the 
accusations of bias and pressure from dominant Member States, which 
seemingly intensifies the more the SG’s powers and reach broaden. 
Regardless, the SG has maintained a significant, independent role within 
both the UN Secretariat and, in particular, within peacekeeping, thanks to 
the norm entrepreneurship of the first two Secretary-Generals – Lie and 
Hammarskjöld – who created the space to allow for the office of the SG to 
act as a creator, institutional-maker and interpreter of norms. This has 
allowed their successors to prioritise agendas, initiatives and policies to 
create or shape peacekeeping norms, simultaneously expanding and 
retracting the boundaries of the principle of non-intervention depending on 
the situation.  
As the remainder of this Chapter will explore, successive Secretaries-
General have re-interpreted the fundamental principles, helping to drive the 
evolution of peacekeeping operations, as Chapter 2 noted,86 from the 
traditional model to multi-dimensional, robust operations, with an expanded 
use of force, questionable impartiality and dubious host state consent. 
Similarly, the office holders have introduced new norms within 
peacekeeping which, again, have emerged from a general consensus or 
understanding of interventionist practices, that were highlighted in the 
previous Chapter, and have then been crystallised by the Secretary-
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General. In the post-Cold War optimism, with the re-emergence of 
peacekeeping and the rise of liberal democracy in a post-ideological world,87 
under Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali democracy promotion was 
introduced into peacekeeping operations and is now a common feature 
within peacekeeping operations.88 Shortly after, when the post-Cold War 
optimism began to fade and the UN was embroiled in a series of catastrophic 
failures in the 1990s, Boutros-Ghali’s successor, Kofi Annan, championed 
the concept of ‘responsibility to protect’, leading to the introduction of 
protection of civilians within peacekeeping mandates.89 Again, the 
introduction of this norm reflected a broader consensus within the 
international community and amongst member states for humanitarian-
based interventions. More recently, following numerous allegations of 
sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) by UN peacekeepers and calls for action 
to be taken to eradicate this from peacekeeping operations, a ‘zero 
tolerance policy’ against SEA was introduced.90 Cumulatively, these norms 
form a patchwork framework upon which peacekeeping operations are 
based and, as will be explored, as they have evolved they have both limited 
and expanded the interventionist nature of peacekeeping, arguably often in 
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line with the trends or fluctuating interventionist rhetoric espoused in 
relation to the principle of non-intervention.91  
3 The ‘Holy Trinity’ 
Evidently, the three fundamental principles or the ‘holy trinity’ are an 
important part of the peacekeeping frameworks. Together, they support the 
principle of non-intervention by acting as a red boundary line around the 
concept of peacekeeping which places limits on peacekeeping’s activities 
and therefore its ability to intervene. Within peacekeeping debates, member 
states, such as Russia and China, are said to frequently invoke the 
fundamental principles in part for political reasons but also ‘to establish 
clear boundaries’ linked to the fact that peacekeeping can become an 
intrusive tool ‘wielded by the West in particular to sort of dictate what 
should happen in some sovereign countries’.92 Thus, again, emphasising 
how the principles draw a line between peacekeeping and intervention, 
supporting the principle of non-intervention. Further, from a TWAIL 
perspective, the ‘holy trinity’ could also be viewed as a useful tool for 
limiting the power of the hegemonic states and therefore limiting their 
ability to use peacekeeping to push their agenda or use coercive action to 
influence change in host states (in other words, to intervene). Once again, 
it also highlights how the power dynamics, which the previous Chapter 
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identified as prevalent within the UN and the principle of non-intervention 
evidently also exist within peacekeeping.   
The fundamental principles therefore form part of peacekeeping’s boundary 
line. Consequently, if one or more of these principles are either broadened 
or violated then this, in turn, has an impact on the non-intervention 
principle.  It could be argued that, at best, an expansion of a fundamental 
principle of peacekeeping (such as the use of force beyond self-defence to 
pro-active force) would result in a contraction of the principle of non-
intervention, as it is permitting coercive action in order to alter the host 
state, thus permitting an act of intervention, under the auspices of 
peacekeeping. At worst, a breach of a principle of peacekeeping (such as 
an operation’s failure to exit after the withdrawal of host state consent) 
could be an instance in where peacekeeping has crossed the fine line 
between peacekeeping and intervention, resulting in a violation of the 
principle of non-intervention. Therefore, taking the definition of intervention 
outlined in the previous Chapters (coercive action to influence change within 
the host state)93 this section will explore how the fundamental principles of 
peacekeeping may support, undermine or even contravene the principle of 
non-intervention. The subsequent section will then continue this by 
examining how the newer norms of peacekeeping – democracy, PoC and 
SEA, may also reinforce or weaken the non-intervention principle. 
                                   




3.1 Consent  
Consent is a cornerstone of international law and plays a key role in 
generating legal obligation,94 based on the notion that the rules which bind 
sovereign states ‘must emanate from their own free will’.95 It has also long 
been established that consent must be ‘internationally attributable to the 
State’; that is, it must come from a person ‘whose will is considered, at the 
international level, to be the will of the State’ and such a person must be 
‘competent to manifest that will’.96 It is usually accepted, then, that it is the 
government who may provide such consent, based on a long-standing 
presumption that governments have ‘effective control over the territory and 
people of the state’ and therefore ‘possesses the exclusive authority to 
express the will of the state in its international affairs’.97 As the subsequent 
Chapter will explore, however, where there is a weak or failed state, or 
competing claims to effective control over certain territories, the matter of 
who may provide consent becomes less clear.  
Nevertheless, as Orakhelashvili argues, consent ‘is even a factor capable of 
validating behaviour which would otherwise be illegal’.98 In this instance, 
the behaviour which is validated (and would otherwise be illegal) is 
intervention in the form of UN peacekeeping. Consent, therefore, ‘is an 
inevitable element in the legal basis of peacekeeping forces’.99 Indeed, as 
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was discussed in the previous Chapter,100 the ICJ noted that state consent 
and an assertion of state sovereignty are embedded within the principle of 
non-intervention, in that, intervention is only allowable at the request or 
permission of the host state. It therefore follows that as peacekeeping is a 
form of collective security intervention, a justified or legitimate intervention 
under the principle of non-intervention, the elements of consent which are 
embedded within the principle extend to peacekeeping. Consent is thus 
considered to be a ‘legal perquisite for the entry and presence of a 
peacekeeping operation within a state and its granting makes Article 2(7) 
inapplicable’.101 Again, the overlap or intertwined relationship with the 
principle of non-intervention is evident. That is, as was discussed in section 
two of the previous Chapter, Article 2(7) of the UN Charter contains the 
only direct reference to intervention within the Charter, specifically 
prohibiting states from intervening in a state’s domestic jurisdiction.102 
Consent to the presence of a peacekeeping operation therefore prevents 
peacekeeping from violating Article 2(7) and becoming intervention. It 
could be argued, then, that as peacekeeping is a form of collective security 
intervention, deployed with the host state consent, if this element of 
consent is lost, the peacekeeping operation becomes illegal intervention, in 
violation of Article 2(7). Peacekeeping can therefore be viewed as 
interventionist behaviour which would be considered illegal, if not for the 
                                   
100 Chapter 2, Section 3. 
101 N Tsagourias, ‘Consent, Neutrality/Impartiality and the Use of Force in Peacekeeping: Their Constitutional 
Dimension’ (2007) 11(3) JCSL 465-482, 469. 




validating consent. However, this argument begins to blur when considering 
contemporary peacekeeping operations which utilise Chapter VII. In light of 
the exception contained within Article 2(7), which states that the provision 
‘shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter 
VII’,103 then if Chapter VII is invoked, Article 2(7) is not violated. Therefore, 
if the Security Council mandates a peacekeeping operation under Chapter 
VII it may disregard Article 2(7) and intervene in the domestic affairs of the 
host state, without its consent. This does not mean that the Council 
derogates from the norm of non-intervention contained within Article 2(7), 
rather, in declaring a situation to be a threat or breach of international 
peace, under Article 39 of Chapter VII, the Council adjudicates the matter 
to be non-domestic and therefore within the remit of their jurisdiction.104 
As such, if a peacekeeping operation’s mandate invokes Chapter VII, as do 
some contemporary operations such as MONUSCO,105 then, in theory, the 
operation could continue without host state consent, without violating 
Article 2(7), but would then become peace-enforcement, not peacekeeping. 
The Council’s use of the phrase ‘Acting under Chapter VII’ within 
peacekeeping mandates, as noted earlier, therefore further muddies the 
water, blurring the boundaries between peacekeeping and peace-
enforcement and the legal requirement for host state consent. Despite this, 
consent is still considered to be ‘indispensable’ for the deployment of an 
operation, otherwise a forceful operation would be peace enforcement, not 
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peacekeeping.106 It is thus the ‘primary distinction’ between peace 
enforcement and peacekeeping;107 thereby playing an important role in 
establishing the legal basis ‘for the emplacement and presence of a 
peacekeeping force within a state’.108 Without consent, then, the 
peacekeeping operation becomes intervention. 
Recognising this importance of consent, Hammarskjöld institutionalised the 
norm as one of the three fundamental principles of consent.109 Again, this 
was arguably not an act of solo entrepreneurship but, rather, built upon the 
well-established significance of consent within international law and the 
growing importance of the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention 
within the Global South as the world entered the decolonisation period. 
Furthermore, from a TWAIL perspective, the inclusion of consent as a 
principle of peacekeeping could be seen as crucial for maintaining newly 
independent states’ sovereignty and consequently their control over 
processes or actions within their state.110 Therefore, both the principle of 
non-intervention and the principle of consent within peacekeeping, protect 
states’ sovereignty, ostensibly providing these Global South state’s with a 
shield against hegemonic intervention, in this instance, in the form of UN 
peacekeeping. However, as this Chapter and Chapter 4 will go on to 
examine, in practice, it is doubtful as to how much these concepts can be 
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used by the Global South to advance their own interests. Indeed, as TWAIL 
scholars such as Anghie argue, sovereignty, in particular, is ‘a flexible 
instrument that readily lends itself to the powerful imperatives of the 
civilising mission’ and is thus a Euro-centric concept.111 As will be explored, 
similar arguments can also be made about the concept of peacekeeping, 
and by extension the principle of consent, with the enduring North-South 
divide again creating a dichotomy between discourse and practice in 
peacekeeping.  
Regardless, in line with the non-intervention rhetoric at the time, 
Hammarskjöld included the pre-requisite of host state consent within 
peacekeeping’s legal framework, also drawing a distinction between 
operations mandated by the General Assembly and actions taken by the 
Security Council under Chapter VII112 - again highlighting the Charter-basis 
arguments previously discussed. Operations of ‘Forces’ mandated by the 
General Assembly were said to have required host state consent in order to 
be ‘stationed or operate on the territory of a given country’.113 
Hammarskjöld then went on to note that this did not exclude the possibility 
of the Council establishing ‘such a Force within the wider margins provided 
under Chapter VII’.114 This suggests that consent is either not necessary or 
was less important for peacekeeping operations mandated under Chapter 
VII, thereby placing a question mark over the principle of consent and its 
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ability to limit peacekeeping as a form of intervention. However, 
Hammarskjöld refused to expand upon this, arguing that it was not 
‘necessary to elaborate this point further, since no use of the Force under 
Chapter VII’ ‘has been envisaged’.115 At the point in which peacekeeping 
was created and institutionalised, its creators did therefore not envisage it 
to be a forceful, potentially interventionist tool, highlighting how far 
peacekeeping has since evolved, with contemporary operations perhaps 
going beyond the concept of peacekeeping and breaching the intervention 
line, as will be explored in the subsequent Chapters. 
3.1.1 De Jure v De Facto 
Whilst it is well-established, then, that consent is essential for the creation 
and deployment of a peacekeeping operation, what is less clear is the role 
and legal necessity of continuing consent throughout the duration of the 
operation’s deployment. That is, whether a withdrawal of consent results in 
the operation having to exit the country immediately or whether it is only 
to exit at the end of its mandate period, if consent is still withdrawn. A 
distinction can, again, be drawn here between operations depending on 
their Charter basis. For the traditional model of peacekeeping operations, 
deployed under Chapter VI, consent must be maintained in order for the 
operation to remain deployed.116 If consent is withdrawn then the operation 
must exit the host state, as occurred with UNEF in 1967 when Egypt revoked 
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its consent.117 Similarly, when Croatia and Rwanda withdrew their consent 
to UNPROFOR118 and UNAMIR,119 respectively, the UN operation was either 
replaced by a smaller operation120 or removed from the country 
completely.121    
For Chapter VII operations, however, it appears that once an operation has 
been consensually deployed, host state consent becomes important for the 
operational or practical effectiveness of the mission, rather than a legal 
requirement for its continued presence.122 Put differently, if the host state 
effectively withdraws their consent, this does not necessarily result in the 
operation having to exit nor does it turn the peacekeeping operation into 
an illegal intervention, as it was initially deployed with consent. As the 
former Head of the Peacekeeping Department in the Office of Legal Counsel 
(UNOLC), Mona Ali Khalil noted, a host state can maintain consent but 
withdraw effective consent.123 That is, there is a ‘de jure consent v de facto 
consent’ - ‘legally, the de jure consent cannot be withdrawn within a 
mandate, only at the end of it.’124 Therefore, a host state consents to an 
operation being deployed but cannot request its withdrawal during the 
operation’s mandate – for MONUSCO, for example, this has typically been 
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a 12 month period. As Ali Khalil points out, in this instance, at the mandate 
renewal date, there needs to be ‘either a re-definition of the mandate to 
appease the host and/or some kind of political pressure’; once again it 
‘comes down, like everything else, to the will of the Council’.125 Thus, the 
TWAIL narrative, which was established in the previous Chapter, of a 
hierarchical power structure embedded within the UN system can be 
applied. That is, if peacekeeping operations are beholden to the veto-
wielding P5 of the Security Council, then this once again reinforces the 
patterns of dominance and subordination which TWAIL seeks to highlight 
and counteract.126 Furthermore, the inability of the host state to eject a 
Chapter VII peacekeeping operation from its territory during its mandate 
period supports the previously made argument that the principle of consent 
may not be a shield for protecting the Global South host states and their 
ability to control actions within their state. Rather, it could be viewed as a 
‘flexible instrument’, like sovereignty, which lends itself to the dominant, 
hegemonic powers, in particular the P5, and their agendas.127 
However, whilst maintaining consent throughout the operation’s 
deployment may not be legally necessary, it does remain important. As will 
be demonstrated in the next Chapter’s examination of consent in the DRC, 
in practice, ‘without host government consent, there is very little you can 
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do’.128 That is, although consent may only be legally required for 
deployment, once within the country it is still required, practically, to allow 
the operation to function. This issue has been recognised in key 
peacekeeping documents such as the Capstone doctrine which notes that 
whilst a host state may initially consent to the deployment of the operation, 
it may ‘subsequently seek to restrict the operation’s freedom of action, 
resulting in a de facto withdrawal of consent’.129 Capstone states that this 
challenges the rationale for the peacekeeping operation and would alter the 
international community’s approach to supporting the peace process. The 
maintenance of relations with the host state is therefore essential and as 
the Capstone Doctrine notes, a UN peacekeeping operation ‘must work 
continuously to ensure that it does not lose the consent of the main 
parties’.130 
Furthermore, recent peacekeeping studies have found that an ‘absence of 
genuine host-state consent represents one of the greatest threats to the 
success of modern peacekeeping missions’.131 Indeed, a Senior Political 
Officer within the UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO) noted that 
‘even the most ‘dysfunctional state’ still has multiple tools at its disposal to 
basically bring the mission to its knees or stop it from carrying out its basic 
functions’.132 Obtaining and then maintaining host state consent is therefore 
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‘an absolute must’.133 As such, strategies may be devised in order to 
manage deteriorating consent and establish shared expectations.134 This 
may primarily be undertaken by the Secretary-General and, by extension, 
the SRSGs, who play a key norm entrepreneurship role in the interpretation 
and application of the principle of consent. That is, within the UN 
Secretariat, General Assembly and Security Council, it is the role of the 
Secretary-General to work with member states to ensure host state consent 
is maintained or, if withdrawn, to apply political pressure to ensure it is 
retained by the mandate renewal. As previously noted, this could, again, be 
viewed as an example of the SG engaging in the dynamic of difference and 
reducing the apparent gap between the dominant UN and the ‘other’ host 
state, through the peacekeeping operation. Similarly, within the field, it is 
the SRSG who has to maintain relationships between the peacekeeping 
force and the host state.135 However, it could be argued that this, in itself, 
is coercive action designed to alter the state and therefore a form of 
intervention. That is, it could be viewed as diplomatic or political 
intervention as UN personnel are applying pressure or attempting to 
persuade the host state to change their opinion on the presence of an 
external, dominant entity - the UN peacekeeping operation, being deployed 
within their state. Thus, in this instance, peacekeeping arguably crosses the 
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divide and becomes intervention, thereby contravening the principle of non-
intervention.  
3.1.2  The Dividing Line? 
The principle of consent within peacekeeping is perhaps the most crucial of 
the three fundamental principles, as it acts as a thin red boundary line 
between peacekeeping and peace enforcement or intervention. However, 
where consent is dubious or withdrawn during the mandate period, then, 
the line between peacekeeping and intervention becomes blurred. 
Maintaining consent is therefore essential for a peacekeeping operation, as 
is evidenced by the efforts which the UN goes to in order to repair 
relationships with the host state. Whilst this could, again, in itself be viewed 
as intervention, it signals the importance of the principle of consent for 
maintaining peacekeeping’s non-interventionist status. Indeed, as a senior 
political officer in the UN Secretariat noted, ‘no matter what the mandate 
says’ there is no real prospect of the UN ‘charging off and doing its own 
military operations without there being a degree of consent from the 
Government- so the principles very much apply to peacekeeping’.136 
The principle of consent therefore forms a central part of peacekeeping’s 
legal framework, demarcating its boundaries and acting as a thin red line 
between peacekeeping and intervention. It follows, then, that when the 
principle is expanded, contorted or re-interpreted, this alters 
peacekeeping’s boundaries and, consequently, supports or undermines the 
                                   




principle of non-intervention. This is further compounded by the fact that 
consent is one third of the ‘holy trinity’ and as the principles cohabit in a 
competitive, constantly evolving arena, when there is an alteration or 
expansion of one, this has a knock-on effect on the others, as the remainder 
of this Chapter and subsequent Chapters will highlight.    
3.2 Impartiality  
The second principle in the holy trinity, impartiality, is often considered to 
be the ‘lifeblood of peacekeeping’, providing it with its distinctiveness.137 
Whilst consent is concerned specifically with the host state and establishes 
the dividing line between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, or 
intervention, impartiality is focused on the peacekeepers and their 
behaviour. It requires peacekeepers to be unbiased in their dealings with 
the parties to the conflict and in the execution of their mandate.138 This is 
not, however, the same as neutrality, despite the often confused and 
inconsistent use of both terms by UN personnel.139 Whilst neutrality ‘refers 
to the character of a peacekeeping operation’, impartiality ‘is an operational 
term and refers to the conduct of the operation’.140 That is, peacekeeping 
operations should not hold any prejudices against parties to the conflict, 
nor should they influence events within the host state.141 More broadly, for 
the principle of non-intervention, in theory, impartiality arguably acts as 
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somewhat of a barrier or protective bubble for the internal affairs of the 
host state; again, a red boundary line around peacekeeping. 
However, the difficulty with the principle of impartiality is that it is an 
‘elusive goal’,142 whilst it is widely recognised as a necessary norm or 
principle, it is unclear what it actually means. The concept itself is not a 
given, it is a claim and, as such, is disputable.143 This, in turn, leads to 
questions about the legal basis or legal validity of the principle, with some 
debating whether it amounts to a ‘general principle of law’ in the sense of 
Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute or whether it gains legal effect through, 
for example, a binding Security Council resolution or the UN Charter.144 For 
peacekeeping, then, the principle of impartiality, arguably still forms a part 
of its legal framework but could, perhaps, be viewed as a principle which is 
not as robust as the other two principles.  
3.2.1  Evolution  
As with the other principles and norms of peacekeeping, the application of 
impartiality or the understanding of impartiality in practice has evolved over 
time, in line with changes to peacekeeping and interventionist practices. 
The concept of impartiality stems from a ‘particularly rigid interpretation’ of 
the UN Charter, in particular Article 2(7) which, as previously discussed, 
prohibits the UN from intervening in national matters, except when acting 
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under Chapter VII.145 Spijker suggests that Article 2(7) should therefore be 
read as a ‘warning to all domestic governments’ that the UN is not created 
to resolve their internal issues for them.146 The principle of impartiality can 
therefore be said to support the principle of non-intervention as it flows 
directly from the prohibition on intervention in domestic affairs in Article 
2(7). Furthermore, ‘the idea that the UN could act impartially’ is also found 
in Article 40 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter,147 which provides that the 
provisional measures which the Council may authorise ‘shall be without 
prejudice to the rights, claims or position of the parties concerned’.148 It is 
based upon these notions, that Hammarskjöld included impartiality as a 
fundamental principle of peacekeeping when acting as norm entrepreneur 
in creating peacekeeping.149 Initially, however, impartiality was not defined 
or made explicit, instead impartiality within these operations was 
predominantly found or maintained through the composition of the force, 
as the permanent members (P5) of the Council or interested parties were 
excluded from providing troops.150 From a TWAIL perspective, this 
application of impartiality could be viewed as both a challenge to and a 
maintenance of the imbalance of powers within the UN and the dominance 
of the hegemonic states which Chapter 2 outlined. On the one hand, it could 
be viewed as a challenge to hegemony as it places a limitation on the 
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dominant Global North states of the Security Council, preventing them from 
contributing troops to the operation and thus removing their ability to 
potential intervene or alter the operation, via its troops, in the field to 
promote their interests and agendas. By extension, this restriction on the 
P5 to physically intervene in the host state, could also be viewed as further 
reinforcement for the principle of non-intervention, as Chapter 2 highlighted 
how these power dynamics also animate intervention, with the principle 
vulnerable to being used by the dominant states. Therefore, prohibiting the 
P5 from contributing troops could be seen as limiting the risk of the principle 
of non-intervention being contorted or expanded by these powers in 
practice. However, on the other hand, this limitation on the P5 does not 
negate the fact that the Council is the organ which sets the peacekeeping 
agenda, producing the peacekeeping operation’s mandate.151 Therefore, 
whilst the P5 may not be able to contribute troops, they have ultimate 
control over deciding when and how the other states’ troops are deployed 
and what tasks they undertake during this time. In essence, then, as the 
majority of troop contributing nations today are from the Global South, the 
application of impartiality in this manner maintains the North-South divide 
as the dominant Global North sets the peacekeeping agenda, with the 
subordinate Global North implementing it.152 That is, the dominant states 
control the direction of peacekeeping, whilst displacing ‘the military, 
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political and strategic risks and personnel costs of labour-intensive 
peacekeeping onto the poorer and weaker states of the Global South’.153 
This, in turn, has also had a practical effect on peacekeeping, as subsequent 
Chapters within this thesis will explore, with some debating how this effects 
the ‘quality’ of peacekeeping.154  
Furthermore, highlighting how the ‘normative composition’ of peacekeeping 
operations is ‘re-balanced each time’,155 impartiality has differed depending 
on what model of peacekeeping the operation adopts. Hammarskjöld 
argued that the use of force in non-Chapter VII operations must be 
‘impartial, in the sense that it does not serve as a means to force 
settlement, in the interests of one party, of political conflicts or legal issues 
recognised as controversial’.156 For traditional peacekeeping operations, 
such as UNEF, impartiality therefore meant being passive, with 
peacekeepers obliged to ‘maintain normal relations with a party whose 
behaviour was being censured by most of the international community’.157 
Thus, peacekeepers were essentially a referee, overseeing the 
implementation of agreements and restricted by the parties, the modest 
mandates and the dynamics of the Cold War. As such, it was arguably easier 
for peacekeepers to maintain impartiality as the tasks which they were 
required to undertake were relatively simple, monitoring and observation 
                                   
153 P Cunliffe, ‘The Politics of Global Governance in UN Peacekeeping’ (2009) 16(3) IntPeacekeep 323-336, 324. 
154 See: J Levin, J MacKay and A Nasirzadeh, ‘Selectorate Theory and the Democratic Peacekeeping Hypothesis: 
Evidence From Fiji and Bangladesh’ (2015) 23(1) IntPeacekeep 107-132; F Haas and N Ansorg, ‘Better 
Peacekeepers, Better Protection? Troop Quality of United Nations Peace Operations and Violence Against 
Civilians’ (2018) 55(6) JPeaceRes 742-758. 
155 Karlsrud (n36) 527.  
156 Summary Study (n8). 




tasks, in less complex or less volatile post-conflict settings. For the principle 
of non-intervention, then, impartiality, in this instance, supported the 
principle as it limited peacekeeper’s activities, thereby limiting 
peacekeeping’s interventionist nature.   
However, this changed as peacekeeping evolved, in line with changing 
conflict dynamics. As the previous Chapter outlined, as the global order and 
international relations evolved, so too did interventionist practice, including 
peacekeeping. For impartiality, a re-imagining of the concept was required 
as peacekeeping moved to a robust model and began to undertake joint 
operations with the host state forces. These joint operations have included 
activities such as capacity building, justice reform and military operations, 
with peacekeepers involved in planning, logistical support and/or the 
execution of the operation.158 As such, it is questionable how these joint 
operations can be reconciled with the principle of impartiality and, beyond 
this, the principle of non-intervention. Indeed, when initially shaping 
peacekeeping, Hammarskjöld explicitly stated that UN operations ‘must be 
separate and distinct from activities by any national authorities’,159 
specifically noting that ONUC could not exercise their authority either in 
competition or in cooperation with the host state.160 Joint operations 
therefore certainly contravene this traditional understanding of impartiality; 
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however, the same cannot be said for the post-Cold War, expanded 
interpretation of impartiality. More recently, it has been argued that joint 
operations are not ‘necessarily a violation of the impartiality principle’ as 
‘you can still be impartial’ and undertake such operations.161 In particular, 
one senior political advisor noted that ‘it’s pretty obvious now, the 
interpretation of the principles has evolved over time’ so that ‘it’s very clear 
that impartiality doesn’t mean neutrality’.162 Therefore, ‘the fact that you’re 
impartial doesn’t prevent you from taking action to neutralise or to diminish 
the ability of those actors to derail a peace process or a political process’.163 
Indeed, for the fulfilment of tasks such as the protection of civilians, which 
permits an extensive level of force, impartiality is, again, considered to be 
maintained as the Council mandates permit force to be used against any 
actor which poses a threat to civilians, thereby including both state and 
non-state actors.164 However, impartiality becomes dubious when a 
peacekeeping operation becomes engaged in joint operations, particularly 
military endeavours. That is, it becomes ‘harder to sustain the notion of 
impartiality of the UN mission, if its military component is engaged in 
military assistance to one of the parties to the conflict’.165 The notion of 
impartiality ‘can be respected, however, while the civilian component is 
assisting the government in other mandated activities such as judicial 
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sector reform and human rights reform’.166 The expansion of impartiality to 
include joint operations, then, is not a violation of the principle but simply 
an evolution, yet it remains questionable how far the principle can evolve 
before it is no longer a legal principle and is simply practice. Similarly, it 
could be argued that this expansion of the principle of impartiality to include 
joint operations undermines the principle of non-intervention as it presents 
an opportunity for the peacekeeping operation to coerce the host state 
government in situations involving military, political and humanitarian 
matters and also reduces the likelihood of peacekeepers being even handed 
in protecting civilians. Thus, it is possible to view the joint operations as a 
potential form of intervention.  
3.2.2  Impartial Complicity 
Closer cooperation with the host state also raises further implications, 
beyond a potential expansion or contravention of the principle of 
impartiality. In particular, a deeper military involvement has resulted in 
legal and practical implications, such as the potential invocation of 
international humanitarian law and the possible complicity of the UN in 
violations of international law.167 The latter issue, in particular, has proved 
to be most problematic, leading to the UN attempting to create safety nets 
or assurances, in order to distance itself from such acts and thereby 
maintain the UN’s legitimacy, credibility and impartiality. Of these 
initiatives, the most significant has been the UN’s Human Rights Due 
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Diligence Policy (HRDDP), which requires the UN to assess whether their 
partners comply with international humanitarian law, human rights and 
refugee law before joint operations commence.168 The policy began as a 
conditionality policy, specific to the Congo, before being expanded to the 
HRDDP and made applicable to all UN missions, offices, agencies, funds and 
programmes which deal with non-UN forces. According to senior UN 
personnel, ‘there was a sense of urgency, that we could no longer support 
operations that inflicted harm on civilians’ and ‘ultimately, we needed to 
apply that same policy across the board’.169 As such, in late 2010 the UN 
Policy Committee decided that the conditionality policy ‘should apply 
globally and system-wide, and launched an internal inter-agency process’, 
led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘to work on the development of a 
new policy’.170 From this, the UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy 
(HRDDP) was developed and officially adopted as an internal policy in July 
2011171 before being made public in March 2013.172 For some, it can be 
viewed as a ‘faithful implementation of existing legal obligations of the UN’ 
and a procedural mechanism which requires a balancing act between not 
contributing to violations of international law and the need to fulfil the goals 
of the operation.173 Indeed, as Mona Ali Khalil, a former Senior Legal Officer 
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of the UN Office of Legal Counsel (UNOLC) noted, the full and prompt 
implementation of the HRDDP has been impeded by ‘the constant fear that 
the host government will stop cooperating with the UN mission altogether 
and/or ask the UN mission to leave its country’.174 Ali Khalil advises, 
however, that the proper implementation of the HRDPP is not only ‘the right 
thing’, it is also ‘the practical thing’ because ‘if you lose your moral 
credibility, it will inevitably undermine your operational effectiveness’.175 
The HRDDP thus highlights both the nuances within the principle of 
impartiality and the interconnectedness of the fundamental principles. That 
is, to place strict conditions on the host state in order to maintain 
impartiality, may have a negative impact on relations with the state and 
therefore the principle of consent. Similarly, as was argued in relation to 
the maintenance of consent, it may also be possible to view the HRDDP as 
coercive action designed to influence change in the host state, as the UN is 
exerting pressure on the government to make alterations in order to meet 
their standards or agenda. More specifically, the UN peacekeeping operation 
is coercing the host state government to make changes to their national 
armed forces by presenting them with an ultimatum – to make the proposed 
changes or the UN will withdraw its support. Thus, the HRDDP could be 
viewed as a form of political or diplomatic intervention. In addition, applying 
a TWAIL lens, regardless of the well-intentioned motives of the HRDDP, as 
was seen in Chapter 2’s discussion of humanitarian-based interventions, 
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the standards of behaviour and human rights values which underpin the 
policy are, ultimately, based on Western-centric ideals. Therefore, as 
occurred with the principle of non-intervention, the dominance of the Global 
North state is, again, subtly reinforced within the concept of peacekeeping 
through the HRDDP.  
In a similar vein, some have critiqued the policy for serving ‘the more 
limited purpose of shielding the UN mission from accusations of complicity 
in war crimes’, rather than significantly reducing the occurrence of crimes 
by the host state forces.176 Indeed, a former military commander within 
MONUSCO noted that they did not understand why the UN ‘should be 
extremely strict in conditioning [their] support’ as they ‘have these 
conditions on the table’ but then ‘continue to play with the people who are 
the real sponsors of instability’.177 They argue that ‘it’s a total contradiction’; 
‘you cannot blame this general or these people who are corrupt’, instead ‘it 
is a collective responsibility’.178 Indeed, it is arguable that there may be a 
need for impartiality to simply return to a more traditional concept, 
whereby, in the spirit of the UN Charter, all actors are reprimanded for their 
violations, rather than simply those who the UN peacekeeping operation 
may be working alongside. As the subsequent Chapter will explore, then, 
the implementation of the HRDDP can present numerous issues, not least 
its seemingly selective application which, applying a TWAIL lens, could be 
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viewed as another example of a concept being wielded as a tool by the 
dominant powers to protect their interests – as previously noted for the 
concept of sovereignty and the principle of consent. That is, it could be 
argued that the HRDDP is predominantly used by the UN as a form of 
protection from implication in violations of international law, rather than as 
a tool to protect peoples of the Global South state from such violations. Put 
differently, as former UN personnel have noted, the policy does little to alter 
the human rights situation within the host state;179 rather, it attempts to 
remove a select few personnel from the host state’s armed forces, whilst 
acting as a shield for the UN against accusations of complicity. 
3.2.3  An Elusive Goal? 
An exploration of the evolution of impartiality also highlights how there is a 
subjective element to impartiality and, within peacekeeping, this is two 
pronged. Firstly, for the peacekeeping operation and the UN, impartiality is 
based on the fundamental values of the UN, which were formulated 
predominantly by Global North states. As seen in Chapter 2, applying a 
TWAIL lens highlights how the UN was created with very little involvement 
from the Global South, hence the values promulgated within the UN Charter 
and which underpin the organisation are based on Global North 
standards.180 It therefore follows that if the understanding of impartiality 
within peacekeeping is based upon these values and standards then they 
are based upon the values and interests of the hegemonic Global North 
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powers. This then leads to the second level of understanding of impartiality; 
that there is perhaps a presumption that all peacekeepers subscribe to 
these ‘universal’ values and, therefore, neutrally apply this understanding 
of the principle of impartiality in practice.181 However, peacekeepers will 
undoubtedly bring with them values from their home country and their own 
personal beliefs.182 Indeed, numerous studies have been conducted on the 
psychology of peacekeepers, particularly in the Post-Cold War era as the 
increase in multi-dimensional operations places different demands on 
peacekeeper’s behaviour and ethos, in comparison to the traditional models 
of peacekeeping.183 That is, multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations 
require peacekeepers to make decisions about who is right and wrong and 
to act accordingly.184 The differing approaches to this is revealed in practice 
in, for example, the varying appetites to engage in conflict to protect 
civilians185 and the sexual exploitation and abuse of civilians by 
peacekeepers.186 This raises two key issues with the principle of 
impartiality. First, it highlights how there is a distinction or disconnect within 
impartiality between the broader understanding of what impartiality is 
within peacekeeping and what it means in practice. At the Security Council, 
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mandating level, impartiality is a concept based on the values of the UN, 
which establishes the requirement for peacekeepers to be unbiased and 
unprejudiced in their dealings with parties to the conflict and execution of 
the mandate. However, in reality, when carrying out the mandate, it 
appears that an application of impartiality carries with it the subjective 
beliefs of the individual peacekeepers. Therefore, it is the individual and 
their TCN commanders who ultimately interpret what it means to be 
impartial, and then act accordingly. From this stems the second issue – that 
it is then these individuals who are ultimately determining peacekeeping 
actions and, therefore, in essence, the interventionist nature of the 
peacekeeping operation. Put differently, it could be argued that if the 
decision to use force to protect civilians falls to individuals or groups of 
peacekeepers, then whether or not they act then determines both the 
interpretation of impartiality and the extent to which the operation is 
interventionist. Indeed, as will be seen in Chapter 4, these nuances within 
impartiality have been particularly prevalent within the UN’s peacekeeping 
operation in the Congo.  
The contemporary, expanded version of the principle of impartiality, then, 
renders the very concept of impartiality even more dubious and 
unattainable. If impartiality is taken to be an ‘elusive goal’, then joint 
endeavours which are undertaken in contemporary multi-dimensional 
operations seemingly push this goal further away. Furthermore, as will be 
explored in the subsequent Chapter, this expanded interpretation and 




a risk to peacekeeper’s safety, UN complicity in violations of international 
law, and the operation’s potential engagement as a party to the conflict. 
Arguably, on these occasions, it places the UN in a very grey area, where 
peacekeeping could perhaps be viewed as intervention in all but name. 
Undertaking military operations alongside state forces or engaging in 
capacity building activities could, thus, all be viewed as coercive action 
designed to alter the state and, therefore, intervention. Despite this, the 
operation seemingly retains its non-interventionist status here, not by the 
principle of impartiality, but by the single thread of host state consent. 
Indeed, the consent of the state, as explored in the previous section, 
appears to be key in preventing the peacekeeping operation from becoming 
both peace enforcement and intervention. As will be explored in the 
following Chapter, there may therefore be a need for a re-imagining or 
clarification of the concept of impartiality in order to re-establish its 
relevance and position as a legal principle within contemporary, multi-
dimensional operations, which have expanded the principle to its very 
limits, if not beyond.  
3.3 Limited Use of Force 
Traditionally, the principle of non-use of force was interpreted narrowly to 
mean force only in self-defence. Peacekeepers therefore had a ‘right’ to use 
force in response to an armed attack upon themselves or attempts to make 
them withdraw from their positions.187 Again, within his Summary Study, 
                                   




Hammarskjöld, as norm entrepreneur, set out the principle of non-use 
force, explicitly noting that it should be ‘exercised under strictly defined 
conditions’.188 Whilst Hammarskjöld did not expand upon the ‘certain cases’ 
in which self-defence may be used, it was made clear that peacekeepers 
were not permitted to take the initiative or proactively use force.189 The 
traditional peacekeeping operations therefore followed this narrow concept 
of self-defence, based on the inherent right of self-defence of an 
individual.190 The exception to this, however, was ONUC. As will be explored 
in the subsequent Chapter, ONUC used a significant level of force and is 
considered to be the first ‘case of a transition from peacekeeping to peace-
enforcement’.191 Whilst ONUC therefore greatly expanded the principle of 
non-use of force, this can be viewed as somewhat of an anomaly for that 
period, with the UN quickly retreating back to the traditional, passive 
operations. However, despite this retreat, the precedent had now been set, 
with the possibility of force beyond self-defence no longer improbable. 
Similarly, it could also be argued that for the principle of non-intervention, 
this expansion of the use of force created a similar precedent within the 
principle, creating the possibility for peacekeeping’s interventionist nature 
to be expanded, thereby undermining the principle of non-intervention.  
Indeed, Hammarskjöld’s successors began to gradually include a creeping 
expansion of the concept of self-defence, through their interpretations of 
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the norm. In a report on the UN’s operation in Cyprus, SG U Thant 
broadened self-defence to include defence ‘necessary in the discharge of its 
function’ and the defence of ‘UN posts, premises and vehicles’ and other 
personnel under attack’.192 U Thant’s successor then similarly expanded the 
concept, again demonstrating the norm entrepreneurship of the SG to 
interpret principles. SG Waldheim extended the definition of self-defence to 
include ‘resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent it [the force] 
from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council’193 
Thus, Waldheim established the broader concept of self-defence which still 
exists today – defence of the self, the mission and its components and the 
mandate. Whilst the Security Council has upheld the UN mission’s inherent 
right of self-defence, that right ‘has been interpreted broadly to include not 
only defence of the personnel, premises, property and freedom of 
movement of the UN operation but also defence of the mandate itself’.194 
By expanding the latter concept to include any impediment to the fulfilment 
of the mandate, some have rendered the concept of self-defence 
‘meaningless’.195 By extension, it could then be argued that it has also had 
the same effect on the principle of non-use of force and, therefore, the 
boundaries of peacekeeping and non-intervention. That is, the broadened 
concept of self-defence creates numerous potential opportunities for the 
use of force, thereby potentially expanding peacekeeping’s boundaries, 
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taking it closer to intervention and simultaneously constricting the principle 
of non-intervention. 
3.3.1  Robust or Enforcement? 
The second most notable shift in the principle of non-use of force came with 
the move to robust peacekeeping which emerged in the late 1990s in 
response to the UN’s failures to prevent mass atrocities.196 As outlined in 
the previous Chapter,197 this marked somewhat of a tipping point for 
attitudes towards intervention, whereby, the hesitancy within peacekeeping 
after ONUC began to change. This shift ‘began with norm entrepreneurs 
advocating Chapter VII to protect civilians in conflict’.198 Indeed, the then 
Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, building upon this, commissioned the 
Brahimi report,199 which aimed to ‘improve the creaking peacekeeping 
function whose credibility had suffered greatly in the mid-1990s’.200 Annan 
sought to challenge those ‘who clung to a vision of the UN Charter that, in 
their view, said that the use of force was unacceptable’, arguing that 
protagonists of conflict must be confronted and stopped ‘through force if 
necessary’.201 As such, the Brahimi report expanded the use of self-defence 
within peacekeeping from defence of the individual to defence of the 
mission. It also introduced the concept of ‘robust peacekeeping’, whereby 
peacekeepers could use force to defend both the mission’s components and 
                                   
196 T Tardy, ‘A Critique of Robust Peacekeeping in Contemporary Operations’ (2011) 18(2) IntPeacekeep 152-
167. 
197 Section 4.2. 
198 LM Howard and AK Dayal, ‘The Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping’ (2018) 72 IntOrgan 71-103, 72. 
199 UNGA, ‘Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations’ (“Brahimi Report”) (21 August 2000) UN Doc 
A/55/305-S/2000/809. 
200 ND White, ‘Peace Operations’ in V Chetail (ed) Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: A Lexicon (OUP 2010) 215.  




the operation’s mandate.202 In recognition of the potential implications of 
this increased level of force, Annan also issued a SG Bulletin on the 
observance by UN forces of international humanitarian law (IHL).203 This 
concept of robust peacekeeping was then further developed by Annan’s 
successor, Ban Ki Moon, with the Capstone Doctrine defining it as 
peacekeeping which involved the use of force at the tactical level, whilst 
peace enforcement involved the use of force at the strategic level.204 This 
was further reiterated by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping 
Operations (C-34) who vehemently argued that robust peacekeeping is ‘not 
peace enforcement’, reiterating the strategic and tactical distinction.205 It 
could be argued, then, that Annan’s acknowledgement of the potential 
triggering of IHL and Ban Ki Moon’s distinction of robust peacekeeping and 
peace enforcement indicate that this expansion took the principle of non-
use of force much closer to the intervention line. That is, it is arguable that 
the Secretary-General’s recognised that robust peacekeeping could 
potentially go beyond the boundaries of peacekeeping and therefore 
attempted to clarify the concept and attempt to set some form of boundary. 
Indeed, the ‘dividing line between peace enforcement and peacekeeping 
operations with coercive components is very fine’.206 As Tsagourias notes, 
within peacekeeping operations that have Chapter VII elements, ‘coercion 
is not the primary aim of the mission but incidental thereto’, with no 
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designated enemy and no solution imposed; therefore, all parties are 
‘treated even-handedly’.207 Thus, whilst this broad authorisation to use 
force goes beyond the traditional or reasonable concept of self-defence, 
thereby moving peacekeeping ‘into the realms of peace enforcement’,208 a 
distinction can seemingly be drawn between these robust peacekeeping 
operations and peace enforcement. 
However, this boundary between peacekeeping and peace enforcement 
grew even thinner in the early 2010s, when the principle of non-use of force 
was expanded even further. During this period, the concept of robust 
peacekeeping widened to include terms such as ‘stabilisation’ and a greater 
emphasis on PoC, in what some refer to as ‘peace-enforcement 
mandates’.209 From 2013, peacekeeping operations in the Central African 
Republic and Mali were given mandates to ‘stabilise’ territory,210 whilst the 
Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) was launched in the DRC as part of 
MONUSCO to use ‘all necessary means’ to ‘neutralise’ and ‘disarm’ armed 
groups in ‘targeted offensive operations’.211 In this latter operation, in 
particular, as Chapter 4 will elaborate upon, the concept of robust 
peacekeeping was expanded even further as the FIB clearly designated an 
enemy and ‘purposefully did not treat all parties equally’212-  all of which 
have been identified as hallmarks of peace enforcement. Robust 
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peacekeeping, then, has a ‘clearly interventionist quality’,213 arguably 
because of the element of coercion contained within the broad 
interpretation of non-use of force and self-defence. As such, robust 
peacekeeping takes peacekeeping into the realm of peace enforcement 
which, in turn, takes peacekeeping much closer to the intervention line. 
However, it arguably undermines but ultimately does not contravene the 
principle of non-intervention on the basis that it was initially deployed with 
host state consent. Again, then, as with impartiality, consent seemingly 
saves the principle of non-use of force from becoming intervention when it 
is interpreted broadly. 
Regardless, UN peacekeeping operations have continued to adopt a much 
more robust posture which was optimised in the 2017 ‘Cruz Report’, 
directed by Secretary-General Antonio Guterres.214 Within this, it was 
argued that ‘the era of ‘Chapter VI-style’ peacekeeping is over’ and both 
the UN and troop or police contributing nations needed to ‘change their 
mindsets, take risks and show a willingness to face these new challenges’, 
rather than be ‘gripped by a ‘Chapter VI Syndrome’.215 Indeed, military 
personal within MONUSCO’s Force component note that the 
recommendations from the Cruz report are used as guidelines for the 
mission’s operational planning.216 This posture and discourse could 
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therefore be viewed as broadening the principle of non-use of force to its 
limits, once again taking it much closer to peace enforcement and the 
intervention line, thus simultaneously undermining the principle of non-
intervention. In particular, the pressure on peacekeepers to adopt a more 
forceful stance invokes a much stronger interventionist rhetoric within 
peacekeeping and creates the possibility for the peacekeeping operation to 
become a form of armed intervention. That is, it takes peacekeeping much 
closer to being perceived as ‘an intervention which uses force’,217 which, as 
seen in the previous Chapter, was identified by the ICJ as one of the most 
obvious forms of prohibited intervention.218  
This insistence on the need to take more forceful risks, from a TWAIL 
perspective, could also be perceived as being uncomfortably similar to 
colonial civilising missions, whereby force was often used by external actors 
to effect change in the host state and fulfil its mission which, in turn, 
reinforced the colonial patterns of domination and subordination.219 In a 
similar vein, then, as peacekeeping operations have a mandate designed to 
make alterations within the host state, albeit with consent, the use of 
heightened levels of force to fulfil these tasks may be viewed as reminiscent 
of colonial practices. Again, underlining arguments made in the previous 
Chapter, particularly by TWAIL scholars such as Anghie,220 that colonialism 
animates international law and contemporary practices, including 
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peacekeeping, may perpetuate colonial dichotomies and practices. Indeed, 
robust peacekeeping has proved problematic for many in the Global South, 
with the Non-Aligned Movement, in particular, criticising it for its lack of 
clarity, calling into question its underlying assumptions, such as the notion 
that more robustness leads to greater effectiveness.221 This, in turn, raises 
questions about the logistical or practical problems which robust 
peacekeeping presents. As Sloan argues, the UN is ‘fundamentally ill-suited 
to undertake militarised peacekeeping’.222 This is evident in the numerous 
criticisms which UN peacekeeping operations have faced in recent years for 
failing to fulfil tasks,223 not least the UN’s operations in the Congo. Similarly, 
this expanded use of force also triggers concerns about the invocation of 
IHL, the safety of peacekeepers, the perception of the operation and the 
reliance on peacekeeping operations to exercise force –all matters which 
will be explored in detail in the subsequent sections. 
As a result, given robust peacekeeping’s expansion of the principle of non-
use of force, potential unintended consequences and impingement of the 
thin red line between peacekeeping and intervention, it is questionable: ‘all 
necessary means’ to what ends?224 That is, it could be argued that the 
negatives of the turn to robust peacekeeping far outweigh any positives; 
therefore, the necessity of this expanded use of force and the turn to robust 
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peacekeeping is debatable. Indeed, this continued expansion of 
peacekeeping’s robust mandates is said to be ‘in danger of getting ‘out of 
its depth’ and biting off more than it can, or indeed, should, chew’.225 Thus, 
there should arguably be a limit to how far the principle of non-use of force, 
along with the other fundamental principles, can be expanded and contorted 
before they no longer remain relevant to peacekeeping. Once again, this, 
in turn, would have implications for the principle of non-intervention as, if 
the peacekeeping principles are broadened almost to their limits (as the use 
of force is at times) then this erodes the boundary between peacekeeping 
and intervention, thereby undermining or even contravening the principle 
of non-intervention.  
4 An Expanding Normative Framework 
The ‘holy trinity’ of principles, buttressed by policy developments such as 
the Capstone Doctrine and Brahimi Report, therefore form a general legal 
framework for UN peacekeeping, albeit one which is constantly stretched, 
reinterpreted and, on occasions, pushed to its limits. This framework 
surrounds peacekeeping like a red elastic band, forming an invisible 
boundary line between peacekeeping and intervention which contracts and 
retracts as peacekeeping continually evolves or the fundamental principles 
are reinterpreted within each peacekeeping operation. If the fundamental 
principles are viewed as the core of peacekeeping, the closest peacekeeping 
has to a beating legal heart, then the norms of peacekeeping – such as 
                                   




democracy promotion, protection of civilians and the prohibition of sexual 
violence and exploitation – could be seen as the ribcage which surrounds 
peacekeeping’s heart. That is, these norms form part of a wider normative 
framework which the legal framework sits within. Together, the two distinct 
but occasionally overlapping frameworks form part of peacekeeping’s 
overall framework, providing somewhat of a guidance for UN peacekeeping. 
Furthermore, for the principle of non-intervention, as with the fundamental 
principles, how these norms are interpreted and applied alters the 
peacekeeping frameworks and the thin, elastic, red boundary line between 
peacekeeping and intervention. It therefore follows that, as was seen with 
the fundamental principles, a narrow interpretation of these norms and 
principles constricts the peacekeeping framework, thereby reinforcing the 
principle of non-intervention. Whereas a broad interpretation of the 
principles and norms expands peacekeeping’s frameworks, consequently 
undermining and potentially contravening the principle of non-intervention. 
 
4.1 Democracy Promotion  
Based on the age-old notion that ‘democracies do not wage war on each 
other’, international law and international institutions have been developed 
‘so as to reinforce democratic governance’.226 For peacekeeping, this has 
resulted in peacekeeping operations undertaking democracy promotion – 
tasks embedded within the operation’s mandate to support the furtherance 
                                   




of democracy within the host state. As with the other ‘new’ norms of 
peacekeeping, democracy promotion was primarily introduced, 
institutionalised and interpreted by the Secretary-General, who built upon 
a growing consensus for ‘democratic governance’.227 It could be viewed, 
then, not only as an illustration of SG norm entrepreneurship but also as a 
prime example of the norm entrepreneur SG engaging in and influencing a 
dynamic of difference. That is, it is the dominant, democratic Northern 
states who recognised a need for the promotion of democracy, having 
identified a gap between themselves and the non-democratic Global South, 
setting about to close the gap through the promotion of democratic 
governance. As such, a dynamic of difference was created, with the 
Secretary-General, as head of the UN, engaged in closing this gap and 
altering the dynamic, through their norm entrepreneur role. 
Indeed, in 1989, the Security Council, following reports from Secretaries-
General Kurt Waldheim228 and Javier Perez de Cuellar,229 established the 
United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) to help supervise the 
electoral process in Namibia.230 This marked the first occasion in which UN 
peacekeeping engaged in democratisation tasks. The norm then became 
formally introduced into UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding in the early 
1990s, in line with the rise of democratisation within international law in 
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the post-Cold War era and the shift in interventionist practice as was noted 
in the previous Chapter.231 In his inaugural speech as Secretary General, 
Boutros-Ghali stressed the importance of the ‘United Nations role in 
strengthening fundamental freedoms and democratic institutions’ and noted 
that ‘if there is no development without democracy, there can also be no 
democracy without development.’232 A notion which could perhaps be 
viewed as a peacebuilding version of ‘democracies do not wage war’. This 
set the tone for the rest of his tenure, which focused significantly on 
furthering the norm of democracy promotion  or ‘democratisation’ within 
the UN system, in particular, within peacekeeping.233 Boutros-Ghali viewed 
the end of the Cold War as presenting a historic opportunity for changing 
the world and the nature of international affairs and introduced both the 
concept of democracy and the term peacebuilding into UN terminology and 
practice.234 Once again, the Secretary-General was acting as norm 
entrepreneur but not in an act of solo volition. Rather, Boutros-Ghali built 
upon a growing consensus, drawing international attention to an ‘issue’ and 
then proposing the norm as a solution, simultaneously connecting the new 
norm with well-established principles, ‘thereby ensuring that it resonates 
with its intended audience’.235 Indeed, in An Agenda for Peace Boutros-Ghali 
institutionalised the norm of democracy promotion, arguing that there was 
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‘an obvious connection between democratic practices [...] and the 
achievement of true peace and security’.236 Therefore, the introduction of 
the principle within UN peacekeeping was evidently premised on the theory 
of liberal democratic peace that democracies do not go to war with one 
another and, as such, ‘liberalism is rationalised and presented as the only 
form of political rationality capable to meeting the challenges of the modern 
world’.237 
4.1.1  Civilising Mission? 
This presumption that liberal democracy is the most ideal form of 
governance and the inclusion of democracy promotion within peacekeeping 
raises numerous issues. Firstly, for the principle of non-intervention, the 
inclusion of the norm has the potential to undermine the principle of non-
intervention as it expands peacekeeping’s normative framework by 
broadening the tasks which a peacekeeping operation is required to 
undertake. That is, as was seen in the previous Chapter,238 as peacekeeping 
evolved from traditional to multi-dimensional operations, their mandates 
and operational tasks grew, consequently expanding both peacekeeping’s 
boundaries and its interventionist potential. In particular, whereas the 
traditional model of peacekeeping focused on conflict or post-conflict 
management, the inclusion of democracy promotion pushed peacekeeping 
into the realm of statebuilding.239  
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Furthermore, for many peacekeeping operations, establishing or supporting 
democracy is a key part of the exit strategy and criterion for measuring the 
success of the operation; an operation may only be considered a ‘success’ 
and therefore leave the host state if a sufficient level of democratic 
governance is established.240 As such, it could be argued that democracy 
promotion, in this instance, is a form of intervention as it invokes an 
element of coercion as it is, essentially, an implicit ultimatum – the host 
state must establish a system of democratic governance, which meets the 
standards of the external actor, before the actor withdraws from their 
territory. In essence, the norm of democracy promotion could be viewed, 
then, as a form of coercive action designed to influence change or alter the 
host state and, thus, intervention or, more specifically, political 
intervention.  
From a TWAIL perspective, democracy promotion could also be viewed as 
problematic as it invokes notions of ‘civilisation’ and, as was seen with 
humanitarian-based interventions in Chapter 2,241 is based on Western 
standards and values. That is, the very concepts of sovereignty and 
statehood, for TWAIL scholars, are deeply rooted in colonial standards and 
were crafted ‘without pre-colonial Africa in mind’.242 Therefore, the Global 
South, when gaining independence, were subscribing to an international 
legal system which they played no part in creating and it is arguable that 
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the same arguments could also be made for democracy promotion. It is 
indisputable that ‘civilisation’, in particular, played an important role in 
shaping international law, particularly through colonial intervention during 
the Age of Empire, as the previous Chapter demonstrated. Whilst this 
narrow concept of ‘civilisation’ ended in the new post-1945 world order, if 
‘civilisation’ is instead considered as an argumentative pattern, ‘one that 
constantly oscillates’ between the two interconnected logics of ‘conditional 
inclusion and perpetual exclusion or deferral of inclusion’, then ‘civilisation’ 
persists.243 As TWAIL scholars, such as Anghie and Tzouvala, have argued, 
the concept of ‘civilisation’ remains and has simply been reinvented in, for 
example, the ‘war on terror’244 or global capitalist expansion.245 It could 
similarly be argued that ‘civilisation’ is also replicated in democratisation 
and, more specifically, the norm of democracy promotion within UN 
peacekeeping operations as it invokes the same notions of inclusion and 
exclusion. Indeed, it is ‘regarded as axiomatic in the western world that the 
most civilised form of government’ is the ‘western form of democracy’.246 
As such, non-democratic states are seemingly viewed by the West as 
adopting a less civilised form of governance; in other words – uncivilised. 
Similar to the discussion on humanitarian-based interventions in the 
previous Chapter, democracy, like human rights, is therefore a concept 
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based on Western ideals which are devoid of the input of the Third World 
and ‘essentially infinite’ and highly ambiguous.247  
Whilst the UN is said to have recognised this Western-centric nature of 
democracy, reflected in its un-willingness ‘to develop a substantive notion 
of democracy’,248 the concept has still been promoted within the UN system, 
not least through its inclusion in peacekeeping mandates. Furthermore, 
given that the UN is dominated by Global North or Western states (as was 
laid out in Chapter 2) the presumption of democracy as the most ideal form 
of governance has prevailed and has filtered into UN peacekeeping through 
the inclusion of the norm of democracy promotion. It appears that this has 
then been somewhat accepted by both the host state and those within the 
Council who seek to counter Western democracy promotion,249 because of 
the consensual nature of peacekeeping. Therefore, because a peacekeeping 
operation is deployed with the host state’s consent, it follows that they 
consent to the operation’s mandate and the tasks contained within it, 
including democracy promotion. However, as previously noted, in practice 
a distinction can be drawn between de jure consent (consent to the 
deployment of the operation which cannot be withdrawn) and de facto 
consent (consent to tasks or changes during the mandate period). As will 
be discussed in later chapters, it then becomes debatable as to how much 
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the host state consents to the democracy promotion tasks in reality and to 
what extent they are able to voluntarily accept or reject such endeavours. 
Regardless of this debate, the argument remains that the pattern of 
‘civilisation’ – conditional inclusion versus exclusion or deferral – is found 
within UN peacekeeping, in this instance when the host state is required to 
adopt a democratic system, under the supervision of a peacekeeping 
operation. The dominant Western actor thereby requires the subordinate 
Global North state to conform to their standards, often despite the fact that 
democracy may neither answer the latter’s needs nor be in line ‘with their 
native traditional pattern of the exercise of governmental authority’.250 As 
a result, these peacekeeping operations become comparable with colonial 
civilising missions, as they invoke similar patterns of domination, 
subordination and conformity to hegemonic standards, which is legitimised 
by international law. Indeed, for some TWAIL scholars, the UN’s shaping of 
post-conflict states through constitutional support, such as democracy 
promotion, ‘serves as a classic instance’ of the ‘imperial project at work’.251 
Moreover, it could be further argued that this is, again, a replication of 
Anghie’s dynamic of difference, as previously noted. Here, a gap between 
two cultures is identified (non-democratic system) with the dominant actor 
(the UN peacekeeping operation) seeking to close that gap by altering or 
normalising (democratising) the ‘other’ (the host state). Thus, 
simultaneously justifying intervention for, in theory, an indefinite period of 
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time as (not withstanding host state consent to mandate renewals) it is the 
hegemonic power who determines the standard which must be met and, 
therefore, whether the gap has been closed, with the subordinate ‘other’ 
having acquired a sufficient level of democratisation. Again, as was 
previously noted, this altering of the ‘other’ includes an element of coercion 
– an implication that a certain standard of democratisation is a pre-requisite 
for the withdrawal of an operation- resulting in peacekeeping amounting to 
a form of political intervention. 
4.1.2  A Pipedream? 
The inclusion of democracy promotion within peacekeeping’s normative 
framework, then, raises questions about the apparent presumption that the 
Western-centric notion of democracy is the most desired form of 
governance and one which is necessary for achieving peace. This becomes 
even more problematic given that its inclusion expands peacekeeping 
boundaries and interventionist potential of a peacekeeping operation, 
thereby taking peacekeeping closer to the intervention line, simultaneously 
undermining the principle of non-intervention. 
Nevertheless, following its introduction, subsequent Secretaries-General 
have continued to emphasise the importance of democracy,252 and the 
Security Council has routinely mandated its operations to include 
democratisation tasks.253 These have taken numerous forms, such as 
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providing technical assistance, monitoring and observing elections or 
ensuring security to allow for the organisation of elections.254 More broadly, 
it has also included the development of bureaucracies and administrations, 
justice and the rule of law and security sector reform.255 Therefore, as 
peacekeeping has evolved to robust, multi-dimensional peacekeeping 
operations, its democratisation tasks have simultaneously expanded.256 As 
such, elections have now become a key part of many peacekeeping 
operations, in particular, the UN’s two operations in the DRC, which have 
supported three democratic elections.257 As noted earlier, then, this 
inclusion of democratisation within UN peacekeeping signalled a shift of 
focus from one of peacebuilding and securing a peaceful post-conflict 
environment to one of statebuilding258 - a task which some argue should 
not be undertaken by UN peacekeeping as it is a very poor tool for achieving 
such matters.259 Indeed, senior personnel within the UN Secretariat suggest 
that ‘a serious question which needs to be asked’ is how realistic or helpful 
it is ‘to expect a peacekeeping operation, that operates on the basis of 
consent, impartiality, to essentially play the role of an arbiter in an electoral 
process’.260 Similarly, it is questionable whether ‘turning a peacekeeping 
operation into a tool for democracy promotion’ is a true reflection or 
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expression of the Council’s will and their main aim of addressing threats to 
international peace and security.261 As Marten argues, ‘the notion of 
imposing liberal democracy abroad is a pipedream’ and peacekeepers 
should therefore limit their goals to providing stability, rather than trying to 
transform societies.262 It could therefore be argued that in addition to the 
problem of whether democracy should be imposed as the desired or 
preferable form of governance, there is a second notable problem of 
whether democratisation by UN peacekeepers is both appropriate and 
logistically possible and, if so, how it is to be quantified.  
That is, it is unclear what the benchmark is for ‘successful’ democracy or 
democratic elections and what it means for a peacekeeping operation if 
these elections are not ‘successful’.263 As will be explored in later Chapters, 
the elections which UN peacekeepers have supported in the DRC have been 
highly controversial, with numerous allegations of corruption and election 
fraud.264 This then exemplifies the the argument made by some TWAIL 
scholars that ‘international law does not take global democracy seriously’ 
as it imposes certain obligations on states (such as the need to hold 
democratic elections) but does not hold it responsible for any further 
deepening or development of the concept.265 It appears that simply 
obtaining the level of ‘democratic state’ or fulfilling the basic requirements 
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of holding elections suffices for meeting the international community’s 
standards imposed to transform the non-democratic state. In a similar vein, 
the UN’s emphasis on democracy is perhaps somewhat ironic, given that 
the organ which sets the peacekeeping mandate, and thus the democracy 
promotion tasks, is the Security Council. As seen in Chapter 2, the Council 
is highly undemocratic, given the disproportionate amount of power which 
the permanent five members hold; therefore, there is, once again, 
somewhat of a disconnect between rhetoric and practice – the UN promotes 
democracy yet is dominated by an extremely undemocratic organ. 
The norm of democracy promotion within UN peacekeeping therefore 
continues to highlight the same patterns of domination and subordination 
and the furtherance of hegemonic ideals and agendas, as was seen in the 
development of the principle of non-intervention in the previous Chapter. 
Thus, supporting the notion that many features of both international law 
and international institutions or legal systems ‘acknowledge and reinforce 
the substantial power differentials between its participants’.266 
Furthermore, applying a TWAIL lens to the concept of democracy and its 
inclusion within peacekeeping also highlights how democracy is based upon 
ideals and standards (specifically Western ideals), thereby lacking any legal 
underpinning beyond the Security Council mandate. As such, it is a norm, 
rather than a legal principle, thereby contributing to peacekeeping’s 
normative, but not legal, framework. For the principle of non-intervention, 
                                   




the norm of democracy promotion is also problematic as its ambiguous 
nature expands peacekeeping’s red boundary line, permitting a 
peacekeeping operation to undertake ill-defined and potentially limitless 
interventionist activities, under the justification of democracy promotion 
which, in turn, severely undermines and potentially contravenes, at times, 
the principle of non-intervention.  
4.2 The Protection of Civilians 
Unlike the norm of democracy promotion, the protection of civilians (PoC) 
has much clearer legal underpinnings in international humanitarian and 
human rights law.267 Indeed, it is argued that UN peacekeeping operations 
are obliged to comply with human rights standards and prevent or halt 
violations of human rights, regardless of whether the operation has a PoC 
mandate.268 PoC therefore invokes or reflects some principles and 
obligations under international law, such as compliance with international 
humanitarian law when engaged in armed conflict.269 As such, whilst PoC 
primarily forms a key part of peacekeeping’s broader normative framework, 
it could also be said to contribute to peacekeeping’s legal framework, where 
it leads to a peacekeeping operation invoking these elements of 
international law.  
As with democracy promotion, the protection of civilians (PoC) is, again, a 
classic example of how norms are incubated and created within the UN 
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System, with the support of, or driven by, the Secretary-General. Of the 
three ‘new’ norms explored within this thesis, it is also, arguably, the most 
interventionist as it has now evolved to permit a substantial, seemingly 
endless level of force in order to protect civilians. Thus, expanding the legal 
and normative boundaries surrounding peacekeeping and, by extension, 
contracting the principle of non-intervention. Described by former 
Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon as a ‘defining purpose of the UN in the 
twenty-first century’,270 PoC has become a centre of gravity for 
peacekeeping operations with over 95% of peacekeepers now mandated to 
protect civilians.271 This has arisen through a rapid expansion of the concept 
over the past twenty years, with noticeable changes almost every five years 
as pressure to ensure peacekeepers protect civilians has increased. 
The UN’s first involvement in the protection of civilians within a 
peacekeeping operation can be traced back to the UN’s Operation in the 
Congo (ONUC) in 1960. Whilst ONUC did not have a POC mandate from the 
Security Council,272 an Operational Directive permitted the peacekeepers to 
afford ‘where feasible [...] every protection’ to ‘unarmed groups’ who may 
be subjected to violence, ‘using armed force if necessary’.273 For some, this 
has been read to include the protection of civilians and should be marked 
as the start of the UN’s foray into such operations. Indeed, Mona Ali Khalil, 
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argues that this was the first POC mandate, ‘not by virtue of the design of 
the mandate’ but on the basis of the then SG, Hammarskjöld’s 
announcement that he would be reading the mandate as allowing ONUC ‘to 
have the authority to step in to save civilian lives’.274 Whilst there was ‘of 
course’ some objection from members of the Council, ‘his interpretation of 
ONUC’s mandate prevailed’.275 This therefore demonstrates the power and 
freedom of the office of the SG to interpret peacekeeping norms and 
influence practice; in this instance, through an interpretation of the SC 
mandate. Whilst it was nearly forty years later when the first PoC mandate 
was introduced, Hammarskjöld’s interpretation here created a precedent for 
SG’s to interpret mandates and pathed the way for the possibility of 
peacekeeping to undertake protection tasks. Indeed, in the early 1990s, 
the UN again began to experiment with the concept of protection of civilians 
with the UN protection forces in the Former Yugoslavia.276 These were 
tasked with an indirect PoC focusing on humanitarian space and access and 
protection of safe areas.277 
Following this, the UNSC authorised a specific PoC mandate for the 
peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone in 1999.278 It is at this point that 
the Council began to insert the language of ‘imminent threat’ into 
mandates, stating that peacekeepers were to protect civilians who were 
‘under imminent threat of physical violence’.279 This introduction of PoC, 
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championed by the then SG, Kofi Annan, reflected the shifting attitudes 
towards intervention, as was seen in Chapter 2,280 with member states 
believing that they had a responsibility to prevent or stop the failures of the 
1990s (such as the Rwandan genocide) from occurring again.281 When 
opening a debate on the introduction of PoC, Annan noted that ‘enforcement 
action is a difficult step’ which often goes against political or other interests, 
but these interests are superseded by ‘universal values’, and PoC is one 
such value.282 Annan therefore introduced and interpreted the norm of PoC 
both within UN peacekeeping and the UN system more broadly, recognising 
that it was a form of intervention but justifying it on a moral or humanitarian 
basis. Again, similarities can be drawn here with the humanitarian-based 
interventions which were discussed in the previous Chapter. Indeed, 
Annan’s advocating for PoC, along with the concept of responsibility to 
protect (R2P), became known as the ‘Kofi Doctrine’ – a belief that state 
sovereignty could no longer be a shield against UN intervention on behalf 
of ‘we, the peoples’.283 This act of norm entrepreneurship by Annan, which 
built upon the general intervention rhetoric at the time, ambiguously 
broadened the scope of UN peacekeeping operations by creating a further 
task within peacekeeping mandates that provided yet another justification 
for intervention.284 If it was acknowledged that these norms of PoC and R2P 
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required the relinquishing of an element of sovereignty then, by corollary, 
it arguably also implied a sacrifice or constriction of non-intervention. This 
then undermines the principle of non-intervention, particularly as the 
concept of PoC is ill-defined and, as it is continually evolving, is potentially 
normatively limitless – thus, in theory, the interventionist nature of the 
peacekeeping operation in this regard is also limitless. As was seen with the 
norm of democracy promotion, questions then arise as to how far this norm 
can be expanded before it crosses the intervention line.  
This is further problematic when this broadening of peacekeeping’s 
boundaries is combined with forceful rhetoric (such as Annan’s 
acknowledgement of the need for ‘enforcement action’285) or uncertainty 
about the level of force which could or should be used by peacekeepers in 
order to fulfil this task. This was particularly the case with the UN’s 
operation in Sierra Leone, which led to debates in the Security Council that 
highlight the differing approaches to intervention amongst the permanent 
members and exemplifies the hegemonic political dynamics within the 
Council which Chapter 2 outlined.286 On the one hand, the UK, fully 
endorsing the inclusion of PoC in peacekeeping operations, argued that the 
Council ‘should not shy away’ from ‘more robust mandates if a force needs 
to act in enforcement mode’ to, for example, protect civilians.287 
Conversely, whilst China equally supported the protection of civilians, 
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recognising that the Council had an ‘unshirkable duty’ in maintaining 
international peace and security, rather than supporting the use of force for 
peacekeepers, it emphasised the need for PoC to cut across the political, 
humanitarian, development and assistance fields.288 Thereby arguing that 
the fundamental way to protect civilians is to ‘effectively prevent and do 
away with conflict’ and that the issue of PoC should be ‘more appropriately 
and more thoroughly deliberated’ in the General Assembly.289 This therefore 
highlights, not only the differing approaches to intervention within the 
Security Council but, more broadly, how the norm of PoC exposes the same 
patterns of subordination and domination that the previous Chapter 
identified within the principle of non-intervention. It is also, like democracy 
promotion and humanitarian-based interventions, a norm which is based 
upon Western values and standards, again, reinforcing the North-South 
divide both within international law and international relations. Applying a 
TWAIL lens, then, the UK’s rhetoric of robust intervention could be viewed 
as promoting a Global North agenda, as the invocation of force and 
emphasis on the Security Council as the primary decision maker reinforces 
the dominance of the Council and therefore the Global North. On the other 
hand, the arguments put forward by China, that the norm of PoC should be 
debated and decided upon within the General Assembly, challenges this 
Northern dominance as all member states could participate in moulding the 
concept of PoC, rather than simply the dominant powers within the Security 
                                   





Council.290 From a TWAIL perspective, this latter proposal is therefore vital 
as it offers a counter to hegemony and allows the Global South to play a 
role in shaping international law and restructuring the international 
system.291 Furthermore, for the principle of non-intervention, it would also 
limit the concept of PoC, demarcating boundaries for the norm and thereby 
limiting the interventionist potential of PoC and, by extension, the 
peacekeeping operation.  
4.2.1  Forceful Protection 
Despite these initial debates on the normative and practical boundaries of 
PoC, the concept rapidly evolved, with five subsequent operations 
mandated to protect civilians.292 There remained, however, a troubling lack 
of operational guidance as to how these mandates should be implemented, 
leading to ‘widely varying interpretations’ by senior mission leadership in 
the field and a failure to meaningfully implement the mandates.293 Once 
again, undermining the principle of non-intervention as the ambiguity of the 
norm of PoC created unclear boundaries for peacekeeping and, 
consequently, uncertainty over its interventionist potential. 
It is also during this period of the early 2000s, as was seen in Chapter 2,294 
that peacekeeping began to shift towards ‘robust peacekeeping’ which had 
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a direct impact on the implementation of PoC, given that PoC and the use 
of force are often entwined.295 The language within mandates therefore 
began to change, with the use of force to protect civilians becoming more 
acceptable. In particular, the Brahimi Report noted that ‘there are situations 
in which peacekeepers not only should have the right, but are morally 
obliged to use force’.296 This shift towards the inclusion of PoC in 
peacekeeping operations became institutionalised and professionalised 
within peacekeeping during the late 2000s as the Security Council began to 
mandate PoC as a priority task for many operations,297 with the UN 
Department of Peacekeeping (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support 
(DFS) examining the operation of the concept in order to guide mandate 
implementation.298 This expansion of the use of force in order to protect 
civilians and PoC as a priority task became further problematic in 2013 when 
the Security Council expanded the norm even further when it introduced 
the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in the DRC – an issue which will be 
discussed in Chapter’s 4 and 5. The FIB, deployed alongside MONUSCO, 
was tasked, amongst other things, to ‘ensure [...] effective protection of 
civilians under imminent threat of physical violence’.299 Whilst this may not, 
initially, appear to differ greatly from other PoC mandates, the FIB was 
unique as it was authorised to undertake ‘targeted offensive operations’ to 
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‘neutralise’ armed groups, thereby permitting a significant level of force.300 
This force, in turn, could be used to protect civilians, marking a robust, 
protective modality which was a first for both peacekeeping and PoC. The 
FIB was then later encompassed within the general mandate of MONUSCO, 
which was similarly authorised to use force to protect civilians. Indeed, it is 
now common for the Security Council to act under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, permitting peacekeepers to ‘use all necessary means’, including 
the use of force, to ‘protect civilians’,301 with its operations in Mali, Central 
African Republic and DRC, for example, all containing robust PoC 
mandates.302 As previously noted, this then causes confusion over the 
peacekeeping operation’s Charter basis and the practical implications of this 
(such as how much force is permissible), thereby, again blurring the 
boundaries between peacekeeping and peace enforcement and the non-
intervention line. 
It could therefore be argued that the norm of PoC creates a double-edged 
expansion within peacekeeping’s frameworks, consequently constricting the 
boundaries of the principle of non-intervention. Firstly, as it became a firmly 
established norm of peacekeeping it created a further justification for 
intervention – similar to the development of the norm of democracy 
promotion – thereby expanding peacekeeping’s normative framework and 
simultaneously constricting the principle of non-intervention. Secondly, it 
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also had the effect of expanding peacekeeping’s legal framework as it 
broadened the principle of limited use of force by permitting force to be 
used to protect civilians, given that force was permitted in defence of the 
mandate and PoC was now a mandated task. The potential for force to be 
used in fulfilment of this task thus appears limitless, again, expanding 
peacekeeping’s boundaries and undermining the principle of non-
intervention. 
4.2.2  A Priority For Whom? 
In addition to the overlap with the use of force and the unclear normative 
and conceptual boundaries of PoC, its evolution into a priority task for 
peacekeepers is also questionable on two further grounds. Firstly, the very 
concept of PoC – to protect all civilians - is an impossible task for any actor, 
not least a UN peacekeeping operation with limited capabilities – as has 
been evident with the UN’s operation in the Congo, which Chapter 5 
explores. Whilst peacekeeper’s may be able to ‘mitigate harm’, it is noted 
that ‘you will always have shortcomings and the idea that you won’t is 
illusory’.303 It has therefore been suggested that a mitigation, rather than 
a protection, framework would be more preferable as peacekeepers simply 
‘can’t protect’.304  
This then leads to the second issue – whether the protection of civilians 
should even be a task for peacekeeping at all or whether it should be the 
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primary responsibility of the host state.305 This is not to say that 
peacekeepers should not protect civilians but that protection efforts should 
ultimately be undertaken by the host government and its forces. Indeed, 
some UN personnel working with the field argue that the protection of 
civilians should be removed as a task, especially a priority task, for 
peacekeeping operations as it should, instead, be undertaken by national 
actors, with support from other international entities, if necessary, such as 
the UN country team.306 This would arguably be a desirable move as, for 
some PoC mandated peacekeeping operations, their prioritisation and 
development of PoC tools has created a reliance on the UN operation both 
by local communities and the host state.307 As Chapter 5 will explore, this 
reliance has been particularly problematic for MONUSCO, with a recent 
strategic review noting that MONUSCO had worked ‘to perfect its own 
system, strategies and tools’ for PoC but had simultaneously ‘tended to 
diminish the primary role of State authorities in assuming their protection 
responsibilities’.308 There is a risk, then, that the host state may become 
reliant on a peacekeeping operation to protect civilians, rather than fulfilling 
the task themselves, which, in turn, raises numerous issues. First, given 
the temporary nature of peacekeeping, as ‘you will be gone tomorrow’, a 
peacekeeper, ‘cannot be part of a lasting solution’.309 Therefore, PoC tools 
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developed and implemented by UN peacekeeping operations, whilst 
admirable and necessary, may not be creating sustainable protection. 
Second, it arguably increases the interventionist nature of the peacekeeping 
operation as it is, in essence, undertaking the role of the state in this area. 
Indeed, it has been noted that it is a ‘very convenient approach’ to have 
the UN in charge of protecting and to default ‘on a very inadequate 
organisation, an outlet to protect’, resulting in ‘basically substituting to 
regalian powers that the state cannot implement’.310 In this instance, then, 
if the host state is willing to accept the UN undertaking this protectorate 
role, it could perhaps be viewed not as intervention in the form of coercive 
action but, rather, intervention by invitation. That is, it could be likened to 
the joint operations that were discussed in Chapter 2,311 which some argue 
are a form of intervention by invitation because they are ‘a function of the 
host state’s consent’ for UN intervention.312 If PoC is to be viewed as a task 
which falls within a state’s national jurisdiction, then, if it established that 
the host state actively encourages or explicitly consents to a peacekeeping 
operation undertaking PoC activities this could also be viewed as a form of 
intervention by invitation. This, in turn, presents a third issue with the norm 
of PoC – the creation of the image of the UN and its peacekeeping 
operations as ‘the saviour’, who ‘would be able to bring protection to every 
corner of the country’.313 From a TWAIL perspective, it could be argued that 
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this idea of the UN as the protectorate or guardian of civilians is 
synonymous with the civilising mission and the colonial dichotomies of a 
‘civilised’ external actor, enlightening and ‘civilising’ the subordinate ‘other’. 
The inclusion of PoC as a priority task for peacekeepers may therefore be 
seen as not only expanding peacekeeping’s interventionist nature but as, 
again, reinforcing the patterns of domination and subordination which have 
been prevalent throughout the development of the principle of non-
intervention and, now, the evolution of peacekeeping. Furthermore, for 
peacekeeping’s frameworks, the norm of PoC once again demonstrates both 
the ability of the Secretary-General to introduce, institutionalise and 
interpret norms and the use of this norm to broaden the legal and normative 
boundaries of peacekeeping. Again, whilst PoC predominantly contributes 
to peacekeeping’s normative framework, its impact on legal principles, such 
as the use of force, and its potential invocation of international law 
obligations, such as IHL, result in the norm also contributing to 
peacekeeping’s legal framework. As was discussed with the other principles 
and norms, the impact or effect the norm then has on peacekeeping’s 
boundaries and the principle of non-intervention is dependent on how it is 
interpreted and applied. That is, if PoC is interpreted narrowly, it constricts 
the red elastic boundary line around peacekeeping, consequently 
reinforcing the principle of non-intervention. On the other hand, if PoC is 
broadly interpreted and applied, as it is when mandated as a priority task, 




potentially limitless intervention and thereby undermining the principle of 
non-intervention.  
4.3 Prohibition of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse 
As with the norm of protection of civilians, the prohibition of sexual 
exploitation and abuse (SEA) by peacekeepers could also be said to have 
clear legal underpinnings in international humanitarian, criminal and human 
rights law. For example, within international humanitarian law (IHL), rape 
and sexual violence is prohibited in both international and non-international 
armed conflicts,314 whilst international criminal law lists rape and other 
forms of sexual violence as a crime against humanity.315 Therefore, as with 
PoC, whilst the prohibition of SEA predominantly contributes to 
peacekeeping’s normative framework, it also makes a subsidiary 
contribution to peacekeeping’s legal framework.  
The norm of prohibition of SEA, however, differs slightly from the other two 
concepts within the normative framework. Firstly, whereas democracy 
promotion and PoC could be generally viewed as positive or proactive norms 
that focus on altering the state, the prohibition of SEA is concerned with 
preventing certain acts committed by peacekeepers and therefore attempts 
to effect change within the peacekeeping operation itself, rather than the 
state. Secondly, as a result of the controversy of SEA by UN peacekeepers, 
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the norm has been relatively slow to develop, due to a mix of the UN’s 
‘gross institutional failure’ to handle allegations316 and member states 
reluctance to prosecute its own troops when they have been found to have 
committed such acts. This then leads to a culture of impunity and a 
stagnating norm, with slow progress made in addressing SEA - something 
which has not occurred with the other two norms, given their rapid 
expansion in a relatively short timeframe. It therefore highlights how, when 
acting as a norm entrepreneur, the SG faces a constant battle of convincing 
member states of the norm’s worth, by presenting a problem and 
demonstrating why the norm is a necessary solution. Finally, in relation to 
the principle of non-intervention, the prohibition of SEA, as a peacekeeping 
norm, again differs from the other norms as it is not, in itself, 
interventionist. Rather, it is attempting to prevent a form of intervention – 
SEA – and, as such, may be viewed as a norm which reinforces the principle 
of non-intervention as it attempts to limit peacekeeping’s boundaries. 
4.3.1  One Case Too Many 
As with peacekeeping’s other norms, the prohibition of sexual exploitation 
and abuse emerged within UN peacekeeping in the 1990s when, as Chapter 
2 discussed, the Cold War paralysis came to an end and there was a revival 
of UN peacekeeping. In particular, it developed after numerous allegations 
of misconduct by UN peacekeepers, particularly in Cambodia and Bosnia, 
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with UN personnel accused of involvement in the use of prostitutes,317 
trafficking and forced sex work.318 Initially, there was a reluctance by the 
UN ‘to recognise the direct and indirect involvement of peacekeepers in 
trafficking’ and other acts of SEA,319 with the first attempt to address the 
issue noted in Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s 1999 bulletin on the 
‘Observance by UN forces of International Humanitarian Law’320- again 
highlighting the norm’s legal underpinnings. Within the bulletin, Section 7 
noted that forces under the command and control of the UN were ‘prohibited 
from committing acts of sexual exploitation and abuse’ and ‘have a 
particular duty of care towards women and children’.321 As has been seen 
with previous norms, the prohibition on SEA was not an act of solo 
entrepreneurship on the part of the Secretary-General but, rather, grew out 
of investigations of the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the 
Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), which were reported to the 
General Assembly,322 who then requested the Secretary-General to 
promulgate specific rules to prohibit this behaviour and provide annual 
reports on SEA data.323 This culminated in Annan issuing a further bulletin 
in 2003, this time specifically addressing SEA, in which he set the 
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foundations of the norm of prohibition of SEA by clearly defining and 
elaborating on prohibited acts and identifying the roles and responsibilities 
of relevant actors.324 This included member states who were tasked with 
undertaking criminal prosecutions in their domestic jurisdictions, if a proper 
investigation amounted to evidence supporting an allegation of SEA. Again, 
within this bulletin, reference was made to the 1999 SG bulletin on IHL, 
noting that operations under ‘UN command and control are prohibited from 
committing acts of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse’ and ‘have a 
particular duty of care towards women and children’, pursuant to section 7 
of the 1999 Bulletin;325 thus, reinforcing the norm’s legal underpinnings. 
Annan then followed this initial bulletin with a commissioned report in 2005, 
after acknowledging that the procedures in place ‘were manifestly 
inadequate and that a fundamental change in approach was needed.’326 The 
Zeid Report, for the first time, provided a comprehensive strategy to 
eliminate SEA in peacekeeping operations.327 This included establishing 
independent investigative teams, curfew setting, and establishing clear 
lines of communication to allow for local populations to report allegations.328 
These could therefore be viewed as boundary setting initiatives, particularly 
the imposition of a curfew, as they restricted peacekeeper’s behaviour and 
reaffirmed peacekeeping’s boundaries, thereby reinforcing the principle of 
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non-intervention. The Zeid report also acknowledged that the decision to 
prosecute peacekeepers was left to the troop contributing nation and was, 
therefore, a sovereign decision. This then highlights two key problems 
within the norm of SEA. Firstly, this early formulation of the norm was 
reactive instead of proactive; that is, it focused upon how to address 
allegations after conduct had occurred, rather than attempting to prevent 
the conduct. Secondly, it was (and remains) based on a reliance on the 
troop contributing country (TCC) to prosecute their troops if they commit 
SEA whilst acting as a UN peacekeeper.329 Thus, the norm is beholden to 
member states’ sovereignty, which has led to a culture of impunity as states 
have been reluctant to prosecute their own troops, as will be further 
explored later in this section and in subsequent Chapters.  
Secretary-General Annan therefore established and began to institutionalise 
the norm of prohibition of SEA within peacekeeping, labelled as a ‘zero 
tolerance policy’.330 This was continued by his successors, such as SG Ban 
Ki Moon, who also issued a bulletin addressing SEA, expanding the norm 
further by including the prohibition of discrimination, sexual harassment 
and the abuse of authority within the Secretariat.331 As Annan had done, 
Ban Ki Moon then commissioned a report from the ‘High Level Panel on 
Peace Operations’ (HIPPO Report) in 2014, which undertook an extensive 
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analysis of the challenges facing peacekeeping.332 The HIPPO Report 
concluded that despite the introduction of the norm prohibiting SEA and the 
‘persuasive rhetoric’, the UN was still not putting the norm of zero tolerance 
policy into practice.333 The report therefore recommended, inter alia, that 
states, particularly TCCs ‘immediately and vigorously investigate and 
prosecute all credible allegations’.334 SG Ban Ki Moon then reiterated this in 
a report on implementing these recommendations, when he also noted that 
‘a single substantiated case of [SEA] involving UN personnel is one case too 
many’.335 This was then buttressed by a Security Council resolution in 2016 
which, inter alia, reaffirmed its support for the UN’s zero-tolerance policy 
and endorsed the Secretary-General’s decision to repatriate units which had 
committed SEA and requested the SG to replace any military or police units 
whose troop or police contributing country had not investigated 
allegations.336 Whilst the endorsement of the Council could be viewed as a 
greater support for the norm, again, the interpretation of the norm during 
this period was limited to reacting to SEA, as opposed to prevention, and 
was dependent on member states complicity.  
More recently, this approach has also been taken by the current Secretary-
General, Antonio Guterres, who launched a high-level task force to prevent 
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and respond to SEA,337 along with a ‘Zero Tolerance’, four-pronged 
strategy.338 This, again, aimed to prioritise the rights of victims, end 
impunity through strengthened reporting and investigations, engage with 
civil society and improve strategic communication;339 thus, building upon 
the same normative frameworks which his predecessors had set. However, 
Guterres also broadened the norm slightly, reinterpreting it to include a 
‘Clear Check’ system which prevented UN staff who had been dismissed for 
SEA allegations from being re-employed.340 This developed the norm to be 
more proactive than it previously had been, by attempting to prevent or 
mitigate the risk of SEA occurring within peacekeeping operations. For 
peacekeeping’s legal and normative frameworks, then, the prohibition of 
SEA has added to these frameworks but, unlike the previous two norms, it 
has not expanded peacekeeping’s interventionist boundaries but, rather, 
has attempted to limit peacekeeper’s behaviour and therefore the 
operation’s interventionist nature. As such, it has reinforced, rather than 
undermined, the principle of non-intervention. The norm is therefore 
somewhat unique in that whereas a broadening of the other two norms 
would expand peacekeeping’s boundaries and its interventionist potential, 
consequently constricting the principle of non-intervention, an expansion of 
                                   
337 UN Peacekeeping, ‘The Secretary-General Announces Task Force on UN Response to Sexual Exploitation and 
Abuse’ (6 Jan 2017) <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/secretary-general-announces-task-force-un-response-
to-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse> Accessed 10 March 2020. 
338 See: UNGA, ‘Report of the Secretary-General: Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and 
Abuse: A New Approach’ (15 May 2017) UN Doc A/71/818 and A/71/818/Corr 1. See also update on the 
strategy: UNGA, ‘Report of the Secretary General: Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and 
Abuse’ (20 March 2018) UN Doc A/72/751 and A/72/751/Corr.1. 
339 ibid. 
340 See: UN Clear Check, ‘The UN Efforts to Combat SEA/Sexual Harassment’ (21 May 2021) 
<https://unsceb.org/sites/default/files/2021-05/2021%20-




the prohibition of SEA would have the opposite effect. That is, an expansion 
of the norm would constrict peacekeeping’s boundaries by restricting 
peacekeepers behaviour, and therefore an operation’s interventionist 
potential, whilst simultaneously reinforcing and possibly expanding the 
principle of non-intervention.  
4.3.2  Reverse Intervention 
In essence, the norm of prohibition of SEA could be viewed as a form of 
intervention in reverse. That is, it is not the norm itself which is a form of 
intervention but, rather, it is the act (SEA) which it aims to prohibit that is 
the intervention. By extension, it could also be argued that the slow 
development of the norm could be seen to be a form of indirect intervention; 
in that, member states are permitting this intervention to continue by being 
unwilling to take significant action to prevent it occurring. Indeed, despite 
the development of the norm, which has been continuously led by the 
Secretaries-General, SEA remains the most problematic issue within UN 
peacekeeping. There are, perhaps, three main problems with or related to 
the norm of prohibition which then hinders both its evolution and its 
sufficient implementation, thereby failing to adequately address or 
eradicate SEA. Firstly, despite the development of mechanisms for reporting 
allegations, including a more open dialogue with civilians, many victims are 
still reluctant to report SEA for numerous reasons, including a fear of 
retaliation by the perpetrator341 or stigmatisation and ostracism from their 
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families and communities.342 This then links with the second notable 
problem - the power differentials between these vulnerable people and the 
UN peacekeepers deployed to protect them within volatile post-conflict 
environments. This occurs, in particular, in the form of gendered power 
relations, whereby peacekeepers who are trained as combat military men 
may have social practices towards local women and girls which ‘flow from 
military-masculine identities constructed around the notion of the inferior 
feminine ‘other’’.343 Indeed, research has found that peacekeeping 
operations with a higher proportion of female peacekeepers and personnel, 
from TCCs with better records of gender equality, have lower levels of SEA 
allegations.344 This suggests that gender parity may go some way in 
reducing SEA but, ultimately, would not address the root cause.345 Similarly, 
as peacekeeping operations are composed of peacekeepers from a vast 
array of countries, there are numerous cultural attitudes within the TCCs 
with differing rules, for example, on the age of consent and the legality of 
prostitution.346 This therefore creates cultural variance within peacekeeping 
operations which has been identified as problematic by representatives of 
major international humanitarian organisations who noted that, ‘some 
troops come in, much more kind of focused, willing to engage and at least 
try to fulfil the mandate’, whilst others ‘have no interest or no appetite to 
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engage into an environment that is often alien to them’.347 As such, these 
latter troops ‘make sure they are safe’ and then ‘you see quite absurd kind 
of stuff in many of these peacekeeping operations, which is quite 
discouraging’.348 The norm of prohibition of SEA therefore struggles to 
impose a normative standard on culturally and sociologically diverse 
peacekeepers, in order to prohibit the intervention of peacekeepers through 
SEA. As such, the contribution the norm makes to peacekeeping’s 
normative framework could be said to be patchy or uneven at best. 
Similarly, this reinforces arguments made earlier about the potential 
subjectivity of the principle of impartiality within peacekeeping operations 
which, again, highlights the difficulty in creating clear legal and normative 
boundaries. Indeed, some have argued that the involvement of 
peacekeepers in sexual exploitation and abuse is politically advantageous 
to warring parties in the host state, providing them with financial and 
propagandist benefits, and thereby breaching the UN’s principle of 
impartiality.349 As with the norm of PoC, then, the prohibition of SEA also 
has an impact on peacekeeping’s other legal principles, demonstrating once 
again how these norms do not exist harmoniously but, rather, in a 
competitive arena which is re-imagined for every peacekeeping operation. 
Despite this, efforts have been made to counter this potential subjectivity 
with the norm and, thus, the potential impartiality. Operational initiatives 
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have been introduced with, for example, mandatory SEA training for all 
personnel prior to deployment within a peacekeeping operation350 and a 
requirement that all deployed personnel carry a ‘no excuse card’ containing 
UN code of conduct and ways to report allegations.351 However, this has, 
again, been found to be significantly lacking352 and reports of SEA by UN 
peacekeepers are still regularly reported.353 For peacekeeping’s frameworks 
and boundaries, this once again emphasises how the norm offers a 
contribution to the normative and (indirectly) legal frameworks, albeit in 
somewhat of a thin or weak manner. 
This then leads to the third significant problem within SEA – impunity. As 
previously noted, when an allegation of SEA has been substantiated it is left 
to the home state (TCC) to prosecute their peacekeepers,354 which has 
proved to be ‘exceedingly rare’.355 Whilst peacekeepers enjoy functional 
immunity when acting within their UN role,356 in theory, civilian 
peacekeepers who are accused of SEA are acting outside of their official 
functions and therefore should be prosecuted by local authorities, whilst 
military peacekeepers who commit SEA ought to be prosecuted by their 
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home state (the TCC).357 However, again, the problem is one of 
implementation, particularly for acts committed by military peacekeepers 
as they remain under the command and control of their host state, who has 
a Memorandum of Understanding with the UN, and it is therefore the TCC 
who is solely responsible for peacekeepers’ accountability.358 This practice 
is also enshrined within legal instruments such as the Status of Force 
Agreement (SOFA) which provides that any criminal prosecutions of 
peacekeepers must be with the TCC, not the host state, thereby protecting 
peacekeepers by granting them immunity from prosecutions by the host 
state.359 As such, the complex legal and normative rules surrounding 
peacekeepers’ immunity, combined with a reluctance by member states to 
prosecute, perhaps based on either a lack of resources or a desire to 
maintain their reputation and TCC status, has led to a culture of impunity 
in relation to SEA.360 
As TWAIL scholar Chimni has noted, the lack of institutional and individual 
responsibility means that the UN represents ‘the rule of nobody’, whereby 
‘a myriad small decisions are taken and interpretations advance for which 
no one in particular is responsible’.361 This is particularly the case for SEA 
by peacekeepers, where ‘the commitment to accountability by TCC and 
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member states is not where it needs to be’; ‘there is still resistance into 
having adequate accountability’ from these actors and ‘as long as that is 
the case, the UN will only be able to do so much’.362 Again, this therefore 
marks a relatively weak contribution to both the normative and legal 
frameworks surrounding peacekeeping. That is, there is the potential for 
these accountability rules to be established as part of the legal and 
normative frameworks (again also highlighting SEA’s legal underpinnings) 
but only if member states are willing to apply them. In other words, there 
is the shadow of a framework or boundary line established here but it is not 
fully realised because of member states resistance to hold their own troops 
accountable. For the principle of non-intervention, this arguably treads a 
fine line between supporting and undermining the principle – the more 
peacekeepers are held accountable, the stronger the legal and normative 
frameworks on accountability within peacekeeping become and therefore 
the greater the support for the principle of non-intervention. On the other 
hand, the less willing states are to apply these rules, the weaker 
peacekeeping’s frameworks in this area become, with a risk that this 
impunity would undermine the principle of non-intervention. 
Furthermore, from a TWAIL perspective, this could be viewed as another 
replication of the continual colonial power dynamics of domination and 
subordination, which is recreated here on two levels. The very act of a 
peacekeeper committing SEA is arguably an example of a dominant external 
                                   




actor (peacekeepers) exploiting their position to the detriment of the a 
vulnerable subordinate other (local populations). Whilst member states’ 
reluctance and the UN’s inability to prosecute such acts could also be seen 
to be an example of domination and subordination, with the hegemonic 
powers unwilling or unable to support the subordinate victims. Indeed, it 
could be argued further that this exploitation of the Global South peoples 
by the external actor is reminiscent of the colonial civilising missions and 
the abuses which were perpetuated during this time, such as King Leopold 
of Belgium’s Force Publique in the Congo.363 Further, the complex 
accountability rules and the inability of the UN to hold peacekeepers liable 
is what TWAIL scholars would perceive as international law’s complicity in 
the ‘repression and silencing of non-European and other peoples’.364 That 
is, the structure of the UN and the rules on accountability effectively shields 
those peacekeepers who commit offensives and, by extension, their TCC, 
at the expense of the victims. In other words, international law protects the 
hegemonic powers and TCCs from the Global South whilst silencing the 
Global South victims of SEA. Indeed, some senior personnel within the UN 
Secretariat believe that there is a lot more which the UN could be doing to 
counter this, arguing that ‘we could escalate the pressure quite significantly, 
we could be more public about it, alternatively we could repatriate it’.365 In 
particular, they note that the Secretary-General has the prerogative to do 
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this ‘but the backlash he would receive in return would be severe’.366 Once 
again, then, the deeply entrenched political power dynamics within the UN 
system, which were explored in Chapter 2, reappear again here, with the 
UN beholden to the member states in somewhat of a deadlock which, 
ultimately, results in the oppression of peoples of the Global South. 
However, in somewhat of a softening of this, in 2016 the Security Council 
granted the Secretary-General the right to repatriate peacekeeper units if 
the TCC failed to prosecute alleged perpetrators of SEA within six months.367 
Whilst this goes some way in clarifying and reinforcing the SG’s authority, 
targeting ‘the part of the accountability chain that the Secretariat cannot’ 
and adding ‘new impetus and political support’ to the UN’s ongoing agenda 
on SEA, there still remain doubts about the operationalisation and practical 
feasibility of repatriation.368 
The norm of prohibition of SEA, then, has the potential to significantly 
contribute to peacekeeping’s normative and legal frameworks and, 
consequently, reinforce the principle of non-intervention. However, its 
contribution is limited by member states’ reluctance to fully embrace the 
norm and hold peacekeepers accountable. When this is compared with the 
rapid expansion of the other two norms of peacekeeping, it, again, 
highlights the perpetual power dynamics and North-South divide that are 
embedded within both the UN and international law which were first 
highlighted in Chapter 2. That is, it appears that the norms of democracy 
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promotion and PoC align with the dominant states’ interests and agenda 
and, therefore, have been developed quite rapidly. Whereas the norm of 
prohibition of SEA, as it, in essence, challenges the dominant powers and 
TCCs, has not advanced at the same pace. Thus, the agenda of the Global 
North has prevailed at the expense, on occasions, of the Global South. The 
norm of prohibition of SEA has therefore provided a thin contribution to 
peacekeeping’s normative framework, with a subsidiary contribution to 
peacekeeping’s legal framework through its potential to invoke laws on 
accountability and, as noted earlier, its underpinning in IHL and ICL. This, 
in turn, both supports and undermines the principle of non-intervention, as 
the inclusion of the norm within peacekeeping’s frameworks reinforces non-
intervention, yet, at the same time, states reluctance to support the norm 
effectively permits SEA, thereby undermining the principle.  
5 Peacekeeping as Intervention? 
Whilst peacekeeping does not possess an articulated legal or normative 
framework, as this Chapter has explored, there exists principles and norms 
which, together, form a complex peacekeeping framework. On the one 
hand, the fundamental principles of consent, impartiality and limited use of 
force constitute peacekeeping’s legal framework, which lies at the heart of 
peacekeeping. And on the other hand, the norms of democracy promotion, 
protection of civilians and prohibition of sexual exploitation and abuse forms 
peacekeeping’s broader normative framework, which surrounds the legal 




frameworks do not exist in isolation but, rather, at times, overlap, with the 
norms of PoC and prohibition of SEA possessing legal underpinnings which 
introduces elements of international law into peacekeeping’s legal 
framework. 
Furthermore, these principles and norms rarely live harmoniously and 
instead ‘coexist in a competitive arena’ with the normative composition of 
a peacekeeping operation being ‘re-balanced each time’.369 There is 
therefore, again, a degree of overlap between the principles and norms with 
an interpretation of one norm impacting the composition of another norm 
or principle - such as PoC and the use of force or the prohibition of SEA and 
impartiality. Indeed, this Chapter has demonstrated how these norms have 
continually evolved and been reinterpreted, typically, in-line with the 
fluctuating interventionist practices or global trends which were highlighted 
in Chapter 2. That is, when there has been strong non-intervention rhetoric, 
such as during decolonisation, the principle and norms have been 
interpreted narrowly, limiting their scope. Conversely, when there has been 
increased support for intervention, as occurred in the post-Cold War era, 
the norms have been interpreted more broadly, thereby expanding the 
concepts. Peacekeeping’s legal and normative frameworks could therefore 
be imagined as red elastic bands that can continually expand and contract 
depending on how the principles and norms are re-imagined. The 
frameworks are therefore fluid which, in turn, means that the boundary 
                                   




between peacekeeping and intervention is also fluid. As this Chapter has 
explored, where the concepts are interpreted narrowly (typically within a 
traditional peacekeeping operation) then the boundaries of peacekeeping 
are limited and so too is peacekeeping’s interventionist potential. However, 
when they are interpreted broadly, as with many contemporary multi-
dimensional operations, the boundaries are significantly stretched, often to 
its very limits, if not beyond, thereby undermining or potentially 
contravening the principle of non-intervention. It could therefore be argued 
that there must be a limit to how far these concepts evolve before they are 
no longer peacekeeping principles, acting as a barrier between 
peacekeeping and intervention, but, instead, become intervention in itself 
– for example, as is the case, at times, with the principle of limited use of 
force. 
The Chapter has therefore outlined these legal and normative frameworks 
and has demonstrated how differing interpretations and applications of the 
norms within these frameworks may result in peacekeeping becoming, on 
occasions, a form of intervention. That is, a form of coercive action designed 
to influence change or alter the host state – such as when peacekeeping 
operations undertake extensive democracy promotion tasks or apply the 
HRDDP, placing ultimatums on the state to alter their armed forces. It could 
be argued, then, that in order for the principles to retain their relevance 
and for the boundary between peacekeeping and intervention to be 
maintained, there must be a firming up of these frameworks. This would 




principles, particularly within some of the contemporary multi-dimensional 
operations, alongside an expansion of norms such as the of prohibition of 
SEA which seeks to limit peacekeepers behaviour. Chapters 4 and 5 will 
therefore examine this in more detail, exploring how these principles and 
norms operate in the UN’s largest peacekeeping operation, in order to 
understand peacekeeping’s legal and normative frameworks and the 
boundary between peacekeeping and intervention in practice. 
Furthermore, this Chapter has also highlighted how the unequal power 
dynamics and colonial legacies which were identified within the principle of 
non-intervention in Chapter 2 also exist within peacekeeping, particularly 
through the inherent imbalance within the Security Council, creating 
continual examples of Anghie’s dynamic of difference. In practice, this 
dynamic then engages the norm entrepreneur Secretary-General who plays 
a central role in the implementation and shaping of peacekeeping’s 
principles and norms. Peacekeeping’s frameworks and an application of 
these frameworks can therefore, at times, be seen to reinforce or recreate 
the North-South divide and colonial dichotomies of domination and 
subordination, particularly where there is an element of coercion or 
peacekeeping is taken closer to the intervention line. This, again, underlines 
the argument that many features of both international law and international 
institutions or legal systems ‘acknowledge and reinforce the substantial 
power differentials between its participants’.370 This, in turn, leads back to 
                                   




the notion that international law is based on ‘fictions’ of state equality and 
state consent371 which leads to the more general debate over whether 
international law is truly international.372 Therefore, as was seen with the 
principle of non-intervention in Chapter 2, the influence of colonialism and 
the persistent power differentials between the Global North and Global 
South has also permeated the concept of peacekeeping. 
If the contents of this thesis can be imagined as a three-tiered pyramid, 
then, whilst Chapter 2 explored the top of this pyramid – the principle of 
non-intervention – this third Chapter has explored the second layer - the 
most prevalent form of intervention today, peacekeeping. Having now 
established the legal and normative frameworks which demarcate 
peacekeeping’s boundary line, Chapters 4 and 5 will take this further by 
exploring the third and final layer to the pyramid – peacekeeping in practice. 
Building upon these explorations of non-intervention and peacekeeping, the 
subsequent Chapters will examine how peacekeeping’s principles and 
norms have been interpreted and applied in the UN’s peacekeeping 
operation in the DRC. Thus, the analysis into peacekeeping’s relationship 
with the principle of non-intervention will be taken deeper, with the aim of 
ascertaining specific incidences in which an interpretation or application of 
the norms and principles may contract or expand peacekeeping’s 
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It has been said that ‘the fortune of peacekeeping would rise and fall in the 
Congo’.1 Indeed, the DRC is often referred to as a laboratory for UN 
peacekeeping – with others calling it a ‘furnace [for] the evolution of 
peacekeeping’2- providing the ‘biggest theatre’3 in which new policies have 
developed. The Congo operations therefore provide the most prominent 
example of peacekeeping, ideal for examining the peacekeeping 
frameworks, which were outlined in Chapter 3, and for exploring the 
relationship between these frameworks and the principle of non-
intervention in practice. Building upon the previous Chapters, this Chapter 
will focus on peacekeeping’s legal framework - the ‘holy trinity’ of consent, 
impartiality and non-use of force – whilst the subsequent Chapter will 
examine peacekeeping’s expanding normative framework, exploring how 
the norms of democracy promotion, protection of civilians and the 
prohibition of sexual exploitation and abuse have evolved in the UN’s 
peacekeeping operations in the DRC. The purpose of this Chapter, then, is 
to trace the evolution of peacekeeping’s legal principles within the UN’s 
three peacekeeping operations in the Congo, examining whether an 
application of these principles in the Congo has, at times, resulted in 
peacekeeping becoming intervention.   
                                   
1 Interviewee 9 quoting a former head of peacekeeping. Interview with Senior UN DPPA-DPO Personnel 
(‘Interviewee 9’) (New York, 27 November 2019) DOI: <http://doi.org/10.17639/nott.7119> pg 36. 
2 Interview with Mona Ali Khalil, former Senior Legal Officer of the UN Office of the Legal Counsel, Director of 
MAK LAW International and an Affiliate of the Harvard Law School Program on International Law and Armed 
Conflict (‘Interviewee 12’) (New York (Skype) 5 December 2019) DOI: <http://doi.org/10.17639/nott.7119> pg 
36. 
3 Interview with Former MONUSCO Military Personnel (‘Interviewee 4’) (Shrivenham, UK, 28 October 2019) DOI: 
<http://doi.org/10.17639/nott.7119> pg 36. 
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1.1 The UN’s Peacekeeping Laboratory  
As was seen in Chapter 2, the start of the UN’s peacekeeping endeavours 
in the DRC began in 1960 when the Opération des Nations Unies au Congo 
(ONUC) was deployed during Africa’s decolonisation period, shortly after 
the country gained independence from Belgium.4 However, the popular 
euphoria prompted by the handover of power soon disintegrated. A mass 
exodus of Europeans, a breakdown in law and order and a secessionist war 
in the province of Katanga plunged the Congo into a series of conflicts, 
dubbed the ‘Congo crisis’.5 As a result, the newly elected Congolese 
government requested ‘UN military assistance’, ‘to protect the national 
territory of the Congo’, less than two weeks after gaining independence.6 
Whilst ONUC was initially deployed as a traditional, benign peacekeeping 
operation, it quickly evolved to use an unprecedented level of force, in both 
strategy and tactics, making it ‘indistinguishable from a standard military 
campaign’.7 The operation was eventually considered a success when it 
assisted in the prevention of the Katangan secession, subsequently 
withdrawing in 1964.8 In the years that followed, the Congo endured a 
thirty-two-year dictatorship and two major armed conflicts, including 
‘Africa’s World War’, which led to the return of the UN in 1999 to oversee 
                                   
4 UNSC Res 143 (14 July 1960) UN Doc S/RES/143. 
5 Within the UN debates on the situation in the DRC was referred to as the ‘Congo crisis’, see: UNGA (15th Session, 
912th Plenary Meeting) (8 November 1960) UN Doc A/PV.912. 
6 UNSC, ‘Cable dated 12 July 1960 from the President of the Republic of the Congo and Supreme Commander of 
the National Army and the Prime Minister and the Minister of National Defense addressed to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations’ (13 July 1960) UN Document S/4382. 
7 T Findlay, The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations (OUP 2002) 51.  
8 As seen in Chapter 2, Section 3.1. 
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the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement.9 Initially, as with ONUC, 
the Mission de L’Organisation des Nations Unies en République 
Démocratique du Congo (MONUC) was a relatively simple, traditional 
Chapter VI peacekeeping mission composed of 500 military observers 
tasked with overseeing the fulfilment of the peace agreement.10 However, 
with persistent conflict and cycles of violence, the operation rapidly evolved 
into a much more robust, multi-dimensional operation, eventually changing 
its name to the Mission de L’Organisation des Nations Unies pour la 
Stabilisation en République Démocratique du Congo (MONUSCO) in 2010, 
to recognise the new inclusion of the ‘stabilisation’ element. Whilst 
MONUSCO’s stabilisation mandate appears similar to ONUC’s mandate, 
particularly through the use of force, the purpose of MONUSCO differs to 
ONUC in that the (ill-defined) concept of ‘stabilisation’ is a political strategy, 
designed to help states restore order and stability in the absence of a peace 
settlement,11 not to be confused with the re-establishment of state 
authority.12 
The evolution of the UN’s operations in the Congo have therefore mirrored 
the cyclical evolution of the principle of non-intervention, which was 
outlined in Chapter 2, with MONUSCO evolving during intervention’s shift 
                                   
9 UNSC, ‘Ceasefire Agreement’ (“Lusaka Ceasefire”) (23 July 1999) UN Doc S/1999/815; G Prunier, Africa’s World 
War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe (Oxford University Press 
2011). 
10 UNSC Res 1234 (9 April 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1234; UNSC Res 1258 (6 August 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1258; 
UNSC Res 1273 (5 November 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1273; UNSC Res 1279 (30 November 1999) UN Doc 
S/RES/1279; UNSC Res 1291 (24 February 2000) UN Doc S/RES/1291. 
11 C de Coning and C Aoi, ‘Conclusion: Towards a United Nations Stabilization Doctrine: Stabilization as an 
Emerging UN Practice’ in C de Coning, C Aoi and J Karlsrud (eds) UN Peacekeeping Doctrine in a New Era Adapting 
to Stabilisation, Protection and New Threats (Routledge 2017) 288-310. 
12 A Boutellis, ‘Can the UN Stabilize Mali? Towards a UN Stabilization Doctrine?’ (2015) 4(1) Stability 1-16. 
 5 
from a military to security approach.13 Since then, MONUSCO has become 
the UN’s largest peacekeeping operation, totalling over 20,000 personnel 
at its peak.14 In an attempt to adapt to changing conflict dynamics and 
demands from the Security Council, Congolese government and regional 
actors, the operation has continually reinvented itself, driven by the 
Secretary-General and Special Representative to the Secretary General 
(SRSG), along with key personnel within the mission and the UN 
Secretariat. Most notably, in 2013 the Security Council mandated the 
operation to include a ‘Force Intervention Brigade’, authorised to undertake 
‘targeted offensive operations’ to ‘neutralise’ armed groups, in cooperation 
or through joint operations with the Congolese armed forces.15 In addition 
to a significant military presence, the operation also has large civilian and 
police components, thereby differing greatly from ONUC’s predominantly 
military force.16 Together, the components have undertaken numerous 
mandated tasks, such as the overseeing of three democratic elections in 
2006, 2011 and 2018 (with questionable success),17 and have been faced 
with a significant Ebola outbreak, recurring conflicts in the East, the 
readjustment of the Congolese political power following a coalition 
government and, more recently, the Covid-19 pandemic.18  
                                   
13 Chapter 2, Section 4.2. 
14 MONUSCO’s current personnel total (as of April 2021) is 17,669. See: UN Peacekeeping, ‘MONUSCO Fact 
Sheet’ <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/monusco> Accessed 18 May 2021. 
15 UNSC Res 2098 (28 March 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2098. 
16 See MONUSCO facts and figures (n14). 
17 ibid.  
18 UNSC, ‘Covid-19 Exacerbating Tensions in DRC’s Coalition Government’ (25 June 2020) Press Release 
SC/14228. 
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1.2 Armed with Legal Principles   
Peacekeeping in the DRC therefore offers a wealth of examples of numerous 
aspects of peacekeeping, not least how the three fundamental principles 
have been interpreted and applied. Indeed, as Spijker notes, when the UN 
first entered the Congo in the early 1960s it was equipped ‘not with heavy 
arms but with legal principles’.19 However, tracking the evolution of both 
the principles and the practice, it is clear to see that the same could not be 
said for today’s robust, multi-functional peacekeeping operations. Whilst 
many within the Secretariat maintain that the traditional peacekeeping 
principles are still relevant,20 it is undeniable that they have been expanded 
and contorted, at times almost beyond recognition, in order to adapt to 
conditions in the field and, in part, to reflect the interventionist rhetoric or 
trends which were outlined in Chapter 2. As such, these re-interpretations 
could be said to expand the scope of peacekeeping as a form of 
intervention, consequently, contracting the principle of non-intervention. 
That is, as Chapter 3 highlighted, when the principles are interpreted 
narrowly then peacekeeping’s boundaries are limited and so too is 
peacekeeping’s interventionist potential. However, when they are 
interpreted broadly, as with the UN’s operations in the Congo, the 
boundaries are significantly expanded, often to its limits, thereby 
undermining the principle of non-intervention.  
                                   
19 O Spijkers, ‘The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping in the Congo’ (2015) 19(1-2) IntPeacekeep 88-117, 
89.  
20 See Interviewee 12 (n2) and Interviewee 16: Interview with Senior Political Affairs Officer, UN DPO 
(‘Interviewee 16’) (New York, 10 December 2019) DOI: <http://doi.org/10.17639/nott.7119> pg 42. 
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This Chapter will therefore examine how ONUC, MONUC and MONUSCO 
have all interpreted and applied the fundamental principles and how this, 
in turn, has altered the fluid, red elastic boundary line which surrounds 
peacekeeping. In other words, it will examine how an interpretation and 
application of the ‘holy trinity’ in the Congo has altered the composition of 
peacekeeping’s frameworks and, consequently, the boundary between 
peacekeeping and intervention. As was set out in the previous Chapter, this 
will demonstrate how peacekeeping’s principles and norms exist in a 
competitive arena, constantly evolving and being reimagined with each 
peacekeeping operation and, even, with each peacekeeping mandate. 
Indeed, for the UN’s current operation in the Congo – MONUSCO – the 
operation functions on a complex mix of civilians and military parts which, 
at times, leads to tension and division despite it being a civilian-led 
operation, with a civilian Special Representative to the Secretary-General 
(SRSG) as head of the mission. As was seen in Chapter 3, the SG and, by 
extension, the SRSG play a significant role in the running of a peacekeeping 
operation, the implementation of the operation’s mandate and in the 
creation, institutionalisation and interpretation of peacekeeping’s principles 
and norms, earning the SG the title of ‘norm entrepreneur’.21  
It could be argued, then, that the SRSG, as an embodiment of the SG within 
the field, is also a norm entrepreneur or, perhaps more fittingly, a norm 
interpreter. Within MONUSCO, the role of the SRSG as a norm interpreter 
                                   
21 I Johnstone, ‘The Secretary General as Norm Entrepreneur’ in S Chesterman, Secretary or General? The UN 
Secretary-General in World Politics (CUP 2007) 123-138. 
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has been pivotal and highlights both this function of the SRSG and the 
broader difficulties which arise from implementing Security Council 
mandates which, again, demonstrates the fluidity of peacekeeping’s 
boundaries. For MONUSCO, the day to day planning and general guidance 
is one which is led by a civilian strategy ‘and the military con-ops are 
supposed to be embedded in the mission concept and follow the civilian led 
SC mandate’.22 However, there are often difficulties in coordination and 
communication between these components with MONUSCO struggling 
‘enormously, as most missions do, to integrate the military within the 
broader kind of multi-dimensional mission structure’.23 In particular, the 
exclusion of civilians from operational planning has been a recurring source 
of contention for civilian staff,24 whilst military personnel argue that secrecy 
of operations is a necessity and was ‘one of the conditions of success of the 
FARDC against M23’.25 Whilst a full exploration of these issues would go 
beyond the scope of this thesis, it highlights how the functioning of the 
peacekeeping operations in practice may also create an additional layer of 
interpretation of the principles of peacekeeping and, thus, potentially 
broaden its interventionist scope.26 That is, once the Security Council has 
interpreted the peacekeeping principles and created the mandate, there is 
                                   
22 Interview with Independent Expert and Former UN Political Adviser (‘Interviewee 8’) (New York, 26 November 
2019) DOI: <http://doi.org/10.17639/nott.7119> pg 25. 
23 Interview with Senior UN DPO Personnel, Policy, Evaluation and Training Division (‘Interviewee 10’) (New York, 
3 December 2019) DOI: <http://doi.org/10.17639/nott.7119> pg 66. 
24 Interview with Independent Expert and Former UN Political Adviser (‘Interviewee 8’) (New York, 26 November 
2019) DOI: <http://doi.org/10.17639/nott.7119> pg 25. 
25 Interview with Former Senior Military Commander (‘Interviewee 11’) (New York (Skype) 3 December 2019) 
DOI: <http://doi.org/10.17639/nott.7119> pg 26. 
26 On the civil-military structure of peacekeeping, see: DPKO, ‘Civil-Military Coordination Policy’ (9 September 
2002) <https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/451ba7624.pdf> Accessed 15 May 2020; UN, ‘Civil-Military Coordination 
Specialized Training Materials (UN-CIMIC STM)’ (UN DPO-DFS, 2004) 
<http://repository.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/89582/STM%20UNCIMIC.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> 
Accessed 15 May 2020. 
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a splintering as is this is then re-interpreted and re-actualised in the field 
by the SRSG and senior leadership within the operation. This may, in 
practice, result in differing approaches on how to implement the mandate, 
particularly between the civilian and military components; thereby resulting 
in differing interpretations of the fundamental principles which are 
embedded within the SC mandate. As such, it could be argued that each 
interpretation of the mandate or each exercise of the role of the SRSG as 
norm entrepreneur creates a further nuance within the concept of 
peacekeeping and, consequently, the principle of non-intervention. 
Arguably, each re-interpretation creates a new mark within the red 
boundary line around peacekeeping, and, if repeated, may build up to 
create a permanent opening, resulting in an expansion of this boundary line 
and therefore an expansion of peacekeeping and its interventionist 
potential. In other words, the SRSG has the ability to interpret 
peacekeeping’s principles and norms, through their application of the 
mandate and therefore, by extension, may contract or expand 
peacekeeping’s legal and normative frameworks which, in turn can either 
support or undermine the principle of non-intervention.  
This Chapter will therefore explore all of these issues, building upon the 
analysis of the previous two Chapters and continuing to apply a TWAIL lens 
in order to demonstrate how the inequalities and power disparities 
embedded within the peacekeeping frameworks may also transpire in 
practice. Taking each of the fundamental legal principles in turn – consent, 
impartiality and limited use of force – the Chapter will take the analysis 
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from the previous Chapter deeper by exploring specific examples of how 
these principles are interpreted and applied in practice and how this, in 
turn, impacts both peacekeeping’s frameworks and the principle of non-
intervention. The subsequent Chapter will then continue this in-depth 
examination by unpicking the application of peacekeeping’s expanding 
normative framework, composed of democracy promotion, protection of 
civilians and prohibition of sexual exploitation and abuse, within the Congo. 
Once again, it will be argued that when these principles and norms are 
interpreted narrowly, they constrict the boundaries or frameworks 
surrounding peacekeeping, thereby supporting the principle of non-
intervention. Conversely, when interpreted broadly, they expand 
peacekeeping’s boundaries and consequently undermine or, at times, 
contravene the principle of non-intervention. In these instances, it then 
raises the question as to how far these principles and norms can evolve 
before they no longer remain relevant to peacekeeping. And, similarly, 
whether there needs to be a limit on the extent to which peacekeeping can 
evolve before it shifts into the realm of intervention. 
2 Consent  
As Chapter 3 established, the principle of consent is a cornerstone for 
peacekeeping, creating a distinction between peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement and validating what would be illegal intervention.27 Therefore, 
consent, as was seen at numerous points throughout the previous Chapter, 
                                   
27 Chapter 3, Section 3.1. 
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prevents peacekeeping from becoming intervention. Despite its 
importance, for peacekeeping operations in the DRC, numerous issues have 
arisen in regards to the principle of consent which highlights the more 
general problems outlined in Chapter 3. These issues can be loosely 
categorised into two themes: consent from whom and consent for what. 
Firstly, at times, the Congo has lacked a clear government or leader, had 
competing claims for territorial control and has been referred to as a failed 
state, making it unclear who can or should provide consent.28 Secondly, 
throughout the UN’s 60-year relationship with the DRC, relations between 
the organisation and the country’s political leadership have frequently 
broken down. This has ranged from veiled threats and criticisms of the 
operation to explicit statements requesting that the UN operation withdraw 
from the country. On these occasions, consent has effectively been 
withdrawn, yet the operation has remained. This calls into question the 
maintenance of host state consent and whether the host is simply 
consenting to the deployment of the operation and is not legally required 
to consent to any changes – substantial, strategic or tactical- once the 
operation is deployed. If the host state is therefore unable to consent to 
significant changes to the operation or unable to eject a peacekeeping 
operation from its territory until the end of its mandate, it is arguable that 
this may amount to coercive action designed to alter the state; thus, 
intervention and, consequently, a violation of the principle of non-
intervention.  
                                   
28 See: W Reno, ‘Congo: From State Collapse to ‘Absolutism’, to State Failure’ (2006) 27(1) TWQ 43-56, 47. 
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2.1 Obtaining Consent  
After the Congo gained independence and the ‘Congo crisis’ ensued, the 
newly independent Congolese government telegrammed the then 
Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld, requesting the ‘dispatch by the 
United Nations of military assistance’.29 They argued that UN assistance 
was necessary to protect their territory against ‘the present external 
aggression’ which was both a ‘threat to world peace’ and a ‘conspiracy’ 
between ‘Belgian imperialists and a small group of Katanga leaders’ to 
execute the secession in Katanga, which they believed was the ‘disguised 
perpetuation of colonialist regime’.30 Therefore, for ONUC, host state 
consent was clearly established as there had been an explicit request from 
the President and Prime Minister of the Congo, thus explicit consent for UN 
intervention. Although there was no violation of the principle of non-
intervention, the context and nature of the request highlights broader 
issues within international law at that time, as explored in the previous 
Chapters. Firstly, the deployment of the peacekeeping operation was, 
again, somewhat of an ironic use of intervention to counter intervention, 
as seen in Chapter 2,31 with the USA’s imperial intervention to counter 
European intervention in the colonial era.32 Secondly, the nature of the 
Congo’s request for assistance was both a first for UN peacekeeping and, 
applying a TWAIL lens, demonstrated the significant power differentials 
which existed during that period and the beginning of the shift from a 
                                   
29 S/4382 (n6). 
30 ibid.  
31 Section 2.4. 
32 See Chapter 2.  
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dominant Global North to a rising Global South – which Chapter 2 noted 
was also a tipping point for the principle of non-intervention.33 That is, at 
the time the Congolese government made their request, they were not yet 
a member state of the UN34 and therefore brought their complaint to the 
Secretary-General, rather than the Security Council. This required the 
Secretary-General to exercise their Article 99 UN Charter power for the first 
time in UN history, demonstrating the significant role which the SG may 
play within intervention.35 The Congo’s lack of member status also meant 
that, despite gaining independence, they had no power or voice within the 
UN system, arguably leaving them in a vulnerable position for the first few 
weeks of ONUC’s deployment. Indeed, within General Assembly debates it 
was Congo’s former colonial power, Belgium, who were consulted on 
matters relating to the Congo, thus, from a TWAIL perspective, maintaining 
the colonial-colonised dichotomy and paternalistic power imbalances.36 It 
could also be viewed as another example of Anghie’s dynamic of difference 
with the dominant actors (the UN and Belgium) identifying and seeking to 
bridge the gap between themselves and the ‘others’ (Congo).  
However, despite the Congolese government having no formal voice within 
the General Assembly before and shortly after ONUC’s deployment, it 
intuitively manipulated the Cold War dynamics to successfully obtain UN 
                                   
33 Chapter 2, Section 3.1. 
34 UNGA Res 1480 (XV) (20 September 1960) UN Doc GA/RES/1480 (XV); UNGA, ‘Resolutions Adopted by the 
General Assembly During its Fifteenth Session’ (20 September – 20 December 1960) 15th Session, UN Doc Supp 
No 16 (A/4684) 64. 
35 See: B Urquhart, Ralph Bunche: An American Life (WW Norton 1993) 311 and MGK Nayar, ‘Dag Hammarskjöld 
and U Thant: The Evolution of Their Office’ (1974) 7(1) CaseWResJIL 36-83. 
36 A/4684 (n34). 
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support and exercise a degree of influence, culminating in the deployment 
of ONUC.37 In particular, after Hammarskjöld acceded to the Congolese 
request and brought the matter before the Security Council, the Congolese 
government threatened to ‘appeal to the Bandung Treaty Powers’ – ‘a 
‘euphemism for Chinese ‘volunteers’’38 – should there be a delay in UN 
assistance.39 As Draper noted at the time, ‘in terms of realpolitik,’ this was 
‘the most telling and operative part’ of the Congolese telegrams.40 This 
manipulation of the Cold War dynamics by the Congolese therefore 
demonstrates the ability of the host state to influence external intervention 
even when they possess little formal power. Thus, as will be explored later 
in this section, even when a state appears to be unable to alter the 
peacekeeping operation, it still has a broad range of tactics or tools which 
it can use to influence an operation. For the principle of non-intervention, 
this suggests that even when peacekeeping appears to enter the realm of 
intervention, becoming coercive action designed to influence change in the 
host state, the host may still be able to counter this potential intervention, 
thereby reinforcing the principle of non-intervention. From a TWAIL 
perspective, this could also be viewed as an example of the Global South 
exercising their voice and using international law and institutions to 
challenge the dominance of the hegemonic powers.41 This example, in 
                                   
37 S/RES/143 (n4).  
38 TM Franck, ‘United Nations Law in Africa: The Congo Operation as a Case Study’ (1962) 27(4) L&ContemProb 
632-652, 634.  
39 UNGA, ‘Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organisation’ (16 June 1960 – 15 June 
1961) UN Doc A/4800. See also: UN Doc S/4382 (n6) 2.  
40 GIAD Draper, ‘The Legal Limitations upon the Employment of Weapons by the United Nations Force in the 
Congo’ (1963) 12(2) ICLQ 387-413, 389.  
41 See: G Abi-Saab, ‘The Third World Intellectual in Praxis: Confrontation, Participation, or Operation Behind 
Enemy Lines’ (2016) 37(11) TWQ 1957-1971. 
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particular, arguably epitomises the changing nature of international 
relations during this period, which Chapter 2 explored.42 That is, it 
demonstrates the rise of the Global South, through the General Assembly, 
which provided smaller, newly independent states with equal voting power 
and a platform to express their interests and defend their sovereignty, often 
through an application of the principle of non-intervention, particularly 
during the Cold War when the Security Council was paralysed. Indeed, 
Congo has been described as a ‘cockpit of the Cold War’, with ONUC an 
‘arena for Great Power tensions’,43 again, reflecting the centrality of the 
Congo throughout history, as well as in the development of peacekeeping 
and the principle of non-intervention.  
For the UN’s later missions in the DRC, MONUC and MONUSCO, the 
attainment of host state consent has also proved to be complex. Following 
the traditional model of peacekeeping, MONUC was deployed after the 
signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire agreement as a simple monitor and observe 
mission.44 However, the Security Council resolution which established 
MONUC made no reference to host state consent, instead it referred to the 
Agreement and noted the role that it requested the UN to play ‘in the 
implementation of the ceasefire’.45 Within the Lusaka Agreement, the 
signatory parties, which included the DRC, agreed that the UN Security 
Council ‘acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter’ shall be ‘requested to 
                                   
42 Section 3.1. 
43 A Doss, ‘In the Footsteps of Dr Bunche: The Congo, UN Peacekeeping and the Use of Force’ (2014) 37(5) 
JStradStud 703-735, 706. 
44 UNSC Res 1279 (30 November 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1279. 
45 ibid.  
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constitute, facilitate and deploy an appropriate peacekeeping force in the 
DRC to ensure implementation’ of the Agreement.46 It therefore appears 
that host state consent was granted for the deployment of MONUC through 
the Lusaka Agreement, thereby an indirect or implied consent. Whilst this 
could perhaps bring the operation closer to violating the principle of non-
intervention, as Sloan notes, instead of referring to consent, the resolutions 
reaffirmed ‘the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence’ 
of the DRC.47 Thus, in emphasising sovereignty and territorial integrity, 
which are a corollary of non-intervention, it appears that the Council did 
not perceive MONUC to be intervention and, therefore, their interpretation 
of the principle of consent here reinforced the principle of non-intervention. 
This was compounded by repeated assurances from the Congolese 
government, which the Council took as evidence of their support for the 
deployment of MONUC and therefore implied consent.48 Indeed, as Sloan 
argues, the Council’s recognition of the Congo’s support could also reflect 
the Council’s awareness that the host state was in a position to reject any 
changes to the mandate which were not based within the mandatory 
provisions of Chapter VII.49 As will be discussed later in this section, this 
then leads to the importance of maintaining host state consent and whether 
the host state can or should consent to changes in the mandate.  
                                   
46 Lusaka Ceasefire (n9) para 11 (a).  
47 J Sloan, The Militarisation of Peacekeeping in the Twenty-First Century (Hart Publishing 2011). 
48 UNSC Res 1332 (14 December 2000) UN Doc S/RES/1332. UNSC Res 1341 (22 February 2001) UN Doc 
S/RES/1341. 
49 J Sloan (n47). 
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For MONUSCO, as it was a continuation of MONUC, consent for deployment 
was not legally required. However, what remains unclear is whether the 
Congolese government had to (and did) consent to significant changes, 
namely the re-naming and evolution of the mission to include a stabilisation 
element. If there was no consent, then it could be argued that the 
operation’s sole legal basis became Chapter VII, thus taking the operation 
across the line into intervention. Indeed, the UN essentially ignored the 
host state requests during this period and continued with the stabilisation 
agenda, which could arguably be perceived as coercive action to alter the 
host state and, thereby, intervention. In the months leading up to MONUC’s 
evolution into MONUSCO, the DRC’s President, Kabila, repeatedly 
demanded that the UN withdraw from the Congo.50 In late 2009, shortly 
after the Security Council had renewed MONUC’s mandate, Kabila 
requested a detailed draw-down plan for the operation by 30 June 2010.51 
Again, in February 2010, three months before the Security Council 
authorised MONUSCO, Kabila officially asked the Under-Secretary General 
for Peacekeeping Operations, Alain Le Roy, to ensure the removal of 
MONUC by mid-late 2011, with the first drawdown to take place around 
June 2010 to coincide with the 50th anniversary of Congo’s independence.52 
At this point, it could be argued that consent to the operation had been 
                                   
50 T Vircoulon, After MONUC, Should MONUSCO Continue to Support Congolese Military Campaigns?’ (Crisis 
Group, 19 July 2010) <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/chad/after-monuc-should-monusco-
continue-support-congolese-military-campaigns> Accessed 7 May 2020. 
51 --, ‘Congo-Kinshasa: MONUC Exit is Probable, But Premature’ (Oxford Analytica, 1 April 2010) 
<https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/congo-kinshasa-monuc-exit-probable-premature> 
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revoked, yet the UN remained in the DRC, authorising MONUC’s evolution 
to MONUSCO, which Le Roy argued demonstrated ‘a new phase in the 
Congo’.53 In order to seemingly placate Congolese concerns, the Council 
did, however, also authorise the withdrawal of up to 2000 personnel by 30 
June 201054 but no further plans were made to withdraw the operation in 
2011, as Kabila had requested. In essence, then, the host state was 
arguably ignored by both the UN and the peacekeeping operation, with the 
external actors continuing to pursue their agenda, regardless of the express 
desires of the host state. It appears that in this instance, peacekeeping 
expanded beyond its boundaries, becoming intervention and therefore 
undermining the principle of non-intervention. Further, from a TWAIL 
perspective, this could also be viewed as a replication of the dichotomies 
of the colonial civilising mission, with the enlightened, external, hegemonic 
power pursuing their agenda and essentially dictating to the subordinate 
‘other’.55  
This, again, highlights the precarious interpretations of the principle of 
consent and raises questions as to whether host state consent is only 
required for deployment, with the retraction of consent during the operation 
having little legal or practical effect – a matter which will be explored in 
subsequent sections. It could also be argued that, more broadly, through a 
TWAIL lens, this again, reflects the long-standing power differentials within 
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interventionist practice which were outlined in Chapter 2, with the Congo 
(a Global South state) still struggling to assert its voice against the UN (a 
Global North led actor), as it did during ONUC’s deployment. Indeed, these 
typical interventionist positions played out in the Security Council, 
underlining the inherent hierarchy within the organ, and the differing 
approaches to intervention amongst the P5, which was also outlined in 
Chapters 2 and 3. Whilst the USA and France pushed for MONUC to remain 
in the DRC, with the former stating that MONUC was needed for protection 
of civilians and security sector reform, China took the opposite view.56 A 
usual proponent of non-intervention, China argued that the Congo could 
not have a new beginning whilst MONUC was deployed, stating that it fully 
supported Kabila’s desire ‘to fly his own wings’.57 This latter phrase, in 
particular, demonstrates that the peacekeeping operation was seen as an 
unwelcome restriction or limitation on the host state’s sovereignty and 
therefore, coercive action amounting to intervention.  
2.2 Consent from Whom? 
A further issue which has arisen in the UN’s operations in the Congo is who 
is entitled to provide consent, the answer to which has the potential to 
broaden the principle of consent, as the greater the number of actors who 
are able to provide consent, the broader the principle and therefore the 
broader the peacekeeping frameworks. Whilst consent is typically 
                                   
56 Closed-door Security Council meeting, quoted in: Congo Research Group, ‘The Future of MONUC (And Debt 
Relief)’ (CRG, 18 March 2010) <http://congoresearchgroup.org/future-of-monuc-and-debt-relief/> Accessed 10 
May 2020.   
57 ibid.  
 20 
attributable to the state,58 within the DRC there have been numerous 
competing claims for power within certain areas, which challenges the 
government’s exclusive control of the whole territory. This, in turn, calls 
into question whether other non-state actors could or should also provide 
consent to the peacekeeping operation. Where the state’s capacity to 
govern has withered (such as in the East of the country), non-state actors, 
including armed groups, traditional leaders, churches and civil society 
groups, have competed to fill these gaps, resulting in Congolese society 
developing ‘new forms of social organisation [...] to compensate for the 
overwhelming failures of the post-colonial nation-state’.59 The ‘effective 
control’ doctrine could therefore be applied to ascertain whether or not 
these non-state actors have exercised ‘effective control’ over certain parts 
of the Congo and, as such, should be required to provide consent to the 
presence of the UN peacekeeping operation in those areas. 
Similar to the principle of non-intervention, the effective control doctrine is 
an ill-defined concept within international law, with no definite source; it is 
instead pieced together through international treaties, regulations and case 
law.60 Determining whether an actor possesses authority within a territory 
is generally determined through three factors. Firstly, Article 42 of the 
Hague Regulations states that territory is occupied when it is ‘actually 
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placed under the authority of the hostile army’ and where ‘authority has 
been established and can be exercised’.61 Secondly, the Fourth Geneva 
Convention notes that the Occupying Power ‘exercises the functions of the 
government in such territory’62 and thirdly, in international case law it was 
found that the occupier’s authority is ‘to the exclusion of the established 
government’.63 It could be argued that, at certain points within the DRC’s 
history, these three elements are satisfied; most notably, during the 1960 
Katangan secession and, more recently, in Eastern Congo where there are 
a significant number of armed groups.  
Taking the first of these examples, shortly before ONUC’s deployment, the 
authorities in the South East province of Katanga declared its independence 
from the rest of Congo. The sizeable province operated independently from 
the rest of the Congolese territory, with its own leadership (Moise Tshombé) 
and infrastructure, and was vehemently at odds with the Congolese 
government who explicitly requested UN assistance in preventing the 
secession.64 It could therefore be argued that Tshombé and his party had 
effective control of Katanga as authority had been established and 
exercised, with the secession leaders exercising the functions of the 
government in that area, at the exclusion of the established government. 
As such, it is debatable whether Tshombé’s party should have provided 
                                   
61 Article 42, Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: 
Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (29 July 1899) and Hague Convention (IV) 
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs 
of War on Land (18 October 1907). 
62 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention) 
(12 August 1949) (75 UNTS 287), Article 6.  
63 Hostage Case, United States v List (Wilhelm) and ors (Trial Judgment) (1950) 11 TWC 757.  
64 S/4382 (n6); S/RES/143 (n4); UNSC Res 145 (22 July 1960) UN Doc S/RES/145. 
 22 
consent for the deployment of UN troops within Katanga. For the UN, this 
was a problematic issue as obtaining the Katangan leadership’s consent 
would have gone against the Congolese governments request and could 
have been interpreted as de facto recognition of the secession’s authority. 
Thus, constituting engagement in the matter of Katanga’s independence 
and, as such, ‘an illegal interference in the domestic affairs’ of the Congo65 
- an issue which will be discussed further in this Chapter’s section on 
impartiality. However, by not obtaining consent from the Katangan 
authorities, there was arguably a risk that the presence of peacekeepers 
could have been an illegal intervention, instead of a consensual 
peacekeeping intervention. This notion is perhaps supported by the fact 
that Hammarskjöld initially refused to permit the deployment of UN 
peacekeepers into Katanga, fearing that it may have been viewed as an 
occupying force.66 As such, it could be argued that Hammarskjöld’s 
interpretation of the principle of consent required consent from Katanga, 
resulting in a clash between the fundamental principles of consent and 
impartiality. That is, to acknowledge consent was needed from Katanga 
would be to recognise their authority; thus, breaching the UN’s impartiality 
by engaging in internal affairs and going against the explicit instructions of 
the Congolese government. On the other hand, to not obtain consent from 
Katanga would have maintained the UN’s impartiality but potentially risked 
amounting to intervention if Katanga established it had effective control, 
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as it appears to have had. Whilst Hammarskjöld initially delayed 
deployment into Katanga, ultimately, the UN did not perceive a need to 
obtain their consent as troops were deployed in the area in late 1960, with 
the Security Council stating that it ‘strongly deprecates the secessionist 
activities illegally carried out by the provincial administration of Katanga’.67 
As such, the UN evidently viewed the Congo as a whole and therefore 
deploying into Katanga was neither coercion nor intervention. The 
Katangan secession therefore exemplifies both the key role which the SG 
may play in interpreting peacekeeping norms and how an interpretation of 
these principles has a direct impact on the interventionist nature of 
peacekeeping and, consequently, on the principle of non-intervention. It 
also highlights how, as the previous Chapter discussed, the fundamental 
norms do not co-exist harmoniously and have to be interpreted or adapted 
in order to live together, with the interpretation or application of one 
principle potentially impacting the others. Again, this highlights the 
argument established in Chapter 3 - that peacekeeping’s frameworks are 
fluid, with the boundaries constantly expanding and contracting depending 
on how the principles and norms are interpreted and applied in the field. 
This, in turn, has the potential to blur the boundaries between 
peacekeeping and intervention, with an expanded or unclear reading of a 
principle having the potential to undermine the principle of non-
intervention.    
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Similarly, for MONUC and MONUSCO, if the effective control doctrine is 
applied, an argument could, again, be made for the need to obtain consent 
from regional or local authorities, particularly those in the East of the 
country where there is little state penetration.68 The size of Western 
Europe, the Congo spans multiple times zones, has hundreds of ethnic 
groups and languages, with ‘distinct political-economic structures and 
regional orientations’, a vast number of political parties and ‘more 
importantly, contains numerous competing power networks.’69 In 
particular, ‘the national elites’ power base does not critically depend on 
formal control over the East.’70 That is, the government has little authority 
or presence in the East of Congo and, as such, derives most of its income 
and influence from other parts of the country. This is in part due to the 
political exclusion or narrow power base which President Mobutu adopted 
during the 1970s in the midst of his dictatorship.71 This led to decentralised 
nodes of power which were not directly dependent on the ‘closed networks 
of presidential patronage’.72 More recently, during Kabila (Jnr)’s regime, 
the ‘presidential patronage network’s’ control ‘remained patchy’; thus, its 
power did not reach to all corners of the national territory and the same 
can be said of the current regime under Tshisekedi.73 The central 
government’s penetration is therefore highly uneven and is sometimes 
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contested, with local actors continuing to ‘exercise influence over the lower 
echelons of the territorial administration and parts of security agencies.’74 
This is further complicated by the involvement or interventions of 
neighbouring states, particularly Rwanda and Uganda, who have repeatedly 
supported armed groups in Eastern Congo to influence change within the 
DRC or further their interests, including exploitation of natural resources.75 
Within the East of Congo, then, it could be argued that where authority is 
established and exercised by non-state actors, at the exclusion of the 
government, then these actors have effective control and, therefore, should 
consent, to the presence of UN peacekeeping in their territory. However, 
whilst this argument may be compelling in theory, in practice, it is unlikely 
to be as persuasive. As Roth notes, for ‘local impositions’, it may be more 
preferable to engage in ‘plausibly democratic or constitutional solutions to 
recognition contests.’76 Therefore, rather than seeking to obtain formal 
consent from local or regional authorities for its presence in those areas, 
the peacekeeping operation would do better to engage with these leaders 
to ensure better cooperation and increased implementation of initiatives; 
as seen, for example, with the Stabilisation Support Unit in Eastern Congo 
who works collaboratively with numerous actors, including local 
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leadership.77 Whilst the interpretation of the principle of consent, in this 
instance, may not expand or alter peacekeeping’s frameworks to any great 
extent, what this example arguably demonstrates are two broader issues. 
Firstly, from a TWAIL perspective, the complexities of the Congolese 
political system and inability of the central government to establish 
authority in the East could be viewed as a legacy of colonialism, specifically, 
the Scramble for Africa.78 That is, the Congo is a prime example of how 
Western states demarcated arbitrary borders, carving up the African 
continent and creating artificial boundary lines which cut across pre-
established societies, often resulting in the ethnic tensions which we see 
today– including this complex mix of ethnic groups and competitions for 
power within the Congo.79 Secondly, it arguably also highlights how 
peacekeeping and, similarly, peacebuilding focus on the state and adopt a 
top-down, state-centric approach, rather than a bottom-up, grassroots led 
approach, which some argue may be more beneficial for creating and 
sustaining long-term peace80 and could, from a TWAIL perspective, render 
peacekeeping less interventionist as it would magnify the voice of the 
Global South peoples, thereby challenging the dominant Western-led 
narrative and agenda. 
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2.3  Consent for Deployment 
Once consent has been obtained, two further interconnected issues have 
arisen within the UN’s peacekeeping operations in the DRC, which were 
noted in Chapter 3 as nuances that have emerged within the principle of 
consent. The first issue is the scope of the host state consent; that is, 
whether they have consented only to the deployment of the operation or if 
this extends to any changes made to the operation whilst it is deployed. 
The second issue is the maintenance of consent and its impact on the 
operation will also be considered, including whether a withdrawal of consent 
requires the peacekeepers to also withdraw.    
Prior to ONUC’s deployment, the UN’s first peacekeeping endeavour – UNEF 
– was created through the recommendatory powers of the General 
Assembly’s in its ‘Uniting for Peace’ resolution.81 As such, whilst the GA was 
‘enabled to establish the force with the consent’ of troop contributing 
countries, ‘it could not request for force to be stationed or operate on the 
territory of a given country’ without the host state’s consent.82 UNEF’s 
presence was therefore ‘consensual or contractual’, with host state consent 
required for any changes or decisions within the operation, such as the 
composition and stationing of the force.83 However, ONUC was authorised 
by the Security Council, not the General Assembly and, therefore, was ‘not 
based on contract but on legislation’.84 Under Chapter VII of the UN 
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Charter, the powers which the Council may exercise in response to threats 
or breaches of peace and acts of aggression, are not recommendations but 
rather are compulsory on Member States.85 Indeed, when mandating 
ONUC, the Council ‘affirmed that its decisions were mandatory under 
Chapter VII of the Charter’,86 not by express reference to Chapter VII but 
by calling upon member states ‘in accordance with Articles 25 and 49 of 
the Charter to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council’.87 
This was also reiterated by Hammarskjöld who noted that member states 
were legally bound to accept and carry out Security Council decisions and 
was later reaffirmed by the ICJ who stated that decisions of the Council, 
whether taken within Chapter VI or Chapter VII, are binding on Member 
States under the terms of Article 25.88 
ONUC’s deployment has therefore been described as a ‘legislative 
intervention’, in comparison to UNEF’s contractual intervention, with two 
key consequences.89 Firstly, ONUC could be ‘altered legislatively’, whereas 
‘a contract can only be altered by the consent of the parties’.90 Secondly, it 
could not be terminated, as a consensual relationship could, by the 
withdrawal of host state consent.91 Therefore, throughout ONUC’s 
deployment, SG Hammarskjöld made numerous changes to the operation, 
without host state consent. This included establishing ‘neutral’ zones for 
                                   
85 Article 25, Charter of the United Nations (24 October 1945) (“UN Charter”). 
86 EM Miller, ‘Legal Aspects of United Nations Action in Congo’ (1961) 55(1) AJIL 1-28, 15.  
87 UNSC Res 146 (9 August 1960) UN Doc S/RES/146, para 5.  
88 Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 2 of the Charter) (Advisory Opinion) [1962] ICJ 
Rep 151; Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (Advisory Opinion) [1971] ICJ Rep 16.  
89 Franck (n38) 638-640.  
90 ibid, 639.  
91 ibid. 
 29 
political refugees92 and authorising ONUC to exercise force against the 
government to protect the territorial immunity of the Ghanaian Embassy 
and to defend ONUC’s control of the port of Matadi,93 which was authorised 
by the Security Council having previously been recommended by the 
General Assembly.94 As Franck notes, ‘the consent of the Congolese 
authorities was never regarded’ by any member state, except perhaps 
France, ‘as a prerequisite to altering the nature of the intervention’.95 
Indeed, the Security Council’s second resolution authorised ONUC to 
restore law and order,96 ‘without further caveat about acting “in 
consultation with the Government of the Congo”’.97 Furthermore, 
Hammarskjöld explicitly reminded the Congolese that the relation between 
themselves and the UN was ‘not merely a contractual relationship in which 
the Republic can impose its conditions as a host state’.98 Rather, it was ‘a 
relationship governed by mandatory decisions of the Security Council’ and 
therefore no government could ‘by unilateral action’ determine how 
measures taken by the Council, within this context, should be carried out.99 
Therefore, as explored in the previous Chapter, it appears that host state 
consent is only legally necessary for the deployment of a Security Council 
mandated operation, and not for any subsequent changes. Put differently, 
the host state cannot determine when an operation’s deployment is to end 
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or decide when specific Council measures should be terminated, nor could 
they determine how the mandated tasks were to implemented.100 Whilst 
there may be an anomaly within this argument, as ONUC was, at one point, 
mandated by the GA when the Council was deadlocked,101 the Assembly 
extended ONUC’s powers but did not create any significant, new tasks 
beyond what the Council had already created, thereby arguably 
maintaining the ‘legislative’ characterisation.102 Regardless, the invocation 
of language such as ‘mandatory decisions’ of the Council and the express 
stipulation that the host state cannot, unilaterally, alter these Council 
measures arguably could be viewed as coercive action. That is, as Chapter 
2 set out,103 if coercive action is understood as activities which override the 
element of voluntariness then, arguably, this is one such example, as the 
host state is unable to voluntarily alter or reject changes to the ‘mandatory’ 
Security Council decisions. As such, when a peacekeeping operation is 
undertaking mandated tasks that the host state may wish to challenge, but 
cannot, then this arguably amounts to intervention and is therefore an 
expansion of peacekeeping’s legal framework and a violation of the 
principle of non-intervention. 
For the UN’s subsequent operations in the Congo, as these were all 
mandated by the Security Council, it is arguable that the ONUC approach 
extends and, consequently, these are also legislative interventions. 
Therefore, the host state is, again, not legally required to consent to any 
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changes to the operation, once it is deployed, as evidenced in the previous 
section of this Chapter when consent was not needed or obtained for 
MONUC’s stabilisation evolution into MONUSCO. Similarly, consent was not 
provided when the Security Council authorised the deployment of the Force 
Intervention Brigade (FIB)104 – a unique, forceful unit authorised to 
undertake unprecedented levels of force in tactical operations.105 For both 
these substantial changes, it is arguable that, whilst not legally necessary 
under the UN Charter, consent should have been obtained, particularly for 
the introduction of the FIB, based on the novelty of the concept and to 
ensure the peacekeeping force complied with international law and did not 
violate the norm of non-intervention. It could be argued that the FIB 
therefore creates a new expansion of peacekeeping and the fundamental 
principles and, subsequently, the principle of non-intervention. In other 
words, it creates a new hole or exception within the red boundary lines that 
demarcate both peacekeeping and non-intervention. As such, it is arguable 
that such a novel development should have required the explicit consent of 
the host state. Whilst it could, in turn, be argued that consent was implicit, 
based on the government’s agreement to undertake joint operations with 
the FIB,106 the fact remains that the FIB broadened peacekeeping’s 
boundaries, bringing it closer to crossing the threshold into intervention.     
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Again, it could also be argued that, from a TWAIL perspective, these 
substantial alterations, taken without explicit host state consent, reflect the 
power differentials between the host state and the peacekeeping operation. 
That is, it could be said that once that element of sovereignty is forgone, 
and the UN has been allowed to enter the host state, the operation, in 
essence, retains that part of the sovereignty, using it to make key decisions 
about the functioning of the operation within the host’s territory. Indeed, 
this could, again, be viewed as another example of Anghie’s dynamic of 
difference with the dominant UN (in particular the mandating Security 
Council) identifying a gap between themselves and the subordinate ‘other’ 
(the host state) and then seeking to reduce that gap by mandating specific 
tasks which the peacekeeping operation must undertake. 
2.4 Maintaining or Coercing Consent? 
Although a peacekeeping operation still retains its legality, then, the lack 
of consent to substantial changes, arguably takes the operation much 
closer to the intervention boundary line, as it is possible to view these 
changes as forms of coercive action undertaken by the peacekeeping 
operation/UN to alter the host state – as occurred, for example, throughout 
ONUC’s deployment, with the shift from MONUC to MONUSCO and with the 
creation of the FIB. This then leads to the second key issue – the 
maintenance of host state consent throughout the operations deployment- 
and the distinction between de jure and de facto consent in practice, which 
was set out in Chapter 3.107 Within the DRC, on numerous occasions the 
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Congolese government has withdrawn effective consent and has acted to 
thwart the activities of the peacekeeping operations. In these instances, de 
jure consent is maintained, as this ‘cannot be withdrawn within a mandate’ 
but de facto the host Government can rescind its effective cooperation.108 
Sustaining consent, in such instances, becomes a political issue, with ‘either 
a re-definition of the mandate to appease the host government and/or 
some kind of political pressure’ to get the host state to agree to the 
extension of the operation’s mandate.109  
For ONUC, difficulties arose almost immediately between the UN/ONUC and 
the newly formed Congolese government which were exacerbated by both 
the decolonisation period and Cold War dynamics which were explored in 
Chapter 2.110 Indeed, Congo’s first Prime Minister, Lumumba, chose to turn 
to the Soviet Union for assistance after relations with the West broke down, 
resulting in a tense relationship between Lumumba and the then Secretary-
General, Hammarskjöld.111 Whilst the government had requested UN 
support, it was initially very hostile towards ONUC and ‘every Congolese 
political faction considered ONUC the enemy’.112 Even when ONUC was 
viewed more favourably, Congo’s political leaders ‘change[d] their views as 
often as their suits’.113 Lumumba, in particular, severely criticised the 
operation, arguing that they were not doing enough to prevent the 
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Katangan secession.114 Again, as previously noted, whilst this did not deter 
Hammarskjöld or his successor, U Thant, from implementing the Security 
Council mandates as they wished (underlining that this could be deemed to 
be coercive action and therefore intervention), it created an undesirable 
tension between the operation and the government. From a TWAIL 
perspective, this also highlights, again, the North-South divide and 
remnants of the colonial dynamics which still lingered throughout 
decolonisation, as was seen in Chapter 2. In particular, Chapter 2 noted 
how Lumumba’s relationship with the UN and the Western states could be 
viewed as an example of a ‘Northern subversive strategy’ designed to undo 
regimes which were not favourable to Western hegemonic states.115 
Furthermore, as ONUC became increasingly forceful, the loss of consent – 
both from the host state and other dominant armed actors in the territory- 
placed individual peacekeepers at risk. As Hatto notes, ONUC demonstrates 
that if some non-state groups withdraw their consent to the UN’s presence, 
then the safety of UN peacekeepers may be at risk.116 This arguably 
demonstrates that whilst de facto or effective consent may not be legally 
necessary, it is evidently important for the operational success and the 
safety of the peacekeepers. Thus, highlighting the importance of 
maintaining host state consent throughout deployment and perhaps 
demonstrating a more practical nuance within peacekeeping’s legal 
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framework. That is, the practicalities or realities of peacekeeping in the field 
may often underpin or buttress the legal principles in some form of an 
indirect, bottom-up approach which, ultimately, seemingly emphasises the 
importance and relevance of peacekeeping’s principles, particularly the 
principle of host state consent. 
Despite these potential lessons which could have been taken from ONUC, 
similar tensions have persisted in the UN’s later operations. Initially, when 
the UN re-entered the Congo with MONUC, there were few tensions 
between the host and the operation. This was perhaps due to the fact that 
it was a difficult transition period, with a weak government and there was, 
therefore, an element of reliance on MONUC for ensuring the 
implementation of the Lusaka Agreement and ending the conflict. This 
reliance by weak transitional governments is said to lead to the tolerance 
of a more significant level of intervention as the host government becomes 
reliant on the UN for security and development assistance.117 Arguably, this 
was reflected in MONUC’s generally positive relationship with the Congolese 
government within the first few years of its deployment. However, as is 
typical with transition governments, as they become stronger, they are less 
interested in a significant military presence and interference in government 
practices.118 Indeed, the tipping point for the Congolese state appears to 
have been the 2006 elections – the first ‘democratic’ elections since the 
country gained independence in 1960. Following this, MONUC/MONUSCO 
                                   




has had a tumultuous relationship with the Congolese government, in 
particular, Kabila, who, when asked about the peacekeeping operation, said 
it was ‘a love-hate relationship’.119 Whilst noting that both MONUSCO and 
the Congo were in the same boat – if one succeeded, so did the other – 
Kabila argued that was a difference in interpretations of ‘success’, with the 
operation focusing on ‘elections and human rights’ whilst the state viewed 
a reduction in armed groups and a population living in ‘total harmony’ to 
be the markers of success.120 This view of the UN has driven repeated calls 
for the operation’s exit. As previously noted, in 2009-2010, prior to 
MONUC’s evolution into MONUSCO, Kabila repeatedly called for the UN’s 
departure, which he continued to reiterate throughout this tenure.121 Most 
notably, in 2018, when the country prepared to hold further elections, 
Kabila once again demanded UN withdrawal, arguing that their presence 
had now been ‘largely mitigated’.122 However, it has been suggested that 
Kabila knew that these attempts to ‘get rid’ of MONUSCO, would be ‘very 
risky’ as ‘he could risk his own power by putting so much pressure’ on the 
UN to withdraw.123 Instead, Kabila is said to have ‘lived with them 
[MONUSCO] and used them to get rid of this own opponents’, such as Jean 
Pierre Bemba.124 This, again, highlights, how the UN peacekeeping 
operation can, at times, be considered to be a form of coercive action 
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designed to alter the host state (and therefore intervention) as the host 
state’s clear rejections of the operation and withdrawal of effective consent 
is, in essence, ineffective. In other words, there is a loss of the element of 
voluntariness here as the host state cannot eject the operation or challenge 
its tasks during the mandate period. Furthermore, the remarks by Kabila, 
in particular the statement made about differing interpretations of success, 
arguably typify the TWAIL arguments which have been made throughout 
Chapters 2 and 3, concerning the Western-centric ideals and standards 
which are embedded within peacekeeping and international law. Indeed, 
there is a clear North-South divide here, with the Global South state (the 
Congolese government) seeking to challenge the dominant North (UN) 
agenda, yet is unable to because of the ‘legalised hierarchy’ which the UN 
is predicated upon.125 This could again be viewed, then, as another example 
of international law acknowledging and reinforcing ‘substantial power 
differentials between its participants’126 as peacekeeping’s frameworks and 
the composition of the UN uphold the mandatory decisions of the Security 
Council, thereby maintaining the dominance of the Council and, in 
particular, the permanent five members. 
In addition to calling for the UN’s withdrawal, the government has also 
attempted to hinder or manipulate the operation. For example, during the 
political crisis of 2015 to 2016,127 Kabila signed an order forbidding his 
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troops (the FARDC) from operating with MONUSCO.128 However, as Senior 
Military personnel deployed in MONUSCO during the period noted, this 
order did not affect MONUSCO’s military components from operating as 
normal, particularly within the North and South Kivus, Ituri and parts of 
Beni, noting that they had ‘never requested the Congolese government to 
give me authorisation’.129 They further argued that ‘to say the government 
was the player against UN efficiency is just a lie’, whilst they had not always 
been supportive, ‘in terms of freedom of action, you cannot imagine the 
freedom of action we had’.130 The experience of this senior military leader 
therefore highlights that whilst the host state government may use their 
consent as a tool to both manipulate the UN peacekeeping operation and 
to protect their national sovereignty, in practice, this arguably does not 
have as limiting an effect on the operation as may first appear. At least, 
this is certainly the case within the East of the country, where, as previously 
discussed, the government holds little power anyway. Thus, again, through 
a TWAIL lens, the patterns of domination and subordination are seemingly 
replicated and maintained.  
It also further highlights the differing understandings of the principle of 
consent, and its impact on the operation, by personnel within the UN 
Secretariat and those within the UN operation in the field. Whilst some 
interviewees of this research, who work in the DPO, argued that there is 
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‘little you can do’ without the host’s consent, others, who have worked in 
the mission in the field argue very differently, noting, as discussed, that 
the Force component, for example, still have a great deal of operational 
freedom, even when lacking host state consent or support.131 This suggests 
that there may perhaps be a gap between the legal, political and conceptual 
understanding of the peacekeeping principle in UN headquarters and the 
operational realities in the mission headquarters, suggesting a need for an 
increase in dialogue between the different UN personnel to ensure a unified 
understanding of the principle and how it should best be interpreted and 
applied within peacekeeping. Without this, peacekeeping’s legal framework 
and, therefore, its boundaries arguably become increasingly blurred; 
thereby, blurring the distinction between peacekeeping and intervention 
and consequently undermining the principle of non-intervention.  
2.5 Making Sense of Consent in the DRC 
The UN’s endeavours in the Congo demonstrate the nuances within the 
principle of consent and, as was seen in Chapter 3, the role of consent in 
acting as the thin red boundary line between peacekeeping and 
intervention. In particular, the UN’s experience in the Congo highlights how 
consent may only be legally required for the deployment of a Security 
Council mandated peacekeeping operation but seemingly still needs to be 
maintained throughout deployment, firstly, to a certain degree for the 
functioning of the operation and, secondly, to prevent the operation from 
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treading or even crossing the interventionist line. As this section has 
outlined, maintaining host state consent has been crucial when trying to 
implement a mandate. Indeed, the Effectiveness of Peace Operations 
Network has argued that a main strategic constraint of MONUSCO has been 
the degree to which cooperation with the host state has diminished over 
the years.132 It noted that many interlocutors have observed that 
MONUSCO ‘has been working with a government that does not want it to 
be there’.133 For some in the DPO, this has been a source of frustration as 
they recognise the somewhat improved relationship with the new President, 
Tshisekedi, and note, with regret, ‘all those years we spent knocking our 
head, trying to work with Kabila and his obstinacy’.134 Therefore, as 
previously noted, maintaining consent can become a political issue, 
requiring changes to the mandate to appease the host or some form of 
political pressure on the host government. However, as was seen in Chapter 
3,135 exerting some form of pressure on the host state to maintain their 
consent to the operation, in itself, could be perceived as a form of coercive 
action to influence change in the state and, therefore, intervention. Again, 
this arguably leads us back to the persistent power differentials within both 
peacekeeping and international relations more broadly, which a TWAIL lens 
highlights, and which, in turn, influences the interpretation and application 
of the fundamental principles of peacekeeping.  
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Indeed, it could be argued that the disregard or seeming manipulation of 
host state consent expands peacekeeping’s legal framework as a significant 
amount of emphasis is placed upon the host state’s initial consent to 
deployment, which then permits an operation to undertake numerous 
actions or changes once within the host state. As such, this broader 
interpretation of the principle expands peacekeeping’s frameworks, 
similarly expanding peacekeeping’s red boundary line and thereby 
undermining or, at times contravening, the principle of non-intervention, 
as the Congo examples illustrate. Once again, as Chapter 3 noted, the 
principle of consent ultimately prevents the deployment or presence of the 
peacekeeping operation from crossing peacekeeping’s boundary line and 
becoming intervention. However, it could be argued that when relations 
between the operation and the host government breakdown and the 
consent is effectively withdrawn, then the specific actions of the operation 
during this time (such as MONUC’s shift to MONUSCO) could be viewed as 
a form of intervention. This therefore, again, demonstrates the fluidity of 
peacekeeping’s boundaries and frameworks and the blurring of the 
boundary between peacekeeping and intervention. 
3 Impartiality  
As with the principle of consent, the interpretation and application of the 
principle of impartiality in the UN’s operations in the Congo has also 
presented numerous issues. This section will explore two of these- joint 
operations with the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) and the UN’s human 
rights due diligence policy (HRDDP)- which were outlined in Chapter 2. 
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Whilst there are numerous other examples throughout the UN’s history in 
the Congo which could highlight the application of impartiality (such as 
ONUC’s involvement in the Katanga secession and MONUC and MONUSCO’s 
capacity building or justice reform)136 joint military operations are perhaps 
the most illustrative example. Through an examination of these, the 
broader issues with the principle of impartiality will be highlighted. The first 
of these is the difficulty in fulfilling a complex mandate or host state 
requests and remaining impartial. The second is the risks of conducting 
joint operations to the perception of the operation by locals, armed groups 
and other actors and, thirdly, the UN’s potential implication in violations of 
international law by host state actors. This section will explore, then, how 
these issues, which arise from a broader interpretation of impartiality have 
expanded peacekeeping’s frameworks and, consequently, undermine the 
principle of non-intervention. This section will therefore question whether 
there must be limits to this evolution in order for impartiality to remain a 
legal principle, rather than simply a reflection of practice, and for it to 
regain peacekeeping’s interventionist boundaries.  
3.1 Joint Operations with the FARDC 
As was seen in the previous Chapter, the authorisation of joint operations 
between the host state and peacekeeping operation was a significant 
evolution both within UN peacekeeping and, specifically, within 
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peacekeeping in the DRC.137 In the UN’s first operation in the Congo, 
Hammarskjöld explicitly stated that the authority granted to ONUC could 
not be exercised ‘either in competition with the representatives of the host 
government or in cooperation with them in any joint operation’.138 
Evidently, then, Hammarskjöld perceived joint ventures to be beyond the 
remit of peacekeeping, thereby narrowly interpreting the principle of 
impartiality and constricting peacekeeping’s frameworks in this instance. 
This, in turn, supported the principle of non-intervention and reflected the 
general non-interventionist rhetoric at that time.139 However, forty years 
later, as the UN returned to the Congo, the principle of impartiality was 
interpreted much more broadly when joint operations became a part of 
MONUC’s mandate almost immediately.140 In line with the UN’s move to 
robust peacekeeping and the new concept of impartiality, which was 
discussed in the previous Chapter, MONUC was soon tasked with protecting 
civilians and working in cooperation with the host state. 
3.1.1  Partnership 
MONUC first began to work closely with the Congolese state during ‘phase 
II’ of its deployment when the operation’s size and tasks were expanded.141 
The Security Council tasked MONUC with establishing a joint structure with 
the Congolese Joint Military Commission, which was created under the 
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Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, to ‘ensure close coordination’ during 
MONUC’s deployment.142 This then led to numerous joint operations and 
increased cooperation, with ‘co-signed orders’ between the Congolese and 
MONUSCO at the strategic, operational and higher levels of the military.143 
In particular, co-signed orders between MONUSCO and the FARDC began 
at the brigade and sector levels in South Kivu, Ituri and North Kivu, with 
the endorsement of senior military in Kinshasa.144 A former Deputy-Force 
Commander within MONUC/MONUSCO noted that ‘in terms of interaction 
and joint planning, lots of things had been done and where possible’.145 
Evidently, then, the newer concept of impartiality was interpreted and 
applied quite broadly within the Congo, almost instantaneously, and this 
continued, seemingly expanding even further as the operation became 
more robust and began to shift from MONUC to MONUSCO, with a larger, 
more complex mandate. For peacekeeping’s frameworks, then, this broader 
interpretation of impartiality arguably expanded peacekeeping’s boundary 
line, thereby taking the operation much closer to the intervention line and 
undermining the principle of non-intervention. Once again, the differing 
interpretations of impartiality from ONUC to MONUC could also be said to 
mirror the shift from non-intervention to interventionist rhetoric that was 
seen throughout the development of the principle of non-intervention in 
Chapter 2. 
                                   
142 ibid.  
143 Interviewee 11 (n25) pg 45. 
144 ibid.  
145 ibid. 
 45 
From late 2008 onwards, MONUC was also increasingly mandated to 
support FARDC operations against armed groups as part of the former’s 
protection of civilian tasks. Between 2008 and 2010, ‘the Mission’s mandate 
evolved significantly’ and ‘an increasingly comprehensive approach to the 
provision of support to FARDC was developed.’146 During this period, one 
of the most notable joint operations was Kimia II, launched by the FARDC 
in 2009 in the East of Congo, and supported by MONUC.147 The aim of this 
operation was to forcibly disarm a Rwandan Hutu armed group, the 
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) which had been 
present in the DRC since the Rwandan genocide.148 The launching of Kimia 
II came after the DRC’s joint operation (Umoja Wetu)149 with Rwandan 
military forces, following a shift in political alliances between the DRC and 
Rwanda in January 2009. This marked a dramatic change in what had been 
an extremely turbulent relationship, as Chapter 2 noted,150 and was aimed 
at bringing peace and security to the region. The operation was therefore 
highly politicised and involved complex, historical regional matters, rather 
than simply the internal affairs of the Congo. This arguably raises two key, 
interconnected problems for the UN, which have reoccurred, in varying 
degrees, throughout MONUC/MONUSCOs other joint operations with the 
Congolese government. Firstly, it seemingly draws the UN into, not only 
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the internal affairs of the Congo, but also regional matters, thereby calling 
into question the UN’s impartiality and, in turn, taking the operation closer 
to intervention. That is, whilst the rhetoric of impartiality remained within 
MONUC’s mandate, supporting the host state in conducting operations 
against specific actors placed the UN against these actors (or other parties 
to the conflict), thereby potentially jeopardising the UN’s impartiality. 
Indeed, the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions argued that 
‘the Security Council’s mandate [had] transformed MONUC into a party to 
the conflict in the Kivus’;151 thus, breaching impartiality and potentially 
triggering international humanitarian law.152 Again, this demonstrates how 
peacekeeping’s frameworks are fluid, with the principles overlapping and 
often invoking other elements of international law, such as IHL, thereby 
contributing to peacekeeping’s legal framework. 
This broad interpretation and application of the principle of impartiality also 
has further practical consequences in relation to the perception of the 
operation and, potentially, the safety of peacekeepers. Given the complex 
history of the Congo and the Great Lakes region, which was touched upon 
in Chapter 2,153 support of these operations runs ‘the risk of partiality’ 
because of the organisation of rebel armed groups along ethnic lines.154 In 
particular, MONUC supported FARDC operations, such as Kimia II, were 
heavily influenced by the Tutsi-based rebel group CNDP who were 
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‘increasingly resented by other local communities’.155 This resulted in other 
Congolese armed groups forging alliances with the FDLR (the group which 
the joint operation was targeting) in order to protect their community 
interests.156 A former MONUC senior military leader noted that the Force 
therefore had to deal with ‘competing priorities’ – the mandate, the support 
of the Congolese army and then attacks because of this support.157 Indeed, 
they state that the attack on the Force in Semiliki ‘was precisely because 
we [were] supporting the Congolese army’.158 An expansive interpretation 
of impartiality therefore also risks peacekeepers safety by embroiling them 
in conflict and presenting them as a target.159  
3.1.2  Implications  
This then leads to the second notable problem which the UN has faced when 
conducting joint operations with the Congolese armed forces – the potential 
implications for the UN if any negative conduct occurs during the operation. 
As seen in Chapter 3, joint operations not only stretch the principle of 
impartiality but also potentially implicate the UN in any violations or crimes 
committed by the host state forces whether before, during or after the joint 
operation.160 Indeed, Kimia II was severely criticised for failing ‘miserably 
to root out the militias’, committing violations of international law and for 
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aggravating ‘an already devastating humanitarian crisis’.161 It was further 
found that ‘the human cost of the operations ha[d] been high due to the 
abuses perpetrated against civilian populations’ by FARDC troops, FDLR and 
RUD-Urunana reprisal attacks and by Mai-Mai groups.162 In particular, 
during the operation, former rebels of the political armed group CNDP,163 
who had been integrated into the FARDC, were found to have committed 
rapes and killings of civilians.164 It is estimated that more than 1400 
civilians had been killed– half by the FDLR and half by Congolese and 
Rwandan armed forces and allied militia- with 7500 women raped and 
900,000 forced to flee their homes.165 The Secretary-General later 
acknowledged these allegations, noting that ‘some components of the 
United Nations system called for an immediate end to Kimia II and for the 
withdrawal of MONUC support for FARDC’.166 Indeed, the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions described the military operations as 
‘a disaster’, with Operation Kimia II ‘producing catastrophic results’ and 
noted that in many areas the FARDC ‘posed the greatest direct risk to 
security’.167 Again, it is difficult to see how the UN could maintain its 
impartiality and, more broadly, the credibility of the Organisation when it 
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was supporting operations and forces that committed such acts. It also 
demonstrates how, in practice, there are differing understandings within 
the UN (both in the Secretariat and the operation) of what is an appropriate 
interpretation of the principle of impartiality, highlighting how, as Chapter 
3 noted, the ‘normative composition’ of peacekeeping operations is ‘re-
balanced each time’.168 As such, it could be argued that this again 
exemplifies how peacekeeping’s frameworks are continually contorted, re-
interpreted and re-applied, thereby leaving the boundary between 
peacekeeping and intervention uncertain and, thus, undermining the 
principle of non-intervention.   
Furthermore, the Congolese military leadership also presented numerous 
problems for the UN and their maintenance of impartiality. The Congolese 
army commander, Major General Dieudonné Amuli Bahigwa, appointed a 
newly-made General, former CNDP leader Bosco Ntaganda, as his effective 
deputy commander. At the time, Ntaganda was wanted on an arrest 
warrant issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for alleged war 
crimes and crimes against humanity169- a matter which the Congolese 
government was said to be aware of.170 Nevertheless, rather than arrest 
Ntaganda, as they were legally obliged to do given they were a party to the 
ICC, the government removed Ntaganda’s name from the official 
organisational structure of the Kimia II operation.171 Then, in a letter to 
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MONUC’s head of mission, the Congolese Minister of Defence explicitly 
stated that Ntaganda was not playing a role in Kimia II.172 However, it was 
later found that Ntaganda had played an important role in the operation, 
acting as the de facto deputy commander and overseeing the integration 
CNDP soldiers into the FARDC.173 MONUC had therefore, unknowingly, 
conducted a joint operation with a former rebel leader who was accused of 
gross violations of international law and who would later lead a mutiny to 
form the rebel group, M23.174 M23 then went on to terrorise Eastern Congo, 
performing summary executions, rapes and forced recruitment of children, 
culminating in the group capturing the city of Goma and the UN 
subsequently launching the Force Intervention Brigade, specifically to 
target the M23 armed group.175 MONUC and, consequently, the UN were 
therefore at risk of being complicit in the crimes committed by the FARDC 
thereby potentially breaching the principle of impartiality. Moreover, this 
could also be viewed as an example of the host state still exercising their 
sovereignty in the presence of an external actor. That is, as was noted 
within the principle of consent, whilst the host state may not be able to 
force a withdrawal of an operation during the mandate period, they possess 
various tools at their disposal which, arguably, permits them to still exercise 
their sovereign rights (here to determine the composition of their national 
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armed forces), even when they have forgone an element of sovereignty to 
the peacekeeping operation.  
Despite this incident, MONUC and MONUSCO continued to work alongside 
the Congolese armed forces. On 1 January 2010, MONUC began a new 
phase of joint military operations with the FARDC, again against the FDLR, 
known as Amani Leo.176 The purpose of this operation was similar to that 
of Kimia II – to protect civilians, prevent armed groups, such as the FDLR, 
from re-gaining territory, and to ‘create conditions for stabilisation and re-
establishment of State authority’.177 However, there was one noticeable 
difference with this operation in comparison to previous joint ventures -  for 
Amani Leo, MONUC began to condition its support to specific FARDC units, 
based on human rights vetting.178 Both the FARDC and MONUC military 
commands agreed to numerous measures such as the deployment of 
Military Police at the battalion level ‘to prevent and sanction violations of 
human rights, international humanitarian and refugee law by their own 
forces’.179 These conditions embedded within the operational directive of 
Amani Leo arguably demonstrates the lessons which the UN had learned 
from Kimia II; that is, the need to include conditions and precautions to 
limit or prevent violations and UN complicity. Thus, a conditionality policy 
                                   
176 MONUC, ‘DR Congo: Peacekeepers Plan Operation Amani Leo with FARDC in North Kivu’ (MONUC, 19 Jan 
2010) <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/dr-congo-peacekeepers-plan-operation-amani-
leo-fardc-north-kivu> Accessed 22 June 2020. 
177 MONUC, ‘MONUC Outlines Cooperation with FARDC in Operation Amani Leo’ (MONUC, 5 March 2010) 
<https://monuc.unmissions.org/en/monuc-outlines-cooperation-fardc-operation-amani-leo> Accessed 22 June 
2010. 
178 --, ‘National Committee for the Defense of the People (CNDP)’ 
<https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/cndp.htm> Accessed 22 June 2020.  
179 MONUC (n176).  
 52 
was born, which, for peacekeeping’s frameworks, could be viewed as an 
attempt to retract the boundaries of impartiality and counter the potential 
complicity of the UN in violations of international law. The conditionality 
policy could again be viewed, then, as another re-imagining of the principle 
of impartiality and, perhaps, an implicit recognition that the broadening of 
impartiality to include joint operations had been taken too far. In other 
words, the elastic band of peacekeeping’s boundaries had been stretched 
to its limits and the conditionality policy was an attempt to retract this 
boundary, shrinking peacekeeping’s frameworks, reducing peacekeeping’s 
scope and bringing it away from the interventionist line.      
3.2 From ‘Conditionality’ to ‘Due Diligence’ 
The consequences stemming from MONUC’s joint operations with the 
FARDC therefore led to the development of a conditionality policy. In 
particular, it arose as a direct response to the Kiwanja massacre in 2008 
where an estimated 150 people were killed, half a mile away from 
MONUSCO peacekeepers.180 As such, the UN was criticised for ‘the lack of 
response and some of the joint support and joint operations that were 
supposed to go into the FARDC.’181 Whilst the Security Council had noted, 
within MONUC’s mandate, that joint operations were to be undertaken ‘in 
accordance with international humanitarian, human rights and refugee 
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law’, this was evidently not enough.182 MONUC officials, including the 
protection advisor under the Deputy SRSG, ‘who was detailing with OCHA 
and the protection cluster, therefore began to draft a ‘non-paper on the 
conditionality’ on how they should engage and the criteria for determining 
who they could and could not work with.183 This again emphasises the key 
role of the office of the SRSG/SG in interpreting norms and shaping 
peacekeeping, in this instance, motivated by the concerns over the FARDC’s 
behaviour and the possibility of the UN being complicit in that behaviour 
when they provided support or directly engaged in joint operations.184 
However, despite this clear need for steps to be taken, the conditionality 
policy was said to be a ‘very sensitive topic’ with some of the senior 
leadership concerned about the political partnership with the Congolese 
government and the difficulty in carrying this message to the government 
and national counterparts.185 Indeed, to place conditions on MONUC 
support, would be to place pressure on an already precarious relationship 
and could have risked losing the operation’s relationship with the host state 
and, consequently, host state consent.186 Again, this could be viewed as 
another example of how the fundamental principles exist in a competitive 
overlapping arena. That is, to withdraw the boundaries of impartiality here 
by placing conditions on the host state had the potential of impacting the 
UN’s relationship with the host government and consequently impacting the 
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principle of consent. Similarly, as Chapter 3 discussed, conditioning support 
could also be viewed as coercive action designed to influence the state and 
therefore intervention, as the UN may be deemed to be exerting pressure 
on the government to make alterations to their armed forces, in order to 
meet both the UN’s standards and basic international laws. Furthermore, 
from a TWAIL perspective, regardless of the good intentions of the policy, 
as was also seen in Chapter 3, it could be viewed as another example of 
Western standards and ideals being imposed by the Global North on the 
Global South.187 
MONUC was therefore placed in a difficult position, with political officers 
within the Secretariat concerned about this relationship and arguing that 
as they had a Security Council mandate, they had no choice but to support 
the Congolese armed forces.188 On the other hand, legal officers within the 
operation recognised that the mandate did not absolve peacekeepers, or 
the UN, from its international obligations ‘in terms of IHL and human 
rights’.189 Indeed, the concept did not gain traction until an Office of Legal 
Affairs (OLA) opinion, which stated the UN’s legal responsibilities, including 
individual legal responsibility for Force Commanders or SRSGs, ‘if a 
peacekeeping operation is either aiding and abetting or being complicit to 
international crimes’.190 In an internal memorandum the OLA stated that if 
MONUC had reason to believe that the FARDC were committing violations 
of international law, they ‘may not lawfully continue to support that 
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operation, but must cease its participation in it completely’.191 MONUC 
could therefore ‘not lawfully provide logistic or “service” support to any 
FARDC operation’ if it had reason to ‘believe that the FARDC units’ were 
involved in such violations.192 The OLA argued that this was on the basis of 
the UN’s obligations under ‘customary international law and from the 
Charter to uphold, promote and encourage respect for human rights, 
international humanitarian law and refugee law’.193 The OLA therefore 
justified the conditionality policy on the basis of peacekeeper’s obligations 
under international law, rather than as a necessity for maintaining the 
principle of impartiality. Thus, further contributing to peacekeeping’s legal 
framework by re-affirming the potential application of these broader areas 
of international law.  
Following this, the policy was then implemented into MONUC’s practice, 
under the leadership of the then Deputy SRSG for the Rule of Law (and 
later SRSG for MONUSCO) Leila Zerrougui.194 Again, highlighting the 
important role which senior leadership, particularly within the office of the 
SG/SRSG, have in acting as norm entrepreneurs and shaping the 
peacekeeping operation. In quite an irregular fashion, the first occasion in 
which MONUC suspended support for a Congolese operation  ‘defied all 
procedure because it was done in a very kind of executive fashion’.195 That 
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is, the current Under-Secretary General for Peace Operations, Jean-Pierre 
Lacroix, in a press conference in the Congo, ‘on the spot’ said that ‘he would 
suspend support’ for a Congolese battalion which had had been accused of 
crimes.196 The policy was then officially endorsed by the Security Council in 
MONUC’s mandate in 2009 where it stated that MONUC support to an 
FARDC-led military operation was ‘strictly conditioned on FARDC’s 
compliance’ with IHL, human rights and refugee law.197 The Council 
stressed that MONUC and FARDC cooperation should be conducted on the 
basis of joint planning, with MONUC interceding with the FARDC command 
‘if elements of a FARDC unit receiving MONUC’s support are suspected of 
having committed grave violations of such laws’.198 The inclusion of 
conditionality within MONUC’s Security Council mandate was therefore 
important as it removed the previous caveat argument made by some 
political officers who argued that support had to be maintained, regardless 
of any violations, because it was within MONUC’s mandate.199  
The conditionality policy, or the roots of the HRDDP, therefore began as a 
very Congo specific policy, focused on addressing UN complicity and, by 
extension, arguably restricting or regaining an element of the expanded 
principle of impartiality. However, it was soon recognised that this was an 
issue which was not Congo specific. According to senior UN personnel, 
‘there was a sense of urgency, that we could no longer support operations 
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that inflicted harm on civilians’ and ‘ultimately, we needed to apply that 
same policy across the board’.200 As explored in the previous Chapter, this 
then led to the development of the HRDDP which was adopted as an internal 
policy in July 2011201 before being made public in March 2013.202 This then 
takes us to the most infamous joint venture to be launched in the DRC – 
the Force intervention Brigade – which was deployed, perhaps not so 
coincidentally, at a similar time to the publication of the HRDDP.  
3.3 The FIB – An African Solution? 
The Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) was deployed as a separate offensive 
combat unit within the Force Component of MONUSCO in March 2013.203 
The FIB was originally composed of 3069 soldiers and was mandated to 
carry out ‘targeted offensive operations’ either unilaterally or jointly with 
the Congolese Armed Forces, FARDC.204 Such operations were to be carried 
out ‘in a robust, highly mobile and versatile manner’, with the aim of 
preventing the expansion of armed groups, neutralising these groups and 
disarming them.205 Again, the objective of the FIB, to target armed groups 
in the East, was similar to the previous joint operations MONUC/MONUSCO 
had undertaken with the FARDC. In particular, the FIB was deployed to 
target the Mouvement du 23 mars (M23). As previously noted, the M23 
emerged out of former CNDP rebels who had been recruited into the FARDC 
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but later mutinied, denouncing their conditions within the Congolese armed 
forces and accusing the government of insufficiently committing to the 
peace agreement.206 Whilst the Brigade is most often discussed in relation 
to the use of force, it also significantly expanded the principle of 
impartiality, arguably in three main ways: its invocation of regional 
interests and interventions; its specific targeting mandate; and the 
subsequent perception it created of the UN.  
Firstly, the way in which the Brigade materialised greatly differed in 
comparison to the previous joint operations, in that it emerged as an idea 
amongst external states. The concept was initially conceived at the 
International Conference of the Great Lakes (ICGLR) and supported by the 
South African Development Community (SADC).207 As the M23 pursued its 
strategy in the summer of 2012, the African Union and the ICGLR proposed 
the establishment of a neutral International Force to ‘eradicate existing 
armed groups’208 and sent a team of representatives to meet with 
MONUSCO personnel ‘to see what could be done’.209 Whilst the concept of 
a Brigade had ‘clearly garnered some support from Kinshasa and other 
parts of the region’, ‘it was quite clear that this neutral force was always 
going to lack the means to be deployed’.210 In particular, it is said that the 
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Security Council, ‘as is still the case, didn’t want to finance [as occurred] in 
Somalia, a new African force’.211 Instead, the Council requested that the 
Secretary-General report on options for MONUSCO,212 leading to a UN 
Military Advisor meeting with the Chairs of SADC and ICGLR to discuss 
harmonising the regional and UN initiatives.213 The FIB could therefore be 
viewed as a replication of some of the interventionist practices discussed in 
earlier Chapters. In particular, a form of collective security or multilateral 
intervention, whereby a group of states have identified a problem within 
another state and agreed to collectively act in an attempt to remedy this 
problem; all the while under the auspices of the UN. 
Moreover, it could also be viewed as an attempted form of regional 
intervention and, for some, was ‘a move for African solutions to African 
problems’,214 which, as seen in Chapter 2,215 is more preferable, from a 
TWAIL perspective, than imported, foreign solutions.216 Indeed, the force 
was composed of troops from South Africa, Tanzania and Malawi217 and is 
said to have been ‘a successful attempt of African solutions to claim, take 
and keep ownership of the African conflict – which Congo is’.218 For the 
Congo, in particular, the FIB also put pressure on Rwanda, who had 
intervened extensively in the DRC for many years, ‘not to intervene and 
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not to provide covert support to the M23’.219 Therefore, ‘what happened 
around the FIB’ is said to have been a ‘game changer’, as ‘the Congolese 
FARDC was suddenly able to overcome the boogeyman of Rwanda’.220 The 
FIB thus played a key role in Congo’s attempts to rid itself of historical, 
regional or neighbouring intervention.  
Again, this creates an interesting dynamic which has been previously 
discussed. That is, it highlights the shift in interventionist practices in the 
modern era, the move to regional intervention or, specifically in this case, 
‘African solutions to African problems’ which, whilst still intervention, is 
seemingly more palatable.221 However, whilst it breaks away from Anghie’s 
dynamic of difference and the practice of the Global North intervening to 
offer solutions or close the gap with the Global South, it is not without its 
problems. As was noted in earlier Chapters, the concept has been used to 
justify extensive inter-African intervention, which is as ‘problematic and 
riddled with hidden agendas as traditional interventions’.222 This has 
particularly been the case in the Congo, more broadly with its complex 
relationships with Rwanda and Uganda and, more specifically, for the FIB, 
with the allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by FIB troops, mainly 
from the South African contingent – a matter which will be explored in the 
subsequent Chapter.223 Overall, then, it could be argued that the UN offered 
the FIB a veneer of legitimacy in addition to legality, as it was deployed 
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within a peacekeeping operation, and therefore deployed with the consent 
of the host state. As such, it arguably expanded peacekeeping’s framework 
significantly, consequently undermining the principle of non-intervention, 
but, ultimately, not crossing the boundary line into the realm of peace 
enforcement or intervention because of the element of consent. Indeed, 
although the previous section noted that an argument could be made for 
the need to obtain explicit consent from the host state for the deployment 
of the Brigade, this was, perhaps, not necessary as the Congolese 
government were said to have manipulated the situation to ensure the 
Brigade was created.224 Arguably similar to how the Lumumba government 
manipulated Cold War tensions to ensure the deployment of ONUC, Kabila’s 
government ‘tried to accelerate’ the FIB’s arrival by ‘strengthening all 
rumours about Ugandan and Rwandan troops on Congolese soil’.225 
Conversely, Rwanda and M23 ‘tried to delay or even avert the arrival of the 
intervention brigade through a very aggressive discourse against the UN’, 
including targeted measures to influence and intimidate Tanzania and 
South Africa226 and accusations of UN cooperation with the FDLR.227 Again, 
this reflects how the broadened concept of impartiality results in the UN 
becoming embroiled in internal and regional issues, thereby jeopardising 
its impartiality and taking it closer to the intervention line. 
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3.3.1  FIB Targeting: Evolution or Breach? 
The creation of the FIB within this complex mix of regional interventions is 
therefore a significant expansion of the principle of impartiality, which 
consequently expands peacekeeping’s frameworks, potentially 
undermining the principle of non-intervention. Similarly, the second way in 
which the FIB expanded impartiality, potentially even breaching the 
principle, is through its use of targeting. That is, the Security Council 
mandated the FIB to go beyond the usual peacekeeping powers of using 
force in defence or reaction to threats, to using force to target specific 
named actors, thereby seemingly contravening the principle of impartiality 
and severely undermining, if not violating, the principle of non-intervention.  
This therefore raises the question– is the FIB’s ability to target named 
actors another evolution of the principle of impartiality or is it a violation of 
the principle? For the framework brigade or regular troops in MONUSCO, 
the Security Council had authorised them to ‘take all necessary measures’ 
to protect the mission, mandate and civilians from threats of violence from 
‘any of the parties engaged in the conflict’.228 Therefore, as a former UN 
senior legal officer notes, if and when government troops ‘were to attack 
or pose a threat to civilians, as they often have done, MONUSCO would 
have a duty under the PoC mandate to neutralise that threat’.229 As such, 
‘impartiality is arguably intact in the PoC mandate, as long as the mandate 
is implemented regardless of the source of the threat’.230 However, the 
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FIB’s mandate differs from this and is said to be ‘biased in every aspect’231 
as, on top of the PoC mandate, it permits the FIB to take the initiative and 
identify, track down and engage with specific armed groups.232 Mona Ali 
Khalil argues that ‘MONUSCO’s impartiality became problematic when its 
peacekeepers were mandated to engage in hostilities with named actors’ – 
as such, ‘it [the FIB’s military action] is no longer in response to an actual 
attack or imminent threat but rather because of the non-state party to the 
conflict being named or designated as a target’, thus ‘destroying 
impartiality’.233 As one senior UN human rights advisor noted, it ‘puts us 
completely on one side because you’ve got a defined enemy’.234 The 
Brigade is therefore said to be ‘actively engaged in favour of one party to 
an ongoing armed conflict, disregarding the peacekeeping principles’.235 It 
could therefore be argued that the FIB’s ability to undertake targeting 
cannot be viewed as an evolution of the principle of impartiality and is, 
instead, a breach of the principle, consequently taking peacekeeping 
beyond its demarcated boundaries and into the realm of intervention.   
Indeed, senior personnel involved in the FIB’s creation noted that ‘very few 
of us thought that the Council would actually agree to everything we was 
asking for because we was asking for extraordinary powers, powers that 
had not been granted to any UN entity before’, such as the ability to 
undertake targeted offensive operations.236 Thus, it could be argued that 
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there was an awareness that the FIB would greatly expand, or even breach, 
some of the fundamental principles of peacekeeping, but this was 
disregarded. This appears to stem from the rationale that ‘if we stick only 
to the principles, if we have a very low reading of what peacekeeping can 
and cannot do, we are going to have a lot of failures’.237 This implies that 
peacekeeping’s principles and, therefore, its legal frameworks are 
malleable and should be expanded and contorted to suit the needs on the 
ground. This, from a TWAIL perspective, could arguably be viewed as 
problematic as it renders peacekeeping open to being used by the 
hegemonic powers, particularly the dominant states in the Security Council, 
as a tool to further their interests and agenda – as was discussed in 
Chapters 2 and 3. Further, it is even more problematic for the relevance of 
the peacekeeping principles and the clarity of peacekeeping’s frameworks 
or boundaries and for the principle of non-intervention as the fluctuating or 
potentially limitless expanding of peacekeeping’s frameworks undermines 
the principle of non-intervention.  
3.3.2  Distinguishing ‘Blue’ and ‘Black’ Helmets 
This then leads to the third noticeable issue with the inclusion of the FIB, 
which is the numerous practical consequences which arise from a Brigade 
that is mandated to target and neutralise specific armed groups.238 In 
particular, it creates the perception, for both local communities and armed 
groups, that all peacekeepers are a combatant in the conflict and therefore 
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a target, placing peacekeepers at risk. Indeed, it has been noted that the 
greatest ‘challenge’ which MONUSCO has faced is the difficulty of 
distinguishing between ‘blue UN and black UN’.239 That is, within a 
peacekeeping operation ‘you cannot have a physical separation between 
those who [are] going to go on the offensive and those who are going to 
go in the protection’ or another component, ‘it doesn’t work like that, it’s 
overlapping’.240 Therefore, it is difficult to distinguish between the civilian 
or general framework peacekeepers (the ‘blue UN’) and the military or FIB 
(‘black UN’). The lack of a clear distinction could therefore result in all 
elements of the operation being associated with the FIB. For civilians or 
local communities this may create a disconnect between the UN and the 
local population – an issue which will be explored in the subsequent Chapter 
when examining the protection of civilians. For armed groups, there is a 
risk that they may perceive all UN personnel or any organisation associated 
with the UN as adversaries – as has occurred with international 
humanitarian organisations in the Congo, who have been targeted by 
armed groups or connected to peacekeeper’s misconduct.241 Furthermore, 
the UN Country Team and UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (OCHA),242 has often been confused or associated with the UN 
peacekeeping operation. As former senior OCHA personnel have noted, 
during MONUC’s deployment, when ‘the mission started to be part of the 
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conflict’, ‘there was one contingent particularly, from a country I’m not 
going to cite, that was heavily engaged in the fight, together with the 
government’.243 As such, the UN was perceived as supporting the 
government. This proved to be ‘extremely difficult’ for OCHA personnel as 
‘we were in rebel territory’, it became ‘extremely dangerous for some of 
our staff’ at times.244 Whilst the ‘peacekeepers had the ‘black logo’ and 
OCHA had ‘the blue logo [...] who knows that’.245 Again, this highlights the 
practical implications246 or consequences of a broad interpretation of 
impartiality and, arguably, the need for the UN to regain some element of 
partiality, through a return to a narrower interpretation of impartiality. 
3.4 Partially Impartial 
Despite the numerous problems which MONUC and MONUSCO have 
encountered when undertaking joint operations, they have continued to be 
conducted. However, the practice has now evolved to include policy 
innovations, such as the HRDDP, which attempts to address some of the 
challenges.247 Indeed, it is said that MONUSCO is ‘probably the mission that 
invests the most resources into the implementation of the HRDDP’.248 There 
are therefore various examples in which MONUSCO has supported FARDC 
operations but has later withdrew its support due to the host state’s 
behaviour, perhaps the most infamous of which is Operation Sukola I and 
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the ‘Red Generals’.249 The operation was, again, aimed at neutralising the 
armed group, FDLR, in Eastern Congo and initial operational planning 
included the full support of MONUSCO.250 However, during the planning, it 
transpired that the head of the operation (General Bruno Mandevu) and the 
commander of North Kivu, the region where the operation was to be 
conducted (General Fall Sikabwe) had poor human rights records.251 
Applying the HRDDP, MONUSCO refused to support the operation unless 
the two Generals were removed. However, the Congolese government 
refused to accede to the UN’s ultimatum, with the government spokesman, 
Lambert Mende, stating that it was a ‘sovereign decision’ and the Congo 
was ‘not under anyone’s supervision’252 – language which, from a TWAIL 
perspective, arguably highlights the ever-present North-South divide and 
desire of Global South states to challenge hegemonic power. Consequently, 
the government ignored the UN’s deadline and instead unilaterally 
announced that it would be launching the operation without UN troops and 
with the two Generals still leading the offensive.253 It is argued that the UN 
therefore put themselves in an ‘awkward position’, by placing themselves 
‘at loggerheads’ with the Congolese government because it was obvious 
that the condition– removing the two Generals- was never going to be 
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met.254 The UN was ‘essentially paralysed’ and ‘all of that contributed to 
what, overtime, came to be a reduction in the effectiveness’ of the FIB.255 
Indeed, it is frequently noted that after the FIB’s initial success in 
neutralising the M23, it has been unable to replicate this level of 
effectiveness, for numerous reasons.256 Following the Red Generals 
predicament, then, it has been suggested that instead of a ‘red flag 
strategy’, a ‘mitigation strategy’ would have been better.257 That is, the UN 
could have noted their concerns and found mitigating circumstances or 
alternative conditions, without demanding the Generals be removed.258 In 
doing this, it would arguably have prevented the UN from becoming 
complicit in violations of international law and still maintained relations with 
the host state, thereby not jeopardising the host’s cooperation or consent. 
This would also remove the potentially coercive ultimatum – to remove 
specific members of the national armed forces – thereby reducing the 
potential for the peacekeeping operation to be deemed to be an 
intervention. 
The implementation of the HRDDP in the case of the Red Generals and its 
impact on the principles of impartiality and consent once again highlights 
how the fundamental principles cohabit in a competitive arena, with an 
expansion of one having an impact on another. More importantly, it also 
reinforces the argument made in Chapter 3 - that the HRDDP, regardless 
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of the seemingly well-intentioned motivations underpinning it, may be 
viewed as coercive action designed to influence change in the host state. 
This is based on the fact that it attempts to coerce the host state into 
making changes to their national armed forces, threatening to withdraw 
support if the conditions are not, thereby impacting on the state’s self-
determination and sovereignty. Indeed, the Congolese government 
explicitly recognised that the composition of their national armed forces 
was a ‘sovereign decision’ and refused to comply with the UN request, 
supporting the argument that the imposition of conditions is a form of 
coercive action and, therefore, intervention. Once again, from a TWAIL 
perspective it also demonstrates the patterns of domination and 
subordination which still linger within the UN and presents another example 
of a peacekeeping policy which is based on Western standards and ideals.259  
This then leads back to the main concern of this broadening of impartiality- 
whether it amounts to a violation or simply an evolution of the principle 
and, by extension, whether it merely takes peacekeeping closer to 
intervention or if it amounts to a contravention of the principle of non-
intervention. Whilst the previous Chapter noted that the broadening of 
impartiality to include joint operations is not a violation of the principle of 
impartiality but simply an evolution, it remains questionable how far it can 
evolve before it is no longer a legal principle and is simply practice. That is, 
the initial joint operations between MONUC and the FARDC could be viewed 
as an evolution, as they entailed joint planning with co-signed orders and, 
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more crucially, were initially conceived in the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, 
which the Congolese host state signed.260 Therefore, joint operations in this 
instance could be viewed as a voluntary decision by the host state, as they 
had willingly agreed to them when signing the Lusaka Agreement. Although 
a TWAIL critique would perhaps argue that it is questionable what choice 
the Congo had in signing the agreement and would recognise the significant 
involvement of the Global North in crafting and implementing the 
Agreement,261 the fact remains that the Congolese host state undertook 
joint planning and led the operations, with MONUC’s support.  
For the later joint operations, including the FIB, it could be argued that the 
interpretation and application of impartiality has gone beyond an evolution 
and has instead breached the principle of impartiality and, similarly, the 
principle of non-intervention. This is based upon the fact that these newer 
operations may result in an application the HRDDP which imposes on the 
state’s sovereign rights, such as the creation and composition of their 
armed forces and the mode of activity or operations conducted by these 
armed forces. As has been noted throughout this Chapter and in Chapter 
3, an application of the HRDDP could therefore be viewed as coercive action 
when a joint operation is paused or the peacekeeping operation threatens 
to withdraw support until the host state implements the former’s proposed 
changes. Thus, in this instance, there is a coercive impact on the host 
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state’s sovereign rights, in particular, the structure of their armed forces, 
thereby arguably amounting to intervention. In a similar vein, the FIB’s 
ability to target specific actors within the host state’s territory could also 
be viewed as a breach, rather than an evolution of the principle of 
impartiality and, by extension, a breach of non-intervention. That is, as has 
been noted, targeting is difficult to reconcile with the notion of impartiality 
and, furthermore, impinges upon the Congolese state’s sovereign rights, 
such as decisions on their national security or, to a certain degree, the 
state’s right to declare war, particularly when the armed groups which the 
FIB is targeting are supported by neighbouring states, such as Rwanda and 
Uganda. Thus, the interpretation and application of impartiality here, again, 
amounts to a violation of the principles of impartiality and non-intervention. 
Even when the choice of target in these operations is selected by the host 
state, it is arguable that an element of coercion still exists, in part based 
upon the fact that the FIB is a creation of the Security Council and, 
therefore, as previously outlined,262 is a mandatory decision or measure; 
thus, again removing an element of voluntariness and invoking coercive, 
compulsory language. In this instance, then, the FIB could be viewed as 
engaging in coercive action which amounts to political or military 
intervention, particularly as determining which actors to target could, 
effectively, influence a change in the Congo’s relations with its neighbours. 
Thus, again, this broader interpretation and application of the principle of 
impartiality, as evidenced in the creation of the FIB, embroils the UN in 
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sovereign matters, resulting in the UN attempting to coerce change in the 
host state and, thus, amounting to intervention.    
It could be argued, then, that the interpretation and application of the 
principle of impartiality within the UN’s operations in the Congo has 
broadened peacekeeping’s frameworks beyond an acceptable limit, 
consequently severely undermining and, at times, contravening the 
principle of non-intervention. However, it is arguable that despite this, the 
operation, as a whole, seemingly retains its non-interventionist status by a 
single thread – host state consent. That is, the consent of the state to the 
deployment of the operation, as explored in the previous section, is key to 
preventing the peacekeeping operation from becoming both peace 
enforcement and intervention. Therefore, whilst some of MONUSCO’s 
practices may amount to intervention, it does not contravene the principle 
of non-intervention as the operation is acting under the umbrella of host 
state consent (de jure consent) – albeit, at times, this consent may be 
effectively withdrawn. Furthermore, it could also be argued that this 
expansion of the principle of impartiality to include joint operations is not a 
violation of the principle of non-intervention as it is, instead, an intervention 
by invitation.263 As was seen in Chapter 2, it has been argued that whilst 
peacekeepers are authorised to conduct joint operations with host state 
forces, the Council cannot mandate the host to conduct such operations.264 
Therefore, were a host state plans and conducts joint operations, this 
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should instead be viewed as ‘a function of the host state’s consent’ for UN 
intervention and therefore an invitation to intervention.265 From this angle, 
then, this broader interpretation of impartiality to include joint operations 
is, perhaps, best viewed as a significant expansion of the peacekeeping 
frameworks and, therefore, a challenge to but not a violation of the 
principle of non-intervention. 
4 Limited Use of Force 
A sense of déjà vu emerges when examining the UN’s use of force in the 
DRC. Each time a peacekeeping operation has entered the country, it has 
done so tentatively or passively but has then rapidly evolved to a robust, 
highly forceful operation in an attempt to counter the complexities in the 
field. As with the previous two principles, the evolution of the principle of 
non-use of force from narrow to broad can be seen in the UN’s 
peacekeeping endeavours in the Congo. Again, this brings with it a plethora 
of issues, some of which overlap or impact with the other two principles; 
demonstrating, once more, the inextricable links between the fundamental 
principles and their competitive existence. Furthermore, where an 
expansive use of force has been adopted, it too has seemingly broadened 
the boundaries of peacekeeping, thereby constricting the boundaries of the 
principle of non-intervention. Similar questions once again emerge as to 
how far the principle of non-use of force can be expanded before it becomes 
something else entirely; that is, how robust can peacekeeping be, before it 
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becomes peace enforcement or intervention? Is there a limit to its 
expansion or is it, like the principle of impartiality, saved by the single 
thread of (precarious) host state consent?      
4.1 Rapid Evolution  
For ONUC, following the traditional model of passive peacekeeping, the 
Security Council, initially adhered to a strict application of non-use of 
force.266 ONUC was limited to using force only in response to threats or 
attacks or to apprehend criminals, and to set up check points or post guard 
positions to prevent disorder, for example, at airports, rail stations and 
roads.267 These positions were also only established if required to 
implement the necessary functions within the agreement with the 
Congolese government.268 Thus suggesting that, perhaps in these early 
stages, host state consent may have been needed for operational changes 
to the mission. More importantly, for the principle of non-use of force, 
Hammarskjöld emphasised that ‘the basic element involved is clearly the 
prohibition against any initiative in the use of armed force’.269 This was then 
reiterated in operational directives (rules of engagement) where it was 
stated that for the ‘use of arms’, ‘on no account are weapons to be used 
unless in cases of great and sudden emergency and for the purpose of self-
defence’.270 Even in self-defence, it was noted that firing ‘should be 
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resorted to only in extreme instances’.271 Similarly, for the ’protection of 
internal security’, it was further stated that ONUC ‘should exhaust all 
possible peaceful means of keeping order before any resort to force’.272 
When interpreting these mandates and directives in the field, the then 
SRSG, Ralph Bunche, stressed the use of force only in self-defence, 
referring to ONUC as a ‘peace force, not a fighting force’, and noting that 
ONUC was there ‘to do harm to no one, if it can be avoided’.273 Evidently, 
as was seen with the principle of impartiality, Hammarskjöld and senior 
leadership within ONUC initially took a very narrow reading of the 
principles, limiting its use of force and arguably espousing strong non-
interventionist rhetoric. This therefore, again, supports the argument set 
out in Chapter 3 that the office of the SG acts as a norm entrepreneur and, 
also reflects how peacekeeping evolved in-line with the patterns of 
intervention which Chapter 2 explored.274 In this instance, the narrow 
interpretation of force arguably mirrored the non-interventionist rhetoric 
that was espoused during that time as newly independent states were 
emerging through decolonisation.275 
However, despite this strong non-interventionist, limited use of force 
discourse, the UN’s approach quickly changed as tensions in the Congo 
grew. Indeed, whilst reiterating minimal force, in private correspondence 
to Hammarskjöld, Bunche discussed the potential need for ONUC to employ 
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force ‘with [a] liberal interpretation of [the] self-defence principle’ in certain 
areas of the Congo.276 Following the assassination of Lumumba, the death 
of Hammarskjöld and growing conflict, the Security Council took a much 
more proactive approach to the use of force. The primary objective of ONUC 
shifted from taking the ‘necessary steps’ to support the withdrawal of 
foreign troops and maintain law and order, to taking ‘vigorous action’, 
including ‘the use of the requisite measure of force, if necessary’.277 Under 
these mandates, ONUC launched numerous forceful and, at times, highly 
controversial operations, such as Operation Morthor which resulted in 
hundreds of casualties and led to internal disputes over whether the SG 
had authorised the SRSG to take military action.278 In essence, it was a 
debate over the extent of the role or boundaries of the Office of the 
Secretary-General. Furthermore, within this expansion of the use of force, 
in its final military endeavour, Operation Grandslam, ONUC used airpower 
for the first time in UN history.279 In an attempt to end the Katangan 
secession, Swedish jets neutralised Katanga’s air force in a coordinated 
attack with ONUC’s ground force, eventually ending the secession.280 
ONUC’s unique use of airpower, further expanded the interpretation of the 
principle of non-use of force and set a precedent which has now resulted in 
attack helicopters and drones becoming an important strategic, military 
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component of peacekeeping operations281 - demonstrating how Congo has, 
at times, shaped UN peacekeeping, rather than peacekeeping shaping the 
Congo.   
This rapid expansion of the principle arguably demonstrates the fluidity of 
peacekeeping’s frameworks and epitomises a recurring dichotomy within 
peacekeeping and the interpretation and application of the fundamental 
principles, which is the clash between theory and practice or a battle 
between idealism and pragmatism. That is, whilst UN peacekeeping was 
conceived in order to be a passive, monitoring tool, in reality, in order to 
achieve its aim of maintaining international peace and security, it has had 
to mould, adapt and evolve beyond these initial conceptions – as has 
already been seen with the other two fundamental principles. Therefore, it 
could be said that whilst a certain position or desire is postulated, in 
practice this may not occur. This is a difficulty which persists today, with 
current MONUSCO military personnel noting that there is an ‘absolute 
tension’ between the idealism and universalism of rights and 
responsibilities, which is translated into the mandate, and the difficulties 
peacekeepers face when trying to apply that criteria.282 Thus, the ‘idealist 
position’ of, for example, limited use of force ‘is right but the pragmatic 
position is what happens’.283 It could be further argued that this spotlights 
a broader issue of the approach peacekeeping takes to post-conflict states 
which is, applying a TWAIL lens, seemingly based upon Global North 
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standards and ideals, with a lack of consideration for the complexities of 
the Global South state. Put simply, it could be seen as demonstrating how 
peacekeeping operations and their mandates are an example of an 
oversimplified Western answer to a very complex, misunderstood 
problem.284 
No more so is this dichotomy evident than with ONUC and its rapid 
evolution of the non-use of force which was repeated when the UN returned 
to the Congo in August 1999 with MONUC. Similar to ONUC’s deployment, 
as previously noted, MONUC was deployed as a traditional, passive 
operation of 90 military personnel, designed to monitor and observe the 
Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement285 and was not authorised to use force beyond 
self-defence. Thus, the principle of non-use of force was narrowly 
interpreted.286 However, as with ONUC, within one year of deployment the 
operation rapidly and forcefully expanded, with a ‘second phase’ of 
deployment in February 2000, raising the troop ceiling to 500 observers 
and 5,537 military personnel287 – a significant increase from the initial 
deployment. This expansion coincided with the UN’s shift to robust 
peacekeeping and the publication of the Brahimi Report, which expanded 
the use of force from individual self-defence to defence of the mission.288 
As was seen in Chapters 2 and 3, through robust peacekeeping, 
peacekeepers were now permitted to use force to defend themselves, the 
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mission’s components and the mandate. Thus, as was seen in the previous 
Chapter, the principle of non-use of force was notably expanded, resulting 
in a simultaneous expansion of peacekeeping’s frameworks and 
boundaries, which, in turn, began to undermine the principle of non-
intervention.289  For MONUC, this robustness was reflected in its Security 
Council mandate which, for the first time, expressly stated that it was 
‘acting under Chapter VII’, permitting MONUC to ‘take the necessary 
action’, as it deemed ‘within its capabilities’ to protect UN personnel, 
facilities and equipment and to protect civilians ‘under imminent threat of 
physical violence’.290 Therefore, again, the UN, upon returning to the 
Congo, rapidly expanded its interpretation and application of the principle 
of non-use force. Although, on this occasion, whereas ONUC arguably 
stepped out on its own in its expansion, MONUC’s broader application of 
the use of force was in-keeping with the general consensus within 
peacekeeping at that time.291 However, in an act of Secretary-General 
norm entrepreneurship and reflecting the use of the DRC as a laboratory 
for UN peacekeeping, the principle was evolved further in 2002 following 
another increase in troops to 8,700 personnel.292 On this occasion, the 
Council endorsed a SG proposal for a revised concept of operations293 which 
called for the significant strengthening of MONUC through the creation of a 
‘forward force’ composed of ‘two robust task forces’ in order to support the 
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disarmament, demobilisation and repatriation (DDR) of foreign armed 
groups.294 Within this mandate, however, the Council simply ‘endorsed’ the 
proposal and did not explicitly invoke Chapter VII or permit the operation 
to ‘take all necessary measures’ when conducting these duties. It is 
therefore suggested that this ‘leads to the conclusion that this was not an 
authorisation to use force beyond self-defence’.295 Whilst this may be true, 
it could be argued that the increased military presence and the introduction 
of ‘robust’ task forces all create the persona of a much more robust, forceful 
operation. That is, it may not have broadened the use of force beyond self-
defence but it arguably could still be viewed as a subtle, vertical expansion 
of the principle or, at the very least, a clarification of the newer concept of 
self-defence, as it permitted force during the fulfilment of a mandate task 
– DDR. 
Indeed, further nuances within the norm of non-use of force emerged 
through MONUC when, in 2003, again following a Secretary-General 
recommendation,296 its use of force was notably expanded with the 
introduction of a ‘Interim Emergency Multinational Force’ (IEMF).297 This 
temporary French-led force was deployed in Bunia for four months and 
authorised to undertake ‘all necessary measures’ to fulfil its mandate.298 
Most notably, the aim of this force, which later became the EU-led 
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Operation Artemis,299 was ‘to contribute to the stabilization of the security 
conditions’.300 The language within the mandates was therefore, again, 
robust but now also included the term ‘stabilisation’,301 which could likewise 
be perceived as a creeping expansion or experiment of this broadened 
principle of non-use force and, thus, an expansion of peacekeeping’s legal 
framework. As a result, these subtle developments – force to fulfil DDR 
tasks, the IEMF and the introduction of stabilisation – could all be seen as 
undermining the principle of non-intervention as they broaden the principle 
of non-use of force and permit the peacekeeping operation to engage in 
further activities which creep closer to the intervention boundary line. That 
is, these activities are proactive (in comparison to the traditional concept 
of reactive force in self-defence) and relate to matters which fall within the 
scope of the host state’s sovereignty, such as domestic and foreign policies, 
territorial integrity and state authority, with the ill-defined notion of 
‘stabilisation’, in particular, engaged in institution building. As such, the 
peacekeeping operations use of force here could arguably be viewed as 
coercive action designed to influence change in these areas of the host 
state, thereby amounting to intervention. Even if, at this point, the 
activities fall short of this threshold and do not amount to intervention or a 
violation of the principle of non-intervention, they are, at the very least, a 
notable expansion of peacekeeping’s frameworks and, therefore, expand 
                                   
299 S Ulriksen, C Gourlay and C Mace, ‘Operation Artemis: The Shape of Things to Come?’ (2004) 11(3) 
IntPeacekeep 508-525. 
300 ibid, 1.  
301 See: A Gilder A, ‘The Effect of ‘Stabilization’ in the Mandates and Practice of UN Peace Operations’ (2019) 66 
NILR 47-73. 
 82 
the red boundary line surrounding peacekeeping, consequently contracting 
the boundaries of non-intervention. 
This broadening of the principle of non-use of force also blurs the 
boundaries between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Indeed, for 
some, ONUC’s robust military activities, in particular, Operation Morthor 
‘marked a temporary lapse of ONUC from peacekeeping into peace 
enforcement’.302 As the former Under-Secretary for Peacekeeping, Marrack 
Goulding, noted, ONUC was the first ‘case of a transition from peacekeeping 
to peace enforcement’.303 However, the ICJ in Expenses found differently, 
highlighting that the force was directed at non-state actors, rather than the 
state, noting that ONUC was not ‘coercive or enforcement action’ and was 
commenced ‘at the request, or with the consent’ of the host state.304 This 
statement from the ICJ suggests, then, that ONUC was not intervention as 
it was supported by host state consent and was not coercive action directed 
at the state. Therefore, as with the principle of impartiality, even if the 
principle of non-use of force is interpreted broadly, the existence of host 
state consent, again, means that the operation is consensual peacekeeping 
and thus not peace enforcement or in violation of the principle of non-
intervention. Despite this, perhaps the argument can still be made as to 
how far these principles are able to expand before they stretch 
peacekeeping’s boundaries to its limits and take it across the line into 
intervention. Indeed, for MONUC’s deployment, the then Secretary-
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General, Kofi Annan, later noted that ‘a firm military intervention, of the 
kind that went beyond the impartial peacekeeping’ that had previously been 
implemented was necessary to create stability in the East of Congo.305 
Arguably, this could be interpreted as both a disregard for the fundamental 
principles or, again, a battle of idealism versus pragmatism, with the latter 
prevailing. By extension, it may then be argued that this suggests that 
MONUC, in practice, went beyond (and was intended to go beyond) 
peacekeeping, potentially crossing the line into intervention. However, 
again, it is seemingly the element of consent which hangs as a single 
thread, holding the peacekeeping operation back from violating the 
principle of non-intervention.  
4.2 An Extension of the State? 
This precarious expansion of non-use of force in the Congo began to peak 
from 2003 to 2006 when the country underwent a transition period, holding 
its first democratic elections since its independence. During this time, 
MONUC’s troop capacity significantly increased again306 and it was 
authorised to use ‘all necessary means’ to complete its mandated tasks, 
which began to include both the protection of civilians (PoC) and election 
support.307 For example, it was able to use force to ‘deter any foreign or 
Congolese armed group from attempting to use force to threaten the 
political process’308 and to assist in the ‘establishment of a secure and 
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peaceful environment for the holding of free and transparent elections’.309 
In a similar vein, the Security Council again authorised the deployment of 
a temporary, EU-led force -EUFOR- to ‘support MONUC to stabilise the 
situation’ and contribute to the protection of civilians.310 Once again, then, 
the Council had authorised a smaller, temporary force and invoked the 
language of ‘stabilisation’ which resulted in some of the most robust and 
forceful peacekeeping action in the UN’s history.311 In particular, the term 
‘stabilisation’ was included in the operation’s name in 2010 with the shift 
from MONUC to MONUSCO,312 which further militarised the operation, 
permitting an increased level of force in order to fulfil a broad range of task 
in order to create stability.313   
Furthermore, the inclusion of protection of civilians within MONUC’s 
mandate again reflected the broader peacekeeping and intervention 
agenda, as seen in Chapters 2 and 3. It also marked the beginning of 
MONUC/MONUSCOs engagement with PoC, which eventually became (and 
remains) a priority task for the operation.314 Whilst this will be discussed in 
greater detail in the subsequent Chapter, for the principle of non-use of 
force, the inclusion of PoC expanded the principle as peacekeepers were 
permitted to use force in defence of themselves, the mission components 
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and the mandate – which now included the extremely ambiguous task of 
acting to protect civilians from threats of violence.315 Thus, it could be 
argued that the potential for force to be used, under the justification of 
PoC, became, essentially, limitless. Moreover, this, again, highlights how 
peacekeeping’s principles and norms cohabit in a competitive arena, 
constantly being re-imagined and altered in reaction to a re-interpretation 
or application of its counterparts. Indeed, whilst the task of PoC is 
‘supposed to be implemented neutrally and impartially’; that is, against 
both state and non-state actors, within the Congo, it is usually only 
implemented against the latter.316 As such, when exercising force against 
non-state actors, to protect civilians from attacks, MONUC/MONUSCO, like 
ONUC, has ‘ended up fighting on the government’s side’.317 As was seen 
within the impartiality section, this then raises issues relating to the risks 
for peacekeepers, the perception by armed groups of the peacekeepers as 
legitimate targets and the potential triggering of international humanitarian 
law. Moreover, it arguably also places the peacekeeping operation in the 
unusual position of essentially becoming (or being perceived to be) an 
extensive of the host state armed forces, as its selective use of force almost 
exclusively against armed groups, in essence, results in the eradication of 
the state’s enemies or opponents – an issue which arguably also occurs 
with the FIB and its targeting mandate. 
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4.2.1  Neutralising state opponents 
The introduction of the FIB in 2013 therefore marked another significant 
expansion or evolution of the principle of non-use of force within the Congo, 
specifically through its ability to launch ‘targeted offensive operations’ to 
‘neutralise’ armed groups’.318 Indeed, by its own admission, the UN labelled 
the FIB ‘the first ever offensive combat force’ in UN peacekeeping,319 
signalling that this was perhaps a new era of robust peacekeeping. Or, at 
the very least, given that it was created ‘on an exceptional basis and 
without setting a precedent’, it was to be viewed as a temporary expansion 
of the principle of non-use of force.320 
Whilst the level of force which the FIB is permitted to use is seemingly no 
different from the level of force which the rest of the framework brigade 
are authorised to use under MONUSCO’s PoC mandate,321 the difference 
(and therefore the expansion to the non-use of force principle) lies in the 
way in which this use of force may be triggered or used. Under any PoC 
mandate, force is authorised against ‘any individual or group that commits 
physical violence against civilians or threatens to do so’.322 Thus, regardless 
of whether the perpetrator is a state or non-state actor, the source of the 
threat is ‘a legitimate target’.323 Within the FIB’s mandate, however, ‘the 
M23 is, named in the resolution as the target, regardless of whether they’re 
physically attacking civilians or jeopardising the safety of civilians in any 
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particular moment’.324 It is this -the specific, explicit targeting of one of the 
parties to the conflict- which is ‘the new, dynamic, tectonic shift in the 
mandate’-325 not the fact that the FIB is using robust force, which was 
already authorised in MONUSCO’s PoC mandate. The targeting of specific 
actors then, as with the principle of impartiality, is also extremely 
problematic for the principle of non-use of force and, arguably, expands 
peacekeeping’s frameworks to its limits, taking peacekeeping much closer 
to the intervention line, potentially violating the principle of non-
intervention, if such force is used.  
However, whilst this remains true, it has been noted that the FIB ‘did not 
actually need to invoke the offensive nature of the force’ because ‘the M23 
did something incredibly stupid’ and attacked the UN.326 Therefore, the 
FIB’s actions against the M23 were not ‘an offensive operation, it was 
always a self-defence’.327 As a former MONUSCO military commander 
noted, by attacking the UN, the M23 ‘gave us the obvious reasons to 
intervene, we had to stop the threat, we had to stop the source of what 
was killing civilians’ and ‘we was able to fire without causing civilian 
casualty’.328 Thus, whilst the FIB had a more expanded version of the use 
of force, it instead relied upon the broader, self-defence interpretation of 
force, acting in defence of itself and civilians.329 As such, it can be argued 
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that this expansion of the principle of non-use of force is only an expansion 
in theory and not, yet, in practice. Therefore, it could perhaps be seen as 
undermining but not yet violating the principle of non-intervention. 
Similarly, the inclusion of the ill-defined term ‘neutralising’ also seemingly 
expands the principle of non-use of force, taking peacekeeping much closer 
to coercive, enforcement action. Indeed, the neutralising of armed groups 
‘is seen by most people [within the ‘broader peacekeeping community’] as 
the crossing of a line that is very problematic for a peacekeeping operation’, 
which was demonstrated by the ‘FIB experience, post-M23’.330 Again, this 
neutralisation of specific targets is also where there is an overlap with the 
principle of impartiality, as previously discussed, as the choice of actor to 
target has implications for the UN’s partiality and the perception of the UN. 
Again, the selection of targets also potentially renders the operation 
vulnerable to being used by the state to eradicate its enemies. Thus, in 
these instances where MONUSCO is mandated to support the state in 
neutralising armed groups, the peacekeeping operation could arguably be 
viewed as an extension of the state. Indeed, these ‘neutralisation’ efforts, 
which are designed to establish security and stability in certain areas of the 
Congo, form part of MONUSCO’s broader stabilisation-related activities 
which, some have argued, result in MONUSCO ‘entering into a form of 
mutual symbiosis with the state’.331 That is, in these contexts, such as when 
MONUSCO has supported the state in neutralising the ADF armed group, 
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‘the UN is an extension and amplification of the state, increasing its 
monopolising potential in the security realm, helping it to eradicate 
enemies’ and boosting the state’s capacity to deliver basic services to the 
population.332 This, again, appears difficult to reconcile with peacekeeping’s 
fundamental principles and, by extension, the principle of non-intervention, 
and creates the perception of the UN as undertaking a ‘parastatal role’,333 
with over 60 per cent of the population viewing the operation’s partnership 
with the Congolese army negatively.334 Thus, if the operation is seemingly 
undertaking functions of the state or acting alongside the host in the 
execution of these sovereign functions, this could, again, be viewed as a 
form of intervention but, arguably, one which undermines but does not 
violate the principle of non-intervention. It could be argued that where the 
operation undertakes these tasks in joint operations or in co-operation with 
the host state, it could be viewed as another form of intervention by 
invitation. If the state is willing to accept the UN undertaking this more 
forceful role, it could perhaps be viewed as intervention by invitation as the 
same arguments which have been made earlier and in Chapter 3 in regards 
to joint operations could, again, be applied, with this being viewed as ‘a 
function of the host state’s consent’.335 
Moreover, the targeting and neutralising mandate also has an effect on the 
legal character of the operation and the risk to peacekeepers. Indeed, as 
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Mona Ali Khalil notes, ‘to the extent that the FIB was an integral part of 
MONUSCO, the FIB mandate resulted in MONUSCO being deemed a party 
to the conflict – not just the FIB’.336 As a result, if and when the FIB is 
engaged in forceful action and therefore a party to the conflict, international 
humanitarian law would be triggered;337 thus, again, contributing to the 
legal frameworks surrounding peacekeeping. Further, whilst Müller argues 
that this ‘intensified role of the UN as an enforcement actor’ was ‘not 
prepared by an assessment and adjustment of the rules and principles 
applicable to UN missions’,338 interviews conducted throughout this 
research suggest this might not be entirely accurate. Indeed, this was a 
matter which was considered by the creators of the Brigade, who 
contemplated the potential scenarios or implications of the FIB using force 
against the M23.339 This included debating whether ‘if you stop being a 
peacekeeper and you become subject to the laws of war, does that make 
the Secretary-General, as a sort of Commander in Chief of the Intervention 
Brigade, a legitimate target?’.340 It could therefore be argued that there 
was a recognition of the legal and practical implications of the Brigade but 
this seemingly did not outweigh the apparent need for the FIB.341 As such, 
even though the legal implications were considered and the mandate was 
‘couched in all sorts of caveated language about ‘without prejudice to the 
principles of peacekeeping’’, it is ‘a sort of conscious departure’ from the 
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fundamental principles, particularly the non-use of force.342 The inclusion 
of the FIB within MONUSCO therefore expanded the principle of non-use of 
force by permitting the use of targeting, and had the consequential effect 
of changing ‘the nature of the mission’ as ‘it really transforms peace 
operations into targets and legitimate targets’.343 FIB troops thus have a 
‘double status of combatants and of protected persons’,344 creating a 
further nuance within the principle of non-use of force and placing the 
operation closer to the intervention line. Indeed, it has been argued that 
the UN understood the FIB to be a peace enforcement mission rather than 
a peacekeeping mission because it not only uses robust force, it also takes 
it further into offensive action.345 Therefore, as the peacekeeping operation 
crosses the line into combatancy, it must also cross the line into 
intervention, making the action one of enforcement not peacekeeping. 
Once more then, the introduction of the FIB significantly expanded 
peacekeeping’s frameworks, blurring the boundaries between 
peacekeeping and intervention and thereby noticeably undermining the 
principle of non-intervention. 
4.3 Force-less Force 
It is clear to see that the UN’s peacekeeping operations within the Congo 
have taken a very broad interpretation and application of the principle of 
non-use of force, thus significantly expanding peacekeeping’s frameworks 
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blurring its boundaries. At times, this has been in-keeping with the general 
consensus on the use of force and interventionist rhetoric, as was outlined 
in Chapters 2 and 3, such as the shift to robust peacekeeping.346 Whilst, at 
other times, the operation has arguably taken the initiative and expanded 
the principle specifically within the Congo (e.g. ONUC during decolonisation 
and the FIB). This, once again, demonstrates how peacekeeping’s principles 
and norms are re-imagined or re-interpreted for each peacekeeping 
operation, emphasising the fluidity of the norms and the peacekeeping 
frameworks. It also highlights the use of the Congo as a peacekeeping 
laboratory, led by the SRSG and senior leadership, and the reputation which 
MONUC/MONUSCO has gained for being an innovative mission.347 This, in 
turn, reinforces the argument made in Chapter 3, that the office of the SG, 
in particular the SRSG, plays a pivotal norm entrepreneur role, significantly 
shaping a peacekeeping operation through their interpretation and 
application of the principles and norms of peacekeeping. 
However, throughout this expansion, despite the authorisation to use 
increased levels of force or target/neutralise named actors, this has not 
always resulted in these powers being used. Throughout MONUC’s 
deployment, despite the high levels of force which the operation was 
permitted to use under the broadened concept of self-defence, it was 
severely criticised for failing to take military action. In particular, it was 
criticised for failing to prevent armed rebels for taken the city of Bukavu in 
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2004, despite the presence of 700 MONUC troops authorised to ‘use all 
necessary means’.348 Similarly, the FIB has also been criticised for failing 
to act and for having little success after its initial offensive against the 
M23.349 Indeed, it is argued that ‘the dynamic which was created in the 
liberation’ of the territory which M23 had occupied ‘was not used to create 
a positive move and we [the FIB] started to hesitate’.350 Therefore, as 
senior UN personnel have noted ‘we almost never get into trouble for using 
too much force, but we always get into trouble when we use insufficient 
force’.351 They maintained that they have never had ‘a single conversation 
with any commander or civilian leader in MONUSCO saying ‘you use too 
much force’’;352 further arguing that MONUSCO has never received any 
complaints that they had used disproportionate or unauthorised force from 
the ICC or Congolese judicial process.353 In a similar vein, the Cruz report 
also criticised the operation for failing to use force, claiming that troop 
contributing nations (TCNs) have ‘Chapter VI syndrome’;354 thus, 
suggesting that there is, again, a gap between theory and practice. That is, 
whilst the principle of non-use of force may be expanded in theory, in 
practice it is not implemented to its fullest extent and, therefore, in reality, 
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peacekeeping’s framework or boundaries are not as expansive as first 
appears. Regardless, it still indicates a trend towards intervention, with a 
more aggressive, militarised form of peacekeeping.355 
Whilst there may be many reasons for this lack of use of force, such as the 
logistics or ‘unpreparedness’ of operating in terrain as diverse and complex 
as the Congo (e.g. engaging in jungle warfare),356 arguably a key factor is 
the TCNs. That is, the political will and interest of the TCN and, by 
extension, the risk-appetite of their troops within the field.357 It is 
frequently noted that some peacekeepers have a low risk appetite as ‘TCNs 
are not prepared for them to die on peacekeeping operations’.358 Indeed, 
‘no normal country would send soldiers to do this type of task and under 
these conditions’ as the jungle terrain of the Congo, combined with the 
unconventional composition of the armed groups requires ‘special forces’, 
as opposed to conspicuous peacekeepers in blue helmets and white 
vehicles.359 Therefore, it is very difficult to conduct these types of 
operations, even for ‘a national, very well organised and strictly 
commanded and controlled, well-trained military’.360 The difficulties of the 
operation, combined with the motivations of the TCNs thus result in a 
reluctance from peacekeepers. Whilst some troops may be ‘much more kind 
of focused, willing to engage and at least try to fulfil the mandate’ others 
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are not willing and able and ‘have no interest or an appetite to engage into 
an environment that is often alien to them’.361 This therefore may be one 
contributing factor or explanation for the lack of force used within the 
Congo, despite the heightened levels of use of force. It also, arguably, 
highlights the inadequacy of peacekeeping as a tool for this these types of 
activities, which, again, leads back to an overarching debate within 
peacekeeping, which is whether it should be undertaking enforcement-style 
tasks at all.362 As such, if the expanded use of force is not being used in 
practice, then it follows that there is little need for the broader 
interpretation of non-use of force and, as such, peacekeeping frameworks 
should be retracted, with a move back towards less robust peacekeeping. 
This, in turn, would bring peacekeeping away from the enforcement or 
intervention boundary line, consequently reducing peacekeeping’s 
interventionist nature and supporting the principle of non-intervention.  
Furthermore, the Cruz report’s highlighting of a seeming reluctance to 
execute Chapter VII action could perhaps be viewed as a recognition by 
some TCNs that such forceful,363 coercive action goes beyond 
peacekeeping’s remit and is, therefore, illegal intervention. There are of 
course, exceptions to these generalisations, as the President of Uruguay 
vehemently disagreed with robust peacekeeping and the deployment of the 
FIB, yet still provided troops who, perhaps somewhat ironically, ‘did a good 
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job’ as they were more familiar with the terrain and style of warfare than 
other TCNs.364 It could also, from a TWAIL perspective, be viewed as an 
unwillingness by the Global South TCNs to carry out the bidding of the 
Global North led Security Council. The levels of force used within 
peacekeeping operations may therefore be dependent, to a certain extent, 
on the motivations, interests and non-interventionist views of the TCN. In 
particular, many of the Global South TCNs (such as countries in the G77 
and NAM) are strong supporters of the principle of non-intervention, 
perhaps offering an explanation for the reluctance to engage in robust force 
in the host state. This then leads, again, to the importance of the 
fundamental principles in providing a red boundary line around 
peacekeeping, consequently preventing it from crossing the line and 
becoming intervention. Within the Congo, the rapid evolution of force, 
introduction of temporary forces and terms such as ‘neutralisation’ and 
stabilisation’, combined with the broad PoC mandates and the FIB’s 
targeting powers all arguably expand the principle of non-use force, at 
times to its limits and perhaps even beyond. As was noted with the principle 
of impartiality, this expansion then has ‘a degree of drift, which has knock 
on effects on the other two’ principles;365 demonstrating the inextricable 
links between the holy trinity and their un-harmonious co-existence. More 
specifically, it arguably highlights how the peacekeeping operation, again, 
is reliant on the principle of consent to maintain its peacekeeping status 
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and how the basis of robust joint of jointly planned operations may lie in 
consent, with these peacekeeping operations therefore better understood 
as a form of intervention by invitation.366 
As with the principle of impartiality, questions remain as to how far the 
principle can be expanded before it is no longer a legal principle of 
peacekeeping. It appears that the increased levels of force, through the 
expanded interpretation of self-defence, may remain as they are now 
common practice throughout most peacekeeping operations.367 However, 
what is still questionable is the effect that the FIB and its 
targeting/neutralising mandate may have on the principle - whether it is 
simply a temporary or exceptional expansion, or whether it has now set a 
precedent and has permanently expanded the boundaries of 
peacekeeping’s use of force. For some, it is obvious that ‘of course, in legal 
terms, we now have a precedence, there’s no denying it’ but it is noted that 
the ‘alignment of stars’ which was needed to create the Brigade is hard to 
replicate.368 That is, there existed a rare agreement or mutuality of 
understanding between the Security Council, those in the field and 
MONUSCO in order to allow for the creation of the Brigade.369 For others, it 
is perhaps a welcome relief that a replication of the FIB would be difficult. 
Whilst it is recognised that the ‘FIB had its moment where it was potentially 
useful’, in that it had an important ‘political role’, namely through having 
SADC, as a regional entity invested in Congo, ultimately, the FIB is said to 
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be ‘flawed and shouldn’t be repeated’.370 Indeed, senior personnel within 
the UN’s Policy, Evaluation and Training Division have noted that ‘in terms 
of doctrine and policy development, we have always treated the FIB as a 
Secretary-General’s exception, as does the Council’s approach’ through, for 
example, the explicit statement within MONUSCO’s resolutions, that it does 
not create a precedent.371 There was therefore a sense of relief ‘from the 
perspective of people in New York and peacekeeping policy people’ who 
were ‘very glad that it hasn’t been replicated anywhere else because it is 
such an exceptional mandate’ that runs counter to tried and tested 
peacekeeping doctrine and principles.372 
5 ‘Holy Trinity’ or ‘Holy Principle’? 
An exploration of an interpretation and application of peacekeeping’s legal 
framework in the DRC therefore raises numerous issues. Firstly, this 
Chapter has demonstrated how the fundamental principles which constitute 
peacekeeping’s core legal framework – consent, impartiality and non-use 
of force- do not exist harmoniously but, instead, overlap and are continually 
re-interpreted, re-applied and re-balanced, arguably, through each 
mandate renewal or significant evolution of the peacekeeping operation. 
That is, when one of the principles is expanded, or interpreted more 
broadly, such as when MONUSCO has embarked upon joint operations with 
the Congolese armed forces, then this has significantly expanded the 
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principles of impartiality and limited use of force and, as such, has required 
a re-balancing of all of the principles.  
This, in turn, leads to the second notable issue which has arisen from this 
Chapter’s exploration – that an expanded interpretation of these principles 
results in an expanded peacekeeping framework, which then undermines 
or potentially contravenes the principle of non-intervention. Throughout 
this Chapter, there have been various points throughout ONUC, MONUC 
and MONUSCO’s deployment where it is arguable that peacekeeping has 
amounted to coercive action to influence change in the host state and, 
therefore, intervention. Examples of this include: ONUC’s involvement in 
the Katanga secession, MONUC’s shift to a stabilisation operation, joint 
operations conducted by both MONUC and MONUSCO and the 
implementation of the HRDDP. It has been argued that in all of these 
instances, the peacekeeping operation has engaged in sovereign matters 
such as the composition of the host state armed forces and diplomatic or 
political policy issues and has attempted to coerce change within these 
areas, thereby attempting to influence change in the host state; thus, 
amounting to intervention. Similarly, the Chapter has also highlighted how, 
applying a TWAIL lens, these elements of coercion often expose the 
recurring North-South divide, patterns of dominance and the furtherance 
of Western-centric ideals and standards – such as the pressure exerted on 
states to provide consent to a mandate renewal and the imposition of 
conditions or standards (through the HRDDP) which must be met before 
joint operations can be undertaken. 
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The third issue which has then arisen from this Chapter’s examination of 
peacekeeping in the DRC, is whether ONUC, MONUC and MONUSCO’s re-
interpretation of the fundamental principles, and therefore the 
peacekeeping frameworks, are best viewed as an evolution or a breach of 
peacekeeping’s boundaries and, by extension, whether they undermine or 
contravene the principle of non-intervention. Again, the question which 
must be asked is – should there be a limit on how far these principles may 
evolve? This is a particularly poignant issue when it comes to the current 
formation of MONUSCO, which includes the FIB. As this Chapter has 
demonstrated, the FIB has arguably been one of the greatest challenges to 
the fundamental principles of peacekeeping, significantly blurring the 
boundaries between peacekeeping and peace enforcement or intervention. 
It has invoked numerous debates over the legality of the operation, its 
compatibility with the fundamental principles and its practical effectiveness, 
including the risk it imposes upon peacekeepers and the potential 
invocation of international humanitarian law. It has also highlighted the 
different approaches to intervention, particularly within the Security 
Council. That is, whilst the UK and France supported the creation of the 
Brigade, both Russia and China expressed reservations, with Russia 
emphasising the inclusion of the fundamental principles in the resolution 
and China stressing the importance of the operation not setting a 
precedent.373 Despite this, the Chapter has highlighted how the FIB’s 
mandate to use targeted force to neutralise armed groups is particularly 
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problematic and difficult to reconcile with the principles of impartiality and 
limited use of force, thus taking the peacekeeping operation beyond the 
boundaries of peacekeeping and into the realm of intervention, thereby 
seemingly violating the principle of non-intervention. However, as has been 
noted, it appears that for this expansion of MONUSCO to include the FIB 
and for most other noticeable evolutions throughout MONUC and 
MONUSCO’s history, the operations have been saved from crossing the 
boundary line and becoming intervention because of the initial host state 
consent that was given to the deployment of the operations. Therefore, 
whilst the principles of impartiality and non-use of force may be expanded 
to their very limits, host state consent acts as a single, thin barrier, 
preventing the operation from violating these principles and amounting to 
a violation of the principle of non-intervention. Put differently, the UN’s 
peacekeeping operations in the Congo demonstrate how consent is the 
distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement or intervention. 
It follows, then, that, in theory, as a peacekeeping operation is only ever 
deployed with host state consent, it can continually expand and evolve once 
in the field, without ever violating the principle of non-intervention, because 
of this initial consent. This is arguably problematic as it turns the 
peacekeeping operation into a hybrid peacekeeping-intervention, which is 
a far cry from the traditional concept of peacekeeping. Indeed, in these 
instances, it is perhaps best to view the peacekeeping operation not as 
peacekeeping but as a form of intervention by invitation, ‘a function of the 
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host state’s consent’,374 as has been argued throughout this Chapter, in 
particular in relation to joint operations.  
This deeper level of analysis into peacekeeping’s legal frameworks in 
practice has therefore demonstrated the complex relationship between the 
fundamental legal principles and the ability of a peacekeeping operation to 
significantly evolve without, overall, breaching peacekeeping’s boundary 
line and becoming intervention. These evolutions within the operations in 
the Congo could therefore be seen as, at times, undermining the principle 
of non-intervention but, ultimately, not violating it because of the principle 
of consent. Building upon this analysis, the subsequent Chapter will 
examine peacekeeping’s normative framework, again providing specific 
examples of how peacekeeping’s norms have been interpreted and applied 
within the Congo and, whether, they too support or undermine the principle 
of non-intervention. 
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1 Introduction  
Whilst the fundamental principles form the core of peacekeeping, 
constituting a large portion of peacekeeping’s legal framework, surrounding 
this is a broader normative framework. Following on from Chapter 4’s 
analysis of the legal principles, this Chapter will consider how the norms of 
democracy promotion, protection of civilians (PoC) and the prohibition of 
sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) have been interpreted and applied in 
the Congo. These norms, although possessing commonalities with 
principles of law are, ultimately, not underpinned by law and therefore do 
not amount to legal principles. However, this distinction between laws and 
norms is not always a clear one, as will be seen within this Chapter, as 
some norms (such as PoC) possess some legal underpinnings and therefore 
make a secondary contribution to peacekeeping’s legal framework. The 
purpose of this Chapter, then, is to explore the evolution of peacekeeping’s 
norms within the UN’s operations in the Congo, examining, as was done in 
Chapter 4, whether an application of these norms has, at times, resulted in 
peacekeeping reinforcing or undermining the principle or non-intervention. 
1.1  Multi-dimensional Christmas Trees 
As seen in Chapter 3, as peacekeeping operations significantly expanded 
after the Cold War, with the shift to multi-dimensional peacekeeping, 
normative aspects began to play an increasingly important role.1 These 
norms therefore form a part of peacekeeping’s broader normative 
                                   
1 See: M Bothe, ‘UN Peace Operations’ in D Fleck (ed) The Handbook of the Law of Visiting Forces (2nd edn, OUP, 
2018) 50-74. 
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framework which, unlike the ‘holy trinity’, are not required by fundamental 
rules of international law and are therefore not legal principles. Despite 
this, the norms do assist in dealing with some of peacekeeping’s complex 
legal questions, such as the responsibilities and liabilities of peacekeepers 
accused of sexual exploitation and abuse, and the applicability of 
international humanitarian and human rights law.2 As such, the norms, at 
times, may have legal underpinnings or may invoke elements of 
international law thereby providing a subsidiary contribution to 
peacekeeping’s legal framework, again demonstrating how, as discussed in 
Chapter 3, the frameworks overlap. This Chapter will therefore assess how 
this normative framework has been interpreted and applied in the Congo 
and how this has impacted the boundaries of peacekeeping and, 
consequently, the principle of non-intervention. It will be argued that, as 
with the legal principles in the previous Chapter, where these new norms 
have been interpreted broadly, it has expanded the boundaries of 
peacekeeping, consequently taking peacekeeping closer to intervention and 
thus contracting or potentially contravening the principle of non-
intervention.  
An expansion of these three newer concepts has also seemingly had a 
knock-on effect on the fundamental legal principles. For example, both the 
protection of civilians and democracy promotion have resulted in increased 
levels of force being used. Thus, an expansion of these norms may result 
                                   
2 See: ND White, ‘Peacekeeping and International Law’ in J Koops, N MacQueen, T Tardy and PD Williams (eds) 
The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (OUP, 2016) 43-59.   
 4 
in a simultaneous expansion or re-imagining of the principle of non-use of 
force. Again, as was discussed in the previous Chapter, this highlights how 
peacekeeping’s norms exist in an unharmoniously competitive arena, in 
which they are re-balanced for each peacekeeping operation and, even, 
each mandate.3 This re-balancing or waxing and waning of norms is 
particularly evident in the UN’s peacekeeping operations in the DRC, which 
is often credited for being innovative4 and ‘a test case for a lot of ideas’.5 
In particular, MONUSCO is said to be ‘quite proactive in initiating changes 
from within the mission, rather than waiting for the Council or waiting for 
headquarters to tell them’.6 These innovations are often led by or credited 
to senior, and to a certain extent, junior personnel within MONUSCO, in 
particular the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
(SRSG).7 It could be argued, then, that MONUSCO’s interpretation and 
implementation of the peacekeeping norms and Council mandate once 
again highlights the key norm entrepreneurship role of the SG, SRSG and 
other senior leadership stemming from the SG’s office, which was explored 
in Chapter 3.8  
This then leads to a further issue with these new, somewhat controversial 
norms, which has arisen in the Congo, and that is the expansion of the 
                                   
3 J Karlsrud, ‘Special Representatives of the Secretary-General as Norm Arbitrators? Understanding Bottom-up 
Authority in UN Peacekeeping’ (2013) 19(4) GG 525-544. 
4 Interview with Senior UN DPPA-DPO Personnel (‘Interviewee 9’) (New York, 27 November 2019) DOI: 
<http://doi.org/10.17639/nott.7119>  
5 Interview with Independent Expert and Former UN Political Adviser (‘Interviewee 8’) (New York, 26 November 
2019) DOI: <http://doi.org/10.17639/nott.7119>. 
6 Interview with Senior UN DPO Personnel, Policy, Evaluation and Training Division (‘Interviewee 10’) (New York, 
3 December 2019) DOI: <http://doi.org/10.17639/nott.7119> pg 37. 
7 ibid. 
8 Section 2. 
 5 
peacekeeping mandate and the tasks of multi-dimensional peacekeeping 
operations. Contemporary peacekeeping mandates are often referred to as 
‘Christmas tree’ mandates, given the extensive list of tasks which the 
Security Council places upon an operation.9 For some, these mandates are 
problematic, particularly in countries such as the DRC, as, once 
MONUC/MONUSCO was ‘no longer helping parties emerging from a conflict 
[to] implement a peace agreement’, it became ‘an open ended, ill-defined 
statebuilding enterprise’.10 This is then said to have become further 
problematic as the operation’s PoC mandate developed, with the concept 
of PoC expanding to include ‘protecting all civilians, everywhere at all times’ 
and ‘obviously, that’s created a huge gap in terms of expectations versus 
what the mission is actually able to do’.11 Similarly, the one-year mandate 
system and renewal ‘frustrates a lot of actors on the ground’ and ‘seems a 
little bit futile’, with ‘so much energy and time’ going into ‘discussing and 
negotiating’, when ‘everyone really knows that in order to bring peace and 
stability to a context like Congo, you need much more medium and longer 
term solutions’.12  
As a result of these significantly expanded mandates, in 2019/2020, as the 
operation is preparing to leave, senior UN personnel note that ‘we’re 
looking for an exit strategy’ and ‘we realise ‘well, there is no exit’’.13 Whilst 
                                   
9 Security Council Report, ‘Is Christmas Really Over? The Mandating of Peace Operations’ (UNSC, 22 February 
2019) <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/research_report_council_mandating_february_2019.pdf> Accessed 20 May 2020. 
10 Interview with Senior Political Affairs Officer, UN DPO (‘Interviewee 16’) (New York, 10 December 2019) DOI: 
<http://doi.org/10.17639/nott.7119> pg 18. 
11 ibid. 
12 Interview with Senior Adviser in the Office of the Special Representative on Conflict Related Sexual Violence 
(‘Interviewee 14) (New York, 9 December 2019) DOI: <http://doi.org/10.17639/nott.7119> pg 21. 
13 Interviewee 16 (n10). 
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there may be numerous answers to this conundrum, one possible solution 
which could perhaps be learnt from MONUSCO’s experience is that, ‘the 
Council should be less ambitious in designing mandates’.14 Arguably, one 
way in which this could be done, is through a retraction of peacekeeping’s 
normative frameworks, as this Chapter will explore. The Chapter therefore 
seeks to question – should these additional norms be a part of 
peacekeeping frameworks? That is, although these norms and the activities 
which stem from them have now become common-place in the evolved 
model of peacekeeping, with the numerous multi-dimensional operations, 
should they remain a model for peacekeeping? In other words, has 
peacekeeping now reached the limits of its current evolutionary cycle and, 
therefore, should it begin to retract back to the more traditional model of 
peacekeeping and away from these large, multi-dimensional operations? 
All of these questions arise when considering the UN’s operations in the 
Congo and, in particular, MONUSCO’s interpretation and application of the 
norms of democracy promotion, PoC and prohibition of SEA. With 
MONUSCO now almost two years into a three-year exit strategy, and with 
plans to gradually withdraw from the six provinces it is currently present in 
(starting with the Kasais in June 2021),15 the difficulties in withdrawing 
such a large operation from a complex situation are evident.16 It therefore 
calls into question the need, feasibility and (as has been explored 
                                   
14 Interviewee 8 (n5) pg 57. 
15 UNSC, ‘Report of the Secretary General’ (30 November 2020) UN Doc S/2020/1150. 
16 See: UNSC, ‘Joint Strategy on the Progressive Drawdown of MONUSCO’ (27 October 2020) UN Doc 
S/2020/1041. 
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throughout this thesis) the legality of multi-dimensional operations. 
Indeed, the steady decline in these large peacekeeping operations over the 
last five years due to budget pressures, a divided Security Council and 
contested track records, combined with the impact of the COVID-19 
pandemic,17 have led some to question their future.18 It could be argued, 
then, that a shrinking of the Security Council mandates, in particular 
through a reduction of peacekeeping’s normative framework, would help to 
resolve some of these practical issues and some of the legal implications, 
such as debates over peacekeeping’s Charter basis.19 This retraction of 
peacekeeping’s normative framework would then retract the overall 
boundaries of peacekeeping and firm the thin red line between 
peacekeeping and intervention, thereby reinforcing the principle of non-
intervention. 
This Chapter will therefore explore all of these issues, taking each of the 
norms in turn – democracy promotion, protection of civilians and 
prohibition of sexual exploitation and abuse- focusing on how an expansion 
of these norms, through multi-dimensional operations such as 
MONUC/MONUSCO, has expanded peacekeeping’s frameworks and thus, 
undermined or potentially contravened the principle of non-intervention. 
Similar to the previous Chapter, it will seek to question how far these norms 
                                   
17 IPI, ‘COVID-19 Crisis an Opportunity to “Rethink and Develop UN Peacekeeping Further”’ (IPI 7 October 2020) 
<https://www.ipinst.org/2020/10/un-peace-ops-during-covid-19-high-level-dialogue#3> Accessed 7 October 
2020. 
18 A Day, ‘The Future of Multidimensional Peacekeeping’ (IPI, 15 September 2020) 
<https://theglobalobservatory.org/2020/09/future-multidimensional-peacekeeping/> Accessed 10 October 
2020. 
19 See: Chapter 3, Section 1. 
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can evolve before they no longer remain relevant to peacekeeping or 
expand peacekeeping’s frameworks to its limits, taking it into the realm of 
intervention. Put differently, it will question whether the Christmas tree 
mandates in the Congo have expanded peacekeeping too far and, as such, 
whether a narrower interpretation of these norms is needed to limit the 
ever-broadening concept of peacekeeping and to reinforce, rather than 
undermine, the principle of non-intervention.  
2 Democracy Promotion  
As seen in Chapter 3, the norm of democracy promotion within 
peacekeeping operations, rather than possessing any legal underpinnings, 
arguably stems from the ‘spirit’ of the UN Charter (“We the peoples”) and 
international institutions’ preference for democratic governance.20 Within 
the DRC, numerous difficulties have arisen in relation to the development 
of democracy within the country and, for some, it is best viewed as a 
‘pseudo-democracy’ – a country whose democratic political institutions, 
such as multiparty electoral competition, ‘masks the reality of authoritarian 
domination’.21 Thus, calling into question the presumption that liberal 
democracy is the most ideal form of governance, which can be transported 
to any state, as seen in Chapter 3. As such, it could then be debated 
whether democracy promotion could or should be included within 
peacekeeping’s normative framework. 
                                   
20 Charter of the United Nations “UN Charter” (24 October 1945), preamble; as discussed in Chapter 3, Section 
4.1 of this thesis. 
21 L Diamond, ‘Thinking About Hybrid Regimes’ (2004) 13(2) JDemoc 21-35, 24.  
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2.1 Democratising the DRC 
Throughout its history, the country has held four elections – 1960, 2006, 
2011 and 2018- with varying degrees of success. The first of these free and 
fair elections was held in May 1960, one month before the country was 
formally granted its independence from Belgium. Under the provisional 
constitution, a bicameral parliamentary government was established, with 
a prime minister (Lumumba) and a president (Kasavubu) elected to lead 
the country through its transition into independence.22 However, as has 
been noted throughout this thesis, the Belgian’s had left the Congo ill-
prepared for independence, with little infrastructure or public 
administration and only a dozen university qualified Congolese.23 
Somewhat unsurprisingly, democracy struggled to take hold within this new 
political culture and Lumumba and Kasavubu, unable to maintain law and 
order, expel foreign troops and counter a secession in Katanga, requested 
UN assistance a mere twelve days after gaining independence.24 ONUC was 
therefore ‘deployed in a country where the institutions of state were 
collapsing’ in what some refer to as the first case of ‘painting a country 
blue’ – the act of the UN taking over administrative functions of a failed 
state to restore peace and order.25 In what could perhaps be viewed as the 
first application of an informal norm of democracy promotion within 
peacekeeping, ONUC was called upon to ‘help establish an indigenous 
                                   
22 See: DN Gibbs, ‘The United Nations, International Peacekeeping and the Question of ‘Impartiality’: Revising 
the Congo Operation of 1960’ (2000) 38(3) JModAfrStud 359-382, 362; D Van Reybrouck, Congo: The Epic 
History of a People (Fourth Estate 2015) 227-281. 
23 ibid.  
24 UNSC Res 143 (14 July 1960) UN Doc S/RES/143. 
25 M Goulding, ‘The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping’ (1993) 69(3) IntAff 451-464, 452.  
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government in a nascent country with a mutinous army, a breakaway 
province, and little experience in self-government’.26 Therefore, as seen in 
Chapter 3,27 whilst the norm of democracy promotion was only formally 
introduced into peacekeeping’s normative framework in the 1990s, it could 
be argued that ONUC temporarily expanded the normative framework here 
by engaging in statebuilding activities. As a result, it took ONUC much 
closer to the intervention line, thereby expanding peacekeeping’s 
frameworks and undermining the principle of non-intervention. Indeed, 
throughout this period, when ONUC was undertaking significant sovereign 
functions, such as maintaining law and order and establishing a governance 
system, this could be viewed as coercive action designed to alter or 
influence change in the state and therefore intervention. In other words, 
ONUC was attempting to establish democratic governance, with the 
Congolese state having little voluntary choice over this form of governance, 
given their vulnerability as a newly independent state (with little 
infrastructure and outbreaks of violence), rendering them reliant on the 
peacekeeping operation and, thus, unable to voluntarily reject ONUC’s 
decisions on law and order and governance systems. Put simply, at certain 
points, the Congo had little choice but to accept the actions ONUC was 
undertaking to establish a state and administrative structure; thus, ONUC’s 
actions can be said to have amounted to intervention. This also then ties in 
with the previous discussions on consent and the extent to which a host 
                                   
26 J Dobbins, SG Jones, K Crane, A Rathmell, B Steele, R Teltschik and A Timilsina, The UN’s Role in Nation-
Building: From the Congo to Iraq (RAND Corporation 2005) 5-29, 7. 
27 Section 4.1. 
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state may consent to or reject peacekeeping tasks once an operation is 
deployed.28 In this instance, it appears that host state consent was 
irrelevant during ONUC’s mandate period for these democracy promotion 
tasks.  
Moreover, this initial attempt at democracy promotion within the Congo 
raised questions as to what establishing democracy within the Congo 
actually meant. For the Belgians it meant organising parliamentary 
elections, to the Afro-Asian and Soviet-bloc states ‘it meant liberating the 
Congo from Belgian colonial control’ and for the United States it meant 
‘ensuring the country not “fall” to a communist dictatorship’.29 What is 
noticeable here, is that the decision on what democratic governance in the 
Congo meant was decided, ultimately, by external actors and not the 
Congolese themselves. Similar to the colonial Scramble for Africa and the 
demarcating of arbitrary borders within the continent, then, the voice of 
the Global South state was the most irrelevant factor in determining the 
fate of the Congo.30 
Two further observations can then be drawn from this. Firstly, the 
involvement of external actors in the internal affairs of the newly 
independent Congo established a precedent which has led to continual 
external intervention in relation to Congolese governance, particularly as 
Congo has been viewed as pivotal in regional and global politics. For 
example, Congo’s neighbours, Rwanda and Uganda, and the Southern 
                                   
28 Chapter 3, Section 3.1; Chapter 4, Section 2.4. 
29 ibid, 9.  
30 See: Chapter 2, Section 2.3. 
 12 
African Development Community (SADC) have all shown a particular 
interest in Congo’s leadership, at times supporting or attempting to 
influence Congolese politics in order to further their own agendas or protect 
their interests within the Great Lakes region.31  
Secondly, from a TWAIL perspective, this supports arguments made in 
Chapter 3 that democracy (and democracy promotion) is a Western-centric 
notion which perpetuates the colonial dichotomies of ‘civilised’ and 
‘uncivilised’, reinforcing patterns of domination and subordination and the 
North-South divide.32 Indeed, the differing views on how ONUC should 
interpret and apply the norm of democracy promotion in the Congo 
arguably reflects how this is a ‘classic instance’ of the ‘imperial project at 
work’, with the dominant external actors determining how the subordinate 
host state should be governed.33 This is reinforced by the fact that the there 
was an apparent lack of host state consent to these peacekeeping tasks, in 
part due to the instability and lack of infrastructure in Congo’s initial few 
months of independence. Furthermore, it could also be viewed as another 
example of Anghie’s dynamic of difference, with the dominant actor (ONUC 
and member states) identifying a gap between themselves and the 
Congolese host state (a lack of democratic governance) and then seeking 
to bridge that gap by altering or normalising (democratising) the host state. 
                                   
31 See: SADC Press Release, ‘SADC Reiterates Its Position For a Stable and Peaceful DRC’ (SADC, 29 May 2020) 
<https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/sadc-reiterates-its-position-stable-and-peaceful-drc> 
Accessed 18 June 2020; Tamm H, ‘Status Competition in Africa: Explaining the Rwandan-Ugandan Clashes in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo’ (2019) 118(472) AfrAff 509-530; M Schneider, ‘Examining the Role of Rwanda 
in the DRC Insurgency’ (Crisis Group 19 September 2012)  <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-
africa/democratic-republic-congo/examining-role-rwanda-drc-insurgency> Accessed 18 June 2020. 
32 Chapter 3, Section 4.1. 
33 V Sripati, ‘The United Nation’s Role in Post-Conflict Constitution-Making Processes: TWAIL Insights’ (2008) 
10(4) ICLR 411-420, 420. 
 13 
Thus, using this as an excuse or justification for intervention. For the 
peacekeeping frameworks and the principle of non-intervention, then, this 
first example of democracy promotion in the Congo, by ONUC, arguably 
expanded peacekeeping’s normative frameworks exponentially, particularly 
for peacekeeping at that time. That is, as seen in earlier Chapters, ONUC 
was deployed during the decolonisation period when interventionist rhetoric 
was low and peacekeeping was, typically, following the traditional, 
consensual, non-interventionist form of peacekeeping.34 However, as was 
noted, ONUC quickly evolved in response to the Congo crisis, resulting in a 
rapid expansion of its peacekeeping frameworks, including, here, its 
normative framework.35 As a result, this expanded normative framework, 
stretched peacekeeping’s red boundary line, taking it much closer to the 
realm of intervention and, at times, potentially breaching the line, 
becoming a form of intervention and thereby violating the principle of non-
intervention.   
2.2 Intervention to Counter Intervention 
Following the Congo’s first elections, and the assassination of the first 
elected Prime Minister, Lumumba, the Congo was ruled by Mobutu Sese 
Seko, whose thirty-two-year dictatorship did little to build Congo’s 
infrastructure, with national resources used to fund Mobutu’s lavish 
lifestyle36- revealing the weakness of the early UN approach to democracy 
promotion. Thus, the socio-economic realities of the Congo, combined with 
                                   
34 Chapter 2, Section 3; Chapter 4, Section 1.2. 
35 ibid. 
36 See: M Wrong, In the Footsteps of Mr Kurtz (Harper Collins Publishers 2000). 
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under-development and authoritarianism, acted as severe constraints on 
the potential institutionalisation and consolidation of democracy.37 As the 
Cold War drew to a close, Mobutu was ousted by a rebel insurgency in 
1997, led by Laurent Kabila and supported by Rwanda.38 When conflict 
ensued, this created a justification for external intervention, particularly by 
Congo’s neighbours, with the South African Development Community 
(SADC) states of Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia launching a military 
intervention in 1998 to support Kabila’s regime against the Rwandan and 
Ugandan backed Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) rebel group.39 
Whilst many view this First Congo War as a Congolese revolution, it has 
been argued that it was, ‘in reality, a regionally built rebellion’.40 Indeed, 
the conflict had local, national and regional dimensions, which resulted in 
SADC, the Organisation for African Unity (OAU), South Africa and other 
regional power brokers attempting to establish a ceasefire agreement in 
the Congo.41 Once again, the strong interests of these external actors in 
the governance of the DRC was evident, in particular, with the neighbouring 
states of Rwanda and Uganda who were said to have wished for a 
Congolese regime that was under their control.42 
                                   
37 See: S Decalo, ‘The Process, Prospects and Constraints of Democratisation in Africa’ (1992) 91(362) AfrAff 7-
35; JF Clark, ‘The Constraints on Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Case for Limited Democracy’ (1994) 
14(2) SAISReview 91-108. 
38 M Deibert, The Democratic Republic of Congo: Between Hope and Despair (Zed Books Ltd 2013) 63.  
39 See: GA Dzinesa and J Laker, ‘Post-Conflict Reconstruction in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)’ 
(CRC Policy Advisory Group Seminar Report, 19-20 April 2010), 20-23 
<https://media.africaportal.org/documents/CCRPB04_Post-ConflictDRC_UpdatedApr2011.pdf> Accessed 15 
March 2020 and Case concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the 
Congo v Uganda) Judgment of 19 December [2005] ICJ Rep 168. 
40 T Carayannis, K Vlassenroot, K, Hoffman and A Pangburn, ‘Competing Networks and Political Order in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo’ (LSE, 2018) 6. 
41 UNSC, ‘Ceasefire Agreement’ (“Lusaka Ceasefire”) (23 July 1999) UN Doc S/1999/815. 
42 Crisis Group, ‘The Agreement on a Cease-Fire in the Democratic Republic of Congo’ (ICG Democratic Republic 
of Congo Report No 5, 20 August 1999). 
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This eventually led to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement which, amongst 
other things, brought the Congolese domestic agenda back to the centre 
stage. This was key for the deployment of a peacekeeping operation, the 
withdrawal of foreign armed troops and the formation of a new Congolese 
armed force and re-establishment of state administration, through the 
initiation of an Inter-Congolese National Dialogue.43 Thus, the Lusaka 
Agreement was the foundations upon which the UN could then enter and 
undertake democracy promotion tasks. As has been noted in previous 
Chapters, MONUC was deployed in 1999 to oversee the Agreement and 
rapidly evolved as conflict ensued, including the assassination of President 
Laurent-Désiré Kabila in 2001, who was replaced by his son, Joseph Kabila, 
during the beginning of the Second Congo War.44 In-line with the increase 
in interventionist rhetoric and a push for democratisation in the post-Cold 
War era, as seen in Chapter 3,45 the Inter-Congolese Dialogue was officially 
opened, two years after the signing of the agreement,46following what 
became typical stonewalling from Kabila.47 In another example of the key 
norm entrepreneurship role of the Secretary-General, the Dialogue was re-
launched at the initiative of SG Kofi Annan who invited the three main 
Congolese parties (the DRC government, RCD-Goma and MLC) to attend 
an informal meeting in New York in November 2001.48 Financial resources 
                                   
43 ibid. 
44 See: K Berwouts, Congo’s Violent Peace: Conflict and Struggle Since the Great African War (Zed Books 2017). 
45 Section 4.1. 
46 See: UN Press Release, ‘Opening of Inter-Congolese Dialogue’ (19 October 2001) UN Doc SG/SM/8000-
AFR/345. 
47 Crisis Group, ‘The Inter-Congolese Dialogue: Political Negotiation or Game of Bluff?’ (ICG Africa Report No 37, 
16 November 2001).  
48 UN News, ‘Fighting in Eastern DR of Congo ‘must stop’, Annan tells Security Council’ (UN News, 9 November 
2001) <https://news.un.org/en/story/2001/11/20102-fighting-eastern-dr-congo-must-stop-annan-tells-
security-council> Accessed 5 June 2020.  
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to ensure a broad range of participants were involved in the process was 
then provided by numerous contributors, including South Africa, the 
European Union, the USA, Canada and Belgium.49 This, again, 
demonstrates the keen interest of external actors in Congo’s political 
affairs50 and is reminiscent of Congo’s first attempts at democracy in 1960, 
whereby decisions over Congo’s governance system were dominated by 
external actors, rather than the Congolese themselves.  
Moreover, the significant efforts of regional actors to resolve the conflict 
and establish governance could also be viewed as an example of ‘African 
solutions to African problems’, as was discussed in Chapter 2.51 In this 
instance, however, it is somewhat of a double-edged sword. On the one 
hand, the Global South states attempts to take ownership and to provide 
solutions to a problem within the Global South is, through a TWAIL lens, 
arguably preferable to externally imposed solutions.52 On the other hand, 
the significant involvement of Congo’s neighbours exposes a noticeable flaw 
within the concept of ‘African solutions to African problems’ - that it may 
be used to justify or legitimate interventions which are just as ‘problematic 
and riddled with hidden agendas as traditional interventions’.53 The notion 
then becomes further troublesome when the dominant role that Western 
actors played in supporting the regional actors bids to establish an 
                                   
49 See: E Rogier, ‘The Inter-Congolese Dialogue: A Critical Overview’ in M Malan and JP Gomes, Challenges of 
Peace Implementation: The UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (ISS, 2004) 29. 
50 See, for example, the UK’s discussion of the situation: HL Deb 28 May 2002, vol 635, Part 145, Cols 1142-
1145. 
51 See: Section 3.4.2; TM Mays, ‘African Solutions for African Problems: The Changing Face of African-Mandated 
Peace Operations’ (2003) 23(1) JConfStud 106-125; 
52 ibid. 
53 C Ero, ‘The Problems with “African Solutions”’ (International Crisis Group, 2 December 2013) 
<https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/problems-african-solutions>. See also: DRC v Uganda (n39). 
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agreement is also considered. That is, the involvement of neighbouring and 
regional actors could essentially be viewed as a straw man – a front or 
disguise – which masked the influential role of the dominant Global North 
states and institutions that were bankrolling and supporting the Dialogue 
behind the scenes. 
Therefore, from a TWAIL perspective, the Dialogue could be viewed, firstly, 
as another example of Anghie’s dynamic of difference and, secondly, as the 
furtherance of Western ideals and standards with an over-simplified 
Western solution to a complex problem. That is, given the extensive 
involvement of the Global North, it could be viewed as a presentation of 
the dynamic of difference with the dominant North identifying a gap 
between them and the ‘other’ (the DRC), creating a division which the 
former then seeks to reduce by transforming the ‘other’, in this instance, 
through democratisation. Furthermore, as with ONUC, the interpretation 
and application of a structure designed to establish democratic governance 
is based upon Western-centric ideals and standards.54 This then invokes 
notions of ‘civilisation’ and reinforces the disparity between the North and 
South states, exemplified with the dynamic of difference.55 In addition, it is 
argued that ‘in their Western ideas’, MONUC/the UN thought it was ‘about 
tribal killing each other so therefore if you take one from each group then 
therefore you are solving the issues which really [it did] not’.56 The 
                                   
54 See: Chapter 3, Section 4.1.1; GH Fox and BR Roth (eds) Democracy and International Law (Edward Elgar 
2020). 
55 N Tzouvala, Capitalism as Civilisation: A History of International Law (CUP 2020) 5. 
56 Interview with Congolese Independent Expert (‘Interviewee 5’) (Oxford, UK, 29 October 2019) DOI: 
<http://doi.org/10.17639/nott.7119> pg 10.  
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imposition of Western standards and ideals, in the form of a Dialogue to 
establish democratic governance, could therefore be considered, on this 
occasion, to be another example of the West’s application of an 
oversimplified solution to a complex, misunderstood problem57 - an issue 
which has been noted throughout this thesis’ exploration of the history of 
intervention. Indeed, it is also a recurring critique of the approach of the 
UN and international actors to peacekeeping and peacebuilding in the DRC. 
For many, international actors fail to understand the root causes of violence 
in the Congo, particularly the way in which local agendas (‘micro-level 
rivalries over lands, resources and traditional or administrative power’) play 
a decisive role in sustaining local, national and regional violence.58 In 
particular, it has been argued that these actors’ emphasis on holding 
elections, as opposed to local conflict resolution, ultimately doomed any 
peacebuilding efforts in the Congo.59 An argument could therefore be made 
that the interpretation and application of the norm of democracy promotion 
by MONUC, in this instance, is an unnecessary expansion of peacekeeping’s 
normative framework because it is simply a furtherance of Western or 
hegemonic standards, ideals and agendas, rather than being a suitable or 
appropriate solution for the Congo. Thus, from a TWAIL perspective, the 
peacekeeping operation’s democracy promotion tasks could again be 
compared to the colonial civilising missions as both contain a dominant 
power attempting to enlighten or transform the subordinate ‘other’ in order 
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for them to meet hegemonic standards, with little regard for the ‘others’ 
interests and needs. 
For peacekeeping’s normative frameworks, MONUC’s involvement in the 
Dialogue could also be seen as one of the first examples of a peacekeeping 
operation engaging in the interpretation and application of the norm of 
democracy promotion. Indeed, MONUC was said to have ‘had a pretty 
intrusive role’60 under their mandate to monitor the implementation of the 
agreement and issue communiques.61 It could be argued, then, that 
MONUC’s contribution to establishing the foundations for a democratic 
governance system was a broad application of the norm of democracy 
promotion, thereby expanding peacekeeping’s normative framework and 
simultaneously undermining the principle of non-intervention. More 
specifically, it could, at times be viewed as a violation of the principle of 
non-intervention as MONUC’s engagement in sovereign matters, through 
their support of establishing a system of governance and leadership, could 
be viewed as coercive action designed to influence change in the host state, 
given the vulnerability of weakness of the Congolese state at that time and 
their subsequent reliance on MONUC. As such, any actions which MONUC 
took in an attempt to foster democratic governance in the Congo could be 
viewed as coercive as the Congolese state had little voluntary choice in 
accepting the changes to their state, given their vulnerable position. Again, 
this then links back to the principle of consent and the debate over whether 
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a host state can and should consent to specific peacekeeping tasks during 
the deployment of an operation. Therefore, similar to ONUC’s role in 1960, 
MONUC’s role throughout the Dialogue could be viewed as amounting to 
intervention, thereby taking peacekeeping beyond its normative and legal 
frameworks. More specifically, it could be deemed to be an example of 
intervention to counter intervention, similar to the USA’s Monroe Doctrine 
and ONUC’s deployment to counter colonial intervention in 1960. Indeed, 
the purpose of the Dialogue was to create a new political order for the 
Congo, that liberated the ‘Congolese from external occupation and 
interference’,62 a notion which was contradictory in nature, given that it 
was driven by external actors. 
2.3 Elections: Declining Intervention and Increasing Corruption 
The Inter-Congolese Dialogue therefore demonstrates how peacekeeping’s 
normative framework was expanded during this period and how the 
inclusion of the norm of democracy promotion can have a direct impact on 
peacekeeping’s legal principles, particularly consent. Furthermore, 
reflecting how the principles and norms cohabit in a competitive arena, 
MONUC’s involvement in the Dialogue could also be said to have impacted 
the principle of impartiality. The significant UN presence in the Dialogue 
arguably placed the UN in a difficult position when the Dialogue raised 
numerous issues,63 not least the fact that Bosco Ntaganda, wanted for war 
crimes by the ICC, was a signatory to the agreement.64 In essence, the UN 
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was therefore working cooperatively or supporting such actors thereby 
impinging upon their impartiality.  
Despite this, the Dialogue eventually resulted in Kabila being officially 
named as President, with some arguing that he largely owed his position 
‘to the support he had from key players in the international community’.65 
Indeed, initially, the main focus of the inter-Congolese negotiations had 
been ‘whether or not Kabila should be recognised as President’, much to 
the rebel movements’ frustrations,66 and for international actors, Kabila 
was viewed as a ‘much more stable’ option for the country.67 Kabila could 
therefore be said to have been purposefully hand-picked or chosen by the 
dominant external actors involved in the Dialogue, rather than him being 
democratically elected by the parties to the agreement. Thus, again 
supporting the argument that these actors, including MONUC, played a 
coercive role in establishing democratic governance in the Congo, thereby 
amounting to intervention. As such, the Dialogue failed to reconcile 
Congolese leaders and political factions and had similarly failed to 
transform Congo’s electoral process or to institute ‘good governance’.68 
However, Kabila was later able to ‘gain a degree of legitimacy’ with the 
2006 elections69 – the country’s second free and fair elections and the first 
elections since 1960.  
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To ensure the success of the 2006 elections, the Security Council authorised 
an EU-led quasi-enforcement mission (EUFOR) to be temporarily deployed 
to support MONUC.70 ‘Acting under Chapter VII’, MONUC were authorised 
‘to take all necessary measures, within its means and capabilities’ to 
complete its tasks.71 This included some of the key themes which had 
begun to emerge within peacekeeping at that time;72 namely, to ‘stabilise 
a situation’, protect civilians and ensure the security and free movement of 
EUFOR personnel and installations.73 Therefore, if MONUC’s role in the 
Congolese National Dialogue could be viewed as phase one of the norm of 
democracy promotion in the DRC, MONUC’s role in the 2006 elections could 
be viewed as phase two of the norm. That is, the norm was expanded as 
these new tasks (such as creating a stable environment for elections, 
supporting EUFOR and providing logistical and strategical support for the 
organising of elections) were introduced into MONUC’s mandate, 
consequently expanding peacekeeping’s normative framework and 
creeping peacekeeping closer to the intervention line. Furthermore, this 
normative expansion also had an impact on peacekeeping’s legal 
framework, particularly the principles of non-use of force and impartiality. 
The invocation of Chapter VII in MONUC’s mandate permitted both MONUC 
and EUFOR to use an increased level of force in order to complete the 
democratisation tasks, such as EUFOR thwarting a heavy attack against the 
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then Vice-President, Bemba.74 This therefore pushed the operation closer 
to peace enforcement and, consequently, intervention, again highlighting 
the overlap between the legal and normative frameworks and 
demonstrating how an expansion or re-imagining of one norm or principle 
may have an impact on the others. This, in turn, may expand 
peacekeeping’s legal and normative frameworks, stretching the red 
boundary line surrounding peacekeeping and consequently undermining 
the principle of non-intervention.  
Moreover, whilst the 2006 elections were generally found to be a success, 
‘technically sound, transparent and credible’,75 with MONUC providing a 
stable environment,76 for some, the UN support of the elections were 
viewed as being motivated by ‘neo-colonialist temptations’.77 Thus, again, 
underscoring the TWAIL arguments that democracy promotion invokes 
notions of ‘civilisation’ and is based on Western ideals and agendas.78 
Indeed, this role or application of the norm of democracy promotion 
continued after the 2006 elections, with MONUC, and then MONUSCO 
routinely mandated to work ‘in close cooperation with the Congolese 
authorities’ to support ‘the strengthening of democratic institutions and the 
rule of law’.79 These mandates could therefore, again be viewed as an 
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expanded or broad interpretation and application of the norm of democracy 
promotion which, in turn, expands peacekeeping normative framework, 
thereby undermining the principle of non-intervention.  
However, whilst the UN was heavily involved in the 2006 elections and the 
development of democracy in the following years, this involvement or 
support decreased for each of the two subsequent elections. Thus, it could 
be argued that there was a retraction of this broadened interpretation of 
the norm of democracy promotion and, therefore, a shrinking of 
peacekeeping’s normative framework, with the red, elastic boundary line 
now being tightened, taking MONUSCO back to a less interventionist 
operation and thereby supporting the principle of non-intervention. Indeed, 
for the Congo’s 2011 elections, the Security Council was faced with the 
dilemma of limiting MONUSCO’s role to the protection of civilians in Eastern 
Congo, as agreed with Kabila, or to expand its mandate ‘in an attempt to 
enforce democratic principles before the elections at the risk of confronting 
the incumbent regime’.80 MONUSCO therefore could have expanded the 
norm of democracy promotion, choosing to go against the will of the state 
to undertake democratisation tasks, but, instead, chose to play a more 
limited role, as agreed with the host state.81 It could be argued that this 
may reflect a recognition, by MONUSCO, that on this occasion, the 
pursuance of democracy promotion would have amounted to coercive 
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action and, therefore, intervention, taking the operation beyond its 
peacekeeping boundaries. 
Whilst this retraction of the boundaries of peacekeeping is both welcome 
and necessary, for some senior UN personnel, it was recognised that this 
decline in international involvement almost had a ‘directly proportional 
relationship’ with ‘increasing levels of rigging’.82 That is, where MONUC 
played a significant role in the 2006 elections, there were fewer allegations 
of rigging and corruption than in the 2011 elections when MONUSCO played 
less of a role in the organising of elections. Indeed, in 2011, whilst Kabila 
was ‘re-elected’, both Kabila and his primary opponent, Etienne Tshisekedi 
(the father of the current President) declared themselves president, leading 
to an eruption of violent protests in response to the controversial results.83 
Similar events then occurred with Congo’s fourth elections, which should 
have been held in 2016 but were delayed until 2018 following Kabila’s 
numerous attempts to amend the constitution and remain in power for a 
third term.84 As occurred in 2011, the 2018 elections, including the build-
up to the elections, were surrounded by political protests, particularly by 
youth groups such as LUCHA, with numerous deaths and dozens of arrests 
by the government.85 There was therefore a repeat of the same pattern of 
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declined external involvement and increased corruption and violence. 
Indeed, UN personnel have noted that for these elections, ‘there was a 
complete rejection of international involvement’, with the Congolese 
government refusing to accept MONUSCO’s logistical support, even though 
it was mandated to provide it.86 For the government, ‘even hints at 
interference in the DRC’s sovereignty is, you know, obviously a no no’; it 
was therefore ‘made very clear that they were going to organise their own 
elections’.87 Again, this demonstrates how MONUC/MONUSCO’s 
involvement in the elections could, at times, amount to coercive action 
designed to influence change within the host state, as they are evidently 
undertaking or engaging in tasks which fall within the state’s sovereign 
rights, which is recognised by the host state. Thus, it appears that the 
greater the role the UN plays in democracy promotion, the more the norm 
and peacekeeping’s normative frameworks are expanded, thereby 
expanding the boundaries of peacekeeping and undermining or potentially 
contravening the principle of non-intervention. 
Furthermore, the elections within the Congo, in particular, the 2018 
elections demonstrate that the electoral process has struggled to produce 
a semblance of democracy in the DRC. Thus, supporting TWAIL arguments 
that ‘international law does not take global democracy seriously’ as it 
imposes certain obligations on states (such as the need to hold democratic 
elections) but does not hold it responsible for any further deepening or 
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development of the concept.88 This, again, reverts back to the issue of what 
is considered to be a ‘successful democracy’ and what it means for a 
peacekeeping operation if these elections are not ‘successful’.89 Indeed, 
although the most recent elections marked the first peaceful transition of 
power in the Congo’s history, the results were extremely controversial, with 
Felix Tshisekedi declared the winner by the Congolese authorities, despite 
voting databases revealing that Martin Fayulu had won the vote.90 For 
many, this was viewed as another bid by Kabila to cling to power, through 
a deal with Tshisekedi,91 again demonstrating how the regime was 
‘vulnerable to authoritarian drift’92 and highlighting how the concept of 
Western liberal democracy has failed to take root in the Congo. Indeed, 
despite elections, the Congolese state ‘remains a predatory structure, as it 
has been during most of the Congo’s history’.93 The Congolese state or 
political landscape is therefore ‘best understood as competing networks of 
access, with power located in individual networks rather than institutions’.94 
In particular, there remains a battle for power within Congo’s political elite, 
with an attempt to dismantle the Kabila regime, as Tshisekedi and his new 
allies, opposition leaders Moïse Katumbi (Ensemble pour la République) and 
Jean-Pierre Bemba (Mouvement de Libération du Congo) met on several 
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occasions in early 2021 to negotiate appointments for key government 
positions, including the role of prime minister.95  
From the 2018 elections, then, it could be argued that it is questionable 
whether the norm of democracy promotion should remain a part of 
peacekeeping’s normative framework or whether peacekeeping should 
focus more on a people-centred, bottom-up rather than state-centric, top-
down approach. Indeed, the political protests prior, during and after the 
2018 elections are said to be ‘a clear demonstration of the Congolese 
population’s aspirations for political change’,96 yet these voices are 
constrained by the patronage power structures and the political elite’s 
desperate bids to cling to power. Therefore, it could be argued that 
supporting grassroots initiatives may be a more preferable means of 
developing democracy within the Congo and, ultimately, securing peace, 
particularly as the Congolese people view electoral concerns, peace and 
security concerns and economic problems as inextricably linked.97  
2.4 Forcing Democracy? 
The interpretation and application of the principle of democracy promotion 
by the UN’s peacekeeping operations in the DRC highlights some of the 
shortcomings of the norm, which were also seen in Chapter 3.98 Namely, 
the comparisons which can be made with the notion of ‘civilisation’ and the 
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colonial civilising mission and the suitability of establishing democratic 
governance in complex, post-conflict settings. In particular, the UN’s efforts 
at democracy promotion in the Congo exemplifies how simply holding 
elections does not equate to nor result in a deeply penetrating, flourishing 
democracy. That is, despite holding elections, the reform of Congolese 
politics and government has been limited,99 with deeply embedded 
patronage systems. As has been noted throughout, the Congo therefore 
remains a ‘predatory regime in which the enormous wealth of the country 
is being monopolised by the rulers and their external allies, instead of 
serving the basic needs of the Congolese people’.100 This is, again, typified 
with the recent allegations made by LUCHA that Joseph Kabila has been 
paid almost $16 million in Congolese taxpayer’s money since leaving 
office.101 Whilst there may have been an official handover of power 
following the elections, then, in reality the same Kabila-regime remains, 
indicating that the holding of ostensibly democratic elections where, in 
essence, window dressing to placate external international actors. 
Therefore, despite the involvement of the UN and the exercise of the norm 
of democracy promotion, predominantly through the supporting of 
elections, democracy has failed to take root. For some, the political culture 
is the main culprit for Congo’s perpetual ‘failure to launch’, which has, at 
times, included political elites thwarting the (mostly) good intentions of the 
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international community.102 As such, some UN personnel argue that the UN 
should ‘stop doing statebuilding’ as peacekeeping ‘is a very poor tool’ for 
undertaking such a task, with MONUSCO spending ‘a huge amount of 
money’ to support a state ‘that has shown no desire or willingness or 
capacity to play the kind of games that it’s being asked to play’.103 Indeed, 
the UN’s emphasis on statebuilding and preoccupation with elections 
distracts from the issues whose resolutions are most likely to lead to peace; 
namely, poverty, unemployment, corruption, poor access to land, criminal 
justice system and education.104 It could be argued, then, that 
MONUC/MONUSCO’s democracy promotion endeavours in the Congo 
presenting numerous issues or lessons which could be learned for 
peacekeeping’s normative framework.  
The first of these issues is whether a focus on institution or statebuilding is 
a suitable task for peacekeeping and whether the norm of democracy 
promotion should therefore be a part of peacekeeping’s normative 
framework. Arguably, MONUC and MONUSCO’s involvement in democracy 
promotion within the DRC indicates that the norm of democracy promotion 
should perhaps be restricted or even removed from peacekeeping’s 
normative framework. This is not to say that democratisation is not a 
worthwhile task but, rather, that it is one which should not be undertaken 
by peacekeeping operations. Indeed, it has been argued that the Council 
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gave MONUC/MONUSCO ‘a task they couldn’t do’, with the statebuilding 
and central reform mandate ‘pie in the sky’ after twenty years, with ‘almost 
no meaningful improvement in the SSR side of things’.105 Therefore, the 
inclusion of democracy promotion could be viewed as somewhat of an 
unnecessary expansion of the normative framework of peacekeeping, in 
part because the operation is ill-equipped to undertake it. This is further 
compounded by the fact that it has the potential to impact the fundamental 
principles of peacekeeping and thereby expand or alter peacekeeping’s 
legal framework which, in turn, may undermine the principle of non-
intervention. For example, MONUC used significant force to create a 
‘stabilised’ environment to hold elections, therefore, the interpretation and 
application of the norm of democracy promotion had a knock-on effect on 
the principle of non-use of force. Similarly, the decision to support (or not 
support) certain actors during electoral processes could be viewed as an 
infringement on the principle of impartiality. This, in turn, could impact the 
principle of consent if relationships between the host government and the 
peacekeeping operation breakdown – as was seen throughout the Inter-
Congolese Dialogue and the 2006 elections. Again, this demonstrates that 
as the norms and legal principles exist in a competitive arena, there is an 
inevitability that changes to one norm or principle, may impact others. By 
extension, when these norms are expanded, thus broadening 
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peacekeeping’s normative framework, this, consequently, expands the 
peacekeeping boundaries and constricts the principle of non-intervention. 
This then leads to the second notable issue – whether democracy promotion 
in the DRC has, at times, amounted to intervention. As the previous section 
argued, at certain points throughout ONUC, MONUC and MONUSCO’s 
history in the Congo, it is arguable that their promotion of democracy has 
amounted to coercive action designed to influence change in the host state. 
ONUC’s execution of state functions to establish a governance system and 
MONUC’s robust involvement in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue and 2006 
elections, for example, could be viewed as having a coercive impact on the 
Congolese state’s sovereign rights, in an attempt to push the Congo 
towards changing to democratic governance; thus, amounting to 
intervention. Indeed, this is reinforced by the Congolese government’s 
rejection of MONUSCO’s involvement in the more recent elections, with the 
state explicitly stating that it was a matter of their ‘sovereign rights’.106 
This then presents the third key issue which has arisen in the Congo, which 
is whether there is a more suitable alternative to democracy promotion 
tasks or statebuilding, such as returning to the more traditional 
peacekeeping role of supporting agreements. As occurred, for example, 
with the launch of the ‘Peace, Security and Cooperation (PSC) Framework’ 
in 2013 (alongside the FIB) which outlined ‘key action at the national, 
regional and international levels required to end the recurring cycles of 
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violence’ in Eastern DRC.107 The framework has since proved to be most 
useful in weakening some of Congo’s long-standing rebel groups, the FDLR 
and ADF,108 and contributing to the defeat of M23. It also encouraged 
Rwanda to ‘not interfere in their neighbours’,109 thereby addressing some 
of the historic regional intervention issues which have hindered the Congo’s 
development of democracy and contributed to instability. The benefits of 
the framework have therefore ‘outlasted the benefits of the intervention 
brigade but, of course, one is more spectacular than the other’.110 Again, 
this can be viewed as supporting the notion that the norm of democracy 
promotion in the form of elections is neither the best nor only way in which 
UN peacekeeping operations can support the political landscape of its host 
country, in order to achieve the ultimate goal of maintaining international 
peace and security. As such, it suggests, again, that there is a need for a 
retraction of peacekeeping’s normative framework, through a retraction of 
the norm of democracy promotion.  
By extension, this raises a fourth issue which can be drawn from the UN’s 
experiences in the Congo – whether peacekeeping should focus more on a 
people-centred, bottom-up approach, rather than a state-centric, top-down 
approach. That is, the UN’s emphasis on democratic elections in the DRC, 
from a TWAIL perspective, could be viewed as a default approach to post-
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conflict states, invoking notions of ‘civilisation’ in, seemingly, another 
example of a simple Western answer being applied to a very complex 
problem.111 The UN’s interpretation and application of the norm of 
democracy promotion within the Congo could be viewed, then, as a failure 
to recognise the complexities of the Congo and, specifically, Congolese 
politics. Indeed, this has, to a certain extent, been recognised by a former 
head of MONUSCO, Alan Doss, who, in a recent piece on ‘the limits of 
outside intervention’, noted that ‘with hindsight’ MONUSCO ‘did not devote 
enough of our energy’ towards building political trust, social cohesion and 
community resilience.112 Instead, Doss claims the mission was ‘overly 
focused on the military dimensions of our mandate’, acknowledging that 
the broader efforts should have been ‘explicit goals for peace operations 
from the start’.113 Similarly, others have argued that democracy itself ‘may 
not be the golden ticket’, at least not in the short term, with real lasting 
peace in the Congo requiring power being given to ordinary citizens.114 In 
particular, the small island of Idjwi, situated in Congo’s Lake Kivu in the 
South East of the country, is cited as somewhat of a success story and 
desirable model, as the only place within Congo to have sustained peace, 
with none of the outbreaks of violence that have plagued the East of the 
country.115 Most noticeably, Idjwi is not governed by Western liberal 
democracy, but by traditional Congolese governance systems of blood 
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pacts, elders, superstitions and magical beliefs.116 Therefore, instead of 
resolving issues by calling the police, armed forces or resorting to violence, 
the people of Idjwi try to contact local groups such as religious networks, 
traditional institutions, women’s groups and youth groups.117 It has been 
argued, then, that many lessons can be learned from Idwji, particularly the 
important role of local actors or micro-politics in ensuring security, as 
opposed to macro-political, government endeavours.118 This arguably 
challenges, then, the international community’s preference for liberal 
democracy as the most suitable form of governance and, perhaps, suggests 
that peacekeeping should begin to focus more on people-centred, bottom-
up approaches in order to identify and support the most appropriate 
initiatives for supporting the establishment of sustainable peace and 
security. 
For peacekeeping’s overall frameworks, then, the Congo demonstrates how 
an expansive interpretation and application of the norm of democracy 
promotion once again expands peacekeeping’s normative framework, with 
an overlap with the legal principles also impacting the legal framework. 
This, in turn, expands peacekeeping’s red boundary line, taking 
peacekeeping closer to intervention and thereby undermining or, at times, 
contravening the principle of non-intervention. This section has therefore 
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suggested that, as was argued in Chapter 4 for the legal principles, a 
redrawing of these boundaries may be needed, through a retraction of the 
interpretation and application of the norm of democracy promotion. 
Ultimately, this would require a review of Security Council mandating,119 
with the need for more realistic, streamlined mandates or, even, ‘designer 
mandates’ specifically focused on the particularities of the situation in which 
the peacekeeping operation is to be deployed.120   
3 Protection of Civilians 
The interpretation and application of the norm of protection of civilians 
(PoC) within the UN’s operations in the DRC is a classic example of the 
struggle of protection mandates with capabilities and impact or 
implementation.121 Indeed, MONUC and MONUSCO have, on occasions, 
catastrophically failed to protect civilians, resulting in mounting criticisms 
against the operation and debates over the inclusion of PoC as a priority 
task for peacekeepers.122 As was noted in Chapter 3, the Congo has been 
somewhat of an incubator for the development of the norm of PoC, with 
numerous policies developed throughout MONUC/MONUSCOs deployment, 
typically in-line with the general developments in the PoC norm but often 
stepping out on its own, significantly expanding the norm within the DRC. 
Therefore, as with the previous norm of democracy promotion and the legal 
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principles discussed in Chapter 4, the broad interpretation and application 
of the norm of PoC in the Congo has led to an expansion of peacekeeping’s 
normative framework which has, in essence, undermined and, at times, 
potentially violated the principle of non-intervention.  
3.1 Becoming a Priority 
As seen in Chapter 3, the UN’s first exercise of the norm of protection of 
civilians can arguably be traced back to ONUC, which was given an 
Operational Directive to ‘where feasible’ afford every protection to 
‘unarmed groups’ who may be subjected to violence, ‘using armed force if 
necessary’.123 Thus, as with the norm of democracy promotion, ONUC 
temporarily expanded peacekeeping’s normative framework, by including 
a PoC element, before the concept was formally introduced into 
peacekeeping’s frameworks.124 
It is then during MONUC’s deployment, when three major incidences 
(Kisangani 2002, Ituri 2003 and Bukavu 2004) highlighted the operations 
limitations, with MONUC gaining a reputation for fleeing conflict, hiding 
behind its compound walls and failing to protect civilians.125 This therefore 
led to the introduction of a PoC mandate, which was in-keeping with the 
broader interventionist rhetoric and formal introduction of PoC into 
peacekeeping mandates.126 The first of these incidences which motivated 
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the change in MONUC’s mandate came with the massacre of civilians in 
Kisangani in May 2002 by RCD-Goma, despite the nearby presence of 
MONUC troops.127 Following this, in early 2003 MONUC was, again, unable 
to contain escalating violence in Ituri, following the repatriation of Ugandan 
forces that had been occupying the area, resulting in the deployment of a 
temporary EU-led force – Operation Artemis- which was mandated to work 
alongside MONUC to stabilise the security conditions and, if necessary, 
‘contribute to the safety of the civilian population’.128 Again, as with 
democracy promotion, the Security Council invoked Chapter VII through 
the inclusion of the ambiguous ‘Acting under Chapter VII’ within the 
chapeau of the resolution.129 As such, the Interim Emergency Multinational 
Force and MONUC were permitted to use an expanded level of enforcement-
style force. 
However, although MONUC was authorised to use robust force, both 
MONUC and Operation Artemis were considered to be ‘totally insufficient’ 
for dealing with the crisis in Ituri, only managing to guarantee civilians 
safety in ‘several very limited spaces carved out with great effort’.130 
Furthermore, both MONUC and Operation Artemis were criticised for simply 
using force to drive the rebels out of Bunia, rather than attempting to 
disarm or disband the armed groups and reintegrate fights.131 As a result, 
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whilst the town of Bunia was eventually secured (after the slaughter of 
hundreds of civilians, with thousands forced to flee)132 the operation did 
little for the rest of Ituri, with numerous atrocities against civilians 
committed in the months following.133 This therefore highlights MONUC’s 
limitations in protecting civilians and is another example of intervention to 
counter intervention, with the UN operation attempting to expel 
neighbouring or regional intervention.  
Following this, the third notable incident or failure by MONUC was the 
capture of Bukavu in 2004 by the Nkunda-led CNDP, again, despite the 
nearby deployment of MONUC troops.134 Indeed, prior to the crisis MONUC 
leadership had been warned on multiple occasions by both UN agencies and 
from independent sources that the situation was highly explosive.135 As one 
UN humanitarian employee, working for the UN Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) at the time, noted ‘when General Nkunda 
started the uprising in the east and started with Bukavu, we saw it 
coming’.136 They therefore tried to work with their UN colleagues, including 
warning the UN country team, in anticipation of Nukunda’s rebellion.137 
However, the then head of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 
who happened to be visiting Congo at that time, had a ‘very very different 
reading on the situation’, arguing it was stable, with matters improving, as 
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talks were happening between groups.138 This was also compounded by 
reports from the Human Rights Special Rapporteur for Congo139 and a UN 
Panel of Experts140 who detailed the extent of the ethnic violence in the 
region, in relation to the exploitation of natural resources. Despite this, 
those within UN peacekeeping refused to accept or listen to the warnings. 
Indeed, it was dismissed by many as merely a ‘tribal war’ with the then 
SRSG, Amos Ngongi, cited as stating that the ‘Congolese are fighting 
among themselves’.141 Whilst UN peacekeeping therefore remained 
steadfast in their interpretation of the situation, organisations such as 
OCHA were discreetly (so as to not create the impression of a divided UN) 
removing staff from potential danger zones and ensuring OCHA personnel 
were present in areas where people may flee to, in order to support them 
when they sought to escape the violence.142 Subsequently, when violence 
did break out, OCHA was relatively prepared, whilst the peacekeeping 
operation was not. Furthermore, when MONUC became involved in the 
fighting, despite OCHA’s efforts, they were also targeted by armed groups 
who did not distinguish between OCHA and MONUC, viewing them as one 
in the same.143 As a result, OCHA contingents had to avoid all UN insignia 
(badges, uniforms, vehicles) and relied on working closely with other non-
UN NGOs in the areas.144 The Bukavu crisis therefore arguably highlights 
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not only MONUC’s inability to protect civilians but a disconnect between 
MONUC and other UN agencies or international organisations in the field145 
and, once again, demonstrates a failure to understand or appreciate the 
complexities of the Congo. 
This latter incident was, therefore, the final tipping point for the operation, 
with international organisations calling for a ‘robust use of force by MONUC 
troops in protection of the civilian population’.146 As a result, this led to the 
increased use of force, as seen in Chapter 4, and a more explicit PoC 
mandate from the Security Council, again highlighting the inter-
connectedness of peacekeeping’s principles and norms. Within this new PoC 
mandate, MONUC’s PoC responsibilities were extended to include protecting 
refugees, internally displaced persons, children in armed conflict, 
humanitarian and human rights workers and victims of sexual violence.147 
Crucially, it also noted that ‘the protection of civilians must be given priority 
in decisions about the use of available capacity and resources’.148 Thus, 
arguably expanding the norm by recognising its need to be positioned as a 
priority task,  simultaneously expanding the potential for force to be used 
to fulfil this task. This was later confirmed by the Council in MONUC’s 2008 
mandate, when MONUC became the first UN peacekeeping operation to 
make PoC its priority task – a priority which has remained in place ever 
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since.149 Furthermore, the differing approaches to the Bukavu crisis by the 
two UN agencies (peacekeeping and humanitarian) weakened the overall 
UN approach at a time when a joint, coherent approach was clearly needed 
to protect civilians. As such, following the crisis, the UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations and OCHA began to work more closely, sharing 
security and analysis and trying to find joint solutions, with an unofficial 
joint framework for collective engagement developing.150 It could therefore 
be argued that the norm of PoC was expanded within the Congo by both 
the inclusion of protection tasks within MONUC’s mandate and, to a certain 
extent, by this collaboration with humanitarian actors. It therefore had a 
broader, institutional impact which could, again, be viewed as an expansion 
of peacekeeping normative framework, on this occasion through the 
engagement with additional international actors. 
The development of PoC within the Congo therefore highlights how 
peacekeeping norms are created and institutionalised, building upon a 
general consensus, trends and external pressures. It also demonstrates 
how the norm gradually expanded within the Congo, thereby resulting in a 
gradual expansion of the normative framework which, in turn, takes 
peacekeeping closer to the intervention line, undermining the principle of 
non-intervention. However, whilst the norm has been expanded within the 
Congo, there is, similar to the norm of democracy promotion, somewhat of 
a gap between the expectations of the norm and the reality. That is, just 
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as democracy promotion has failed to establish a deep and lasting 
democracy in the Congo, so too has the norm of PoC struggled to result in 
the protection of civilians, with the increased levels of force rarely used. 
This is, arguably, in part because, as noted in Chapter 3, the protection of 
all civilians is an impossible task, particularly within a country the size of 
Congo.151   
This then raises numerous issues, such as whether or to what extent the 
norm should be included within peacekeeping’s normative framework and, 
in particular, if it is to be included, whether it should be a priority task given 
that a failure to fulfil the task may impact the ‘success’ of the operation. 
That is, a problem with mandating PoC as a priority task is that it is difficult 
to fully implement and requires the cooperation of the host state. If the 
tasks must be fulfilled in order for the operation to fulfil its mandate and 
withdraw, then, consequently, exit strategies are ‘hostage’ to the host state 
who ‘may be unwell, or unable, to carry them [the PoC tasks] out’.152 A 
commitment to PoC consequently ‘worsens this dilemma of when and how 
to leave’, which the UN and AU have faced in their joint Darfur mission in 
Sudan, and, are arguably at risk of facing in the DRC.153 This then leads to 
the question of who PoC should be a priority for – the state or the 
peacekeeping operation- and whether PoC should therefore remain a 
priority task for a peacekeeping operation or, rather, as with democracy 
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promotion, there should therefore be a retraction of this norm, such as 
limiting PoC to protecting civilians in specified situations. 
3.2 PoC Tools 
After the protection of civilians was established as a priority task for 
MONUC, the operation began to significantly develop PoC tools resulting in 
a much more nuanced or evolved understanding of the norm of PoC. That 
is, MONUC/MONUSCO’s interpretation and implementation of the norm of 
PoC has created a comprehensive collection of PoC tools which has 
significantly expanded peacekeeping’s normative framework, 
simultaneously expanding its interventionist potential and thereby 
undermining the principle of non-intervention.  
Often, these tools were developed following a noticeable failure or incident 
of violence, resulting in the death of civilians. For example, after the 
massacre of more than 100 people near a MONUC camp in Kiwanja (North 
Kivu) in 2008, joint protection teams (JPTs) were established.154 These 
multi-disciplinary teams, composed of military, police and civilian personnel 
from the peacekeeping mission are deployed to ‘hotspots’ or areas needing 
protection in order to analyse protection needs and outline preventive and 
responsive measures which may need to be taken.155 In addition to these 
teams, the UN also developed a ‘Must-Should-Could’ (PoC) Matrix (MSC), 
a joint planning exercise between MONUSCO and the humanitarian 
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community.156 The aim of this matrix is to identify priority areas and to 
assess the threat level and degree of vulnerability of the local community. 
It then ranks areas as being ‘must protect’, ‘should protect’ and ‘could 
protect’. This information is then passed along to a ‘Protection Cluster’ and 
SMG-PP157 who decides on the appropriate action to be taken. Therefore, 
in a similar way to which the Bukavu crisis resulted in closer cooperation 
between peacekeepers and humanitarian actors, the PoC matrix also 
enhanced cooperation between the UN peacekeeping operation and the 
wider humanitarian community. Again, this creates a subtle expansion in 
the norm of PoC by extending peacekeeping’s reach into the humanitarian 
sphere. Whilst this may be well-intentioned, it runs the risk of undermining 
the work of impartial and unarmed humanitarian actors where their tasks 
may overlap with those of the UN peacekeepers.158 
In a similar vein, MONUSCO has developed further tools in order to 
implement the norm of PoC, focusing on building partnerships at the local 
level, with Community Liaison Assistants (CLAs) – national staff working 
alongside troops in military bases to enhance interaction between the Force 
and local communities .159 These assistants analyse protection needs and, 
again, inform protection strategies and plans. Alongside this, Community 
Alert Networks (CANs) have been established as an early-warning 
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mechanism within communities surrounding MONUSCO bases, 
communicating via radio or mobile phone to alert one another of an 
imminent threat.160 More recently, this network has developed a specific 
phone number (similar to a 999 call in the UK) for threat warnings. Along 
with Community Protection Committees161 and Local Security Committees, 
these PoC tools demonstrate a broadened interpretation and application of 
the norm of PoC and, as has been noted throughout this thesis, mark more 
of a people-centred, bottom-up approach to peacekeeping. Indeed, the 
2015 HIPPO Report emphasised the significance of local actors to the 
effectiveness of peace operations, noting that ‘they are the main agents of 
peace’162 and ‘engagement must increasingly be regarded as core to 
mission success’.163 Furthermore, when visiting the DRC in August 2019, 
Secretary-General Guterres’ first visit was not to the newly elected Prime 
Minister, Tshisekedi, but to Ebola survivors and health workers in North 
Kivu, to assess MONUSCO’s implementation of its mandate to protect 
civilians.164 This could, again, be viewed as an example of the SG’s norm 
entrepreneurship as it is reinforces the norm of PoC and reflects an aim of 
Guterres’ tenure to build greater partnerships.165   
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Despite this expansion of the norm of PoC and the development of these 
tools, designed in order to allow MONUSCO to implement the norm, there 
have still been numerous occasions in which the peacekeeping operation 
has failed to execute this norm and protect civilians. In particular, there 
has often been a pattern of failures despite a significant UN presence, with 
systemic rapes and attacks against civilians occurring in close proximity to 
MONUSCO bases.166 On occasions, these have also occurred despite 
repeated warnings from the local protection committees,167  suggesting a 
failure on the part of both MONUSCO and its PoC tools which had been 
purposefully established to prevent such incidences. This is further 
compounded by a failure of the operation to adequately respond to the 
massacres, as occurred in the village of Mutarule, North Kivu, when 
MONUSCO failed to visit the village until two days after the massacre,168 
simply condemning the attacks and labelling it as a flare of ‘inter-ethnic 
violence’.169 Once again, this could be viewed as a disregard for the 
complexities of the Congo and an example of how the norm of PoC may be 
expanded in theory but not necessarily in practice. Indeed, here, MONUSCO 
had essentially failed to implement or support the very PoC tools which 
they had helped to establish. That is, they had failed to respond to alerts 
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from the protection committees that they had helped to create which, for 
some, consequently results in MONUSCO providing a false sense of 
security.170 
This then leads to three main issues which stem from the PoC efforts in the 
Congo which have been outlined in Chapter 3.171 Firstly, whether the PoC 
mandates could be perceived as imposing a duty or obligation on 
peacekeepers to protect civilians; secondly, if this is a duty which should 
be placed upon peacekeepers or should, instead, be a priority for the host 
state; and thirdly, the perception local populations have of UN 
peacekeeping as protectors of civilians. All these issues, in turn, then pose 
questions as to how broadly the norm can or should be interpreted and, 
consequently, to what extent this then impacts peacekeeping normative 
frameworks and the principle of non-intervention. 
3.3 Expectations and Capabilities  
The prioritisation of PoC within peacekeeping mandates, in-line with the 
shift to robust peacekeeping, resulted in force being permitted in order to 
protect civilians.172 As noted earlier, the often-invoked phrase of ‘Acting 
under Chapter VII’ included within PoC mandates introduces enforcement 
elements into a peacekeeping operation, creating confusion over what this 
means for both the norm of PoC and the principle of limited use of force. A 
broader interpretation of PoC may therefore have a knock-on effect on the 
principle of non-use of force, again demonstrating the co-habitation of 
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peacekeeping’s norms and principles and the overlap between the legal and 
normative frameworks. This shift to a more forceful implementation of PoC 
is seen in the language of MONUC/MONUSCO’s mandates and is posited in 
such a way that it seemingly places a legal duty or obligation on 
peacekeepers to protect civilians. In 2003 the Security Council 
‘authorise[d] MONUC to take the necessary measures’ as it deemed ‘within 
its capabilities’ to ‘protect civilians’ under imminent threat of physical 
violence.173 Ten years later, the language surrounding PoC changed 
slightly, with the Security Council authorising MONUSCO to ‘take all 
necessary measures’ to ‘ensure’ the ‘effective protection of civilians under 
imminent threat of physical violence’.174 This broadening of the language 
surrounding ‘necessary measures’ (from ‘the’ to ‘all’) arguably invokes 
more coercive language, implying that a broader range of measures (‘all’) 
needed to be taken – including the use of force- rather than simply those 
measures which the operation could determine, for itself, where within its 
capabilities. This therefore broadens the already ambiguous notion of 
‘necessary measures’, thereby expanding the norm of PoC and 
consequently expanding the normative frameworks of peacekeeping, 
increasing its interventionist potential and consequently undermining the 
principle of non-intervention. That is, were these measures may include the 
use of increased levels of force or may impact the state’s sovereign rights, 
then this could amount to coercive action designed to influence change in 
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the host state and, therefore, intervention.175 This is then compounded by 
the fact that more recent mandates note that when prioritising tasks, ‘the 
protection of civilians must be given priority in decisions about the use of 
available capacity and resources’.176 Again, reinforcing the positioning of 
PoC as a priority task and emphasising that this places an obligation on 
MONUSCO to focus its resources on this task. 
Indeed, the inclusion of the term ‘ensure’ also implies that the protection 
of civilians has become an obligation for MONUSCO peacekeepers. It could 
therefore be argued that the language within the PoC mandate imposes a 
legal duty or obligation on MONUSCO peacekeepers to protect civilians, 
however they deem necessary, if they are under imminent threat of 
violence. Further, as these PoC mandates are authorised under Chapter 
VII, pursuant to Article 25 of the UN Charter, although member states are 
not obliged to contribute to a peacekeeping operation, if they do, then they 
become bound by Articles 2 and 25 and must accept and carry out 
measures within the mandate ‘so as to achieve its lawful objectives’.177 
Indeed, both the Department of Peace Operations (DPO, then DPKO) and 
the Department of Field Support (DFS) have noted that peacekeepers ‘are 
authorized and are duty bound to undertake actions to protect civilians’ 
when the host state is unwilling or unable to do so.178 Furthermore, in their 
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2017 Guidelines on the use of force by UN peace operations, the 
departments argued that if ‘the mission is mandated for PoC’ then they are 
under an ‘obligation to use force to protect civilians from armed attack’, if 
‘all other unarmed tactics, techniques and procedures fail’.179 Therefore, as 
noted in Chapter 3, this creates a two-pronged expansion of peacekeeping’s 
legal and normative frameworks, pushing peacekeeping closer to the 
intervention boundary line. Firstly, it expands the concept of PoC, 
confirming it is a priority task and an obligation for peacekeepers to fulfil 
and, secondly, the stipulation that force can and should be used to fulfil 
this task simultaneously expands the principle of non-use of force. This 
ambiguous language in the mandates, combined with the expanded use of 
force in defence of the mandate (and therefore in defence of tasks such as 
PoC) expands the norm of PoC exponentially.180 Thus, by extension, it 
expands peacekeeping’s frameworks and undermines the principle of non-
intervention when PoC tasks invoke elements of coercive action that 
impinge upon state’s sovereign rights. As was suggested for the norm of 
democracy promotion, it could be argued that there needs to be a review 
and reimagining of the Security Council mandate in order to clarify these 
legal and practical issues. In particular, to clarify how much force could or 
should be used in order to implement a PoC mandate and whether this, in 
turn, is a legal duty or obligation.   
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3.4 MONUSCO the Protector 
This language of ‘duty’ and ‘obligation’ also points to a further issue which 
is whether or to what extent peacekeepers should be tasked with protecting 
civilians. Arguably, this language within the mandates places an undue 
burden on UN peace operations and could be perceived as both an erosion 
of host state sovereignty and interventionist behaviour by the peace 
operation, depending on the ‘measure’ which is used (e.g. use of force). As 
previously noted, the very concept of PoC – to protect all civilians- is an 
impossible task, evidenced in the numerous so-called failures of MONUC 
and MONUSCO in the Congo. This leads to the question of whether PoC 
should be the primary responsibility of the peacekeeping operation. 
Within the Congo, this has become a particularly poignant issue as 
MONUSCO is now the primary actor undertaking the protection of civilians, 
as opposed to the state, thereby creating a reliance on the peacekeeping 
operation to fulfil protectorate tasks. In a 2019 strategic review of 
MONUSCO, it was noted that the operation had ‘pursued an out-focused 
mission-drive protection strategy’, focusing on perfecting its own system 
and thereby diminishing the primary role of State authorities in assuming 
their protection of civilians.181 As such, whilst MONUSCO’s internal PoC 
systems had been strengthened, there had been ‘little success in terms of 
national ownership and buy-in.’182 The independent review therefore 
deemed that MONUSCO’s general approach to the protection of civilians is 
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‘disconnected from the overarching political strategy needed to sustain 
local gains.’183 The review therefore proposed that the operation should 
reinforce capacity building for Congolese authorities, in order to 
progressively transfer ‘tools and capacities relating to the protection of 
civilians’ to Congolese security forces.184 
Put simply, then, whilst MONUSCO had created numerous PoC tools and 
strategies, such as the community liaison assistants and threat matrix, this 
has strengthened MONUSCO’s ability to protect civilians but not the 
Congolese states, which, in turn, raises numerous issues. Firstly, as seen 
in Chapter 3, it expands the norm of PoC and peacekeeping’s normative 
boundary, arguably, to its limits, pushing the peacekeeping operation 
beyond the red boundary line and into the realm of intervention as it is, in 
essence, undertaking the role of the state as the protection of its citizens 
is a sovereign right. Therefore, the UN is ‘basically substituting to regalian 
powers that the state cannot implement’.185 As noted in Chapter 3,186 where 
the state is willing to accept the UN peacekeeping operation undertaking 
this role, as in the Congo, then an argument could be made that this a 
‘function of the host state’s consent’ and, therefore, a form of intervention 
by invitation.187 
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Secondly, MONUSCO’s heightened PoC role creates a reliance on the 
peacekeeping operation (both by the state and local populations) and an 
unrealistic perception of MONUSCO as the protector of all civilians. Indeed, 
senior UN personnel have noted that because MONUSCO has been allowed 
‘to substitute itself for the national authorities’, this has created ‘all sorts 
of perverse incentives’, as the large, expensive peacekeeping operation 
‘creates a perfect opportunity for elites that are benefiting from a particular 
way of doing things to blame everything on the UN’.188 As such, when there 
is an outbreak of violence which leads to loss of civilian life, both the state 
and the local population are ‘pointing the finger at the mission’ and ‘hardly 
anyone’s asking, well why isn’t it the government that is dealing with the 
problem’, ‘why isn’t the FARDC not able to protect civilians’.189 This 
dichotomy was epitomised in December 2019 when anti-MONUSCO 
demonstrations broke out in Beni and neighbouring towns, such as 
Butembo, with protestors claiming that the peacekeeping operation had 
failed to protect civilians from rebel attacks.190 Three days prior to the 
protests, rebel fighters belonging to the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) 
attacked and killed at least nineteen people in a village near Oicha, 
approximately 14 miles from Beni,191 where there is a significant MONUSCO 
presence.192 The local population had therefore perceived the protection of 
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civilians to be the role of MONUSCO, rather than the state, thereby holding 
peacekeepers accountable for their perceived inability or failure to protect 
civilians. 
Again, this creates a problematic reliance on a temporary peacekeeping 
operation, which, from a TWAIL perspective, could also be seen as 
reinforcing patterns of domination and subordination, recreating the 
colonial archetypal image of the external actor as the enlightened 
saviour.193 That is, it is the dominant, Global North led actor who is deemed 
to be the protectorate of the Congolese peoples, as opposed to the Global 
South host state. In essence, this reinforces or replicates the colonial 
dichotomies of the a ‘civilised’ Global North and an ‘uncivilised’ Global 
South, the latter of which requires the support and protection of the former. 
As a result of this reliance, interviewees within the Office of the SRSG in 
Congo have argued that there is a need to ensure civil society are aware 
that MONUSCO is not and should not be the main protector of civilians,194 
with others working within MONUSCO also arguing that PoC should be 
removed as a priority task for MONUSCO and should instead be undertaken 
by the UN country team.195 Indeed, as MONUSCO is progressively phasing 
down, pursuant to its exist strategy, the operation has been working on 
‘detailed plans for scaling up’ the UN country teams ‘presence and 
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programmatic activities’ in the area where MONUSCO is set to withdraw.196 
This has included provincial-level transition task forces and has been guided 
by the humanitarian-development-peace nexus approach, demonstrating 
the significantly developed relationships between these actors since 
MONUC and OCHA’s clash over the Nkunda-led CNDP attack in 2004. 
Furthermore, for PoC, MONUSCO has been working with provincial leaders 
and civil society organisations ‘to map existing provincial mechanisms for 
the protection of civilians, in view of the progressive handover of 
responsibilities to local actors’.197 Thus, perhaps demonstrating a 
recognition of the state’s inability to undertake protectorate tasks and, 
arguably, marking a necessary shift in approach from state-centric, top-
down to people-centred, bottom-up, as has been discussed throughout this 
thesis. 
MONUSCO’s interpretation and application of the norm of PoC therefore 
demonstrates how a broad understanding expands peacekeeping’s 
normative boundary, thereby undermining the principle of non-intervention 
and, at times, potentially taking peacekeeping into the realm of 
intervention. Furthermore, it also highlights a wider issue of how to 
reconcile people-oriented PoC mandates with the state-centric logic of UN-
mandated interventions.198 This is now demonstrated in the operation’s 
withdrawal as it is engaging with local-level authorities and civil society 
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organisations, thereby seemingly adopting grassroots, bottom-up 
approach. As such, it could be argued that this, again, supports the notion 
of a need for the re-drawing of peacekeeping’s boundaries and a move to 
a more bottom-up, insider led approach which, again, may require a review 
of the Security Council mandate as it is this which, ultimately, sets the 
parameters which a peacekeeping operation may act within. 
4 Prohibition of Sexual Abuse and Exploitation  
The DRC has an unfortunate history of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) 
both during conflict and in peace time. Since the start of the 1996 First 
Congo War, rape has been used as a weapon of armed conflict, with the 
fragmented command structures of both armed groups and the Congolese 
armed forces (FARDC) leading to the use of sexual violence as a military 
tactic.199 This resulted in the Congo being labelled the ‘rape capital of the 
world’ in 2010.200 However, it is not only the warring parties in the Congo 
who have subjected civilians to such horrors - UN peacekeepers have also 
been significant perpetrators of sexual exploitation and abuse. As such, 
similar to the development of the norm of PoC, the interpretation and 
application of the prohibition of SEA in the Congo has resulted in numerous 
tools and policies, thereby broadening the norm in an attempt to address 
the issue. However, as was noted in Chapter 3, the development of this 
norm, unlike its counterparts, has been somewhat slow, with a disconnect 
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between the Secretary-General and office of the SG who have promoted 
the norm, and the Security Council and Member States, including the troop 
contribution nations (TCNs) who have typically done little to support the 
norm. Indeed, whilst the Security Council mandate repeatedly ‘strongly 
condemns’ sexual violence in conflict, encouraging the Government of the 
DRC to combat such violence and end impunity, particularly when acts are 
committee by host state forces (the FARDC), this same level of 
condemnation and drive to implement strategies and roadmaps is not seen 
for sexual violence committed by UN peacekeepers.201 This again 
demonstrates the hypocrisy or power differentials that are entrenched 
within peacekeeping, as a TWAIL lens has highlighted throughout Chapters 
2 and 3. The norm of prohibition of SEA therefore differs from the other 
principles and norms in that its slow development has resulted in only a 
limited expansion of peacekeeping’s normative framework. For the principle 
of non-intervention, then, the norm has supported, rather than undermined 
the principle but, as Chapter 3 noted, a broader interpretation of the norm 
would reinforce the principle further given that its aim is to restrict 
peacekeeper’s behaviour and limit their coercive intervention through SEA.  
4.1 Protectors or Predators? 
As early as the UN’s first operation in Congo, ONUC, there were allegations 
of rape by Ethiopian troops and an Indian officer.202 Reporting of such 
incidences then became most prominent in 2003-2004, shortly after the 
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UN had returned to the DRC with MONUC. In 2003 an uncovered memo 
from the MONUC child protection officer in Kindu to MONUC headquarters 
in Kinshasa reported fears about allegations of SEA by MONUC forces, yet 
no action was taken.203 Similarly, when a gender advisor to MONUC 
contacted UN headquarters in New York requesting that Moroccan troops 
in Kisangani were not sent to Bunia, following allegations of extreme sexual 
abuse, including child pornography, a short-lived investigation was dropped 
due to a lack of evidence and support for the inquiry.204 As noted in Chapter 
3, these allegations arose around the same time as the General Assembly’s 
report on SEA of refugees by aid workers in West Africa205 and the 
subsequent SG’s Bulletin on protection from SEA.206 However, this did not 
necessarily translate into any noticeable action with the Congo – the norm 
was therefore not transported into the field. Again, as has been noted with 
the other two norms within this Chapter, there is then a gap between theory 
and practice. 
A year later, in June 2004, a cable sent from MONUC’s office in Kinshasa to 
the UN’s New York headquarters detailed fifty claims of SEA against minors 
by MONUC forces in Bunia.207 It is at this point that an independent UN 
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investigation team from the Office of Internal and Oversight Services 
(OIOS) was deployed to Bunia to conduct investigations,208 which was 
followed by a special investigative team from the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).209 Despite the investigations, details of 
allegations continued to emerge.210 However, in line with Annan’s newly 
launched zero tolerance policy,211 MONUC’s resolutions began to recognise 
the ‘grave concern’ of allegations of SEA by MONUC personnel.212 In doing 
so, it encouraged MONUC to conduct training for personnel and to ensure 
‘full compliance’ with its code of conduct, simultaneously, urging TCNs to 
‘take appropriate disciplinary and other action to ensure full accountability 
for misconduct’.213 Similar statements  ‘expressing grave concern’ and 
calling for training and accountability were also repeated in MONUC’s 
subsequent mandates,214 with SG Kofi Annan introducing ‘non-
fraternisation’  regulations in the DRC which banned peacekeepers from 
having sexual relations with the local population.215 
Whilst the Secretary-General was therefore promoting the norm of 
prohibition of SEA (once again highlighting the norm entrepreneurship role 
of the SG)216 arguably, the same cannot be said for the Security Council, 
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on the basis of MONUC’s subsequent mandates and their approach to SEA. 
That is, it is debatable how much of a priority the norm of prohibition of 
SEA was in the DRC given that in 2007, in an eight page mandate, the first 
and only mention of SEA came on the final page of the mandate in the 
second to last paragraph.217 The same phrases were again reiterated and 
placed low-down on MONUC’s list of tasks in the 2008 mandate.218 This 
shifted in 2009 in MONUC’s final mandate when the issue of SEA became 
incorporated into MONUC’s PoC tasks, with the tackling of SEA by UN 
peacekeepers therefore essentially moving from the bottom of the task list 
to the top, surpassing DDR and SSR provisions.219 Under the umbrella of 
protection of civilians, including humanitarian and UN personnel, the 
Council again requested that the SG continued to fully investigate the 
allegations of SEA and take appropriate measures per the 2003 SG 
Bulletin.220 Whilst this was still a reiteration of statements that had been 
made for the previous four years, it could be argued that the absorption of 
SEA into PoC placed the issue higher on MONUC’s task list, placing it within 
one of its priorities, thereby expanding the norm slightly.  
However, what remained problematic was that neither the 2008 nor 2009 
mandates made any reference to the role of TCNs in addressing SEA 
committed by their troops, instead the mandates call upon the Secretary-
General to investigate allegations and to take appropriate measures under 
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the 2003 SG Bulletin.221 Therefore, it could be argued that the absorption 
of SEA into PoC, rather than being viewed as placing the norm higher on 
MONUC’s priority list could instead be seen as detracting from the 
seriousness of SEA, essentially downgrading it as a problem in and of itself. 
Indeed, in the next Security Council mandate, as MONUC transitioned into 
MONUSCO, the norm of SEA was again moved, this time placed under 
MONUSCO’s second priority task of ‘stabilisation and peace 
consolidation’.222 With this 2010 mandate, the Council simply stated that 
the SG was to take the ‘necessary measures to ensure full compliance’ of 
MONUSCO with the UN’s zero-tolerance policy on SEA and ‘to keep the 
Council informed if cases of such conduct occur’.223 Within this mandate, 
then, the reference to SEA by peacekeepers was relatively short, with no 
reference to the SG Bulletin. This could be viewed as somewhat of a 
disregard or waning of support for the norm of prohibition of SEA which 
was reflected in the fact that MONUSCO’s 2011 and 2012 mandates did not 
contain a single reference to SEA committed by UN peacekeepers.224 This 
seemingly diminished support for tackling SEA was again evidenced in the 
2013, 2014 and 2015 mandates which referred to SEA by peacekeepers 
but simply repeated the same sentence that had been contained within the 
2010 mandate – that the SG was to take the necessary measures to ensure 
compliance with the UN’s zero-tolerance policy and to keep the Council 
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informed of any allegations.225 The implementation of the norm of 
prohibition of SEA within the Congo during this period therefore 
demonstrates how peacekeeping’s norms and principles, as was seen in 
Chapter 3, ‘wax and wane’226 and are dependent on external pressures, 
events and practices. More specifically, it highlights how a lack of support 
for a norm results in its stagnation. From a TWAIL perspective, the seeming 
disinterest of the dominant actors (in particular the Global North P5 within 
the Security Council) to engage with and develop the norm, reflecting how 
peacekeeping is beholden to the agenda of the hegemonic powers. That is, 
as the prohibition of SEA is evidently not a priority for member states, given 
that it requires them to potentially address issues within their own state 
troops or within another TCN, then it is, consequently, not a focus within 
the peacekeeping agenda. Indeed, it is a task which is primarily offloaded 
to the Secretary-General, despite the fact that is an issue directly stemming 
from member states. In essence, then, the norm is highly politicised, with 
member states seemingly more concerned with losing the support of a TCN 
or souring relations between states than they are of addressing SEA 
amongst its peacekeepers. This is exemplified by the fact that within 
MONUSCO, the TCN with the most significant number of SEA allegations 
against it is South Africa227 – a key TCN who contribute a sizeable battalion 
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to the Force Intervention Brigade, which is also often commanded by South 
African military personnel.228 
This, in turn, again exemplifies the inherent power differentials embedded 
within the UN system in addition to the unequal balance of power between 
the external, dominant actor and the subordinate host state. This is 
evidenced, particularly during this period, with the Security Council 
mandates which routinely condemned sexual violence by the Congolese 
national armed forces and other armed groups, yet, again, remained silent 
on the issue of SEA by UN peacekeepers. Furthermore, SEA can be said to 
have become a tool to reinforce the North-South divide, with dominant 
Western states, such as the United States, using allegations of SEA against 
troop contribution countries to, amongst other things, ‘delegitimise their 
claims on relevant debates’.229 
4.2 SG’s Norm Entrepreneurship  
This low-point for the norm within the Congo significantly changed following 
the 2015 HIPPO report which, as noted in Chapter 3, expanded the norm 
of prohibition of SEA, renewing support for the UN’s zero-tolerance policy 
and reaffirming the primary responsibility of troop and police contributing 
countries to investigate allegations.230 The impact of the HIPPO report was 
then reflected in MONUSCO’s mandates as the Council explicitly referred to 
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the report and their own resolution.231 Supporting this revival of the norm, 
they again called upon the Secretary-General to ensure compliance of the 
zero-tolerance policy within MONUSCO but also requested troop and police 
contributing countries to ‘take preventative action’ including pre-
deployment awareness training.232 This was then reiterated in MONUSCO’s 
mandate in the following year, reflecting a broadening of the norm within 
the Congo, with this noticeable shift from simply reporting allegations to 
now undertaking pro-active, preventative steps in the form of pre-
deployment training. This could therefore be viewed as an expansion of the 
norm of prohibition of SEA and peacekeeping’s frameworks, simultaneously 
supporting the principle of non-intervention as it attempted to prevent 
violence by peacekeepers against civilians. 
The norm was then expanded further within the Congo following a strategic 
review of MONUSCO, which noted the need to enhance the authority of the 
SRSG to ensure accountability of MONUSCO staff.233 Alongside the pre-
established tasks of the SG and the TCC’s provision of pre-deployment 
training and investigating allegations, a performance management 
framework was also introduced.234 The Secretary-General was now 
mandated to conduct a comprehensive performance review of all MONUSCO 
units in accordance with the Operational Readiness Assurance and 
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Performance Improvement Policy and the zero-tolerance policy on SEA.235 
Again, this demonstrated how a renewed support for the norm within the 
broader UN Secretariat had filtered into the UN’s peacekeeping operation 
in the Congo. Thus, it reflects how the peacekeeping agenda is very much 
influenced and shaped by the dominant states, again highlighting the 
entrenched power differentials within the UN system and peacekeeping. 
Furthermore, this expansion of the SG and SRSGs tasks within this area, 
including the requirement of the SG to report to the Council every three 
months on the percentage of MONUSCO contingents who meet the 
performance standards, also highlights the important norm 
entrepreneurship role of the SG.236 Indeed, as previously noted, the norm 
of prohibition of SEA can therefore be said to be largely driven by the Office 
of the Secretary-General, which is reflected here in the implementation of 
the norm within the Congo. 
Through this broadened norm, in 2019 and 2020 similar reiterations of the 
SG and TCCs role in the implementation of the norm have been included 
within MONUSCO’s mandate, this time shifting the task from under the 
heading of ‘Gender, Sexual Violence and SEA’ to ‘Mission Effectiveness’.237 
However, despite these advancements, there still remain allegations of 
SEA. More recently, there has been a gradual increase in the number of 
SEA allegations reported in the SG’s three-month reports. Initially, between 
1 December 2019 and 29 February 2020, three allegations of SEA by two 
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military contingent members and one international staff member were 
received.238 This increased to five allegations of SEA by military, police and 
civilian staff were recorded between 1 May and 31 August 2020,239 with a 
further six allegations of SEA by peacekeepers within the military 
component of MONUSCO recorded from 1 November 2020 to 28 February 
2021.240 These were then referred to the relevant troop or police 
contributing countries (TCC) or the Office of Internal Oversight Services for 
investigation, with the victims referred to the UN Population Fund, UN 
Children’s Fund and other relevant partners for support.241 Whilst there 
may be numerous reasons for this gradual increase in allegations reported 
by the SG, including an improvement in the reporting mechanisms and 
performance reviews of peacekeepers, more broadly it, again, 
demonstrates the renewed support for the norm and a more concerted 
effort to tackle SEA, beginning with this continual monitoring and 
reviewing.  
These efforts to maintain the norm are also evidenced in the adaptations 
undertaken throughout the COVID-19 pandemic to ensure the tools and 
policies are still implemented. This therefore marks a further development 
or deepening of the norm, albeit one which seemingly does not alter the 
peacekeeping boundaries but simply reaffirms support for the norm. In 
particular, in order to ensure community outreach of the UN’s zero-
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tolerance policy on SEA, this was predominantly undertaken through radio 
broadcasts and text measures owing to the pandemic.242 Beyond this, 
projects under the trust fund which provide support to victims of SEA began 
in January 2021 in Bunia, Beni, Uvira, Kalemie, Bujovu and Sake which, 
again, are worthwhile projects but reactive rather than proactive and do 
not address the root cause or prevent SEA.243 As such, the development of 
the norm appears to be moving forward but a stuttering pace.  
4.3 Perverse Consequences of Interventions 
Despite these noticeable developments in the interpretation and application 
of the norm within the Congo, as noted, SEA by peacekeepers within 
MONUSCO remains problematic. Therefore, whilst MONUSCO has achieved 
many positive results, such as re-establishing a (precarious) peace 
throughout much of Congo,244 these interventions ‘have also produced a 
series of detrimental outcomes’, such as an increase in human rights 
violations.245 These incidences of sexual exploitation and abuse could be 
viewed, then, as another of ‘the perverse consequences of well-meaning 
international efforts.’246 That is, although committed by a very small portion 
of peacekeepers, these actors exploit their positions of privileged power 
and subsequently tarnish the whole of the mission, undermining any 
positive contributions which the operation may have made. This then 
underscores concerns raised in Chapter 3 about the suitability of sending 
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soldiers, who are trained to fight, to keep peace, particularly when this is 
combined with differing cultural attitudes and rules on sexual conduct.247  
As former Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon noted, even ‘a single 
substantiated case’ of SEA involving UN peacekeepers is ‘one case too 
many’.248 Indeed, senior personnel within the UN Secretariat have noted, 
the UN ‘can definitely do more’, particularly the Secretary-General, but, 
again, as previously noted, a fear of the severe backlash from member 
states, limits the SG from speaking out more.249 This is evident in the Congo 
with the significant number of allegations of SEA against troops from South 
Africa.250 Thus, despite South Africa having the highest record of SEA-
related cases of all TCCs, with 45% of all SEA cases in MONUSCO from 
2008-2013 having been committed by South African troops, it has 
remained a key contributor of troops.251 Similarly, in 2018, eleven of the 
twenty-two allegations of SEA were committed by South African troops 
(with some allegations involving more than one incident and upto three 
troops), yet there was only one repatriation, with South Africa, again, 
continuing to contribute troops and playing a pivotal role within the FIB.252 
This therefore highlights how despite the tools and policies which have been 
developed, including the deployment of more female peacekeepers,253 
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there is a permanent obstacle in the way of the norm of prohibition of SEA 
- the reliance of the UN on TCCs to prosecute their personnel and provide 
adequate gender awareness training pre-deployment.254 The UN is 
therefore beholden to member states and, as such, as has been 
demonstrated within the Congo, this has limited the development of the 
norm of prohibition of SEA, consequently restricting peacekeeping’s 
normative framework which, in turn, has the effect of undermining the 
principle of non-intervention because it does little to prevent these acts 
against civilians being committed. 
5 Regaining Peacekeeping’s Normative Boundaries 
Whilst Chapter 4 demonstrated how the fundamental principles of 
peacekeeping have been interpreted and applied within the UN’s 
peacekeeping operations in the DRC, this Chapter has explored 
peacekeeping’s norms of democracy promotion, protection of civilians and 
the prohibition of sexual exploitation and abuse. Adopting the same 
approach as the previous Chapter, this section has sought to examine how 
an interpretation and application of these norms has either expanded or 
contracted peacekeeping’s normative framework. Thus, once again 
demonstrating the fluidity of these frameworks and the red boundary line 
that surrounds peacekeeping, which, consequently may reinforce or 
undermine the principle of non-intervention, depending on how broadly the 
norms are interpreted. Throughout this exploration, a TWAIL lens has also 
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continued to be applied, with the Chapter noting, in particular, how the 
norms of peacekeeping may contribute to the maintenance of the power 
differentials (which had been explored in Chapters 2 and 3) and how these 
norms appear to be frequently driven or based upon the dominant states 
interests and agendas. 
This Chapter has found that, firstly, like peacekeeping’s legal principles, the 
norms cohabit in a competitive arena in which they are re-balanced for 
each operation and, even, each mandate.255 In particular, it has highlighted 
how these norms have waxed and waned, typically in-keeping with 
international trends, but, often, in response to changes within the Congo, 
thereby reinforcing the notion that the DRC has frequently been used as a 
test bed for UN peacekeeping. That is, MONUSCO is considered to be an 
innovative operation which has been ‘quite proactive in initiating changes 
from within the mission, rather than waiting for the Council or waiting for 
headquarters to tell them’.256 Put simply, at times, it is the Congo which 
has shaped UN peacekeeping, rather than peacekeeping shaping the 
Congo. 
Secondly, the Chapter has highlighted that whilst the norms form a part of 
peacekeeping’s broader normative framework, which surrounds 
peacekeeping’s core legal framework, there are, at times, a degree of 
overlap.257 For example, whilst the concept of democracy promotion could 
perhaps only be considered as a norm, failing to amount to a legal principle, 
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PoC and the prohibition of SEA have clearer legal underpinnings in areas 
such as international humanitarian and human rights law, thus providing a 
subsidiary contribution to peacekeeping’s legal framework. Similarly, where 
a broader interpretation and application of these norms has been taken in 
the Congo, this has had a knock-on effect on the legal principles with, for 
example, democracy promotion and PoC invoking questions over 
impartiality and an increased level of force, thereby expanding the 
principles of impartiality and non-use of force. 
This then leads to the third matter which this Chapter has noted- the impact 
of these frameworks on the principle of non-intervention. It has been 
argued that the broader understanding of democracy promotion and PoC, 
which has been implemented in the DRC, has led to an expansion of 
peacekeeping’s normative frameworks that has consequently undermined 
or, at times contravened, the principle of non-intervention. Indeed, it is 
argued that, at times, this broadened application of these norms has 
resulted in the peacekeeping operation undertaking coercive action 
designed to influence change in the host state and, therefore, intervention 
– such as MONUC’s involvement in the Congo’s National Dialogue or 
MONUSCO’s substitution for the state in the protection of civilians. 
Conversely, it has been found that of the three norms, the prohibition of 
SEA is the only norm to have not been rapidly developed and broadly 
interpreted, thereby only providing a limited contribution to the normative 
framework. However, as seen in Chapter 3, it has been argued that, unlike 
its democracy and PoC counterparts, a narrow application of the norm, 
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seemingly based predominantly on member states reluctance to support 
the norm, effectively permits SEA and thereby undermines, rather than 
supports, the principle of non-intervention. Therefore, in essence, the only 
norm to support the principle of non-intervention is the one that is least 
developed. 
Finally, the Chapter has argued that the significant expansion of 
peacekeeping’s normative framework in the Congo, through the norms of 
democracy promotion and PoC, in particular, has pushed peacekeeping to 
its very limits. As such, the Chapter has advocated for the need to re-draw 
the normative (and indeed legal) boundaries of peacekeeping (by 
narrowing the interpretation and application of these principles) in the hope 
of retracting peacekeeping’s interventionist potential and reinforcing the 
principle of non-intervention. A shrinking of these legal and normative 
frameworks, would, perhaps, then mean a retreat from the large, multi-
dimensional operations, with their ambiguous Christmas tree mandates, to 
a more traditional model of peacekeeping. This, in turn, would go some 
way in helping to clarify the legal issues which this thesis has explored 
(including peacekeeping’s charter basis) and more appropriately match the 
mandates to peacekeeping capabilities. As this Chapter has suggested, this 
may therefore require a review of Security Council mandating and a 
consideration of adapting a more people-centred, as opposed to state-
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1. Introduction  
This thesis has highlighted, through an exploration of peacekeeping’s 
frameworks in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the interventionist 
nature of peacekeeping and the potential for peacekeeping to cross the thin 
red boundary line between peacekeeping and intervention, thereby 
becoming a form of intervention. That is, both peacekeeping and 
intervention are ill-defined with no pre-determined or explicit frameworks 
creating set boundaries around the concepts. As such, both concepts are 
fluid, open to being reinterpreted and contorted, particularly by dominant 
powers, in order to justify interventions or meet the needs and agendas of 
these dominant actors. Throughout an exploration of these issues, the 
thesis has also uniquely adopted a TWAIL perspective, seeking to offer, not 
a totalising destructive critique of intervention and UN peacekeeping, but, 
rather, a constructive critique, highlighting instances were colonial patterns 
and dichotomies of domination and subordination and the North-South 
divide are replicated within intervention and peacekeeping practices. It has 
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therefore provided an alternative to the prevailing Western narratives in 
order to contribute to the reimagining and reinvigoration of UN 
peacekeeping. 
The thesis has explored all of these issues in somewhat of a pyramid 
structure. Beginning with the top of this pyramid, Chapter 2 explored the 
development of the principle of non-intervention before Chapter 3 moved 
on to explore the second layer - the most prevalent form of intervention 
today, UN peacekeeping. The third Chapter also exposed the legal and 
normative frameworks surrounding peacekeeping and how those laws and 
norms potentially interacted with the principle of non-intervention. The final 
layer of the pyramid then examined peacekeeping in practice, with Chapters 
4 and 5 exploring how the legal and normative frameworks are interpreted 
and applied within the UN’s peacekeeping operations in the DRC. The thesis 
therefore provides a deep analysis of intervention and peacekeeping in 
order to determine the relationship between the two and to question 
whether peacekeeping is, at times, intervention. 
2. Intervention as Peacekeeping  
To begin with, Chapter 2 traced the development of the principle of non-
intervention, with intervention defined as any action taken by a state, state 
actor or international organisation such as the UN, which may be deemed 
coercive, in order to force change within the host state.1 The Chapter then 
highlighted how the concept and practice of intervention has been 
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somewhat cyclical. That is, there has been a constant fluctuation in 
intervention and non-intervention rhetoric with, often, a disparity between 
rhetoric and practice. In other words, whilst the principle of non-
intervention may have been emphatically supported, in practice, 
interventions have continually occurred, as was seen, for example, with the 
Cold War proxy wars. These cycles of interventionist practice have therefore 
had the impact of either supporting or undermining the principle of non-
intervention. Unpicking all of this, the Chapter began by examining the 
historical development or roots of non-intervention, including the Peace of 
Westphalia and colonialism, it then went on to examine key tipping points 
such as the formulation of the United Nations and then, most crucially, the 
decolonisation period.2 It is this latter period that this thesis has argued was 
a crucial moment for the formulation of the principle of non-intervention as 
it transformed from a principle which exclusively benefited the European 
hegemonic powers, to one that now applied to the newly independent Global 
South states. The principle therefore transformed from a European or 
Western principle to a universal one and was ‘professed equally 
emphatically in the East, West and Third World’.3 Having clarified the 
composition of the principle of non-intervention, which had been 
significantly developed within the UN system, particularly with General 
Assembly Resolutions and Declarations, the Chapter then went on to 
explore the nuances within the principle.4 It examined how, through the 
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International Court of Justice (ICJ) and regional organisations, a greater 
understanding of the principle in practice began to develop, with the ICJ, in 
particular, condemning intervention in the Global South and, for the first 
time, addressing intervention by the Global South within the Global South.5  
From this, the Chapter continued to explore how the firmly established 
principle of non-intervention developed throughout the post-Cold War era 
and into the twenty-first century. It noted how intervention began to 
diversify, with the end of the Cold War sparking a shift in attitude towards 
intervention, which arguably undermined the principle of non-intervention, 
as there was greater support for intervention. The increased optimism 
about the potential for the UN during this period, combined with the 
perceived failures of the international community, such as the Rwandan 
genocide and Srebrenica massacre, resulted in a move from unilateral to 
multilateral intervention.6 There was therefore a revival of UN 
peacekeeping, through the justification of collective security intervention, 
and a return to humanitarian-based interventions, with the introduction of 
the concept of the responsibility to protect (R2P).7 During this period, 
Chapter 2 argued that the principle of non-intervention was both challenged 
by these increasing justifications for intervention and simultaneously 
further developed as the principle began to grapple with regional 
interventions, with ICJ decisions, again, providing some clarity on how 
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these related to the principle.8 This diversification in the forms of 
intervention therefore contributed to a more nuanced understanding of the 
principle of non-intervention and its application in the ever-changing 
modern era. This was then further developed in the post-9/11 era which, 
Chapter 2 argued could, again, be viewed as a tipping point for the principle, 
as intervention shifted from a military to security approach. Threats to 
international peace and security now included, not just armed conflict but 
civil violence, organised crime, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, 
poverty, infectious disease and ‘environmental degradation’, permitting 
states to ‘take advantage of any relevant security system’ in order to 
counter these issues.9 This shift was, in turn, reflected in UN peacekeeping 
with a move to robust, multi-dimensional, ‘stabilisation’ operations pushed 
peacekeeping into the realm of intervention. The Chapter then began to 
question whether UN peacekeeping, as the most prevalent form of 
intervention today, could be considered to be, at times, a form of coercive 
action designed to influence change in the host state and, therefore, 
intervention. 
Whilst exploring this development of the principle of non-intervention, 
Chapter 2 also applied a TWAIL lens which highlighted numerous issues, 
such as: the unequal global order, lack of a Third World or Global South 
voice within both international law and the international system, and the 
use of international law to maintain hierarchies, including colonial legacies 
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and patterns of domination and subordination. Indeed, the Chapter argued 
that the formulation of the principle of non-intervention during the 
decolonisation period was largely driven by the newly independent Global 
South states and could therefore be viewed, from a TWAIL perspective, as 
a prime example of the Global South challenging both the dominance of the 
Global North and the international law and institutions which maintained 
this hierarchical system.10 Furthermore, Chapter 2 also argued that the 
structure of the UN, particularly the veto-wielding Security Council, 
legitimised Western global hegemony through the ‘cloak of universality’11 
and exploited the unclear Charter basis of peacekeeping, meaning the 
Council can move from non-interventionist Chapter VI peacekeeping 
operations to interventionist Chapter VII operations. That is, regardless of 
the influx of Global South states into the UN General Assembly, the 
inherently biased Security Council enshrines the power of the hegemonic 
permanent five (p5) states, perpetually maintaining the North-South divide 
and dichotomies of domination and subordination, whilst espousing 
principles of universality and equality. Chapter 2 then highlighted how this 
filters down into the UN system and into its activities, such as peacekeeping, 
with this argument explored further in Chapter 3.  
Alongside this, following Anghie’s discussion on the influence of colonialism 
in shaping international law,12 Chapter 2 argued that the principle of non-
intervention had also been animated by colonialism, providing examples of 
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this colonial influence, such as when the principle had ostensibly applied to 
the Global South but had been used by the Global North to legitimise 
extensive intervention – as occurred in the Congo in 1960 with the 
deployment of ONUC and throughout the 1990s with the humanitarian-
based interventions. The Chapter further argued that remnants of 
colonialism or colonial practices could be found within intervention today, 
particularly, within UN peacekeeping. It was argued that comparisons may 
be drawn between the two forms of intervention, not least given that both 
were (or are) the most illustrious forms of intervention in their era – 
colonialism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and peacekeeping in 
the twenty-first century. Chapter 2 also argued that both peacekeeping and 
colonialism invoked, for example, elements of domination and 
subordination and were largely motivated or shaped by the interests and 
will of the hegemonic powers.13  
3. Peacekeeping as Intervention  
Flowing on from this comparison, Chapter 3 explored the second layer of 
the pyramid – UN peacekeeping – finding that, despite the lack of an explicit 
framework, there do exist principles and norms which, together, form a 
complex peacekeeping framework. The Chapter argued that peacekeeping 
possesses both legal and normative frameworks which establish an invisible 
red boundary line around peacekeeping that divides peacekeeping from 
intervention. The Chapter found that, along with the broad framework of 
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the UN Charter, the fundamental principles of consent, impartiality and non-
use of force constituted peacekeeping’s legal framework, whilst the newer, 
more controversial norms of democracy promotion, protection of civilians 
(PoC) and the prohibition of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) constituted 
peacekeeping’s normative framework. It was argued that the legal 
framework sits at peacekeeping’s core and is surrounded by the much 
broader normative framework. However, Chapter 3 highlighted how these 
frameworks do not exist in total isolation but, rather, overlap at certain 
points. In particular, it noted how the norms of PoC and prohibition of SEA 
contain legal underpinnings, thereby potentially invoking elements of 
international humanitarian, criminal and human rights law and 
consequently making a secondary contribution to peacekeeping’s legal 
framework.14 It was further argued that these principles and norms do not 
exist harmoniously and instead ‘exist in a competitive arena’ with the 
normative composition of a peacekeeping operation being ‘re-balanced each 
time’.15 Therefore, if, for example, one principle is interpreted broadly, this 
may have an impact on another principle or norm, thereby altering 
peacekeeping’s overall framework. These frameworks could therefore be 
viewed as a fluid, red elastic band, constantly expanding and contracting, 
as the principles and norms within them are routinely reinterpreted and 
contorted within each peacekeeping operation and, even, each 
peacekeeping mandate. 
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When exploring each of these principles and norms in turn, assessing their 
evolution and their contribution to peacekeeping’s frameworks, the Chapter 
adopted the lens of the Secretary-General. That is, the Chapter found that 
the Secretary-General (SG), as head of the Secretariat and, therefore, head 
of peacekeeping, was a ‘norm entrepreneur’ who had the ability to create, 
institutionalise and interpret norms, thereby possessing the ability to 
significantly shape peacekeeping.16 Focusing on the role of the SG thus 
offered a deeper analysis of peacekeeping and its relationship with non-
intervention and highlighted how the SG’s embeddedness allowed them to 
influence the trajectory of peacekeeping and promote norms, as was seen 
with Kofi Annan’s promotion of the norm of PoC. It also highlighted how the 
SG is embodied within the field by the Special Representative to the 
Secretary-General (SRSG) who leads the peacekeeping operation and has 
significant control over how the operation’s mandate is interpreted and 
applied. Thus, determining the interpretation and application of 
peacekeeping’s principles and norms within their operation. For example, it 
was found that within the UN’s operations in the DRC, there has been a 
marked difference in the operation when the SRSG has had a more robust 
or forceful agenda, compared to when the SRSG has focused on creating a 
political dialogue. Therefore, in essence, the SRSG can be said to determine 
the interventionist nature of the operation, simultaneously dictating the 
composition of the peacekeeping frameworks for that mandate. Again, this 
                                   
16 I Johnstone, ‘The Secretary-General as Norm Entrepreneur’ in S Chesterman, Secretary or General? The UN 
Secretary-General in World Politics (CUP 2007). See also: Chapter 3, Section 2. 
 10 
highlights the fluidity of peacekeeping’s frameworks and how the norms and 
principles of peacekeeping are continually re-imagined for each operation.   
Chapter 3 therefore highlighted how the six principles and norms are 
continually contorted, re-interpreted and re-shaped which results in 
peacekeeping’s frameworks being continually contracted and expanded. 
That is, the Chapter explored each principle or norm in turn and found that 
whether in isolation or taken together, if the principles are interpreted 
narrowly, then this constricts peacekeeping’s frameworks, thereby firming 
the boundary between peacekeeping and intervention and consequently 
reinforcing the principle of non-intervention. However, with the exception 
of the prohibition of SEA, when the principles and norms are interpreted 
broadly (as is frequently the case with contemporary, multi-dimensional 
stabilisation operations) then this expands peacekeeping’s frameworks, 
blurring the line between peacekeeping and intervention and therefore 
undermining the principle of non-intervention or, at times, potentially 
contravening it. It also found that these evolutions within peacekeeping 
were often in-line with the interventionist trends which Chapter 2 explored. 
That is, where the principle of non-intervention was emphatically supported, 
such as during decolonisation, peacekeeping operations followed the 
traditional model of peacekeeping, with the principle’s narrowly interpreted 
and peacekeeping deemed to be non-interventionist in nature. Conversely, 
when there has been support for intervention, such as in the post-Cold War 
era with the calls for humanitarian-based interventions and 
democratisation, peacekeeping’s boundaries have been expanded, leading 
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to the introduction of, for example, robust peacekeeping and multi-
dimensional operations. Therefore, any changes to peacekeeping’s 
boundary line, by extension, results in changes to the boundaries of the 
principle of non-intervention. In particular, the Chapter found that the 
evolution of peacekeeping was often in-line with the interventionist trends 
which had been outlined in Chapter 2. As such, when there has been strong 
non-interventionist rhetoric, peacekeeping’s boundaries have been 
narrowly interpreted; conversely, when there has been support for 
intervention, peacekeeping’s boundaries have been expanded, leading to 
the introduction of, for example, robust peacekeeping and multi-
dimensional operations. 
The only exception to this pattern is the norm of prohibition of SEA, as the 
Chapter found that a broader interpretation and greater application of this 
norm would reinforce the principle of non-intervention as it places a 
restriction on peacekeeper’s behaviour with the aim of preventing them 
from committing a violent form of intervention. Thus, unlike the other two 
norms of peacekeeping – democracy promotion and PoC - Chapter 3 found 
that the prohibition of SEA was not, in itself, interventionist but was instead 
designed to prevent intervention. However, it found that this norm, unlike 
its counterparts, had not evolved as rapidly nor had it received the same 
level of support from member states, arguably due to the fact that it places 
restrictions upon the dominant, intervening actors and condemns their 
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misconduct.17 Thus, from a TWAIL perspective, highlighting how the 
moulding or reimagining of peacekeeping’s frameworks are shaped by the 
dominant powers to meet their interests. 
Indeed, a TWAIL lens was, again, applied throughout this Chapter and 
highlighted how the same dynamics and patterns of domination and 
subordination which were found within the principle of non-intervention 
could also be found within UN peacekeeping. In particular, an application of 
the TWAIL lens demonstrated how the principles and norms are 
predominantly based upon Western values and standards and their 
interpretation and application is often based upon the hegemonic powers 
interests and agendas – as was seen with the norm of democracy promotion 
and PoC.18 It also highlighted examples of where Anghie’s dynamic of 
difference is recreated within peacekeeping and noted how this dynamic 
may, at times, be shaped by the Secretary-General, given their pivotal 
norm entrepreneur role. Furthermore, throughout the Chapter it was noted 
how peacekeeping’s frameworks and their application, can reinforce or 
recreate the North-South divide, thereby maintaining the colonial 
dichotomies of domination and subordination, particularly where 
peacekeeping is taken closer to the intervention line and could be viewed 
as coercive action designed to influence change in the host state – such as 
through the use of force or PoC.  
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4. The DRC – Peacekeeping’s Laboratory 
Chapter 3 therefore set out peacekeeping’s legal and normative 
frameworks, demonstrating their fluidity and ability to constantly expand or 
contract, depending on how the principles and norms are interpreted and 
applied. Chapter 4 then took the legal framework – the principles of 
consent, impartiality and non-use of force- and examined how each 
principle had been interpreted and applied within the UN’s peacekeeping 
operations in the Congo. The Chapter found that, firstly, as was argued in 
Chapter 3, the principles and norms do not exist harmoniously but, instead, 
overlap and are continually re-interpreted, re-applied and re-balanced 
through each mandate renewal and, even, in reaction to changes in the 
field, such as an increased in armed group violence. The Chapter found that 
when one of the principles is expanded, such as when MONUSCO has 
embarked upon joint operations with the Congolese armed forces, then this 
broader interpretation of impartiality has simultaneously expanded the 
principle of limited use of force, which has also impacted the principle of 
consent where relations during these operations breakdown.19 This, in turn, 
leads to the second notable finding – that is, when these principles have 
been broadly interpreted, they have expanded peacekeeping’s legal 
frameworks, stretching the invisible red boundary line around 
peacekeeping, taking it much closer to the realm of intervention, and 
thereby undermining the principle of non-intervention. Indeed, the Chapter 
argued that, at times, ONUC, MONUC and MONUSCO have all crossed this 
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boundary line, potentially violating the principle of non-intervention, as they 
have undertaken coercive action designed to influence change in the host 
state and, thus, intervention. The Chapter argued that ONUC’s involvement 
in the Katangan secession, MONUC’s shift to a stabilisation operation, joint 
operations conducted by both MONUC and MONUSCO and the 
implementation of the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) could 
all be cited as examples of this coercive action, rendering the peacekeeping 
operations a form of intervention. In particular, the Chapter explored the 
conducting of joint operations between MONUSCO and the Congolese armed 
forces (FARDC), arguing that these operations are difficult to reconcile with 
peacekeeping’s ‘holy trinity’ of legal principles and could, perhaps, be best 
viewed as a form of intervention by invitation.20 
Throughout this exploration of the three legal principles in the Congo, 
Chapter 4 also highlighted the key role which the Secretary-General and 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) play in shaping the 
peacekeeping operation, thereby reinforcing the argument put forward in 
Chapter 3 - that the SG is a norm entrepreneur within peacekeeping. In 
particular, it noted how the trajectory of MONUSCO within the DRC is 
noticeably shaped by the SRSG, depending on their expertise or 
interpretation of the Security Council mandates. For example, when the 
SRSG adopted a more forceful and robust interpretation of the mandates, 
the Force Intervention Brigade was deployed, marking a significantly robust 
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period in MONUSCO’s history. Furthermore, the continued application of a 
TWAIL lens throughout the Chapter, again highlighted the continual 
patterns of domination and subordination, along with the dominance and 
furtherance of Western-centric ideals and standards. It argued that this was 
particularly the case were the peacekeeping operation could be deemed to 
be undertaking coercive action – such as the pressure exerted on states to 
provide consent to a mandate renewal or the imposition of conditions or 
standards (through the HRDDP) which must be met before joint operations 
are conducted.21  
Continuing this analysis of peacekeeping’s frameworks in the DRC, Chapter 
5 explored peacekeeping’s normative framework, unpicking the three 
norms of democracy promotion, protection of civilians (PoC) and the 
prohibition of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA). Again, as with the legal 
frameworks, it found that these norms do not exist harmoniously, with a 
degree of overlap between these norms and the legal principles, particularly 
when, for example, an application of democracy promotion or PoC invokes 
the use of force.22 The Chapter also found that, as highlighted in Chapter 
3, these norms, although not amounting to legal principles, may at times 
contribute to peacekeeping’s legal frameworks where they may trigger 
broader elements of international law. As with the legal principles, it also 
found that were the norms of democracy promotion and PoC are expanded 
and interpreted more broadly, this results in an expansion of 
                                   
21 Chapter 4, Section 3.2. 
22 Chapter 5, Section 3. 
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peacekeeping’s frameworks, thereby stretching the red elastic boundary 
line surrounding peacekeeping. Chapter 5 therefore once again 
demonstrated the fluidity of peacekeeping’s frameworks and its boundaries 
which has, consequently, resulted in a constantly fluctuating support or 
undermining of the principle of non-intervention.     
In particular, the Chapter found that a broader application of the norms of 
democracy promotion and PoC within the Congo had, again, resulted in 
ONUC, MONUC and MONUSCO, at times, undertaking coercive action to 
influence change in the host state and, therefore, intervention. For 
example, the Chapter argued that MONUC’s involvement in the Congo’s 
National Dialogue, established by the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, and 
MONUSCO’s substitution for the state in protection of civilian tasks 
amounted to coercive action and thereby intervention.23 Chapter 5 also 
found that the outlier to this pattern of continually broadening norms, was 
the norm of prohibition of SEA. It found that although there has been a 
troubling level of SEA committed by peacekeepers within MONUSCO, there 
has not been the same level of commitment to the expansion of the norm 
of prohibition of SEA as there has been with the norms of democracy 
promotion and PoC.24 It has been argued that this has, in part, been due to 
a reluctance of member states to engage in the matter, highlighting how 
the UN is, again, beholden to its member states, particularly the hegemonic 
powers. Indeed, as with the previous Chapters, a TWAIL lens was again 
                                   
23 Chapter 5, Section 2.2 and Section 3. 
24 Chapter 5, Section 4.3. 
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applied throughout Chapter 5, highlighting how the patterns of domination 
and subordination and the furtherance of Western interests had been 
recreated in, for example, the pursuance of democratisation in the Congo, 
despite it clearly failing to take hold and, instead, is used to disguise 
authoritarian regimes and patronage systems of governance.25 Similarly, 
the Chapter noted how the expansion of MONUSCO’s PoC tools and policies 
created a reliance on the peacekeeping operation, often resulting in 
MONUSCO undertaking the role of the state.26 As such, Chapter 5 argued 
that the broadening of the norms of democracy promotion and PoC within 
the Congo had been taken too far. It suggested that these norms had 
expanded peacekeeping’s normative framework to its very limits, requiring 
a re-drawing of the normative boundaries of peacekeeping, through a 
retraction or constriction of the broad interpretations of these two norms. 
In order to achieve this, it was noted that this may require a change in the 
approach taken by the Security Council to mandating peacekeeping 
operations, including a move back towards the more traditional concept of 
peacekeeping and, perhaps, a shift to a people-centred, rather than state-
centric, approach to peacekeeping.  
5. Conclusion 
The thesis has therefore unpicked the relationship between peacekeeping 
and intervention, demonstrating how, at times, an expansion of 
peacekeeping’s legal and normative frameworks results in the undermining 
                                   
25 Chapter 5, Section 2.4.  
26 Chapter 5, Section 3.4. 
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or potential violation of the principle of non-intervention. The thesis has 
therefore imagined these frameworks as forming an invisible red, elastic 
boundary line around peacekeeping which constantly expands and contracts 
with each re-interpretation or re-imagining of peacekeeping’s principles and 
norms. Through an exploration of peacekeeping in the DRC, it has been 
argued that in recent times the continual expansion of these principles and 
norms has resulted in the red boundary line being stretched to its very limits 
and, even, beyond. Therefore, in answer to the question posed at the very 
beginning of this thesis – peacekeeping is, at times, intervention.  
Whilst it could be argued that those operations which are mandated by the 
Security Council under Chapter VII cannot amount to intervention, due to 
the exception embedded within Article 2(7),27 this thesis has argued that 
these operations should be considered to be peace enforcement or 
intervention, not peacekeeping. That is, these operations stretch the 
traditional understanding of peacekeeping, blurring the lines with peace 
enforcement, and expanding peacekeeping far beyond its intended purpose. 
Indeed, the move to robust peacekeeping, Cruz report28 and Action for 
Peacekeeping initiative29 all appear to promote a more aggressive form of 
peacekeeping which this thesis has shown has resulted in an increase in 
intervention. The contemporary multi-dimensional operations and their 
                                   
27 See: Chapter 3, Section 1 and Section 3.1. 
28 CA Dos Santos Cruz, WR Phillips and S Cusimano, ‘Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers: We 
need to change the way we are doing business’ (“Santos Cruz Report”) (19 December 2017) 
<https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/improving_security_of_united_nations_peacekeepers_report.p
df> Accessed 10 May 2021. 
29 UN Peacekeeping, ‘A4P+ Priorities for 2021-2023’ 
<https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/a4p_background_paper.pdf> Accessed 10 May 2021. 
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extensive Christmas tree mandates permit broader interpretations of 
peacekeeping’s principles and norms in an attempt to fulfil the mandated 
tasks. This results in an expansion of peacekeeping’s frameworks and an 
increase in peacekeeping’s interventionist potential, along with unrealistic 
expectations of an operation that has neither the resources nor capabilities 
to fulfil such mandates. Moreover, this thesis’ unique application of a TWAIL 
lens has demonstrated how this move towards increased intervention is not 
just legally and practically problematic but is also a return to neo-colonial 
times. That is, it reinforces patterns of domination and subordination, 
creating a concept of peacekeeping which is made in the image of the 
hegemonic Security Council, thus contradicting the intent and purpose of 
the United Nations to be a universal, global organisation.30   
It could therefore be argued that peacekeeping has evolved too far. The 
grandiose forms of intervention, through multi-dimensional stabilisation 
operations, appear to be reaching a natural end. Whilst these operations 
were an innovative response to the conflict of its day, it is questionable 
whether they remain an appropriate model of peacekeeping in the current 
climate. As such, there is arguably a need for a narrowing of these 
peacekeeping frameworks and a move away from multi-dimensional 
operations back to a more traditional model of peacekeeping, which would 
be consistent with peacekeeping’s cyclical nature. Now, in 2020/2021, as 
there has been a gradual decline of multi-dimensional operations over the 
                                   
30 See Chapter 1, Charter of the United Nations (24 October 1945). 
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last five years as a result of budget pressures, a divided Security Council, 
contested track records and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic,31 the 
time is arguably ripe for this re-imagining of peacekeeping.  
In order to achieve this, there needs to be a fundamental 
reconceptualisation of peacekeeping operations, with a review of what and 
who contributes to peace. More specifically, two key factors could help to 
effect this change – one stemming from the Security Council and another 
coming from the overall approach to peacekeeping. Firstly, there needs to 
be a revision of Security Council mandates, including a re-structuring of the 
mandate which would assist in debates over peacekeeping’s Charter basis 
and the blurring of peacekeeping and peace enforcement. That is, the 
Council should reconsider the catch-all phrase of ‘Acting under Chapter VII’ 
which is placed into the introductory section or chapeau of some resolutions, 
including that of MONUSCO.32 Instead, the invocation of Chapter VII should 
only occur within specific paragraphs, clarifying which tasks, such as PoC, 
are mandated under this provision. This could then provide some clarity 
over peacekeeping’s legal basis and assist peacekeeper’s in the 
implementation of the mandate, whilst simultaneously firming the 
boundaries between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. As such, it 
would go some way towards remedying the interventionist shift within 
peacekeeping, which this thesis has highlighted.  
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In a similar vein, the Council should also consider a revision of its Christmas 
tree mandates, reducing the list of mandated tasks which it sets for a 
peacekeeping operation and creating more realistic, stream-lined 
mandates. This could also include ‘designer mandates’ which are specifically 
focused on the particularities of the situation in which the operation is to be 
deployed.33 Again, this would assist in clarifying some of the legal and 
practical issues which this thesis has explored. Indeed, if interviewees of 
this research have noted that ‘constraints of the Security Council mandate’ 
was ‘the major framework for us to make decisions’, as opposed to general 
international law, then it follows that the key to retracting peacekeeping’s 
frameworks is through a shrinking or re-imagining of the mandate.34 
Secondly, as this thesis has suggested at various points, the UN could also 
re-consider its state-centric, outsider-led, top-down approach to 
peacekeeping, moving, instead, to one which is people-centred, bottom-up 
and insider-led, focused on including the input of actors on the ground. Put 
simply, peacekeeping should be a concept for ‘we the people’ rather than a 
concept for member states, which reflects the broader, fundamental 
purposes of the UN that is also invoked for other UN initiatives, including 
the Sustainable Development Goals.35 This shift in approach may then 
create more sustainable solutions to conflict and violence, particularly in 
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complex settings such as the DRC. It would also challenge the lingering 
colonial dichotomies and patterns of domination and subordination, within 
intervention and peacekeeping, which a TWAIL lens has demonstrated still 
exist within the two concepts. Therefore, a re-imagining of peacekeeping, 
through a move to a more people-centred approach, could challenge these 
power dynamics and give a greater voice to peoples of the Global North in 
the hope of finally establishing sustainable peace and security within 
countries such as the Congo. 
These are not easy problems to answer but just because they are difficult 
does not mean that they cannot be, at the very least, attempted. Indeed, 
as Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld famously stated, the United 
Nations ‘was not created in order to bring us to heaven, but in order to save 
us from hell’.36 Peacekeeping should therefore not be expected to fulfil 
unrealistic lists of tasks set by a body of hegemonic powers but, rather, to 
support host states and its peoples in developing sustainable peace and 
security. Thus, peacekeeping should retreat back towards a more traditional 
model, re-considering its raison d’être and how it could more appropriately 
fit with the modern era. However, such an endeavour would perhaps require 
the norm entrepreneurship of a unique Secretary-General, like Dag 
Hammarskjöld, which is a mantle that few may be able to undertake.
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